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
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DISCIPLE-LOGIA.

By *Disciple-Logia* I mean words spoken by our Lord to persons offering or invited to become disciples, or whom He wished to instruct as to the conditions of discipleship.

The sayings of this sort recorded in the Gospels are usually dealt with separately, interpreters endeavouring to ascertain their meaning with little use of the comparative method. The main exception to this rule is supplied by the triplet of sayings addressed to the three aspirants of whom we read in Luke ix. 57-62, where one can hardly help comparing the three cases one with another, and studying the words of Jesus with a view to bringing out their appositiveness to the respective cases as discriminated.

It is, however, intrinsically probable that there is something to be learnt from gathering this class of sayings into a group, and making them the subject of careful study with the purpose of discovering their common characteristics. There is every chance that thoughts will suggest themselves to one pursuing this method, which are not likely to strike us when we take the sayings one by one. It is even possible that a synoptic study may remove difficulties not easily surmountable by isolated consideration, and put into our hands a key to the meaning of sayings in the interpretation of which we have never been able to attain complete satisfaction, or lend credibility to words which, viewed apart, appear of doubtful authenticity.

The following list of relative *logia* is sufficiently full

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I

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for our purpose, if not exhaustive. As the sayings are familiar to all we give only brief catchwords :

1. Fishers of men.
2. Foxes have holes.
3. Let dead bury dead.
4. Putting hand to the plough look not back.
5. Take up the cross.
6. Hate father and mother.
7. Sell all that thou hast.

Most of these sayings, looked at singly, appear at first simply repellent, mercilessly severe, expressive of an unsocial, unsympathetic, morose mood, as if the speaker did not want disciples, had no faith in the possibility of getting reliable followers, and used harsh phrases to express that scepticism and waive would-be disciples away. Consider, *e.g.*, that awful word about taking up the cross. What a terrific picture it would suggest to men familiar, through Roman custom, with the mode of execution pointed at—crucifixion, the most ignominious and the most cruel mode of putting criminals to death! Jesus and His disciples, a band of malefactors (as the world judged), marching to their doom in that horrible form, stooping under the weight of the cross which they carried, man by man, on their shoulders! What chance of getting men to become disciples after suggesting a picture like that? Did the person who so spoke really want disciples? Or rather, did Jesus ever really utter such dreadful words? Or, again, consider the *logion*, “The foxes have holes.” Taken in its surface sense as pointing to an itinerant life with no fixed abode, what appositeness has it to the case of the *scribe* to whom, according to Matthew, the word was addressed? What purpose does it serve beyond indicating a dry manner and an unwelcoming mood, as if to say, I do not want *you*. There is terror in the word

about the cross; there is no great terror here for a scribe or for anybody else, but there is, so it seems, a new way of accomplishing the object served by the terror, that of keeping men at a distance and escaping intimate relations.

Looking at the group collectively, the impression of severity made by the *logion* concerning the cross is confirmed. All but the first wear a stern aspect, and even it might terrify simple fishermen by the glimpse it gave into an utterly unknown future involving possible risks for the fishers of *men*, much more serious than those experienced on the sea of Galilee with its sudden tropical squalls. But while the severity remains the idea that it was meant merely to repel is completely dissipated. We observe, for example, that several of the sayings express thought in figurative or symbolic language. "Fishers of men," Foxes have holes," "Putting hand to the plough," such words appeal to the imagination, and so fix themselves in the mind indelibly. Figures catch hold, and are unforgettable, and this is the reason of their use by the wise. But when once we perceive the purpose of a teacher in employing such poetic forms of language, it begins to dawn upon us that perhaps even his repellent severities are used for the same purpose. Figures catch the *fancy*; what if severities are meant to catch the *conscience*, the heroic element that is latent in the heart of man, drawing while they repel, drawing in proportion to their repellent power? Then there is another feature in some of these sayings which is obviously fitted to attract—their *appositeness*, not only to the idea expressed but to the persons to whom they are spoken. Kindly familiar words, charged with homely associations, are used to depict the new unfamiliar career to which those addressed are summoned. *Fishers* of men, hand to the *plough*. "Fishers" to fishermen, "plough" to ploughmen, who had turned over the soil of their little farms before they

began to work as husbandmen in the larger fields of the kingdom.

It thus results from this preliminary survey that in uttering these *disciple-logia*, so strange, hard, and repellent in their surface aspect, Jesus was but showing Himself an expert in the art to which He summoned Peter and Andrew, James and John, catching men on various sides of their nature by the words He spake to them at the crisis of their lives. This will appear more clearly from a fuller study of these words with reference to the uses they were fitted and designed to serve.

In these *disciple-logia*, then, Jesus seems to have had three ends in view: impressiveness, sifting, and confirmation of those not scared. All three ends were obviously important. Words, to have any vital effect, must first of all arrest attention. Words bearing on a new untried career should be vividly descriptive of its nature and conditions, so that men may enter on it with their eyes open and their minds made up. And it is well that words which sift and eliminate the unfit should also confirm the resolution of the fit, serving as inspiring mottoes which appeal to and strengthen the heroic mood of disciples.

1. In one way or another all the seven sayings are *impressive*, some by figurativeness and appositeness, some by severity, all by originality and laconic brevity. The figure of fishing in the first appeals at once to the imagination and the heart of fishermen. The emblems taken from foxes and birds in the second invest the disciple-life with poetry and pathos, even when we do not clearly see where the exact point of the comparison lies. There is a ring of sternness in all the rest which must have made them fall with startling effect on the ears of those to whom they were addressed. "Let dead bury dead"—unreasonable, heartless, you think? That may or may not be, but you have at least noticed what He said.

"Take up the cross"—horrible! Good, you have at least understood His meaning. "Look not back when you have put hands to the plough"—what! not a fond regretful thought of home and friends? How unsympathetic! Be it so; meantime it is satisfactory that you comprehend the situation. "Hate father and mother"—revolting, impossible. Say you so? It is well, at all events, that you perceive what discipleship comes to; you might have missed the point had it been less rudely put. "Sell all that thou hast"—what, all? It takes one's breath away to think of it. Yes, but it puts the alternatives unmistakably before you.

The seven sayings are all *original*, and therefore impressive. It is not necessary to maintain that nothing like any of them was ever uttered before. There are very few words spoken by the most original of men that are absolutely new. Proverbial sayings especially are apt to be of hoary antiquity, and to be at home in many tongues. The saw about not looking back when your hands are on the plough is as old as Hesiod. The seven words to disciples, nevertheless, were all probably new relatively, if not absolutely, for both speaker and hearers. In any case they possessed moral if not literary originality. There might be a maximum of moral originality when there was the smallest measure of literary originality, as in the case of the word spoken to the man who came enquiring about eternal life: "Sell all that thou hast." From a literary point of view these words present nothing remarkable. If Jesus had aimed at literary originality and felicity, He might have couched the counsel in a parable like that of the precious pearl, with a "Go thou and do likewise" appended. But He spoke in plain terms as in the circumstances more likely to be impressive. In the prosaic realism lies the originality. He means literally what He says. Sell *all*; that is what has got to be done. The

boldness and peremptoriness of the demand reveal the unexampled spiritual insight of the Master.

It is unnecessary to dilate on the brevity of these sayings as enhancing their impressiveness. The brevity is apparent, and its virtue is attested by our own experience. What words of Jesus are better remembered? It is true that brevity has its drawbacks. It involves sometimes a sacrifice of clearness, and creates work for the commentators. "Let the dead bury their dead." A weighty counsel laconically expressed, but leaving something unsaid. Literally understood, the policy prescribed is impossible. Dead men cannot bury dead men. The word "dead" is used in two senses, wherein, doubtless, lies the *curiosa felicitas* of the saying. We perceive the meaning to be "let the dead in *soul* bury dead *bodies*." But even when we have understood this a scruple arises. Are the spiritually alive therefore justified in neglecting the last duty to parents? Explanations are obviously needed. But these may be left to the conscience of disciples, assisted, if needful, by commentators and casuists. The great Master must not dilute and weaken His words by qualifying clauses. It is His part to state strongly, briefly, memorably the main truth, which, in the case in question, is the urgent and paramount claims of the kingdom on men's devotion and service. That He has done to perfection.

2. That the seven sayings were fitted to perform a *sifting* function it is easy to see. That Jesus meant them to serve this purpose is very credible in view of the experience which lay before Himself and the men who were to carry on His work. He was not in the dark as to the general character of that experience, and He knew well that none but picked men of true sincere heart, firm will, and power to stand trial, could meet it without flinching. For such men He was ever on the outlook,

and among the methods He employed for insuring that only such should enter the disciple-circle was the use of sifting words addressed to volunteers. The words of this type which have been preserved were admirably adapted to that end. Not many would persist in seeking admission after the word about the cross had been spoken. The wonder is that any remained within the circle after hearing it, that the twelve did not desert in a body. The truth probably is that the eleven honest men did not take the saying in earnest, and that the one false man, more shrewd than the rest, did lay it to heart, and determined, as soon as convenient, to become a deserter. Fear of what was coming and the scramble for distinction within the disciple-circle, together, made Judas a traitor.

The one fault which may plausibly be ascribed to the seven sayings in reference to their sifting function is over-severity. Instead of merely dividing between reliable and unreliable, were not such stern words, it may be asked, fitted rather to scare all candidates for discipleship, indiscriminately, away? It is certainly true that many a man can endure in actual experience what he cannot stand in imagination. Why not then try to find out secretly who is to be trusted, and having arrived at a conclusion on this point, seek to win the approved by fair encouraging pictures of the future, rather than risk the loss of a faithful follower by too candid forecasts of the dark side of destiny? So raw recruits have sometimes been beguiled into enlisting for military service in the British army. Why not pursue a similar policy in procuring soldiers for the arduous warfare of the Divine kingdom? The suggestion is plausible, and it may be admitted that the policy sketched might conceivably be followed to a certain extent, not only with advantage, but without involving anything questionable on the score of morality. It is not necessary to say all at first, and what may wisely be said depends on the

temperament and moral state of the person dealt with. Christ's mode of treatment was not uniform. His word to the four Galilæan fishermen showed the bright side of the picture rather than the dark. It served to draw into His circle men of whom He had already formed independently a favourable judgment. Sterner words, for them and for all disciples, came later, when they were somewhat prepared to bear them and the hour for speaking them was seasonable. "Fishers of men" was the fit initial word; "take up the cross" was the appropriate watchword when the great day of battle was near. In other instances austere, repellent words had to be spoken at the outset. "The ploughman must not turn back" may seem a harsh, ungenerous, not to say gratuitous insinuation, spoken to one who merely asks permission to bid farewell to friends before entering on a career that is to separate him from them for ever. But what if the wish means reluctance to part, and saying farewell ends in staying at home? Then the candidate is really looking back, and the warning word will decide his fate. If he goes home, he goes never to return. If he stays, he ceases to look back and concentrates his thoughts on making a straight furrow. Another instance of a stern word spoken at the initial stage is that addressed to the man in quest of eternal life. "Go, sell all that thou hast": why make so inexorable and uncompromising a demand just then? Why not say to this man, as to Matthew the publican, simply "follow me," and leave all else to be understood, and to work itself out as the natural sequel of discipleship? Because this is no common man, but a man of great spiritual possibilities, a possible Paul or Barnabas. So much has been given him that much must be required of him. In a heroic career alone can he find the rest he seeks, and the sooner he understands that the better. The counsel to sell all he had simply shows him the door into the Blessed Life.

3. The disciple-logia were fitted and intended to *confirm* as well as to sift. To such as were not scared by their severity, they would serve for life as inspiring, exhilarating watchwords. This double function belongs to all words pitched in the heroic key, even to the names of battlefields on a regimental standard. To the novice these names may be words of terror, reminding him that the soldier's life means something more than regulation drill and barrack routine, even occasional, it may be frequent, exposure to danger in real grim warfare. But to one who has caught the soldier spirit they are words of inspiration thrilling his soul, whispering in his ear: Your comrades fought valiantly and won the day; go and rival the fame of the illustrious dead. Heroic words are awful while the heroic temper slumbers, but when the soul has once been roused, they become like military music, to which we march with light heart and nimble, elastic step. Deeds which inaugurate a new heroic career have the same magic effect. "'Tis done, the great transaction's done!" Awful to look forward to, a thing of terror while you hesitated, but joyful to look back upon; an event of eternal significance, never to be forgotten, never thought on without renewal of rapture. How full of meaning that perfect, *πέπρακεν*, "he hath sold," in the parable of the precious pearl! The thing is done once for all, it is an act which decides destiny. What joy would have come to the seeker after eternal life had he followed the pearl-merchant's example, joy which may be measured by the sorrow and depression arising out of unwillingness to take the decisive step. Such sorrow and such joy are the counterparts of each other, the sorrow being the penalty of shrinking from the heroic, the joy the reward of those who enter into the true blessed life by the door of self-sacrifice. Sell all, O aspirant, and thou shalt be blessed in thy deed, and ever after, the fateful word of counsel spoken by the Master will sound in thine ear like the refrain of a song.

The elation caused by spirit-stirring words spoken at a spiritual crisis is by no means imaginary. It is real, so real as to be a source of danger. It may foster pride, and so cause enthusiasm to degenerate into fanaticism. What said Peter shortly after the utterance of the "sell-all" *logion*? "Behold, we have forsaken all and followed Thee."¹ There, in the bud, is the spirit of proud self-consciousness, which reached its full blossom in an ascetism for which selling all and kindred acts became ends in themselves and constituted the essence of the Christian life in its highest phase. The risk of misunderstanding and abuse is very real, and very serious. Yet such words as "sell all" and that about eunuchism for the kingdom² must be spoken. They are necessary to awaken, stimulate, and sustain that heroic element in the human soul without which nothing great, memorable, and worthy of a place in the page of history or in song, has ever been done in this world. The hero has the faults of his qualities, but it is better far to have the hero with all drawbacks than to have nothing in human life that rises above prudentialism, commonplace, and humdrum. Would one not be the better of a few heroes in Church and State, even now, in addition to the crowd of men who are oppressively wise and prudent? But how are heroes to be reared? By the prophet of an age, if there happens to be one, having faith in the human soul, and speaking to it in heroic dialect, with a voice like the sound of a trumpet. That voice some of the dead will hear, and they that hear shall live, and they that live shall do valiantly. Nothing but the heroic word will serve. Echoed speech will fall flat, time-serving speech will get no serious attention. Even a mixture of the heroic and the commonplace will fail. If you want to rouse men to enthusiasm, ply them with heroic motives alone, and do not be afraid to place the ideal before them in the most

¹ Matt. xix. 27.² Matt. xix. 12.

exalted form. Let duty appear as a great mountain, hard to climb, but fascinating by its very attitude.

It remains now to use the knowledge we have obtained concerning this class of sayings as a whole, and the purposes they were meant to serve, as an aid to the better understanding of any particular sayings which present special difficulty. The only one to which this description strictly applies is the second in our list: "the foxes have holes," but we may place beside it the fifth: "take up the cross." In the case of the former the question is one of interpretation, in the case of the latter it is a question of authenticity. Of the latter first and very briefly.

Could our Lord have uttered so *terrible* a word? that is the question. Doubt may arise on more general grounds. The reference to the cross may not unnaturally be held to presuppose that His own cross was present to the mind of the Speaker. Is this likely? Could Jesus know so long before the time in what form He was to meet death? Does it not appear from the successive announcements He made to the disciples that the details of His Passion became only gradually clear to His mind? First it is predicted in general terms that there will be varied suffering ending in death; next, that the victim will fall into the hands of His deadly foes through betrayal; finally, that the Gentile powers will have a share in the tragedy, and will consummate its indignities with mockery, scourging and crucifixion.¹ There is not much force in this argument. The gradual unfolding may indicate, not increasing insight, but considerate communication piecemeal of very unwelcome tidings. No great intervals of time elapsed between the successive announcements, so that there was little space for growth in insight. The probability is that the whole details of the passion were before Christ's mind from the

¹ Mark viii. 31, ix. 30, x. 32. Compare with the last-cited text Matthew xix. 19, where crucifixion is mentioned. "Killed" is the word in Mark.

first, if not as certainties, at least as likelihoods of the situation: betrayal by a false disciple already suspected, the inevitable intervention of Gentile authority, the manner of death, crucifixion, thereby virtually settled.

But, granting all this, is it likely that Jesus would utter that awful word about cross-bearing to men who knew from observation what crucifixion meant? Is it not more probable that the saying, in its original form, ran: "Who-soever will come after Me let him deny himself," and that the clause "take up his cross" was added after our Lord's death and resurrection, in the course of tradition, when the cross had become the symbol of suffering for Christ's sake, and had lost much of its terror for the Christian mind? The most that can be said for this hypothesis is that it is *possible*. There is no urgent need for any such supposition. The severity of the saying creates no demand for it. Severity, we have seen, was a part of Christ's method. The use of the cross, as a concrete symbol of the hardship of disciple-life, was perfectly natural on His part even though He was not thinking of His own cross at the moment. If the aim was to depict in vivid colours the hard lot appointed for the followers of a persecuted teacher, as involving a combination of cruelty and ignominy in the superlative degree, then no better symbol could be thought of. It said all in a single word.

Let us turn now to the *logion* concerning the foxes and the birds. The authenticity of this saying no one disputes, but there may be a very legitimate question as to its true interpretation. Taken in its natural surface-sense, as descriptive of a wandering life without a fixed abode, it seems to lack the *appositeness* characteristic of the disciple-logia. According to Matthew the word was spoken to a *scribe*, which may confidently be regarded as in accordance with the historic fact. Now wherein lay the suitableness of the saying, taken in its surface-sense, as spoken to such a

person? Why tell a *scribe* more than any other man that the teacher he proposed to follow had no certain place of abode? Did he not know that already? And why should the fact scare him more than others? He was, we may suppose, a young man, not a master, only a scholar desiring to make himself acquainted with the secrets of wisdom. What terrors would an itinerant life have for a youth in quest of truth? Rabbinical students were, I presume, like other students, not effeminate and self-indulgent, but hardy, adventurous, romantic, capable even of finding pleasure in petty austerities connected with the scholar's vocation. In a sunny eastern land these could be nothing more than petty. A free, roving life under a blue sky would attract rather than repel a man with any poetry in him. Away from towns and crowds and social conventionalisms, amid the peaceful solitudes of hill and forest, with only the music of the birds and the brooks and the winds to break the silence, and the wild flowers to scent the air, who would not gladly follow the sage who offered to lead him thither, and in such sacred haunts to initiate him into the mystery of the Blessed Life?

But, suppose the physical situation—literal homelessness—to be an emblem of the spiritual situation—that of one who found no home for his *soul* in the religion of the time. And, to make that supposition probable, suppose further we place the incident in connection with the journey of our Lord northwards towards the borders of Tyre and Sidon, after, and in consequence of, the grave and ominous encounter with the scribes in reference to ceremonial ablutions.¹ We are free to place it as we please, for the historical setting is not clear in the evangelic tradition, Matthew connecting it with the excursion to the east side of the lake on the occasion of the encounter with the demoniac of Gadara; Luke with the final journey towards

¹ 1 Matt. xv.—20.

Jerusalem. Observe then: on that northward journey Jesus was not only a homeless wanderer, as on all His journeys, but a *fugitive* from His native land, driven thence by the bitter, deadly ill-will of religious adversaries, an exile on account of religion. How natural that in such circumstances the physical and the spiritual situations should be mixed up in His thoughts, and that words referring to the one should have latent reference to the other, and demand that reference as the key to their ultimate meaning. The natural and the spiritual always lay close together in Christ's mind, and very specially in moments of prophetic exaltation. The well of material water readily suggested the well of everlasting life, and the viands on the table the good part that could never be taken away.

What a deep, pathetic meaning the saying bears when read as a parable! "I am at present a wanderer, going to live among Gentiles—literally without a home. But that is a small matter compared to the spiritual state which is the cause of this homeliness, and whereof my homelessness is an emblem; that, viz., of one solitary, friendless, his soul in exile; nothing in common between Him and the scribes, in thought, belief, practice; no rest for His soul in their religious teaching and customs!"

Now the appositeness of the saying as addressed to a *scribe* is evident. It means: "I am a fugitive from Galilee because I am isolated in spirit. My thoughts about God, righteousness, the kingdom of God, the Messianic hope, are all different from those which prevail, and the religious leaders, your teachers, are intolerant of nonconformity. Are you prepared to break completely with old beliefs and customs and class prejudices, to separate yourself from old friends, masters, and fellow-scholars, and to become in My company an object of keen suspicion and inveterate, murderous ill-will?"

That is not so easy as to follow a wandering teacher, and sleep on the ground, and snatch a precarious meal from chance benevolence. Is the scribe equal to the heroic demand? Let us think of him as generously as possible. He is not yet, we will suppose, confirmed in the artificial ways of the scribes. It takes time to make an ingenuous young soul the absolute slave of an evil system, and the melancholy process, presumably, has not in this case reached its baleful consummation. The candidate for discipleship has still some open-mindedness, is still capable of being impressed by the wisdom and goodness of Jesus. His becoming a disciple of the great Outcast is not inconceivable. But it will be a momentous crisis in his religious history; nothing short of a moral and religious revolution. Jesus would have him understand this before he begins. Therefore he addresses to him this mystic, pregnant, parabolic word concerning the foxes and the birds.

But would the scribe perceive the deeper meaning of the saying, and, if not, must we not take it in the surface-sense it bore for him? Why, I reply, should the mystic import be hidden from him any more than from the man to whom Jesus said, "Let the dead bury their dead," a saying in which the natural and spiritual are confessedly blended? I apprehend that men accustomed to hear Jesus were on the outlook for latent spiritual meanings. His looks and tones in particular instances might hint that more was meant than met the ear. What met the ear had its own truth; "the natural interpretation"¹ is not excluded by the mystic; the only question is, Is that all? The very

¹ Shailer Mathews, of the University of Chicago, in his work *The Social Teachings of Jesus* (1897), p. 101, finds in the logion the idea that Jesus "was a man without a home"; and with reference to my view in the *Expositor*, October, 1896, calls this "the most natural interpretation." Of course it is. It is *the* natural interpretation, but it does not exclude mine.

manner of Jesus might indicate that it was not all. The circumstances, too, might quicken intelligence. If the historic occasion were the flight of Jesus to the North, a young scholar of the scribes, cognisant of what had recently taken place between Jesus and his masters, could hardly help reading between the lines, especially if, as we must assume, his sympathies in the quarrel went with the Wanderer.

The more I think of it the more I am convinced that the mystic interpretation of this most characteristic and pathetic *Logion* which I ventured to propound in the pages of the EXPOSITOR, October, 1896, is the true one.

A. B. BRUCE.

*A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE GALATIANS.*

VI. PAUL AS A JUDAISTIC PREACHER.

WE have remarked in § v. on the intense feeling shown in this paragraph, vv. 6-10. Any topic that is touched on in these verses must be taken as a point of transcendent importance in the Galatian difficulty. Why, then, does Paul lay such stress on the supposition that he¹ may begin to preach a different Gospel? Can anything be more improbable? Why does he waste time on such a possibility? What part does that supposition play in the Galatian difficulty?

We are bound to the view that the supposition here introduced in this emphatic position was really a serious element in the Galatian trouble; *i.e.* the Galatians had acquired the opinion that Paul had somehow been conveying a different message, a new Gospel,² contrary to the Gospel which they received from him on the first visit. This opinion, of course, had been instilled into them by the Judaistic emissaries, who had been preaching in the Galatian Churches since Paul's second visit. In v. 11 Paul returns to the same topic. "If," he says, "I still preach circumcision." Here there is an unmistakable reference to an assertion made by the Judaistic preachers that Paul himself had been preaching the Gospel of circumcision; and it is noteworthy that here again Paul uses an expression of the most vehement indignation and disgust: "I would that they which unsettle you would even mutilate themselves." It was this accusation of having preached an anti-Pauline

¹ ἡμεῖς, Paul and his companion in preaching. As Lightfoot says, "St. Paul seems never to use the plural when speaking of himself alone."

² So Lightfoot, and (I think) almost every one.

Gospel that hurt Paul and made him use such strong language in both places where he refers to it.

But was not the accusation too absurd? It was, however, believed by the Galatians, for otherwise Paul would have suffered it to "pass by him as the idle wind." Its danger and its sting lay in the fact that the Galatians were misled by it. Now they could not have believed it merely on the bare assertion of the Judaizers. There must have been some appearance of difference in Paul's teaching on his second visit, which gave some support to the statements and arguments of the Judaistic teachers, and so helped to mislead the Galatians.

This is a hard point for the North-Galatian theory; for it is difficult to imagine how Paul's teaching on his third journey (*Acts* xviii. 23) could have seemed more favourable to the Judaistic side than his teaching and action on his second journey (*Acts* xvi. 2-5). On the other hand, as Lightfoot himself, on II. 3, allows, Paul's actions in Lystra, Iconium, etc., on his second journey, are the basis of this distortion of his teaching. The supposed North-Galatian Churches are assumed to have believed that Paul was a Judaizer, because, shortly before he came to them for the first time, he had been acting in South Galatia in a way that they thought Judaistic. But they must have known from the beginning what Paul had done in Lystra, and it is hard to think that there could have been any even outward difference between the teaching of Paul in South Galatia and the teaching of Paul and Timothy a few weeks later in North Galatia.

There is no satisfactory explanation of this paragraph in *Galatians*, except that the Gospel which the Galatians received on the former visit had begun to seem to them discordant with Paul's subsequent action and teaching on his second visit. This is exactly what the South-Galatian theory brings out; and we see that in *Acts* xvi. Luke, as

always, is trying to give us the means of understanding the Epistles. On the second journey Paul came delivering to the Galatians (*Acts* xvi. 4) the decree of the Apostles in Jerusalem. That might fairly seem to be an acknowledgment that those Apostles were the higher officials, and he was their messenger. He circumcised Timothy. That might readily be understood as an acknowledgment that the higher stages of Christian life were open only through obedience to the whole Law of Moses; in other words, that as a concession to human weakness the Gentiles were admitted by the Apostolic Decree to the Church on the performance of part of the Law, but that the perfecting of their position as Christians resulted from compliance with the whole Law. It is clear from *Galatians* iii. 3 that this distinction between a lower and more perfect stage of Christian life was in the minds of the persons to whom Paul was writing. However different Paul's real motive was in respect of Timothy, the view of his action suggested by the Judaistic teachers was a very plausible one, and evidently had been accepted by the Galatians. The action, in truth, was one easy to misunderstand, and not easy to sympathise with.

Moreover, the Decree itself was quite open to this construction. "It seemed good to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things"—this expression can plausibly be interpreted to imply the ellipsis, "but, if you voluntarily undertake a heavier burden, we shall praise you for your zeal in doing more than the necessary minimum." To zealous and enthusiastic devotees, such as the Asia Minor races were, this interpretation was very seductive. They doubtless had heard from Paul of Peter's speech (*Acts* xv. 10), in which he protested against putting on them a yoke too heavy even for the Jews; but, under the stimulus of enthusiasm, they responded to the Judaists

that they could and would support that yoke, however heavy.

Moreover, the Galatians had been used to a religion in which such ritualistic acts (*τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, iv. 3) were a prominent part; and it was natural that they should again "turn to the weak and beggarly elements." The result of the whole series of events described in *Acts* would naturally be that the Galatians were predisposed to follow the Judaistic emissaries, and to think that Paul on his second visit was preaching another Gospel, and that this second Gospel was the true Gospel, as being brought from the real Apostles, the pillars of the Church.

This misinterpretation of his conduct, with all the danger it involved, Paul had to meet at the outset. It was fundamental; and until it was put out of the way he could make no progress in setting the Galatians right. He meets it, not by mere denial (which is always rather ineffective), but by the intense and vehement outburst: "If Silas or I, or an angel from heaven, preach to you any Gospel other than that which Barnabas and I preached unto you, a curse on him!"

VII. ANOTHER GOSPEL.

It is unnecessary here again to delay long on the false sense given to *ἕτερον* and *ἄλλο* by some commentators. That has been already discussed in the *EXPOSITOR*, August, 1895, p. 115 ff. But the immense and well-earned influence exercised by that great scholar, Bishop Lightfoot,¹ makes it advisable to recur briefly to the fact that the distinction between *ἄλλος* and *ἕτερος*, when they are contrasted, is not

¹ I have observed some cases in which highly distinguished Biblical scholars unhesitatingly follow his opinion on *ἕτερος*—*ἄλλος* as certainly correct.

(as he asserts) that ἄλλος means "one besides," while ἕτερος signifies "unlike, opposite." Each is perfectly susceptible of meaning "different, unlike"; but when they are used together and contrasted with one another, the fundamental meaning of the words comes into force, and ἕτερος, which means "a second, another of the same class, new" (e.g. a new king, a successor), denotes specific difference, while ἄλλος denotes generic difference. I quoted (on the suggestion of Mr. R. A. Neil) Thucydides ii. 40, 2-3, where ἄλλοις denotes all non-Athenian nations, while ἐτέροις distinguishes one class of Athenians from another. That excellent scholar sends me also another reference, Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 5, p. 1263 a, 8, ἐτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἀν εἴη τρόπος, "if the farming class is other, i.e. a distinct subclass of the general body of citizens, then the form of communism would be quite different (from what it would be, if all citizens were farmers)." Mr. A. Souter also points out to me Plato, *Protag.* 329D-330B, where (to put the meaning briefly) Socrates says: "The different parts of the whole class called gold are not different from one another (οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων) except in respect of size; but the different parts of the whole class called virtue (i.e. the special virtues) are quite different in character from one another (ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο),¹ and each has its special function; it is the same as in the case of the face and its parts: the eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; and of the other objects in the world (τῶν ἄλλων) no specific part is like another specific part (of the same object, οἷον τὸ ἕτερον)." Here, clearly, the various parts of a whole are ἕτερα to one another, whether they be unlike or exactly the same; different wholes are ἄλλα; and when the unlikeness of the parts of a whole is emphatic-

¹ I.e., τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο (Stallbaum quotes other instances of the ellipse of τὸ μὲν).

ally asserted, these parts are said to be τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

In perfect agreement with these examples, Prof. F. Blass, in his *Grammatik des N.T. Griechisch*, p. 175 f., says that "ἕτεροι is in place in the sense of *eine zweite Abtheilung*." In fact, it would not be inconceivable or unintelligible Greek, though doubtless awkward and harsh, to say about a pair of things, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο, the one is quite different from the other.

In view of cases like these, it is impossible, within the limits of Greek, to admit Lightfoot's rendering of ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο, "a different Gospel, which is not another," i.e. "is no Gospel at all." We must either follow the American revisers, "another Gospel, which is nothing else save that there are some that trouble you," or we must understand "another Gospel, which is different (from mine) only in so far as some persons confuse you and try to pervert the Gospel of the Anointed One," i.e. the Gospel which is preached, e.g., by Peter, might be called ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, but it is not different from mine except in being perverted by these false teachers.

It is no argument against what is here said to point out cases where ἕτερος means "different." The word is perfectly susceptible of taking that sense. In fact, you find both ἕτερος and ἄλλος passing into the sense of each other,¹ as a glance at Stephanus will show; and in later Greek this passage becomes steadily more apparent. But the question is, What do they mean when they are pointedly opposed to one another in a sentence?

¹ Yet in Iliad N. 64, ὄρνειον ἄλλο means a bird of a different class (ἀλλόφουλον, as the Schol. says): ὄρνειον ἕτερον is hardly conceivable there, as it would be so urgent to understand "a second eagle."

VIII. "SEEKING TO PLEASE MEN."

In the EXPOSITOR, July, 1897, p. 66, Prof. W. Locke pointed out in a most illuminative paper that, in order to comprehend many passages in Paul's letters, we must understand that certain phrases represent the substance, if not the actual words, of the taunts levelled in speech against him by his Jewish-Christian opponents"; and, to make this clear, he prints those phrases between inverted commas.

The phrases, "persuade men," and "seek to please men" in *Galatians* i. 10 are evidently of this nature. Paul was accused by the Judaizing emissaries of trimming his words and ideas to suit the people among whom he was: it was said that in Jerusalem he Judaized, as when he concurred in the Decree: in Galatia among the Gentiles he made the Jews of no account: even when he brought the Decree at the order of the greater Apostles, he minimized and explained it away to suit the Galatians, but yet, to please the Jews, he circumcised Timothy. It was easy to distort Paul's method of adapting himself to his audience and "becoming all things to all men," so as to make this accusation very dangerous and plausible.

He recurs later to the taunts mentioned here, *vv.* 8-10. In *vi.* 17 he dismisses them with the words, "from henceforth let no man trouble me." In both places his answer is the same: he appeals to the sufferings which he has endured because of his teaching. If he had sought to please men, he would not be the slave of Christ: he bears in his body the marks of the Lord Jesus, for the marks left in his body by the stones at Lystra (and probably by the lictors' rods at Antioch and Lystra, *St. Paul*, pp. 107, 304), brand him as the slave of Jesus (such marks on the bodies of slaves still catch the eye of the traveller in that country, *e.g.*, Ramsay, *Everyday Life in Turkey*, p. 7). He leaves

the Galatians to judge from his life whether he has aimed at pleasing men or at serving God.

IX. TONE OF ADDRESS TO THE GALATIANS.

This opening paragraph, i. 6-10, does not merely show the intense feeling that raged in Paul's mind: it is also a revelation of Galatian nature. His power of vividly representing the situation in all its reality before his own mind made him in the moment of writing as fully conscious of his correspondents' nature and mind as he was of himself. Things presented themselves to him, as he wrote, in the form which would most impress his Galatian readers. It was that intense sympathetic comprehension of the nature of others that made him such a power among men. Hence, in this Epistle, you see the whole nature of the Galatian converts spread open before you; and it is not the bold, proud, self-assertive nature of a northern race, like the Gauls, that is here revealed. Let any one who has some knowledge of the difference between oriental nature and the nature of the "barbarians" from the north-western lands, or who has studied Polybius and Plutarch's picture of those Gauls who swept in their small bands over Asia, trampling in the dust the multitudinous armies of great kings and populous cities, those fierce, haughty, self-respecting barbarians, keenly sensitive to insult, careless of danger or wounds, settled as an aristocratic and conquering caste among a far more numerous race of subject Phrygians—let any such person judge for himself whether this paragraph, or the fresh start, iii. 1 ff., is the way to address such an audience: the tone of authority, of speaking from a higher platform, is exactly what a man of tact would carefully avoid. But many modern writers seem never to have considered what was the position of the Gauls in Galatia. They write as if Paul were addressing simple-minded, peaceful tribes of

gentle South-Sea islanders, whom he treats as his children. The Gauls were an aristocracy settled for nearly three centuries as nobles among plebeians, like the Normans among the Saxons in England. See below, on chap. iii. 1.

But this very tone, brief and authoritative, is the effective method of addressing the native races of Asia Minor. It is so now, and it was the same in ancient time, when the very word "Phrygian" was equivalent to "slave." Every traveller who mixes with the people of Anatolia learns how necessary is the "touch of authority" mixed with frankness and courtesy. On this point I can only appeal to those who know; and add the statement that the best possible illustration of the tone of this whole Epistle is the experience of the traveller (as, for example, p. 27 ff. of my *Impressions of Turkey*).

This difference of tone from all other epistles has, of course, been noticed by every one, and is usually explained as due to anger. But Paul, even when angry, was not one of those persons who lose their temper and say injudicious things; while deeply moved and indignant, he only became more resolute and alert and watchful: the tone of this letter is misunderstood by those who fail to read in it the character of the persons to whom it is addressed.

X. THE GOSPEL WHICH YE RECEIVED.

The whole paragraph becomes most clear if we understand that "the Gospel which ye received" refers definitely to the occasion and manner in which the good news was first received by the Church or the individual. Similarly in *Acts* xv. 36 the ἀγγελία τοῦ λόγου took place on the first journey: on that journey the apostles brought the good news to Antioch and Lystra and Derbe (*Acts* xiii. 32; xiv. 7, 15, 21. But on the second and third journey "strengthening" is the term employed (xvi. 5; compare xv.

41, xviii. 23). In *Acts* xv. 35 διδάσκοντες καὶ εὐαγγελιζόμενοι describes the two processes of teaching the converts and carrying the good news to those who had not yet heard it.

In view of this difference it is highly probable that Paul's second visit to Galatia was a very brief one, in which he confined his attention to strengthening and instructing the converts without seeking to carry on a further process of evangelization. That has been assumed on the authority of *Acts* in the reckoning of time in my *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 85; and it seems to gather strength from the language of *Galatians*. Εὐαγγελισάμεθα and παρελάβετε refer to the single occasion when the Churches were formed, the first journey; and the instruction given on the second journey is distinguished from it. Paul does not trouble himself to prove that the second message was consistent with the first. He merely says, "if the second message was different, a curse be upon me: you must cleave to the first, which came direct from God."

The point, then, which Paul sets before himself is not to show that he has always been consistent in his message, but to prove that the original message which he brought to the Galatians came direct from God to him. If he proves that, then the other accusation of later inconsistency on his part will disappear of itself.

This method is obviously far the most telling. Even if Paul, by a lengthened proof, difficult to grasp, had proved that he had always been consistent, that did not show that he was right or his message divine. On the other hand, if he proved that his first message was divine, then the Galatians would from their own mind and conscience realize what was the inner nature and meaning of his conduct on the second journey.

The line of proof is, first, an autobiographical record of the facts bearing upon his original Gospel to the Galatians, and

thereafter an appeal to their own knowledge that through this first Gospel they had received the Spirit. That was the ultimate test of divine origin. Nothing could give them the Spirit and the superhuman power of the Spirit except a divine Gospel.

XI. DATES OF THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

Paul in this retrospect mentions a number of events in his past life. The question has been keenly debated whether the dates which he prefixes to some of the events are intended to mark the interval between each and the preceding event, or the period that separates each from his conversion. Let us put down the facts clearly. The following events are mentioned :—

1. The conversion and call to the Gentiles (i. 15, 16). This is the starting-point, and is therefore introduced by *ὅτε*.

2. *εὐθὺς*, the retiring to Arabia; *καὶ πάλιν*, the return to Damascus (i. 17). Probably it would be better to number these as 2 and 3; but I refrain from doing so, lest I seem to some to press the reasoning too hard. It would strengthen my argument to class them as two distinct facts.

3. *ἔπειτα μετὰ τρία ἔτη*, the first visit to Jerusalem, and the stay of fifteen days there (i. 18, 19).

4. *ἔπειτα*, the retiring to Syria and Cilicia, and continuance there (i. 21–24).

5. *ἔπειτα διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν*, the second visit to Jerusalem (ii. 1–10).¹

The form of this list with the repetition of *ἔπειτα* seems, so far as I may judge, to mark it as a compact enumeration,

¹ The form of ii. 11 ff. implies that it is not a sixth item in this retrospect. There is no *ἔπειτα* or other similar word to introduce it. It is marked by a new *ὅτε* as a fresh start, parallel to i. 15.

in which the reader is intended to hold the whole together in his mind, and to think of each as a fact in a continuing biographical series. The thought is, as it were, "My life in the Divine reckoning begins from the conversion and call to the Gentiles: in the gradual working out of that call there are the following stages; but in thinking of my life, you must hold always in mind the epoch-making fact of the Conversion; if you would understand my life, you must refer every act in it to that primary revelation of the will of God in me." Hence all the numbers must be interpreted with reference to the great epoch. To consider that in this biographical enumeration each new item, as it were, blots out the previous one, so that the numbers are to be reckoned as intervals that elapsed from the item preceding to the item following, is to lose the dominance of the central and epoch-making event, which is never absent from Paul's mind.

And is it not true even now? On our conception of that one event depends our whole view of Paul's life. So far as we understand his Conversion, do we understand the man. My argument in this section is the same thought which I would apply to Paul's whole life; and, if I be granted time and opportunity, I would write his life with that thought always dominant: "You understand nothing in Paul unless you take it in its relation to his Conversion." He that fails to do that in any case fails entirely: there is but one way, and he that misses it goes wrong inevitably in his conception of Paul's work.

It was a true instinct that led the Church to take the Conversion as the day of St. Paul. For other saints and martyrs their day of celebration was their *dies natalis*, the day on which they entered on their real life, their day of martyrdom. But the *dies natalis* of St. Paul, the day on which his true life began, was the day of his Conversion.

We follow that instinct here, and reckon all the events

in this autobiography by reference to that thought, always dominant in his mind, and which ought always to be dominant in the reader's mind—his Conversion.

Further, we observe that those who take the other view of the meaning of these numbers always argue as if the list consisted of three events: (1) conversion, (2) first visit to Jerusalem, (3) second visit. But Paul, by the form of the list, marks it as containing either five or six separate items, each introduced in a similar way; and it does violence to the form of expression which here rose naturally in Paul's mind, if it be declared that the other items are to be dropped entirely out of sight, and we are to think only of the three.

Again, Paul never neglected the most vigorous and incisive way of putting his thought: he neglects rhetorical verbosity, but he never neglects, he could not neglect, the effect that is given by putting facts in their most striking form. Here the numbers derive their effect on his readers' minds from their greatness; and, if he had been able to use the number 17, he would surely and inevitably (according to my conception of his nature) have taken the expression which enabled him to use the larger number: see above, § IX.

In using this passage for chronological reckoning, it must be borne in mind that Paul's words, *μετὰ τρία ἔτη*, etc., do not correspond to our "three years after." For example, counting from A.D. 31, *μετὰ τρία ἔτη* would be A.D. 33, "the third year after"; but "three years after" would be A.D. 34.

XII. THE REGIONS OF SYRIA AND CILICIA.

The expression has been treated by some scholars as describing two countries; and they seek to find a discrepancy between *Galatians* i. 21 and *Acts* ix. 30, as if in

the former it were asserted that Paul visited Syria first and afterwards Cilicia, whereas in the *Acts* it is stated that he went direct to Tarsus. Then other commentators seek to avoid this inference either by pointing out that on the way to Cilicia he would remain at Syrian ports long enough to justify him in saying that he came to Syria and Cilicia, while others argue that his residence at Antioch during the latter part of the period justifies him in speaking of both Syria and Cilicia, without implying that the Syrian visit was before the Cilician.

All these views start from a misconception of Paul's language and thought. He always thinks and speaks with his eye on the Roman divisions of the Empire, *i.e.* the Provinces, in accordance both with his station as a Roman citizen and with his invariable and oft-announced principle of accepting and obeying the existing government. Thus he speaks of Achaia, Asia, Macedonia, Galatia, Illyricum, using in each case the Roman names, not the Greek: Achaia to the Greeks meant a much smaller country than to the Romans, and it was only in rare cases that the Greeks used either Achaia or Galatia in the wide Roman sense. But the most striking example of Paul's habit of using Roman names is τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ in *Romans* xv. 19. The Greeks used the name Ἰλλυρίς to correspond to the Roman *Illyricum*; and no example seems to occur in Greek of Ἰλλυρικόν used as a noun except in Paul's letter to the Romans. The Greeks never used Ἰλλυρικός except as an adjective. Only a person who was absolutely Roman in his point of view could have employed the term Ἰλλυρικόν, and he could mean by it nothing but "Provincia Illyricum."¹

¹ It is noteworthy that in 2 *Timothy* iv. 10, Paul speaks of this same Province as Dalmatia. The difference of name might be appealed to as pointing to the difference of authorship of the Pastoral Epistles; but, in the more probable view, it is merely a sign of the change which was actually happening during Paul's lifetime. The name Illyricum (universal in early writers) gradually gave place to Dalmatia (which previously was only the southern part of the Province,

Further, the phrase τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας καὶ Κιλικίας should not be understood as "the κλίμα or region of Syria and the κλίμα of Cilicia." Κλίμα was not used to denote such a great district as Syria or Cilicia; and it is unfortunate that both the Revised and Authorised Versions translate it by the same term that they used for χώρα in *Acts* xiv. 6, xvi. 6, xviii. 23. Χώρα is correctly used to indicate the great geographical divisions of a province (as in those cases); and we might speak of the χώρα of Cilicia and the χώρα of Syria, but not of the κλίμα of Cilicia. I confess that I have never been able to feel any confidence about the precise geographical sense of κλίμα;¹ and scholars, as a rule, scorn to think about the exact distinction between the various geographical expressions. But it is at least certain that the regular usage is τὰ κλίματα Συρίας, κλίματα Ἀχαΐας (2 *Cor.* xi. 10): four small districts in the west of Cilicia Tracheia were called τὰ κλίματα;² Sinope and Amisos are defined as πρὸς τοῖς κλίμασι κείμεναι (Justinian, *Novella*, 28).

In accordance with his usual practice, Paul here thinks and speaks of the Roman Province, which consisted of two great divisions, Syria and Cilicia (*Provincia Bithynia et Pontus*). We must accordingly read τῆς Συρίας καὶ Κιλικίας, with the common article embracing the two parts of

as constituted by Augustus in A.D. 10, the northern division being Liburnia); and the common name from 70 onwards was Dalmatia (as Mommsen says, "*wie sie seit der Zeit der Flavier gewöhnlich heisst*," *Röm. Gesch.* V. c. vi., p. 184). Suetonius, guided doubtless by his authorities, calls the Province Illyricum under the earlier Emperors, but varies between the names under Claudius and Otho. Similarly, under Nero, Paul varies, following the common usage, which was evidently swinging definitely over from the old to the new name between 57 and 67.

¹ The word has long engaged my attention, see *Histor. Geogr.*, p. 417, where it is suggested that it should be taken in the sense of "lands sloping back from the sea," when applied to Sinope, Amisos, and the four Cilician districts; though in other passages, such as *klima Mnozenia*, (*Acta Theod. Syc.*), it seems to have only the vague sense of "territory."

² *Histor. Geogr.*, p. 417, and table facing p. 362.

one province, according to the original text of N. Although I do not recollect any example of the expression "Prov. Syria et Cilicia," yet the analogy of Bithynia-Pontus is a sufficient defence. Phœnicia, which is in this double name reckoned as part of Syria, is in a more accurate view distinguished from it; and hence the Province is sometimes named by enumerating the three parts;¹ but on the whole the prevalent view classed Phœnicians part of Syria.

The meaning of i. 21, then, is simply that Paul spent the following period of his life in various parts of the Province Syria-Cilicia; and it confirms the principle of interpretation laid down by Zahn that "Paul never designates any part of the Roman Empire by any other name than that of the Province to which it belonged; and he never uses any of the old names of countries, except in so far as these had become names of Provinces" (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 124).

W. M. RAMSAY.

NOTE ON § VII.

Professor Bywater writes that Bonitz recognises a similar distinction between ἕτερος λόγος and ἄλλος λόγος in Aristotle to that which I have drawn between ἄλλο εὐαγγέλιον and ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον (see Bonitz, *Index Aristot.* p. 290 b. 19).

¹ The provincial *cultus* with its ἀγών was κοινὸς Συρίας Κιλικίας Φοινίκης (Henzen, *Bull. dell' Inst.* 1877, p. 109; Mommsen, *Res Gestae D. Aug.* p. 173).

(To be continued.)

A FRESH EXPLANATION OF GENESIS VI. 3.

THE Hebrew phrase in Genesis vi. 3, which is represented in the Authorized Version, and also in the text of the Revised Version, by "for that he also is flesh," belongs to the not inconsiderable number of Biblical sentences on which a large amount of scholarly ingenuity appears so far to have been spent to but little purpose. All the ancient versions and early commentators agree in treating the word "bēshaggām" (בֶּשַׁגָּאָם) as a compound of the particles "bē," "sha(g)," and "gam"; and the absolutely literal equivalent of this combination is to be found in the words "for that . . . also" contained in the authorized rendering of the phrase. Against this view modern scholarship has rightly seen fit to revolt. There is first of all the fact that nowhere else in the Hexateuch does the form "sha" take the place of the usual relative particle "āshēr" (אֲשֶׁר). Its occurrence¹ is, on the other hand, very frequent in Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon, and it is also found a certain number of times in several (presumably) later Psalms. There is, therefore, a pretty strong *prima facie* case against the solitary presence of the apparently late form "sha" in a document (J) which the critics assign to c. B.C. 750 at the latest.

Another very weighty objection to the traditional explanation of the word lies in the almost uniform² Masoretic pronunciation "bēshaggām," with a long syllable at the end; for the particle "gam" = "also" has a short *a*. We have, in fact, in the present case an instance of tradition being opposed to tradition. The traditional pronunciation of the word in question forces us to treat the termination

¹ For further details on this point, as also on the traditional pronunciation of בֶּשַׁגָּאָם, see Budde, *Die Biblische Urgeschichte*, p. 12 sqq.

² With this compare Mr. Ball's statement in his edition of Genesis (Haupt's Polychrome Bible), p. 52.

"ām" as a suffix of the third person plural; whilst the traditional rendering of the phrase presupposes a short syllable at the end as part of the word "gam" (also). And as the traditional translation is also opposed by the anomaly of the supposed presence of the form "sha," modern scholars have rightly decided to follow the Masoretic pronunciation rather than the ancient rendering of the word.

The old view was, however, too well established to be easily discarded from the text of the Revised Version; and it is only in the margin that the alternate translation, "in their going astray they are flesh," is to be found. In this the Revisers have shown the most excellent common sense. They rightly disliked the idea of exchanging an ancient doubtful translation for a modern equally doubtful one. The marginal rendering does justice to the termination "ām" of the word "bēshaggām"; but it in other respects substitutes new difficulties for the old ones. Hebrew scholars are aware that "shag," in the sense of "going astray,"¹ can only be allowed a very precarious sort of existence, and it is, moreover, very difficult to extract a satisfactory meaning from this translation of the phrase. If one says that "in their going astray they are flesh," one should also expect the converse to be true, that man is not flesh if he does not go astray; but in order to arrive at such a conclusion, a metaphysical train of reasoning is required which, I venture to say, is entirely foreign to the simple and crisp documents of which the book of Genesis is composed. An utterance like, "Pure and sinless man is not flesh, but spirit; it is only in his fall² that his fleshly nature appears," would sound entirely different from all the rest of the Hexateuch; and the cramped expression of the same

¹ Also on this point see Budde, *loc. cit.*

² The sense is by no means improved, if the "going astray" refers to the fall of the angels; see *c.g.* Budde and Ball in the passages already mentioned.

idea by the phrase "in their going astray they are flesh" is worse still. The critic who has so far written most elaborately in defence of this view is Professor Budde in his *Biblische Urgeschichte*. But the same writer has, alas! brought down the whole argument to a veritable *reductio ad absurdum* by his categorical declaration that Genesis vi. 3 must be bodily lifted out of its present position and transplanted to its supposed original place after chapter iii. v. 21. According to Budde, we should, therefore, have to read: "Unto Abram also, and to his wife, did the Lord God make coats of skins, and clothed them. And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man" (or, abide in man); "in their going astray they are flesh; let his days, therefore, be a hundred and twenty years." If literary criticism can accomplish feats of this kind, if it can, in a case like this, make it absolutely certain that a verse which now stands in one place of the Bible originally followed a different sequence altogether, no wonder that the archæologist, who may happen to have very little or no taste at all for a close literary analysis of the text, revolts against the whole method, and declares the "higher criticism" to be but the baseless fabric of the student's brain.

I will not tire the reader with a discussion of the four or five more or less ingenious emendations that have been proposed as substitutes for the Masoretic reading "bēshaggām." Those who have time and inclination for it will find a full account of nearly all that has so far¹ been said on the subject in Prof. Budde's well-known work to which I have referred. But I will now proceed to state as briefly as I can what appears to me to be the right explanation of this difficult phrase. In order to do this effectively, I must ask the reader's indulgence, if I begin with a brief grammatical analysis² of the word "bēshaggām." The letter א at the

¹ Mr. Ball (*op. cit.*) decides in favour of בְּשִׁגְגָם, "owing to their guilt."

² The analysis would indeed not be necessary, if the exact agreement between בְּשִׁגְגָם and בְּשִׁגְגָם had been laid stress on before.

beginning is no doubt a particle ; and it will be seen further on that, in conformity with the Authorized Version, it has in this instance the force of a conjunction. The word "shaggām" (שַׁגָּאָם) is exactly equal in form to "qawwām" (קַוָּוָם) in Ps. xix. 5. Now "qawwām" (their line) is compounded of "qāwē" or "qaw" (a line) and the suffix "ām" (their). Grammatically speaking, therefore, "shaggām" will have to be analysed in the same way, namely, into "shāgē" or "shag" and the suffix "ām." We thus arrive at the preliminary conclusion that we have here to deal with a substantive (not an infinitive) to which a pronominal possessive suffix is attached. The question which remains to be solved is what the meaning of the word "shāgē" or "shag" is. Here the Ethiopic, which is as closely related to Hebrew as Arabic, will help us out of our difficulty. In that language "shegā," which would be represented in Hebrew by "shāgē," means *σωμα*,¹ body. Applying this sense to the Hebrew word before us, we obtain the entirely satisfactory translation, "Inasmuch as their body (or substance) is but flesh." "My Spirit," says Yahweh, "shall not strive with man (or, abide in man) for ever, considering that his substance is but flesh." The divine breath of Yahweh's supernal life is so far exalted above the weak and fleshly nature of man that it cannot be permitted to stay for ever in such a gross kind of earthly body, a body, moreover, which has by its fall sunk lower in the scale of being than it had been at first, and has also been the means of lowering the dignity of the "sons of God."

Of the Arabic,² Syriac, and also other Hebrew analogies of the word "shēgā" or "shāgē," I will not speak now. Suffice it to say that the root-meaning of the word is that of "growing" or "increasing," and that it thus admirably

¹ It also means *σάρξ*, flesh ; but it is largely used in the sense of *σωμα*, body, the meaning required by the present passage.

² I must, however, mention that the Arabic word "sajjiyya(tun)" means "indoles, natura hominis."

applies to the physical or animal substance of the human body. No surprise need be felt at finding a fresh "hapax legomenon" in the Hebrew of the old Testament, considering that many other such are known to exist in it; and the fact of their occurrence is sufficiently accounted for by the comparatively small number of documents that have come down to us from the times of the ancient Hebrews.

I will, in conclusion, point out that the ancient versions and early commentators, though apparently mistaken in their analysis of the word "bēshaggām," nevertheless gave the general sense of the phrase correctly enough. For it can be seen at once that the rendering "for that he also is flesh" practically amounts to the same as "inasmuch as his substance is but flesh." This is indeed one of the, perhaps, not inconsiderable number of cases in which tradition was guided by common sense to perpetuate the right meaning of a phrase, notwithstanding the obscurity which had settled down on some form or forms of which the collateral analogies of cognate languages had been either lost or forgotten.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

WERE MATTHEW AND ZACCHÆUS THE SAME PERSON?

THIS may seem a startling question, but the reader must judge of the evidence for himself. It has generally been assumed that Matthew and Levi are two names of one and the same person, but considerable doubt is thrown on this identification by the alternative reading "Lebbæus" for "Thaddæus" in S. Matthew x. 3, and S. Mark iii. 18. In their "Notes on Select Readings" Westcott and Hort, commenting on this reading, observe: "This name is apparently due to an early attempt to bring Levi (*Λευεῖς*) the publican (Luke v. 27) within the Twelve, it being assumed

that his call was to apostleship; just as in Mark ii. 14 *Λευεῖς* is changed in western texts to *Ἰάκωβος* because τὸν τοῦ Ἀλφαίου follows, and it was assumed that the son of Halphæus, elsewhere named as one of the Twelve, must be meant. The difference between the two forms of the name would be inconsiderable in Aramaic, *Lewi* and *Levi* or *Lebi* or *Lebbi*; and *Λεββαῖος* might as easily represent *Lebbi* as *Θαδδαῖος* Thaddi. Indeed the identity of Levi and Lebbaeus, evidently resting on the presumed identity of the names in Greek, is implied in a remark of Origen. . . . In reply to a taunt of Celsus that Christ chose for His Apostles "publicans and sailors," Origen (Cels. 376) first allows no publican but Matthew, and then refers concessively to "Lebes [*Λεβῆς* but ? *Λευεῖς*], a publican who followed Jesus," "but," he adds, "he was in no wise of the number of the apostles except according to some copies of the Gospel according to Mark." WH point out that Origen was here so far at fault that he failed to observe that in S. Matthew as well as in S. Mark *Θαδδαῖον* was not the only reading.

We have learned to attach a greater value of late to Western readings than WH do; and it is the object of this paper to show some reason for believing that the Western text here preserves the right reading, and that Matthew and Levi are not to be identified, but rather Matthew and Zacchæus.

We may first note that it is natural to bring two sons of Alphæus together, as would in this case be done if we read Mark iii. 18, "James the son of Alphæus, and Levi." It was necessary to distinguish this James from the son of Zebedee; hence the patronymic is placed after his name only.

But what seems to me to supply the missing link in the evidence is the fact that Clement of Alexandria informs us that, according to some authorities, the name of the

publican in Luke xix. 1-10 was "Matthias" (*Strom.* iv. 35). In another passage he says "Matthew" (*Quis Dives*, 13). Here he couples together "Zacchæus and Matthew, who were rich men and publicans." Zahn remarks that, in this passage, Clement refers only to Luke xix. 5-7, or its apocryphal parallels, and not to Matthew ix. 9 ff. For the passage runs, "The Lord Himself bids Zacchæus and Matthew . . . entertain Him." I think Zahn is right, and that Clement means that his readers must decide for themselves whether Zacchæus or Matthew is the right name in the pericope alluded to. "The Lord," he says in effect, "bids rich men and publicans entertain Him, as in the story about Zacchæus and Matthew"—the story, that is, as told, on the one hand in the canonical Gospel of S. Luke, and, on the other hand, in the Apocryphal Gospel, which read Matthew for Zacchæus. Clement does not attempt to reconcile this inconsistency, but it seems natural to suppose that Matthew and Zacchæus are really two separate names of one and the same person. By the time of Clement this fact may have been forgotten. At any rate he is content to note the divergence of his authorities on the point without accounting for it. Thus we have in this passage of Clement a presumption that Matthew and Zacchæus were, respectively, the nomen and prænomen of one rich publican. The reading of Matthew x. 3, which appears in our A.V., "Lebbæus, whose surname was Thaddæus" (ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θαδδαῖος) may likewise owe its origin to the fact that Thaddæus was Levi's "nomen gentilicium." WH regard this as a case of conflation, but it is found not only in the Peschito, but also in the Æthiopic and Armenian versions, and one Latin version. It is clear, at any rate, that one of the apostles was known by the name "Thaddæus" c. 250 A.D., for it was about this time that the legend of "Addai" or "Thaddæus" originated at Edessa, and it is possible that Levi Thaddæus

did preach the gospel in Eastern Syria, though doubtless it was not until the conversion of the King Abgar Bar Manu, in the latter half of the second century, that the gospel began to make any real progress in this region.

But what was the Apocryphal Gospel in which Clement found Matthew substituted for Zacchæus? Zahn thinks that it must have been the "Gospel of Matthias," which is referred to occasionally in the lists of apocryphal gospels which have come down to us, and he therefore regards Matthew as a slip for Matthias. He supposes that the earlier gnostics pretended to have access to a secret tradition of Matthias, and deliberately assigned certain episodes of the gospel story to him, and published their own garbled version of the gospel under the title of the "Gospel of Matthias," or the "Traditions of Matthias."

If, however, we examine the evidence for the existence of this supposed extra-canonical Gospel of Matthias, I think we shall find that it all resolves itself into the simple fact that the "Gospel according to the Egyptians" was, in the main, based on the original Gospel of S. Matthew, and was therefore known as "the Gospel according to S. Matthew," or "the Traditions of S. Matthew." I will endeavour briefly to substantiate this statement.

In the fragments which Zahn has collected of Origen's scholia on Luke i. 1, we read: "Matthew did not merely take in hand to write a gospel, but actually wrote one, being moved by the Holy Ghost; likewise both Mark and John, as also Luke . . . Many indeed 'took in hand' both the Gospel according to Matthias, and many others: but the Church of God prefers the four (canonical) Gospels alone." If we suppose that Matthias is a misreading for Matthew, what Origen here says is that there had been many recensions of the Gospel of S. Matthew, "written up" by those who "took it in hand." This is exactly what the Gospel according to the Egyptians appears to

have been. It is perfectly natural that, as an Apocryphal Gospel seemed to be referred to, and it was assumed that no such gospel could be entitled "according to Matthew," copyists should have substituted Matthias. Similarly, in other supposed references to a Gospel of Matthias, it is highly probable that Matthias should be corrected into Matthew.

A similar result is suggested by the position of this Apocryphal "Gospel of Matthias" in the three lists of apocryphal books in which it occurs. These are (1) the so-called "Decretum Gelasii," (2) the rescript of Pope Innocent I., (3) the Appendix to the list of "Sixty Canonical Books." In the first case, under the "Notitia librorum apocryphorum qui non recipiuntur," the list of Apocryphal Gospels is headed with those of Matthias and Peter. In the rescript of Pope Innocent, after the list of canonical books, we read, "But the rest, whether under the name of Matthias or James the Less, or under the name of Peter . . . are not only to be repudiated, but also to be condemned." The Appendix to the "Sixty Canonical Books" only mentions two Gospels, those according to "Barnabas," and "Matthias." A variant reading is "Matthew." The close association of the Gospels of Matthias and Peter in the two older lists, and their position at the head of the list in the "Decretum Gelasii," suggest that we have here to do with the two great Apocryphal Gospels, which we know to have been current together in Egypt—the Gospel according to the Egyptians and the Gospel of Peter. I cannot here go into the further reasons which lead me to believe that Basilides was the author of the "Gospel according to the Egyptians," but may perhaps be permitted to refer the reader to my *Lectures on the Early History of the Gospels*, in which I have tried to justify this position.

It is true that no absolute proof of the identity of

Matthew and Zacchæus has been, or, to my knowledge, can be, adduced, but I think we may fairly say that there is a very strong presumption in favour of such a theory. Clement was not a Jew, but an Athenian; else he might have sifted the matter further, and have suggested the identity of Matthew and Zacchæus. But he seems to have been indifferent to such a detail: what he cared about was the fact that our Lord taught rich publicans, whatever their name might have been, to use their money for good purposes.

It may be worth while, in conclusion, to refer to the tradition, which we find in the Clementine Homilies, that Zacchæus was the first bishop of Cæsarea. If, at the date when the original Clementine romance was written, Matthew and Zacchæus were convertible names, we have a natural explanation of the undoubted prominence of Zacchæus in the early Church of Western Palestine here referred to, and of the fact that the author of the Clementine Homilies assigns to Zacchæus a position of equal rank with Clement of Rome, asserting that they succeeded, respectively, in the West and the East, to the original primacy of S. James, Bishop of Jerusalem.

It is not improbable that Zacchæus was S. Matthew's tribal name. In Ezra ii. 9 we read of the "children of Zaccai," who are mentioned as one of the families who returned from the Captivity. There is a striking similarity of form between "Addai" and "Zaccai," suggesting that both Zacchæus and Thaddæus were "*nomina gentilicia*." Zacchæus may thus very well have been a sort of surname, and it would be by this name, rather than by the more homely name of Matthew, that the great Apostle would be known to the outside world in the early days of Christianity.

J. H. WILKINSON.

HARNACK, JÜLICHER, AND SPITTA ON THE LORD'S SUPPER.

I.

OF recent years there has been considerable discussion in theological circles in Germany regarding the Lord's Supper, discussion which, in view of the important place the rite holds in the worship of the Church and the reverence with which it is regarded, has naturally awakened considerable interest. In this paper it is proposed to give a brief sketch of some of the more important contributions to this discussion. In reviewing the articles of Harnack, Jülicher, and Spitta, we shall obtain a fair idea of the main questions which have been raised.

Harnack may be said to have given the start to the discussion in 1891 by his paper, "Bread and Water, the Eucharistic Elements in Justin" (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, VII. 2, pp. 117-144). His object in this paper is to prove that in Justin, the most important witness to the practice of the early Church, the eucharistic elements are represented as bread and water. Having established this point, he proceeds to draw from it certain conclusions as to the nature of the rite itself.

Aware of the startling nature of the question he raises, he endeavours to prepare the way for it by showing that among early Christians the practice of celebrating with bread and water was very prevalent. We find it not only among Gnostics, but in sects differing so widely as Ebionites and Encratites, a proof at once of its antiquity and its wide diffusion. Nor only in heretical sects. We have the evidence of Cyprian to show that it obtained also in the Catholic Churches. From a letter addressed by him to Cæcilius we learn that it was the custom with several North African bishops to celebrate with bread and water. They appear to have defended this practice on the following grounds :—

(1) By appeal to Scripture. All the passages in the Old Testament which speak of the giving of water to drink are cited. The *locus classicus*, according to Harnack, seems to have been Isaiah xxxiii. 16, ἀρτος αὐτῷ δοθήσεται, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ πιστόν.

(2) On grounds of expediency. The smell of wine in the early morning betrayed the Christian. The Aquarii seemed to have argued that seeing some liberty had been used in changing the celebration from evening to morning, a similar latitude might be permitted in the substitution of water for wine.

(3) By appeal to tradition. The practice would hardly have been defended on the above grounds had there not been a precedent for it, and Cyprian himself admits that there were *Antecessores* to whom the North African Church could appeal.

It was no novelty, then, this that Cyprian was protesting against, but a practice which had been some time in vogue. How long we cannot say, but Harnack is of opinion that, seeing it was not based on ascetic grounds, it must have dated from a very early period.

Having thus prepared the way, Harnack comes to the evidence of Justin. The important passage is *Apol.* I. 65-67; but before considering this he first examines all the other passages in Justin's works, in which we have, or might expect, a reference to the Lord's Supper. This examination yields the following results:

(1) Justin never speaks of wine in the celebration.

(2) In the only passage in which he mentions the liquid (*Dial.* 70) he applies the ὕδωρ πιστόν of Isaiah xxxiii. 16 to the Sacrament.

(3) In six passages in which he mentions the blessing on Judah ("Binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass's colt unto the choice vine; he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes")—a passage consistently

applied by later Fathers to the Lord's Supper—Justin suggests no such application; and even when, on the lines of this passage, he is drawing a comparison between Christ and Dionysus, the point of comparison is found, not in the wine which finds a place in the religious mysteries of Christ and of Dionysus, but in the ass, and the vine to which the disciples are represented as having found the colt bound.

(4) In the two passages where Christ and Dionysus are compared, Harnack suggests that the text has been corrupted, and *οἶνος* substituted for *δνος*, which is evidently the correct reading.

There remains, then, the passage, *Apol.* i. 65–67, in which the elements are mentioned five times. Two of the instances may be dismissed as unimportant, inasmuch as they leave the question open as to what the contents of the cup are. Upon the other three, then, the decision depends. At first sight they appear to tell decidedly against Harnack's contention. But he believes he has good ground for suspecting their genuineness. One of them (c. 65) mentions *ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος* as the elements. The juxtaposition of *ὕδατος* and *κράματος* Harnack finds suspicious, *κρᾶμα* being itself a mixture of wine and water. One naturally conjectures that the *καὶ κράματος* is an interpolation. But we are not left to conjecture. There exists a second MS. for chapters 65–67, the Ottobianus, and in it the suspicious words *καὶ κράματος* are wanting. In the other two passages which remain the elements are given as *ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ*. But we have seen that in two other passages *οἶνος* has been smuggled in instead of *δνος*, and that *καὶ κράματος* has been added to the bread and water which Justin gives as the elements. In these circumstances Harnack has little hesitation in regarding the addition of the *οἶνος* here as due to the hand of an emen-

dator, and instead of *ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ*, would read, in both passages, simply *ἄρτος καὶ ὕδωρ*.

Justin then, Harnack concludes, describes a celebration of the Lord's Supper, in which bread and water, not bread and wine and water, were the elements, and his disciple Tatian was introducing nothing new when he used water alone.

The prevalence of the practice of celebrating with water instead of wine—from Justin's words we might almost conclude it was the general rule—militates against the suggestion that it was due to ascetic tendencies. From Cyprian we have learned that it was based upon tradition. With the object of tracing the origin of the practice, Harnack collects all the available material up to the old Catholic Fathers, which he arranges in the following four groups :

(1) Passages in which wine (or wine and water) is expressly mentioned.

(2) Those which speak only of the cup or of the draught.

(3) Those which speak of water.

(4) Those which mention only the breaking of bread, and are silent as to the cup.

The conclusions which follow from this survey are to Harnack very clear. The Lord's Supper, as it was originally understood, was a simple meal. The blessing of it was connected not with the bread and wine, but with the eating and drinking. Bread and wine are a simple meal. A still simpler is bread and water, and one more within the reach of the poor. This too may become the Lord's meal. The most constant element in a meal is bread. The contents of the cup may vary. So the constant element in the Lord's Supper is the bread; the draught is only the accompaniment of the bread, and what kind of drink is used is matter of indifference. The elements

of the Lord's Supper are *bread and the cup*—not necessarily the cup of wine.

That this was the case in earliest times is proved by Paul's testimony. In 1 Corinthians x. 16, xi. 23–28, he speaks only of bread and the cup. True he assumes (1 Cor. xi. 21) that wine is drunk at the Agape, but on the other hand he compares the sacramental draught to the water drunk by the Israelites in the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 4), and says absolutely *καλὸν τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα, μηδὲ πεῖν οἶνον* (Rom. xiv. 21). To except the sacramental wine is an "unworthy evasion." In 1 Corinthians x. 17 he speaks of the Lord's Supper as if it were a matter of bread alone. In Paul, then, we find all the elements which explain the later practice. We need not wonder that it became the practice later, even in Rome, to celebrate with bread and water, when Paul himself sanctioned such liberty. The position of the Fourth Evangelist is practically the same. To the believer Jesus Christ converts bodily nourishment into spiritual—that is the important point. In this connexion he mentions bread—for bread is nourishment *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*—and calls Christ the Bread come down from heaven. He says nothing of wine, but speaks of the living water (iv. 6).

Ignatius and the *Didache* follow on the same lines. The former says nothing of wine, but mentions only the bread, and speaks of spiritual eating and drinking. The latter finds in the phrase *κλάσις τοῦ ἄρτου* a sufficient description of the ceremony. Evidently the drink is regarded only as an accompaniment.

Justin is only following Paul and John and Ignatius, then, when he describes the gathering of the Christians as a gathering *εἰς ἄρτους* (*Apol.* i. 67), and his phrase *τροφὴ ξηρά τε καὶ ὑγρά* may be regarded as the classical one to express the earliest view of the Sacrament. In Justin, it is true, we find a certain advance beyond the position of

Paul. Paul's is the standpoint of freedom. To celebrate with water is permissible. But in the time of Justin the permissible has become the regular practice. How did this come about? And how did the practice so quickly cease? We can only conjecture. Harnack gives the following sketch of what he believes may have been the course of development :

Jesus instituted a meal to commemorate His death, or rather, He represented bodily nourishment as His flesh and blood, *i.e.* as nourishment of the soul (through forgiveness of sin), if partaken of in thankful commemoration of His death. When Jesus instituted the rite, bread and wine stood on the table, and these were the elements He selected. These were also, no doubt, the elements which the disciples used in their daily celebration. But from the beginning the breaking and the eating of bread occupied the foreground ; for it was a meal that was celebrated. At the meal there was drink, and whatever was drunk was drunk as the blood of Christ. It was sometimes, especially with the poor, water. Ascetic tendencies contributed to the substitution of water for wine. Paul warned against offending the weaker brethren who scrupled to use wine. And so the practice of celebrating with wine and water gradually increased, especially between 64 and 150 A.D., until towards the end of this period Justin could speak as if it were the established custom. But after 150 A.D. a reaction set in. The Church perceived the danger of the ascetic tendencies which had contributed to the celebration with water. At the same time reverence for the letter of Scripture increased. According to the Gospels Christ had used wine at the institution of the Lord's Supper. Upon this fact the Church took its stand in opposing the water celebration. Wine and water may have been suggested as a compromise, but wine was insisted on. Naturally, of course, the practice of using water took some

time to die out. As the ascetic reasons for the practice were abandoned, considerations of expediency, as we have seen, took their place. But gradually the Catholic manner of celebration gained the ascendancy, until at last even the memory of the former practice almost disappeared.

The lesson which Harnack would draw from his study of the subject is briefly this:—That it is an error to think that the elements in the Lord's Supper are matter of importance. It is *the act* of eating and drinking that is the distinctive feature. "In representing nourishment as His body and blood, the Lord has sanctified the most important function of the natural life. He thus introduces Himself into the midst of the natural life of His followers, bidding them nourish this natural life for the development of the spiritual. This they cannot do of themselves; but Jesus promises at every meal which they celebrate in His memory to be present with the power of forgiveness of sins."

Harnack's paper excited a good deal of adverse criticism. It called forth a reply from Jülicher among others, whose paper "On the History of the Celebration of the Lord's Supper in the Early Church" (*Theologische Abhandlungen, Weizsäcker gewidmet*, 1892, pp. 217–250) contains a spirited attack upon the conclusions of Harnack, and an interesting contribution to the discussion as to the significance of the Lord's Supper, suggested by the latter part of Harnack's article. We proceed to give a brief survey of the course of his arguments.

First then in criticism of Harnack. It is quite true, Jülicher admits, that, apart from *Apol.* i. 65–67, Justin never speaks of wine in the Sacrament. But there is nothing surprising in the fact that instead of bread and wine he should speak of bread and the cup, seeing that these are the expressions used by Paul and the Synoptists. And it is true, further, as Harnack points out, that Justin applies the *ὕδωρ πιστόν* of Isaiah xxxiii. 16 to the Sacra-

ment. But must we therefore conclude that the cup contained only water? By no means. All we conclude is that Justin, having been induced by the *ἄρτος δοθήσεται αὐτῷ* to interpret the verse with reference to the Eucharist, proceeded further to apply the *ὑδωρ πιστόν* to the sacramental wine—no great liberty in a typologist. The comparison of the *ὑδωρ πιστόν* to the wine of the Sacrament is not a whit more striking than that of the wine to the blood of Christ. As to the fact that Justin, in the various passages in which he speaks of the blessing on Judah (Gen. xlix. 11), finds no reference to the wine of the Eucharist, this is by no means so significant as Harnack would make out. As a matter of fact, Novatian, Augustine, and many other writers explain the passage without any reference to the sacramental wine. In Justin's case, indeed, such a reference would be out of place. His explanation of the verse is a piece of fantastic allegory. Why then should we expect him to take the words *ἐν οἴνῳ* and *ἐν αἵματι σταφυλῆς* literally?

Harnack lays much stress on the fact that *δνος* has twice been changed into *οἶνος* in *Apol.* 54 and *Dial.* 69, where Justin is making a comparison between Christ and Dionysus, and finds in the correction an attempt to draw a parallel between the Lord's Supper and the Dionysus mysteries. Jülicher admits the text-correction, admits even the motive which, according to Harnack, inspired it; but he denies the importance which Harnack assigns to the fact. The matter may be very simply explained. The copyist did not know anything about the ass in the Dionysus mysteries, but he knew that Dionysus was the god of wine, and naturally thought that *δνος* was a mistake for *οἶνος*. But that does not justify us in concluding that every other *οἶνος* in Justin, concerning which we feel doubtful, must be ascribed to this copyist. It is by no means improbable that a scribe of the fifth or ninth cen-

tury, who found an esteemed Father like Justin giving bread and water as the elements in the Lord's Supper, may have thought it a mistake and added *καὶ οἶνος*; but the probability is in no way increased by the fact that the same scribe, in two quite different passages, changed an *ὄνος* which he did not understand into *οἶνος*.

There remains then only the section *Apol.* 65-67 as evidence that Justin gives water as the second element. What do we find in it? The elements are mentioned three times, once as *ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος*, and twice as *ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ*. What strikes us first is that there appear to be three elements here instead of two. Why this explicit mention of the water, seeing it was understood as a matter of course? Jülicher accepts Zahn's explanation, that Justin's object in expressly mentioning the water is to show the groundlessness of the calumnies current as to the orgies celebrated at the meetings of the Christians. The use of *κράμα* in the first of the three passages is strange. We should have expected *οἶνος*; and Harnack has no hesitation in concluding that it is an interpolation. But the very strangeness of the word is against this. If there is an interpolation here, surely the corrector would have chosen the simple *οἶνος* which occurs immediately after, instead of this strange word *κράμα*. It is true that in another MS. of later date the *καὶ κράματος* is wanting. But this later MS. is full of errors, and the omission of *καὶ κράμα-τος* after *ὕδ-ατος* may easily be explained by Homoioteleuton. The difficulty of the word *κράμα* still remains. We must probably take it as meaning the wine mixed with water.

Harnack's arguments in favour of the reading *ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος* in chapter 65, then, fall to the ground. With them falls all reason for believing the *οἶνος* in the other passages—attested by both MSS.—to be spurious.

But even though Justin's testimony be discredited, there

still remains a formidable array of evidence brought forward by Harnack in proof of the use of water in the Sacrament. Jülicher subjects it also to severe examination. That it was the practice among various sects to use water is no proof, he urges, of a tradition to this effect in the Church. The practice may be easily accounted for by the ascetic or dualistic tendencies of the sects concerned. If, as Harnack alleges, they appealed to Scripture in support of their practice, that is rather a proof that the practice so defended was an innovation. From Cyprian's letter, indeed, it is plain that the practice obtained to a certain extent in the Church in Africa. But to what extent? Throughout the whole province? as Harnack concludes. Surely this is too wide an interpretation of the *quidam* whom Cyprian mentions. Apart from this letter of Cyprian's, we should never have heard of such a practice in the African Church. Can we believe, then, that it was general? Hardly. It is not the prevalence of the practice, but the novelty of it, and the importance of the point at issue, that makes Cyprian enter so fully into the matter.

Harnack concludes further from Cyprian's letter that the practice was supported by an appeal to Scripture. This Jülicher regards as very questionable. It is hardly compatible with the *ignorantia* and *simplicitas* which Cyprian attributes to the offenders. True, Cyprian touches on various passages of Scripture. But we have no proof that they had been already cited by his opponents. Most probably it was he himself who first introduced them into the discussion. Having entered on the question, he is determined to thrash it out, and anticipates any possible defence that may be made on the authority of Scripture.

How are we to account for the origin of this practice? Harnack attributes it to fear lest the smell of wine in the morning should betray the Christian. But this motive of fear is only urged by Cyprian as a reproach, and is hardly

to be taken seriously. Jülicher advances a simpler explanation. The use of wine in the morning was an offence against the laws of good society. He quotes Clemens Alexandrinus and Novatian in proof of this feeling. In justification of the use of water instead of wine at the morning celebration, it was urged that the change from evening to morning warranted some change also in the elements employed. So the Aquarii used water in the morning, and in the evening *mixtum calicem*. A long-established practice may have contributed further to the use of water at the morning celebration. It was customary to take some of the consecrated bread home and partake of it next morning before any other food. This could not be done with the wine; but if the bread were dipped in water, one had the feeling of having fully partaken of the Eucharistic meal. If that was permissible to the individual, why not to the whole congregation?

It remains now to consider the evidence of Paul, in whom Harnack professes to find all the elements which explain the later practice. That Romans xiv. 21, *καλὸν τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα μηδὲ πεῖν οἶνον*, should have been adduced by Harnack in support of his thesis, is in the highest degree surprising. There is not a single word in the whole context suggesting reference to the Lord's Supper. The Apostle is enforcing by concrete example the propriety of sacrificing our liberty when the conscience of a weak brother is imperilled. The point in question is that of meats. It is about meat and eating that Paul is speaking all through the chapter. It is only when he comes to sum up the discussion in a general conclusion that he speaks of drink, just as he sums up the corresponding discussion in 1 Corinthians with the general law, *εἴτε οὖν ἐσθίετε, εἴτε πίνετε, εἴτε τι ποιεῖτε, πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε* (1 Cor. x. 31). Do we conclude from that verse in Corinthians that there was any question as to the per-

missibility of wine? Equally inadmissible is any such conclusion from Romans xiv. 21. But further, the whole context not only does not admit, but positively forbids, any reference to the wine of the Lord's Supper. Paul is speaking of that which a brother regards as *κοινόν*. Could any Roman Christian at the time Paul was writing have thus regarded the wine which Christ offered to His disciples at His last meal? And can we imagine Paul complaisantly giving way to such scruples, and urging the majority to alter the character of their celebration in conformity to them?

The other passages in Paul appealed to by Harnack are equally unconvincing. 1 Corinthians x. 23 no more proves the use of water in the Sacrament than the *ὕδωρ πιστόν* of Isaiah xxxiii. 16 in Justin. That the Lord's Supper was celebrated among the disciples as a meal is true indeed, and we are grateful to Harnack for emphasizing this aspect of the Eucharist. But he goes too far when he puts the breaking and eating of bread in the foreground, and regards the drink as no integral part of the meal. To the Oriental, drinking is as essential a part of a meal as eating. 1 Corinthians x. 17 does not prove the greater importance attached to the bread. Paul could hardly have used the cup to illustrate the thought he wished to express.

Specially noteworthy is the protest which Jülicher makes against the distinction drawn by Harnack between the Lord's Supper and the Agape. This, he maintains, is to introduce later distinctions into apostolic times. Paul knows nothing of an Agape and an Eucharist thereafter, but of one celebration alone, which from beginning to end was, or should be, *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*. When he speaks of one *ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων ἀναξίως* (1 Cor. xi. 27), he is thinking, not of a man who has become intoxicated at the preceding Agape, but of one who regards the Lord's Supper as an ordinary meal and thinks only of satisfying his appetite.

What Paul blames in the Corinthians is not that they allow some brethren to come hungry to the table of the Lord while they have themselves eaten to the full, but that *at that table* they snatch greedily at the bread and wine for themselves, instead of dividing it in a brotherly spirit among all. We must remember how different was the celebration then from what it is now. The Lord's Supper was a meal. The bread and wine were passed round to all, not once but many times, until all had been consumed. When Paul blames the Corinthians because *ἕκαστος τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον προλαμβάνει*, it is because they are frustrating the purpose not of the preceding Agape, but of the Lord's Supper, a meal not for the satisfaction of one's appetites but for realising the brotherly unity of the Christian congregation.

We come now to the most interesting part of Jülicher's paper. He raises the following most important question as to the origin of these *κυριακὰ δεῖπνα* of which we read in Paul: Is there reason to believe that Jesus formally instituted the Lord's Supper as a rite intended to be repeated among believers in commemoration of His death? Startling as the question appears, it is forced upon us by a careful examination of the authorities. We have four accounts of the Lord's Supper—Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul. Matthew and Mark say nothing of such formal institution; Luke and Paul, on the other hand, plainly assert it. But Luke's indebtedness to Paul here is generally admitted. We have then Paul on the one side as an independent witness, and Matthew and Mark on the other. Matthew and Mark are certainly some decades later than 1 Corinthians, but they, like Paul, are no doubt merely reproducing the traditional account they have received. The sources from which they draw are similar to Paul's, and the decision as to which account is to be preferred must rest on internal evidence. Comparison of Matthew and Mark leads to the conclusion that the shorter account

of Mark is the original. The choice then rests between Mark and Paul, and Jülicher has little hesitation in deciding for Mark. We detect the hand of Paul in the complicated *τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἑμῷ αἵματι*, as compared with the simple and more natural *τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου τῆς διαθήκης* of Mark. Possibly the *καινὴ* of Paul is original, but otherwise our verdict must be in favour of Mark. But see what follows. While Paul has *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, Mark has only the simple *λάβετε*—a slight difference according to Weizsäcker, but to Jülicher of the very highest importance. For with Mark alone before us we should never conclude that Jesus meant the celebration to be repeated. Now we can imagine no reason why Mark should have omitted the injunction which we have in Paul, had he found it in the tradition on which he was basing. From the earliest times, so far as we can learn, the Church had adopted the view presented by Paul. If Mark omits all mention of this formal institution, then it must be because he found nothing to that effect in the source from which he drew. But while we can imagine no reason for the omission of the words of institution, if they had been preserved in the tradition, we can easily account for their insertion if they had not. They are only the explicit statement of what was universally believed to be the Saviour's purpose in the celebration. What more natural than that some words should have been introduced into the narrative, expressly indicating what all understood to be the Saviour's intention! We conclude then that in Mark and Matthew we have the earliest tradition regarding the Lord's Supper—the earliest tradition, according to which Jesus gave no indication that He desired the celebration to be repeated.

But if Jesus did not institute the rite in remembrance of Himself, what purpose had He in the celebration? What meaning are we to attach to the impressive words with

which He handed to His disciples the bread and cup, "This is My body," "This is My blood"? Weizsäcker has described them as "a parable," and Jülicher accepts the description; but not in the sense in which Weizsäcker uses the word. He protests here, as he has done so vigorously elsewhere, against the parables of Jesus being regarded as riddles of which He gave the solution to His disciples in private. Can we imagine Jesus, a few hours before His death, on the last occasion on which He could speak in peace with His disciples, leaving as a legacy to His most intimate friends—a problem to solve? No, the words which flow from a heart moved as that of Jesus must have been at this time are plain and simple, words from the heart to the heart. The more ingenious or profound the interpretation advanced of the Saviour's words, the greater reason for suspecting it. For this reason Jülicher rejects Harnack's interpretation. It makes too great demands on the hearer or reader, and gives a meaning to the words of Jesus which only the ingenuity of the student can discover in them. The simplest explanation is the best. Jesus lets the cup full of red wine pass round among His disciples. "As this wine will soon disappear," He says to them virtually, "so will My blood soon be shed; but not in vain," He adds to comfort them, "for it is shed *ὕπερ πολλῶν*; it is blood of the covenant." His words, when He hands the bread to His disciples, are to be understood in the same sense. Weizsäcker would make a distinction between the two parts of the celebration. In the wine he sees a reference to the death of Christ; but when Jesus says of the bread, "This is My body," he thinks that, so far from pointing to the death of this body, He is referring to His personal presence, of which He had given promise in Matthew xviii. 20. The objection to this is obvious. Is it likely that Jesus, with the two elements for consumption on the table before Him, would choose one of them as a

symbol of the permanent and the other as a symbol of the perishable? Or that He would select that body, to whose death He is about to refer in the next breath, as a symbol of His permanent presence? And if He had done so, is it likely that the disciples would have understood Him? No. Nothing is more certain to Jülicher than that both parts of the celebration are to be interpreted in the same sense. True, bread in itself does not suggest the death of the body; but all the four accounts mention the breaking of the bread, and it is here that the point of comparison lies. By bread and wine, then, Jesus illustrates the same thought. They are used by metonymy to denote the perishable part of Him, bread the solid being compared to His body, wine the liquid to His blood. It is quite in accordance with the practice of Jesus to use such a double illustration. We have called His words a parable, and we know how frequently He used a pair of parables to illustrate the same thought, *e.g.* the leaven and the mustard-seed, the lost sheep and the lost piece of silver. Those who have the craze for interpreting the parables as allegories will no doubt want to know why bread is chosen to represent Christ's body and wine His blood. That is a question which must be left to the allegorisers to discuss. In so far Harnack is quite right. Jesus could have illustrated the same thought by the Paschal lamb and a cup of water.

So far as we have gone we have found the *tertium comparationis* in the *ἐκλασεν* in the one case, and the *ἐκχυννόμενον* in the other. And the thought suggested by the "parable" is the impending death of Christ. But Jesus speaks not only of His death but of the blessings which follow from it. And in view of this we may ask further: Is it mere accident that the elements Jesus selects are things for eating and drinking, things which nourish the body? Or does He mean further to suggest that just as the bread, when it is broken and devoured, gives nourish-

ment and strength, so the destruction of His body will result in blessing to man? And of the wine likewise? It may be so. In this case we should have to widen our conception of the *tertium comparationis*, and instead of confining it to the points mentioned above, regard it as embracing the nutritive character of the elements as well. This further thought is not so certain as the reference to the death. Even if we admit it, however, it is quite a different thing from what Harnack professes to find in the celebration when he speaks of it as "the sanctification of the most important function of the natural life." Are the sower and the seed and the leaven sanctified by their place in the parables of Jesus?

Briefly then to sum up Jülicher's conclusions. The Lord's Supper is neither a riddle propounded by Jesus to His disciples, nor an important contribution to Christian ethics, nor a provision in any way for the Church of the future. Jesus inaugurated nothing, instituted nothing. He had no thought of keeping His memory fresh. The Man who spoke Matthew xxvi. 29 did not look forward to any long separation. His action at the table is to be regarded simply as a solemn farewell to His disciples. His hour has come; and He desires to assure them that the death He is going to meet, which appears to involve the frustration of all His hopes and plans, will yet be a source of blessing to man. The words that fall from His lips are addressed to Himself as well as to them. If they are meant to comfort His disciples, they serve at the same time to lighten His own heart.

But if Jesus had no thought of making a permanent institution of the celebration, how did it come so soon to acquire this character in the early Church? To this question the last part of Jülicher's paper is devoted. He gives a sketch of the possible course of events. The celebration must have made a deep impression upon the disciples.

How precious the words of Jesus must have seemed to them as they began to recover from the shock of His death! When they assembled again at Jerusalem, the little family eagerly looking for the return of the Head, would not every meal at which they met together recall that last supper they had eaten with their Master—what He had said and done? As they broke bread to eat, as the cup was passed round, would they not repeat what Jesus had said at that farewell meal? So the rite would live on in the early Church. So far as possible believers would endeavour to reproduce the original situation, and it appears highly improbable to Jülicher that water or anything else would be used instead of wine. But one point of difference there must be—now there was a looking back, whereas in the original celebration there had been a looking forward. The purpose of the first Lord's Supper had been τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλειν. This purpose was not lost sight of later (1 Cor. xi. 26), but the "shewing forth" now took the form of commemoration; nor was it likely that this daily commemoration of the death of Christ, in which the faith and love of the brotherhood found appropriate expression, would be continued were it believed to be contrary to the will, or without the sanction, of the Master. It was only to be expected that some words, such as the τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, should find their way into the narrative. We do not know what may have happened at the first of these celebrations at Jerusalem. Possibly some of those appearances of the risen Saviour which are mentioned in 1 Corinthians xv. 5, 7 may have taken place on such occasions. If so, that would increase the reverence attached to these δειπνα κυριακά. But even without this we can understand how readily such celebrations would become a sacred practice in the early Church, and would be introduced into every new congregation, so that one Christian might recognise

another ἐν τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου (Luke xxiv. 35). In the second century congregations became too large for meeting together at an ordinary meal; abuses, such as those mentioned in 1 Corinthians, suggested the need of a change, to which no doubt the feeling that there was a certain profanation in associating such a solemn celebration with a meal for the satisfaction of the appetites contributed. And so gradually, but not for a long time, not till they had assumed new forms and been employed for new purposes, the original δειπνα disappeared. The meaning of the celebration was changed; massive formulas were employed to describe the blessings which flowed from participation; the τοῦτο ἐστίν was taken literally, as proving that it was actually the body and blood of Christ that was partaken of.

“The purpose of the first Eucharist was to teach the disciples to believe in and understand the death of Christ. His followers continued to celebrate it in commemoration of that death. This is the point of view of Paul, the man who has contributed most to our appreciation of the death of the Saviour. But with him the celebration has lost its mournful character, for the death of Christ is to him tidings of gladness. The ‘for you’ has absorbed the other elements, and in the Lord’s Supper we are celebrating not what we have lost, but what we have gained by Golgotha. In spite of the enormous changes which the piety or the superstition of later ages has introduced, the Lord’s Supper still fulfils the purpose which the Saviour had in view—to reconcile His followers to the fact, and enlighten them as to the significance, of His death.”

G. WANCHOPE STEWART.

DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN ROMANS.

V. FAITH, AND PEACE WITH GOD.

HAVING stated fully and formally, in Romans iii. 21-26, his two great fundamental doctrines of (1) righteousness or justification through faith and (2) through the death of Christ, St. Paul at once draws from them in verse 27, by a question, a logical inference. "Where then is the exultation? It has been shut out." That the first-mentioned consequence of justification is exclusion of boasting, may seem strange. But probably Jewish boasting of a special favour and indulgence of God was one of the most serious hindrances to the early spread of the Gospel. That St. Paul refers here to distinctly Jewish boasting, is made evident by the words *apart from works of law* in verse 28, by the question in verse 29, *is it of Jews only that He is God?* and by the reference in verse 30 to *circumcision* and *uncircumcision*. This reference to Jewish boasting gives the writer an opportunity of twice restating his first fundamental doctrine, viz. in verse 28, "we reckon that a man is justified by faith, apart from works of law"; and in verse 30, "God is One, who will justify circumcision by faith and uncircumcision through faith."

Notice the phrase *a law of faith*. Evidently the Apostle means that, by announcing salvation for all who believe, God proclaimed a new law requiring men, under penalty of His disfavour, to believe the Gospel of Christ. Similarly in Acts xvii. 30: "He now commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent." The phrase *law of faith* is another example, in addition to those mentioned in my former papers, of the Gospel cast by this great student of law into legal phraseology.

A common objection to the Gospel which overturns Jewish boasting is at once stated and met; or rather a

common objection is made a stepping stone to important positive teaching in support of the main doctrine. It might be objected that, by overturning Jewish boasting, the Gospel overturned also the ancient Law in which the Jews boasted as a mark of the special favour of God towards their nation. St. Paul therefore asks, "do we then make the Law of no effect through the faith" which we preach? The absence of the article before the word νόμον, thrust conspicuously to the beginning of the question and repeated in the answer, leaves to it the fullest latitude, and suggests that to overturn the Law of Moses is to overturn the whole principle of law. But the long reference to Abraham in the verse and chapter following and the quotations from Genesis prove that the writer had specially in view the sacred books in which, in ancient Israel, the abstract principle of law had assumed historic and literary form. A close parallel is found, in an epistle closely allied to that to the Romans, in Galatians iv. 21, "tell me, ye who wish to be under law, do ye not hear the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons," etc., followed by an exposition of the story of Ishmael and Isaac.

In support of his assertion that by preaching justification through faith he is maintaining the Law, St. Paul quotes what is perhaps the most important passage in the Old Testament, viz. Genesis xv. 6. Abraham is in darkness and doubt and fear. God brings him out from the tent in which the lonely man nurses his loneliness and directs him away from the darkness around to the stars shining overhead, and speaks to him the memorable promise, "So shall be thy seed." And now for the first time the sacred narrative records the effect, in man's heart, of the word of God: *Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness.* "In that day," as we read in Genesis xv. 18, "God made a covenant with Abraham." Of this covenant, all the peculiar privileges of Israel were a result.

In other words, the Book of the Law asserts that the superior privileges in which the Jews boasted were obtained for them by their father Abraham, some years before the rite of circumcision was ordained and centuries before the Law was given, on the simple condition of faith. A more complete reply to the objection that faith as a condition of salvation overturns the Law could not be given. For, as St. Paul argues in Romans iv. 9-12, Abraham's faith was earlier even than circumcision.

After stating this analogy between God's treatment of Abraham and the Gospel announced by Christ, St. Paul further expounds, in verses 18-21, the faith of Abraham. This exposition is the best account of faith to be found in the Bible.

We have in verse 18 a definite promise: *so shall be thy seed*. We have, in verse 19, a natural obstacle which seemed to make fulfilment of the promise impossible; and this duly taken into account by Abraham: *he considered his own body, already dead, being about a hundred years old, and the deadness of the womb of Sarah*. We have, in verse 20, Abraham's regard to the promise of God, and his reliance on the infinite power of God: *giving glory to God, and being fully assured that what He hath promised He is able also to do*. The Bible and the history of the kingdom of God contain no nobler example of the faith which, even in view of natural impossibilities, leans upon the word and power of God and expects fulfilment. And certainly no faith of man has ever been more fruitful of blessing.

Notice here a third phrase, peculiar to St. Paul, describing the Gospel of Pardon. In Romans i. 17, iii. 21, 22, we have *righteousness of God through faith*; in chap. iii. 26, 28, 30, *justification through faith*; in chap. iv. 3, 5, 9, 11, 22, *faith reckoned for righteousness*. These phrases are evidently equivalent. In the third of them the *righteousness* is conspicuously forensic. This third phrase

thus confirms the exposition given in my third paper of the first and second phrases.

The abiding importance of the statement in Genesis xv. 6 that Abraham's faith was reckoned to him for righteousness, and its close bearing on the salvation announced by Christ, reveal to St. Paul a purpose in the record far above the writer's thought. He adds, in chapter iv. 23-25, *it was not written because of Him only, that it was reckoned to him, but because of us also*. In other words, the close bearing of the story in Genesis upon the faith of the servants of Christ reveals in the ancient narrative a hand divine. The supreme proof of the special inspiration of the Old Testament is the light which it sheds upon the Gospel of Christ.

The total difference between the promise believed by Abraham and the Gospel believed by us makes conspicuous the essential identity of his faith and ours. He believed the promise of *God, who makes alive the dead*; we believe on *Him who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead*.

Notice the future form, so difficult to translate, *to whom it is afterwards to be reckoned*: οἷς μέλλει λογίζεσθαι. These words cannot refer to justification on the judgment day. For this is justification through faith, which is always, in the New Testament, a present blessing. The final justification, of which we read in Romans ii. 16, Matthew xii. 37, is a judgment according to works. The word *us* in Romans iv. 24 forbids us to refer this reckoning for righteousness to those who in time to come will believe and be justified. The simplest explanation, and one quite satisfactory, is that the future is rhetorical, that St. Paul throws himself back into the past, to the time when the Book of Genesis was written, and standing by him looks forward to the Gospel of Christ. The Apostle asserts that the story of Abraham and the covenant which God made with him had reference to days far in the future and to a better covenant.

So far St. Paul has dealt only with the first of the two great doctrines stated in Romans iii. 21-26, viz. justification through faith. He now approaches the second, viz. justification through the death of Christ: *who was given up because of our trespasses*. These words are little more than a repetition of those in chapter iii. 25: "whom God set forth as a propitiation . . . in His blood." For if, as we saw, God gave Christ to die in order to harmonize with His own justice the justification of believers, then was He given up because of our trespasses. For, had not man sinned, there had been no need for this costly means of justification. These words thus mark the transition from the fuller exposition of the first of these doctrines to the fuller exposition of the second.

He who was given up to death because of our trespasses was also *raised because of our justification*. To this last word, it is needless to give any meaning other than that of its cognate verb in chapter iii. 24, 26, 28, 30. The preposition *διὰ* with the accusative represents the justification which God purposes to bestow on the condition of faith as a motive prompting Him to raise Christ from the dead, in order thus to give a sure foundation for justifying faith. It would have been equally correct to write *εἰς τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*, representing justification merely as the aim of the resurrection of Christ. But the preposition here used is equally appropriate. For a cherished purpose becomes a motive for action. The selection of the preposition was probably suggested by the use of the same particle in the earlier part of the same verse: *because of our trespasses*. A good example of a similar use of the same preposition is to be found in the Nicene Creed: *δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν*. Men and their salvation were the motive which prompted the incarnation of the Son. Another may be found in Thucydides, bk. ii. 89: "The Lacedemonians, when leading the allies, *because of*

their own glory bring them up, the more part unwilling, into danger."

The simplicity and correctness of the above exposition renders needless all attempts to give to the word *justification* any unusual sense. Godet understands it to denote some universal justification of the race, of which the justification of each one through his faith is a personal appropriation. But, of such use of the word, we have no trace in the Bible: and its adoption here, without further explanation, would be meaningless.

No verse in the New Testament has given rise to more divergent and strongly held opinions among the best scholars than has Romans v. 1. The difficult reading *ἔχωμεν*, *let us have peace*, is accepted with confidence by Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Westcott. It is found in all uncials earlier than the 9th century, and in some of the best cursives. Tertullian's exposition (*Against Marcion*, bk. v. 13) makes probable that the same reading was current in North Africa at the end of the 2nd century. Origen expounds this verse at great length; and his exposition makes quite certain that he had before him the subjunctive reading, and knew of no other. The same is true of Chrysostom. The versions confirm the testimony of the Greek manuscripts and the Fathers. The earliest trace of the reading *we have peace* is found in a correction in the Sinai MS. attributed to the 4th century. A similar correction, attributed to the 6th century, is found in the Vatican MS. There are uncertain testimonies for the same reading in some of the Fathers: and in later days it became common. In other words, we have a practically unanimous testimony, coming to us from the West and the East and the South, and reaching back to the 2nd century, that St. Paul wrote *let us have peace with God*. The same reading is accepted by the English revisers, qualified only by the mildest note on their margin, "some authorities read *we have*."

In spite of this overwhelming external evidence, the reading so strongly supported is rejected by the able commentators Meyer, Godet, and Oltramane, on the ground that it gives no meaning consistent with the grammar and usage of the Greek language and with the phraseology and thought of St. Paul. Gifford admits "the great preponderance of external testimony" in favour of the other reading; but, strange to say, in his exposition retains the reading he is compelled to reject. This refusal to expound the reading found in all the best documents is the strongest protest these writers can make against the expositions hitherto proposed. This failure to expound a reading we are compelled to accept emboldened me, in my commentary, to propose another exposition.

It has hitherto been assumed that the words *δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν* imply that justification has already taken place, and make this a reason why we should *have peace with God*. This assumption is embodied in the rendering given in the Revised Version: "Being therefore justified by faith, let us have peace with God." But this interpretation is by no means the only one which the words admit or indeed suggest. The aorist participle implies only that the abiding state of peace with God which the writer desires in his readers must be preceded by justification through faith; and leaves the context to determine whether justification is looked upon as actual and as a reason for having peace with God or as a means by which it must be obtained. This last is the use of the aorist participle, so far as I have observed, in all the many passages in the New Testament in which it precedes a subjunctive or imperative. As examples, I may quote 1 Corinthians vi. 15, *ἄρας οὖν τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ποιήσω πόρνης μέλη*; Acts xv. 36, *ἐπιστρέψαντες δὲ ἐπισκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἀδελφούς*; Ephesians iv. 25, *διὸ ἀποθέμενοι τὸ ψεῦδος, λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν*. Similarly, Aristotle, *Nicom. Ethics*, bk. iii. 5. 23, *ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ*

ἐκάστης εἶπωμεν; bk. vi. 3. 1, ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.

Even with a future indicative, the aorist participle denotes almost always an event still future; as in Romans xv. 28, τοῦτο οὖν ἐπιτελέσας καὶ σφραγισάμενος αὐτοῖς τὸν καρπὸν τοῦτον, ἀπελεύσομαι, κ.τ.λ. So Acts xxiv. 25, καιρὸν δὲ μεταλαβὼν, μετακαλέσομαι σε. In Romans v. 9, 10, we have the other use twice, *i.e.* the participle recalls an actual fact and uses this as a ground of hope for the future. That in these two passages the participle refers to an event already past, is indicated by the word νῦν in verse 9. In all other places in the New Testament, so far as I have observed, and very frequently in classical Greek, the aorist participle preceding a subjunctive or imperative or even an indicative future denotes the means by which the future event is to be brought about.

This use of the aorist participle is common in the LXX. as a rendering of two Hebrew imperatives, jussives, or cohortatives. So Genesis xi. 7: καταβάντες, συνχέωμεν; chapter xviii. 21, καταβὰς οὖν ὄψομαι. That the translators chose this rendering for a Hebrew construction which they might have reproduced literally by two Greek imperatives, etc., proves how thoroughly inwoven into the Greek mind is the construction used.

The above interpretation of the aorist participle gives good sense here. The present subjunctive denotes, not an entrance into, but an abiding state of, peace with God, which St. Paul sets before his readers as their privilege. The aorist participle preceding it implies that this abiding state of peace with God must be preceded by the event of justification. In other words, the verse before us asserts that the doctrine of justification through faith, already stated and defended, puts within our reach an abiding state of peace with God. This exposition may be rendered, LET US THEN, JUSTIFIED THROUGH FAITH, HAVE PEACE WITH GOD.

The above exposition is required by the meaning of the phrases *justified through faith* and *peace with God*. For, as we have seen, justification of the guilty involves pardon: and every ruler is at peace with those whom he pardons. One who is justified is, by the very meaning of the word used, already at peace with God, and necessarily continues so as long as he continues in a state of justification. To exhort such a one to have peace with God, as is done in the Revised Version, is mere tautology. This tautology is avoided by the exposition just suggested. For, although justification involves peace with God, the two phrases represent the same blessing in different aspects. Justification is a judge's declaration in a man's favour: the phrase *peace with God* reminds us that formerly there was ruinous war between us and God, and asserts that this war has ended. The Apostle teaches that it is our privilege, by means of the justification implied in the Gospel of pardon, to be henceforth at peace with God. The same idea is kept before us in verses 10, 11, in the phrases "reconciled to God" and "we have received the reconciliation."

The only objection to the above exposition is that elsewhere St. Paul speaks of his readers as already justified. This is implied in verse 2, "we have had access into this grace in which we stand"; in verse 9, "justified now in His blood"; in verses 10 and 11, just quoted, and in chapter viii. 1, "there is therefore now no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus."

A complete answer to this objection is found in St. Paul's habit of writing from an ideal and rapidly changing point of view. In chapter iii. 7, he puts himself among liars and asks "if the truth of God, by my lie, hath abounded for His glory, why am I also still judged as a sinner?" In chapter iv. 24, he puts himself beside the writer of Genesis, and says that the story of Abraham's faith was written not merely to pay honour to him but because of us to whom

faith will be reckoned for righteousness, viz. those who believe on Him that raised Christ. In chapter v. 1, he goes a step further and bids us at once enter, through the gate of justification, into a state of peace with God. In verse 2, he advances still further as already standing in the grace of God: and this standpoint is maintained in verses 9-11. On the other hand, in chapter vii. 14-25 the Apostle throws himself back, as in another paper we shall see, into the time when he was a conquered captive and slave of sin. And in chapter viii. 30 he throws himself forward to the time when God's purpose will be fully accomplished and those already justified will have entered the glory of the children of God. This changing standpoint is a marked feature of his vivid thought.

If the above exposition be correct, the subjunctive present is rhetorical. St. Paul might have written, as so many later MSS. have given us his words, "justified through faith, *we have* peace with God." But he prefers to urge his readers to appropriate the blessing about which he writes; and immediately afterwards assumes that they are doing what he bids them. In other words, the exposition now proposed is much nearer to the familiar rendering of the Authorised Version than is the rendering given by the Revisers.

This exposition permits us to take the word *καυχώμεθα* in verses 2 and 3 as an indicative: *we exult in hope of the glory of God . . . we exult also in the afflictions.* The Revisers' preferred rendering, *let us rejoice*, is much feebler. For it is of little use to exhort men to rejoice in afflictions. Such joy must be spontaneous; or it is worthless. To assert that we do exult not only in hope of glory but also in our afflictions is much more in harmony with the heroic confidence of St. Paul. And an assertion, rather than an exhortation, agrees with the indicatives immediately foregoing.

As already stated, Meyer and Godet and Oltramane reject a reading to which they can attach a suitable sense: and Gifford, while compelled to accept the reading, does not attempt to expound it. Fritsche and Alford understand the participle to imply that the readers were already justified, and this is given as a reason for so living as to be at peace with God. But they are evidently dissatisfied with their own exposition.

Dr. Sanday and Mr. Headlam in the *International Commentary*, if I rightly understand them, accept my exposition. Unfortunately they give no translation, and thus leave their readers in uncertainty as to the exact meaning they derive from the Apostle's words. But their paraphrase of Romans v. 1 is, "we Christians ought to enter upon our privileges. By that strong and eager impulse with which we enroll ourselves as Christ's we may be accepted as righteous in the sight of God, and it becomes our duty to enjoy to the full the new state of peace with Him which we owe to our Lord Jesus Messiah." In other words, they represent St. Paul as setting before his readers justification, which he has already expounded, as a gateway to peace with God. In their exposition they correctly say: "The aor. part. δικαιωθέντες marks the initial moment of the state εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν. The declaration of 'not guilty,' which the sinner comes under by a heartfelt embracing of Christianity, at once does away with the state of hostility in which he had stood to God, and substitutes for it a state of peace which he has only to realise." The writers acknowledge that the exposition given in my commentary "is perfectly tenable on the score of grammar; and it is also true that 'justification necessarily involves peace with God.'" Their only criticism is that "the argument goes too much upon the assumption that εἰρ. ἔχ. = 'obtain peace,' which we have seen to be erroneous." But this I have never said or suggested. These words denote only an abiding state of peace with God.

Apparently these scholars agree with me to interpret *καυχώμεθα* in verse 2 as an indicative, *we exult*, thus differing from the Revisers, who put in their text *let us rejoice*, with *we rejoice* in their margin. But the two commentators give no exposition of the word. Their rendering *exult*, already adopted in my commentary, seems to me to convey the sense of the Greek word better than does the Revisers' rendering *rejoice*, which should be reserved for another Greek word.

The uncertainty attaching to Dr. Sanday and Mr. Headlam's exposition of Romans v. 1, 2, illustrates the necessity, in every critical commentary, of a literal translation. Without such, it is sometimes difficult to know how the expositor interprets the words of the original.

St. Paul has now completed his exposition of his first great doctrine. He has asserted that in the Gospel is manifested and revealed a righteousness of God through faith for all who believe. This he afterwards describes as justification through faith; and later on as faith reckoned for righteousness. Still later on, he speaks of this justification as a gateway into a state of peace with God; and treats as equivalents the phrases *justified* and *reconciled to God*. This various phraseology teaches that God receives into His favour as righteous all who believe the good news of salvation announced by Christ, accepting their faith as the one condition of pardon.

In my last paper we saw that this pardon comes to us through the violent death of Christ on the cross. Some further consequences of this doctrine of justification through the death of Christ, I hope to expound in another article.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

SOME RECENT OLD TESTAMENT LITERATURE.

THE second volume of Prof. G. A. Smith's *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*¹ completes the Expositor's Bible. The idea of such a series was a veritable inspiration; and, by its conception and realisation, Dr. Robertson Nicoll has rendered a great service to English-speaking students of the Bible. The concluding volume is worthy of the series and of the great reputation of the author of the famous exposition of Isaiah i.-xxxix. The books expounded are Zephaniah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Obadiah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Joel, and Jonah. A very valuable feature of the exposition is a complete new translation. There are also full historical and critical introductions, and occasional critical and explanatory notes on the text and exegesis. Prof. G. A. Smith considers that these books do not suggest so much practical teaching for our own day as their predecessors. On the other hand, "they form a more varied introduction to Old Testament Criticism, while, by the long range of time which they cover, and the many stages of religion to which they belong, they afford a wider view of the development of prophecy." We may say a word or two about sections of the book which deal, in the author's clear and scholarly fashion, with some important questions. One of the shocks administered by recent criticism has been the assertion of Kusters that the narrative in Ezra i.-iii. is midrash, as little reliable as some sections of Chronicles; that there was no attempt to build the Temple before 520; that there was no Return of Exiles at all under Cyrus; and that the Temple was not built by Jews who

¹ "The Expositor's Bible," edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A., LL.D.; *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, by G. A. Smith, D.D., LL.D.; London: Hodder & Stoughton; pp. xx. 543, 7s. 6d.

had come from Babylon, but by Jews who had never left Judah. Since this view was published it has been fiercely assailed and warmly defended; it has been substantially accepted by Canon Cheyne. Our author states and discusses the pros and cons.; and decisively rejects Koster's theory. One naturally hesitates to set aside the definite statements of Ezra i.-iii. on anything less than overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and the evidence adduced is not overwhelming. Moreover the chronicler's authority is much greater for post-exilic than for pre-exilic history; and it is not so likely that we have here an example of his habit of constructing history on *a priori* data. Another important subject very fully dealt with is the date of Joel. Dr. G. A. Smith refers to the discussion of the same question by Dr. Driver in the *Cambridge Bible*, but his treatment of it is parallel and not dependent. It is very interesting and satisfactory that two such great authorities should publish, almost at the same time, two independent investigations arriving at the same conclusion. Our author, also, places Joel after B.C. 444.

Another important question is the interpretation of Habakkuk i. 2-4. Following Budde, Dr. G. A. Smith rejects the views that the wicked oppressors are Jews who are to be punished by the Chaldeans; or that the righteous are Israel and the oppressors the Chaldeans. He holds also with Budde, that the righteous are Israel, the oppressors a heathen power who are to be punished by the Chaldeans; and to render this view possible he places i. 5-11 after ii. 2-4. But whereas Budde thinks that the heathen power is Assyria, our author suggests Egypt as at any rate an alternative. We may also mention that the following passages are regarded as additions to the books in which they stand: Zephaniah ii. 8-10, iii. 14-20; Zechariah ii. 10-17, ix.-xiv.; Malachi ii. 11-13a. That the

last passage is an interpolation is, apparently, a discovery of our author's.

We have also received two volumes of the new *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament*.¹ This series is not, as its title might suggest, an abridgment of the *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*, but is an entirely independent work. It is a pity that German publishers cannot devise distinctive names for their series: there is a bewildering variety of *Handbuch* and *Handkommentar*, *kurzgefasstes* and otherwise. The present series seeks to furnish adequate information in a minimum space, and therefore in the most concise and lucid form. It assumes Kautzsch's translation of the Old Testament, but yet is intelligible without that translation. The critical principle of the series is the historical treatment (*religionsgeschichtliche*) of the Bible. Volumes on *Proverbs* by Wildeboer, and on *Job* by Duhm, have already appeared.

The publishers have been fortunate in securing Prof. Budde for *Judges*. Although Schrader long ago suggested that the Prophetic Narratives (J and E), used by the compilers of the Hexateuch, extended beyond the Conquest of Palestine, and were among the sources of *Judges* and *Samuel*, it was Prof. Budde, who in his *Richter und Samuel* furnished analytical proof of this position. In the present volume we have a concise exposition of the theory and an exegesis based upon it. There is a convenient table in which the contents of *Judges* are distributed between J, E, J₂, E₂, Rje, D₁, D₂, Rp, and other later hands. The history of the book is briefly as follows: by the combination of J and E, a Book of *Judges* was formed containing the account of the Greater *Judges*, Ehud, Deborah

¹ *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament*, D. Karl Marti; *Das Buch der Richter*, D. Karl Budde, Ord. Prof. der Theologie in Strassburg, pp. xxiv. 147, paper covers, 8s. 9d.; *Das Buch Hiesekiel*, Lic. Theol. A. Bertholet, Privatdocent der Theologie in Basel, pp. xxvi. 259, five illustrations, paper covers, 6s., Williams & Norgate, 1897.

and Barak, Gideon and Abimelech, Jephthah, Samson and Samuel; and also of the Migration of the Danites, and the Outrage of Gibeah. Some slight editorial changes were made in this work by a Deuteronomic Editor, D₁. From this book a second Deuteronomic Editor, D₂, constructed a new work by adding a didactic framework, and the story of Othniel, and omitting amongst other sections the account of Abimelech, of the death of Samson, of the Danite Migration, and the Gibeah incident, and the history of Samuel. The book assumed substantially its present form under the hands of a Priestly Editor, Rp, who added the remaining or Lesser Judges—with the exception of Shamgar, who is a still later addition—and restored many of D₂'s omissions, entirely recasting the story of Gibeah.

This scheme will be familiar to many of our readers in Moore's great commentary on *Judges*. Moore largely follows Budde in his analysis, and Budde in turn makes constant reference to Moore, and fully recognises his work as the standard commentary on *Judges*. Naturally they do not always agree, and each has a value of its own. Budde endorses the conclusion of Lagarde and Moore that *Judges* in B is not the Septuagint, but an entirely different translation, which Moore is inclined to date in the fourth century A.D. The analysis of *Judges* at once explains the confusion as to dates; these are due to the mechanical combination of different systems of chronology. It also disposes of a difficulty as to the *Song of Deborah*; the *Song*, as a whole, is clearly contemporary with the events it describes; yet some words found in it only occur elsewhere in very late Biblical or even in Mishnic Hebrew. Accordingly Seinecke and Maurice Vernes relegate it to a late post-exilic period. Budde holds that the *Song* is a contemporary work, but that it was first inserted in *Judges* by the Priestly Editor to whom the late words are due. According to Kautzsch and Moore about six verses are

unintelligible in the present Hebrew text; each phrase can be translated by itself, but it will not make sense with the context. Probably in these phrases and elsewhere the Priestly Editor has replaced obsolete words, which he himself did not understand, by others current in his own time. Budde also agrees with Moore and other critics that, when Jephthah made his vow, he deliberately contemplated the sacrifice of a human victim—a view, as Moore reminds us, as old as Augustine, who suggested that Jephthah meant to offer up his wife. As against critics who recognise only *one* ancient source of the Micah story, Budde discovers in it traces of both J and E. In this connection we are inclined to suggest that the last clause of xvii. 7, *wehû' gār shām, and he was a sojourner there*, should be read, *wehû' gērshōm, and he was Gershom*, and regarded as a remnant of a clause giving his name Jonathan ben Gershom. Speaking of the book generally, it is admirable for its scale, and will be a most useful companion to Moore, but we regret that Prof. Budde's space should have been curtailed on an important subject to which he has given special attention.

The volume of the *Kurzer Hand-Commentar* on *Ezekiel* is by A. Bertholet, of Basel, the author of an important monograph on the attitude of the Israelites and Jews towards the Gentiles. His *Ezekiel* is very complete and scholarly, and yet not overloaded with technical details; so that, in spite of limitations of space, it is lucid and interesting. One of the principles of the series evidently is that the Introductions should be as brief as possible. Hence we have chiefly the statement of results. Perhaps this is not much to be regretted here, seeing that few problems of the Higher Criticism arise in connection with the Book of Ezekiel. The denial of its authenticity, as a whole, by Zunz and Seinecke has met with no support; and criticism is only concerned with the question of minor

interpolations. According to Bertholet, the most important addition by a later hand is the description of the commerce of Tyre, xxvii. 9b-25a. This passage is in a different rhythm from the rest of the chapter, and is a prosaic list of wares and customers, interrupting the great description of Tyre as a stately ship. The chief sacrifice to brevity is the absence of any discussion of the relation of Ezekiel xl.-xlviii. to the Law of Holiness, Leviticus xvii.-xxvi. The author merely mentions the leading views, and quotes with approval Stade's conclusion that the editor of the Law of Holiness is not Ezekiel himself, but a member of the priestly circle in which Ezekiel moved.

A word or two may be added on other points. One of the trials of the modern student is that by the time he has learnt a new date, and thinks he has got a firm foothold amidst the shifting sands of Biblical chronology, some ruthless critic proposes to alter it. For instance, we have been told pretty emphatically and unanimously that Deuteronomy was published in B.C. 621; Dr. Driver and Dr. G. A. Smith both give this date in their latest works without a hint of alternative or uncertainty. But Bertholet gives B.C. 622 for that event in just the same unhesitating fashion. The author agrees with Dr. Davidson and Dr. Skinner that Ezekiel was a man in middle life at the outset of his ministry, and not, as Josephus states, a mere youth. He further agrees with them in their picture of the prophet as a pioneer in the writing of a volume of prophecy; in his pastoral care for individuals; in the systematic discussion of theology; and in the prominence in his writings of the apocalyptic element. Our author, like Orelli, accepts Klostermann's view that Ezekiel did actually remain silent and motionless for seven days (iii. 15, cf. iv. 1-8), and that the prophet suffered from catalepsy. He quotes with approval a sentence of Orelli's: "We must regard the disease as a divinely-ordained means

for prophecy." For a brief discussion and rejection of this theory we may refer the reader to a note in Dr. Skinner's *Ezekiel*, Expositor's Bible, p. 55, which concludes: "In the hands of Klostermann and Orelli the hypothesis assumes a stupendous miracle; but it is obvious that a critic of another school might readily 'wear his rue with a difference,' and treat the whole of Ezekiel's prophetic experiences as hallucinations of a deranged intellect."

Dr. H. Zimmern—one of the great masters of Semitic grammar—has composed a brief *Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages*.¹ It is on a smaller scale than Dr. Wright's Comparative Grammar, and is intended as a handbook for students. It is however by no means merely an introduction to larger works, but has an independent value of its own. As an English transliteration is given of all the Semitic words it can be used by readers who know no Semitic language but Hebrew. The parallel tables of forms in the various languages will often show at a glance the origin of apparent anomalies in the Hebrew. The use of this little volume will render the study of Hebrew or Aramaic much more intelligible and interesting. Of the origin of "the so-called Phœnician Alphabet," Dr. Zimmern writes: "It is probably in a measure dependent both on the Egyptian Hieroglyphic and the Babylonian Cuneiform script; but its inventors worked, comparatively speaking, very independently (*relativ sehr selbständig verfahren sind*)."

*Babylonian Influence on the Bible*² is a very full discussion of Genesis i. 2, with a profusion of parallels and illustrations from Babylonian and other folklore.

W. H. BENNETT.

¹ *Vergleichende Grammatik der Semitischen Sprachen, Elemente der Laut- und Formenlehre*, von Dr. H. Zimmern; Berlin, Reuther & Reichard; London, Williams & Norgate; pp. xi. 194, 5s. 6d. nett.

² *Babylonian Influence on the Bible and Popular Beliefs*, by A. Smythe Palmer, D.D., Vicar of Holy Trinity, Wanstead; London, David Nutt, pp. 110, 3s. 6d.

*THE PROMISE OF SLEEP, AND TWO OTHER
PASSAGES, RECONSIDERED.*

CONTROVERSY is sometimes a painful necessity, but no controversy is, I trust, necessary between myself and Prof. Robertson. To love the psalms as the works of self-effacing, devout, and, in a finer sense perhaps than the old one, inspired men, and to love not only the psalms, but even the interpretations and applications of them that have suggested themselves to the minds of believers in God, should constitute a bond between students who, on purely technical points of scholarship, may differ. Moreover, I so constantly find that critics exaggerate differences and minimize points of contact that I am quite unwilling to criticise Prof. Robertson, even though some of his remarks on Psalm cxxvii. give me a slight shock. I do not think that "So He giveth His beloved sleep" is what the psalmist meant to say, nor yet that Grätz is right in simply altering נִשָּׁן (usually rendered "sleep," which, however, in Hebrew is שָׁנָה) into שֵׁנִים, "sleeping," i.e. "while they sleep." Nor does it help us sufficiently to change כֵּן, "so," into כִּנֵּן, "surely," a change which I made in my translation of the Psalms, following that sober-minded critic, Kamphausen. I quite agree with Prof. Robertson that it is rather odd to adopt a translation which in your commentary you pronounce "quite inadmissible," even if in the text you enclose the words between two delicately printed notes of interrogation. I am really surprised at Prof. Wellhausen's peace of mind. How can he rest at nights, think-

ing of the uncertainty in which he has left the closing words of a most beautiful passage?

It would, I think, be best to have two distinct kinds of commentaries. One might be based on one or the other of our two most prized old English versions; the other on the most critical text of the Psalms that we can find or produce. Dr. Ker and Mr. Marson have both made contributions to a commentary of the former class; Prof. Wellhausen (with all his incompleteness as an editor) is foremost among those who have aimed at a commentary on the Psalms of a critical and yet popular order. Considering how dear the Psalm, as it stands in our old versions, has been to countless souls, I think it perfectly justifiable to preach upon it. Those who are in friendship with God, whether they sleep or wake, have no anxiety, nor do they regard bodily rest as loss of time, because it is God, not man, who "gives the increase," and overwork will not bring success any nearer. "Ambrosial sleep" is indeed one of God's best gifts, and Mohammed is before many Christians in his appreciation of this. Still, though not impossible in another context (sleeplessness, says another so-called Psalm of Solomon,¹ is the portion of the wicked), I do not think the antithesis between the pious who sleep, and the worldly who are sleepless, is natural in Psalm cxxvii. God's first gift to His beloved, who are elsewhere called "the poor and afflicted," is—bread. A contrast between the "distressful bread" (Shakespeare, *Henry V.*) of the worldly and the "quiet morsel" of the pious would be natural, but not that which has become familiar to simple readers of the Authorised Version.

I would venture to remark that in the Septuagint, and in Jerome's own Latin version, the beautiful antithesis found in the Authorised Version is much less prominent. The respective renderings are:

¹ Psalms of Solomon, iv. 18.

"It is vain for you . . . when He gives to His beloved sleep"¹ (LXX.).
 "After ye have sat down, who eat the bread of sorrows, so He will
 give to those who love Him sleep"² (Jerome).

This will perhaps suggest that there really is something odd about the form of the Hebrew phrase, and its connection with the context, apart from the unusual נ at the end of שָׁנָא (sleep?). And now for the indispensable correction of the text. Let him who can produce a better one throw the first stone at me. אֶכְלִי should be לֹא אֶךְ, somewhat as אֶכְלִי in Psalm xxii. 30 should be לֹא אֶךְ (Grätz, Wellhausen, etc.). עֲצִבֶיכֶם should be לִידֵיךָ, עֲצִבֶיךָ should be לִידֵיךָ (so LXX., Pesh.), and שָׁנָא, which has sprung from שָׁנָא,³ should be omitted. Thus the line becomes quite symmetrical; it is divided by a cæsura into two parts, one with three, the other with two beats. I will give it in combination with the preceding line:

"It is all in vain, ye who rise up early, | and late sit down;
 Surely not your distressful bread | giveth He to His beloved."

Bread, not sleep, was the preoccupation of the pious psalmist and his companions. The friend of God may work less hard than the worldly, but "bread shall be given him, his waters shall be sure" (Isa. xxxiii. 16). "Give us this day our daily bread." Have we really lost much? If any other scholar has preceded me, I hope he will understand that I willingly acknowledge his priority.

The next passage is rendered in the Authorised Version:

"Behold, Thou desirest truth in the inward parts, and in the hidden part Thou shalt make me to know wisdom."

Delitzsch agrees so far as the second part of the verse is concerned, but in the first part he thinks "reins" prefer-

¹ ὅταν δὲ τοῖς ἀγαπητοῖς αὐτοῦ ὕπνον.

² Postquam sederitis, qui manducatis panem dolorum, sic dabit diligentibus se somnum.

³ The idea is that the scribe began to write the next distich with אֶכְלִי, on the model of v. 2, and omitted to delete the wrongly written word.

able to "inward parts." And certainly, if the generally received view of the sense of v. 6 is correct, both **בְּטָחוֹת** and **בְּסִתָּם** should be designations of two of the inner parts of the body; they should be equivalent to **בְּכַלְיוֹת**, "in the reins," and **בְּלֵב**, "in the heart." But I maintain that there are no philological means of proving this. It is mere Rabbinical trifling to say that the "reins" are called **טָחוֹת** because "smeared over" with fat, and in Job xxxviii. 36, to which the Rabbins refer, the text (see below) is corrupt. The sense "hidden part" = "heart," for **סִתָּם**, is less arbitrary, but still not probable. The word occurs once elsewhere in the sense of "secret" (Dan. xii. 9, participle), and then **סִתְּמִים** (properly, "stopped up") is explained by **סִתְּמִים**, "sealed" (cf. Dan. viii. 26, xii. 4); **כָּל-סִתְּמוֹ** in Ezekiel xxviii. 3 is a corruption of **חֲסִימוֹ** (Cornill). Now let us turn for a suggestion to the Septuagint. This version makes sense by disregarding the two **ב** in **בְּטָחוֹת** and **בְּסִתָּם**—*ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἀλήθειαν ἡγάπησας, τὰ ἀδελὰ καὶ τὰ κρύφια τῆς σοφίας σου ἐδήλωσάς μοι*. Apart from the wrong tense, this gives probably the right meaning of the second half of the verse. But there is no reason to offer for ignoring the two **ב**, and our experience elsewhere, both with **טָחוֹת** and with **סִתָּם**, warns us to look out for corruption of the text. Let us begin with **סִתָּם**. There is, I believe, only one word in the dictionary from which **סִתָּם** can have sprung; it is **תַּעֲלָמוֹת** (Ps. xliv. 22, LXX. *τὰ κρύφια*; Job xi. 6, xxviii. 11), which LXX. probably read. And how shall we correct **בְּטָחוֹת**? With sound linguistic perception the Massoretic editors recognise in the initial **ב** a preposition. But evidently the most natural preposition is **בְּ**. The sense should be, "Thou carest for sincerity" (**אֱמֶת**; A.V., "truth") more than for "anything which can be done with formal accuracy without sincerity." Now surely we can see what is required—in short, what the psalmist wrote. Comparing Psalm li. 16, 17, xl. 7, and especially

Hosea vi. 6b, we may with confidence restore *מִפְּגָדוֹת*; the corruptions and the omission implied were easy. The distich will then read thus :

“For Thou carest for sincerity more than for offerings;
Make me then to know the secrets of wisdom.”

The first proof of sincerity a sinner can give is a free and full confession of guilt. In order that he may continue in the same path, the speaker (who is the pious community personified) asks that God would teach him the “secrets of wisdom,” *i.e.* how to conform his conduct to the will of God. True wisdom is the knowledge of the ways that are pleasing to God, and ability to walk in those ways. The community has failed sadly in the past; it longs now for the fulfilment of those great prophecies in Jeremiah and Ezekiel which point to a more steady walk in the ways of God as reserved for the Israel of the future.

3. It was stated above that Job xxxviii. 36 is corrupt. I believe, or rather, am certain, that I can point out the right correction, at any rate for the first part of the verse. It runs thus in the Revised Version,—

“Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts,
Or who hath given understanding to the mind?”

“Inward parts” is the rendering of *טְחוֹלִים*; “mind,” of *שִׁכְוִי*. Marginal renderings are given—“dark clouds” for the one, “meteor” for the other. “Meteor” is really a good suggestion; “dark clouds” is not, nor would it make a good parallel to “meteor.” The clue to the original of *טְחוֹלִים* is to be found in Job xli. 21, where *תִּיֹתָח* should rather be *תִּרְתָּח*, as has been seen by Barth and Budde, except that Budde renders “club,” whereas the Assyrian *tartāḫū* (which is the original of *תִּרְתָּח*) means “javelin” (Delitzsch) or “lance” (Jensen). There are no more frequent sources of error than the transposition and the confusion of letters. *טְחוֹלִים* comes from *תִּיֹתָח*, and *תִּיֹתָח* is a

corruption of תרתח. But it is no ordinary lance of which the poet speaks—it is the “lance-star,” *i.e.*, according to Jensen, Antares, the heliacal setting of which heralds the autumnal equinox, but, according to Hommel, Procyon. Thus we get a beautiful supplement to the questions of verses 31 and 32 relative to Orion and other constellations. In the second line I am almost, but not quite, sure that שְׁכִנִי should rather be קֶשֶׁת, “bow,” *i.e.* the *kakkab kashti* = Sirius. Thus the distich becomes:

“Who hath put wisdom into the Lance-star,
Or given understanding to the Bow-star?”

I have also, as I believe, been able to restore תרתח in two other places in the Old Testament. For these passages I refer the reader to an article on “Textual Criticism,” which has appeared in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* for July, where I have also mentioned what I believe to be the discovery of these new star-names in Job.

T. K. CHEYNE.

HARNACK, JÜLICHER, AND SPITTA ON THE LORD'S SUPPER.

II.

WE come now to Spitta. His contribution to the discussion is contained in his article, “The Early Christian Traditions concerning the Origin and Meaning of the Lord's Supper” (*Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums*, Bd. i., pp. 205–337, 1893). In a previous work he had reached conclusions which appear to have met with considerable acceptance. The view he had formerly held was this—that Jesus had invested the Jewish Passover with a deeper significance, and transformed it into a Christian celebration; and that in this form the celebration had at first been repeated yearly, until the transplantation of Christianity to Gentile soil

led to the union of the Lord's Supper with the Agape, and in consequence to more frequent celebration, and to a certain change in the meaning of the rite. But further study has led him to change his position, and in the present paper he puts before us the new conclusions he has arrived at.

The first part of his paper is devoted to an inquiry into the TIME and OCCASION of the words of institution. So far as the time is concerned, on one point all the accounts agree, that the Lord's Supper coincides with the last meal Jesus ate with His disciples on the night He was betrayed. But the agreement goes no further. It is now almost universally recognised that the Fourth Gospel dates that last meal on the 13th Nisan, *i.e.* the day before the beginning of the Feast of the Passover, while the Synoptic Gospels more or less clearly identify the Last Supper with the Passover supper, *i.e.* assign the 14th Nisan as the date. Spitta proceeds first of all to establish the fact that according to the Fourth Gospel the Last Supper falls on the 13th Nisan. He does not confine himself to the chronology of the later chapters of the Gospel, but considers further whether in the passage John vi. 26-58, assuming that our Saviour's words here have any bearing on the Lord's Supper, we find any reference to the Passover. A critical examination of the passage leads to the conclusion that the section vv. 51-59 is a later addition, and makes it plain that there is not the slightest reference in the words of Jesus to the Passover. So far, then, the position of the Fourth Gospel is clear. The Lord's Supper was celebrated on the 13th Nisan, and there is no connexion between it and the Passover.

But, on the other hand, the Synoptic Gospels seem to decide no less plainly for the 14th Nisan. The Synoptic Gospels—but we must distinguish between the Synoptic Gospels and the Synoptic tradition, and Spitta believes he

can find evidence of a tradition in the Synoptic Gospels which points to the 13th Nisan. It is in Mark that he finds most distinct traces of this tradition. In Mark xiv. 1 we have a date assigned to the resolution come to by the enemies of Jesus to capture Him and put Him to death: *ἦν δὲ τὸ πάσχα καὶ τὰ ἄζυμα μετὰ δύο ἡμέρας*. Why, we ask, this precise statement of the date on which this resolution was come to? The answer is given in the next verse: *ἔλεγον γάρ μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, μήποτε ἔσται θόρυβος τοῦ λαοῦ*. Was it with regard to the capture or the execution of Jesus that the Sanhedrists resolved *μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ*? To the execution. They proposed to take Him *ἐν δόλῳ*, so that, so far as the capture was concerned, they need not have feared an uproar. It is the execution that, two days before the Passover, they resolve to accomplish *μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ*. And this resolution *μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ* can only mean "before the feast." For why delay till after? The people would have dispersed, but Jesus also might have left the city. According to Mark, then, it was the plan of the Sanhedrists to capture and execute Jesus before the feast. They make a bargain with Judas, and he seeks to betray him *ἐνκαίρως* (v. 11), *i.e.* at the right time—the right time, of course, being the time agreed upon by the Sanhedrists, *viz.* before the feast. Thus far, at any rate, the tendency of Mark is to place the capture of Jesus before the Passover.

But the verses which follow (Mark xiv. 12–16) are in glaring contradiction with what we have found to be the tendency of the preceding narrative. Without any reference to the agreement come to between the Sanhedrists and Judas, the Evangelist proceeds to describe the arrangements made by Jesus for the celebration of the Passover. The plan, then, to capture Him before the feast had fallen through. Why do we hear nothing more about it? If this plan is important enough to receive the careful mention it does, why does Mark not tell us how it was that

it was given up and another substituted? The verses 12-16 are so entirely out of connexion with what has gone before that we must regard them as an interpolation. This view is confirmed by the fact that v. 17 does not harmonize with what immediately precedes it in the suspected passage. In the interpolated verses we read of Jesus sending two of His disciples to prepare the Passover, while in the seventeenth verse we find Him coming *with the twelve*. Spitta has no hesitation in concluding that Mark xiv. 12-16 completely lacks organic connexion with the rest of the narrative. Omit these verses, and the tendency of the rest of the account is to confirm the opinion that Mark is basing on a tradition which assigned the 13th and not the 14th Nisan as the date of the Last Supper and capture of Jesus.

The further course of the narrative in Mark is all in favour of this conclusion. In the account of the capture, trial, and crucifixion of Jesus there is not one word to suggest that all this took place on a Sabbath-like feast. The whole conduct of the Sanhedrim would have been illegal on this assumption. Minor points in the narrative—Simon coming from the fields, Joseph buying the linen, the release of a prisoner, of which the most natural explanation is that it was to enable him to celebrate the feast—strongly support the view that the date of the crucifixion must have been the 14th Nisan. Nor can we understand the conduct of the high-priests on the generally accepted chronology of Mark. They had resolved not to capture and execute Jesus during the feast, and yet directly in the teeth of this resolution they not only take Him then, but, instead of keeping Him safe in prison, for no reason that we can see, proceed to try Him and put Him to death, running straight into the danger they had resolved to avoid. It is evident, then, that the account of the preparation of the Passover is irreconcilable with the rest of

the narrative. We have but to omit it, and there remains a clear and consistent narrative pointing to the 14th Nisan as the date of the crucifixion.

This conclusion is borne out by the evidence as to the character of the meal which Jesus ate with His disciples on the night of His betrayal. Was it or was it not the Passover? We have four accounts, which arrange themselves into two groups—Mark and Matthew, Paul and Luke. On comparing them, we observe the following main points of difference:

(1) Paul and Luke represent the Lord's Supper as an ordinance, the institution of which at the Passover supper had been premeditated by Jesus. Luke is emphatic, *ἐπιθυμία ἐπεθύμησα τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα φαγεῖν* (xxii. 15). The *εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν* of Paul (1 Cor. xi. 24, 25) is to the same effect, and points unmistakably to the Passover (Exod. xii. 14). In Mark and Matthew, on the other hand, there is no evidence of premeditation. The so-called words of institution give us the impression of being spoken on the impulse of the moment, and there is no mention of a repetition of the celebration.

(2) Luke makes the meal begin with wine, evidently thinking of the first cup of the Passover, and from the very beginning we feel that it is a sacred feast that is being celebrated. Mark and Matthew describe an ordinary meal, *καὶ ἀνακειμένων αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσθιόντων*; and where Luke puts the first cup, they introduce the Judas episode. Now there would be no place for such a speech as that of Jesus regarding the traitor in the liturgy of the Passover, and it is probably this feeling that makes Luke reserve the Judas episode to the end.

Mark and Matthew, then, know nothing of a Passover supper, while Paul and Luke distinctly point to it. But even in these latter we note some points which seem to conflict with the view they present. For instance, if it

was the Passover supper, it is strange that Jesus should have chosen the bread, and not rather the lamb, to represent His body. And again, the point at which the blessing occurs is suspicious. At all ordinary meals the blessing came before the breaking of the bread, but in the Passover supper after. And yet, even in the accounts which represent the supper Jesus is eating as the Passover, we find the *εὐλογεῖν* coming before the breaking of the bread. These and one or two other minor points in the accounts of Paul and Luke stand as a protest against the view which these accounts are designed to present, that the last meal of Jesus with His disciples was the Passover supper.

Briefly, then, to sum up the results of the enquiry into the Synoptic tradition regarding the Lord's Supper :

(1) There is clear evidence of a tradition in Mark which assigns the 13th Nisan as the date of the celebration. In the present form of the Mark Gospel this tradition is obscured by the interpolation of Mark xiv. 12-16 ; much more so in Matthew, where, however, we see many traces of it. Luke, on the other hand, distinctly assigns the 14th Nisan as the date. Spitta further finds evidence in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter and the *Didaskalia* in favour of the Mark tradition.

(2) As to the character of the meal, Paul and Luke represent it as the Passover supper, Mark and Matthew as an ordinary meal.

(3) Even in Paul and Luke, however, there are certain points which are hardly compatible with the theory of a Passover supper.

We come now to consider the MEANING of the words of institution. Spitta starts from Mark's account, which has proved the most reliable on the question of date and occasion. Mark represents Jesus as distributing to His disciples bread and wine. Evidently it is a meal that is

here in progress. But what kind of a meal? Not the Passover. Many things are against this—the date, as we have seen, the distribution and invitation to partake, which would be out of place at the Passover supper, where all help themselves without invitation, the fact that the bread should be chosen to represent the body of Christ instead of the Paschal lamb. But if not the Passover, what then? Spitta finds a hint to the answer in the words, τὸ αἶμά μου τῆς διαθήκης τὸ ἐκχυννόμενον ὑπὲρ πολλῶν. The reference to the Mosaic covenant of Exodus xxiv. 8 is unmistakable. But just as there is a difference of detail in the two cases, in the one blood being used, in the other wine, in the one the blood being sprinkled, in the other the wine poured out and drunk, so the covenant of which Jesus is speaking is opposed to the Mosaic. What covenant, then, can Jesus be thinking of when He lets the cup go round among His disciples, and describes it as the blood of the covenant? The answer is clear to Spitta. It must be the Davidic-Messianic, so often opposed to the Mosaic. One of the most common figures under which this covenant is represented is that of a meal; cf. Isaiah xxv. 6–8, lv. 3; Psalm cxxxii. 15, etc. In the Gospels we find Jesus making frequent use of this figure. Spitta instances the beatitudes, Matthew v. 6, Luke vi. 21; the parable of the ten virgins, where the Parousia is represented as a wedding feast; the parable of the great supper. Bread and wine are frequently mentioned as features of the banquet. In Luke xiv. 15 it is described as eating bread, in Mark xiv. 25 as drinking wine. Spitta brings forward a long list of quotations from Rabbinical literature to prove the familiarity of this idea. No figure is more common to describe the spiritual blessings of the Messianic age than that of eating and drinking. The Messiah is represented sometimes as the Giver of the manna, sometimes as the manna itself. Philo repeatedly describes the

manna as the Logos, and 1 Corinthians x. 3 *seq.* shows that such a conception is not unfamiliar to Paul, who, after speaking of the manna and the water together, says with regard to the latter that the Israelites drank *ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθούσης πέτρας, ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός*. We have the same thought in John vi. 48-50, where Jesus calls Himself the Bread which cometh down from heaven. In the Jewish apocalyptic writings the Messiah is described further as the Vine of the fruit of which the righteous shall drink. In view of these expectations, Spitta thinks that it is no mere accident that Jesus, according to John, describes Himself as the true Vine.

It was expected, then, that when the Davidic-Messianic covenant was established the righteous would be nourished with some wonderful food and drink. This bread, wine, water, or whatever it was described as being, is nothing less than the Messiah Himself; so that one can actually speak of "eating the Messiah," or drinking Him in His blood, the juice of the grape. And as the blessings to be obtained are essentially the blessings of the Messianic covenant, this Messiah's blood of which one drinks may be fitly designated the blood of the covenant.

Are there any references to this Messianic meal in the records of the institution of the Lord's Supper? Without a doubt. Mark and Matthew have the saying about drinking new in the Kingdom of God, which Luke introduces at the beginning of the celebration. At the conclusion Luke has the significant saying, *καὶ γὰρ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν καθὼς δέδοται μοι ὁ πατήρ μου βασιλείαν ἵνα ἔσθητε καὶ πίνητε ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης μου ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου* (xxii. 29 *seq.*), while Paul strikes the eschatological note in his *ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ* (1 Cor. xi. 26), and John has the speech about the true Vine. The invitation to partake in Mark and Matthew (*λάβετε, φάγετε, πίνετε*) points in the same direction. It recalls the invitation of Isaiah lv. 1-3, and

suggests such parallels in the Gospels as Luke xiv. 17, "Come, for all things are now ready"; and Matthew xi. 29, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." It is doubtless this thought of the Messianic banquet that has suggested the πάντες in Christ's invitation to His disciples to partake.

In what sense, then, are we to understand Jesus's words at the table? From Mark xiv. 25 and Luke xxii. 30 we see that He is thinking of the completion of His work. His words to the traitor seem to point to the failure of that work, but His faith never wavers. In the very hour that He is preparing for death He speaks as one who has overcome the world. He looks forward with confidence to the triumphant establishment of the Kingdom He has come to found, and with the eye of faith sees that hour as if it were already come. Already, in imagination, He is sitting at table with His disciples in the Kingdom of God, and dispensing to them those blessings which only He, the Messiah, can supply. It is in this spirit that He distributes the bread and wine to His disciples with the words, "Take, eat, this is My body," "Drink ye all of it; this is My blood of the testament, which is shed for many." Death has no terrors for Him; no sense of failure embitters the prospect of the abandonment of His work. With unfaltering confidence He looks forward to the future, and already seems to see the glorious work completed, already seems to be drinking of the fruit of the vine with His disciples in His Father's Kingdom. Already that hour seems to have come to which He looks forward in the intercessory prayer, "Father, I will that they also, whom Thou hast given Me, be with Me where I am, that they may behold My glory, which Thou hast given Me."

It is only from this eschatological point of view, the point of view expressly suggested by all accounts of the

celebration, that we can understand Christ's words at the table. To start with the symbolical meaning of the bread and wine, and endeavour to decide what is meant by eating Christ's body and drinking His blood, is to open the door to all manner of subjective interpretations, none of which can be accepted with certainty, and most of which give the impression that the words of Christ must have been unintelligible to His disciples. Equally inadmissible is the attempt to explain Christ's words as referring to His death. True, we find this interpretation already current in apostolic times, but that does not diminish its improbability. Nay, in the situation this meaning is impossible. Can we believe that Jesus, when He gave His disciples the bread and the wine, meant them to be regarded as symbols of His violent death? Would they have been appropriate for the purpose? The red wine, the blood of the grape, might certainly suggest human blood. But it is not with the wine but the bread that Jesus begins. And what resemblance is there between bread—even though it be broken—and a dead body? The bread is broken simply that it may be eaten. And the eating and drinking put all thought of reference to the death of Jesus out of the question. The very suggestion of eating a dead body and drinking human blood is revolting. And, further, if Jesus had been referring to His death, is it likely that the disciples would have understood Him? He was in the midst of them, in the full enjoyment of life. How were they to realize that the bread represented the crucified body and the wine the shed blood of the Master whose words they were listening to? We must remember that the thoughts so familiar to ourselves regarding the significance of the death of Christ were foreign to the disciples, whereas, on the other hand, those apocalyptic expectations regarding the Messianic banquet, which are so strange to us, were familiar to

them. It is only by endeavouring to put ourselves into the historical situation that we can hope to understand the meaning of the words that fell from Christ's lips. And once we do so, once we appreciate the sublime enthusiasm of the moment which called forth those words from the Saviour, we shall cease to imagine that He had any other end in view than simply this—to invite the disciples to receive Him to themselves. All thought of intention to found a rite for the observance of the Church is out of the question. Such an object is incompatible with the spirit in which the words were spoken, which betrays no pre-meditation, but rather the spontaneous outpouring of a heart profoundly moved, and inconsistent with the character of the Saviour, who throughout His life had displayed a lofty indifference as to the forms which were to govern the life of the Church.

It is true the meal was repeated in the early Church, but nothing indicates that this was done in obedience to a supposed command of Christ or with reference to His death. On the contrary, so far from the latter being the case, we read in Acts ii. 46 that the Agapes were celebrated *ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει*, and we have to regard them as religious meals which the Christians celebrated together, at which it was natural that they should recall the words which the Saviour had spoken at that last meal with His disciples. As they partook of the food placed before them, they would remember what He had said of Himself as the true nourishment of the soul, and look forward with joyful anticipation to the time when they should sit at meat with Him in the Kingdom of God. Nor is it likely that these thoughts would be associated only with those elements He had used at the Last Supper. Along with bread and wine, water was frequently employed to describe the blessings of the Messianic age. Wine may not always have been

drunk at the Agapes, and we can well imagine that in the early Christian celebrations water may have been drunk in remembrance of Him who had spoken of Himself as the living water.

But in course of time a change took place. This simple repetition of the original meal disappeared before the celebration of the Lord's Supper as a Christian Passover in commemoration of the death of Christ. We can trace the beginnings of the change in the earliest times. Spitta offers the following sketch of the probable development: If Jesus died on the 14th Nisan, then the meal which He ate with His disciples on the 13th was not the Passover. The disciples then could not have eaten the Passover at this time, for it is out of the question to imagine that they would do so in the melancholy circumstances. But the law commanded, "If any man of you or of your posterity shall be unclean by reason of a dead body, or be in a journey afar off, yet he shall keep the passover unto the Lord. The fourteenth day of the second month at even they shall keep it" (Num. ix. 10 *seq.*). The disciples, in obedience to this command, would return to Jerusalem to celebrate the second Passover on the 14th Ijjar. This is the simplest explanation of the fact that we find them again in Jerusalem, although they had been commanded to seek the risen Saviour in Galilee. We can hardly over-estimate the importance of this, the first Christian Passover. A month before, when they had thought to eat the Passover with Jesus, His blood had been shed on the cross. In consequence of their Easter experiences they now see the death of their Master in a new light. The parallel between Jesus and the Paschal lamb, which was slain at the same hour, must at once have forced itself upon them. Here is the germ of Paul's *τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός*. Do we wonder that this Passover meal, invested with this new significance, assumed the character

of a new institution? If, as is by no means improbable, on this occasion Jesus appeared to the disciples, that would enhance the importance of it. We are almost tempted to identify this meal with that of which we read in the spurious conclusion of the Mark Gospel, and which is referred to in Acts i. 4 (though dated later), at which Jesus appeared for the last time to His disciples before He was received up into heaven. An interesting parallel suggests itself between this last meal of Jesus with His disciples before His ascension, and the last meal before His death. On both occasions He went out with the disciples to the Mount of Olives; on both occasions He was taken away from the disciples—the first time by His enemies, the second by the darkness of a cloud into which He was received, never to appear again. This last meal was really a Passover.

But be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the celebration of the Christian Passover reaches back to the earliest times, and that it exercised considerable influence on the original celebration of the Lord's Supper. That the disciples themselves should have misunderstood the meaning of our Lord's words is hardly possible. But we can easily understand how, after Christ was long dead, others, hearing the words *σῶμα* and *αἷμα Χριστοῦ*, would naturally think of the death of Christ. To those who did not know the historical situation in which the words were spoken the analogy of the Passover most readily suggested itself as an explanation of their meaning. In this light the Lord's Supper was regarded. Such an interpretation was bound to react upon the accounts of the origin of the Lord's Supper. The theory of a Christian Passover pointed to the 14th Nisan as the date of the original celebration, and the analogy of Exodus xii. 14 to a direct institution by Christ.

Spitta proceeds now to test this conjecture as to the

probable course of things by an examination of the accounts of the Lord's Supper. He begins with Luke, whose narrative he would curtail by the omission of xxii. 20, which evidently is the result of an attempt to combine Paul and Mark—the first half of the verse pointing to 1 Corinthians xi. 25, while the *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυννόμενον* is taken from Mark xiv. 24, and introduced so awkwardly that what is there said of the *αἷμα* is here applied to the *ποτήριον*. In Luke's account we already see a vast change. The cup comes first, and the distribution of the bread is the climax of the celebration. No symbolical meaning is attached to the cup, as the wine in the Passover had none. The words which are spoken as the bread is distributed correspond to the "*hoc est pascha*" of the Paschal liturgy. Evidently it is a Christian Passover that is here described: so early had the practice of the Church begun to influence the traditions regarding the original celebration. When we find such changes introduced into the narrative of the last supper, do we marvel at the discrepancy in the chronology of the Passion? It is no more difficult to understand than this variation in the form of the celebration, and springs from the same source—the identification of the Lord's Supper with the Passover.

The original tradition regarding the Lord's Supper is preserved in purer form by Mark and Matthew, though somewhat obscured by the introduction of the passage describing the preparation for the Passover. But we have no difficulty, as we have seen, in finding in Mark and Matthew clear evidence against the 14th Nisan as the date of the original celebration.

Paul agrees with Luke in regarding the Lord's Supper as a memorial of the death of Christ. But we note certain variations from Luke. He does not follow the order adopted by Luke, and in the words over the cup he keeps more closely to the apostolical tradition. The points on

which he differs from Mark and Matthew are significant. He has *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, ὅσάκις ἔαν πίνητε, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, which has its parallel in Luke in the words spoken at the end of the celebration, specially with reference to the bread. Further, instead of *τῆς διαθήκης* he has *ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη*, and, most important of all, the simple *τὸ αἷμά μου* of Mark and Matthew has been replaced by *ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ αἵματι*. Clearly this is a transformation of the original words, and an awkward one enough, as the New Testament cannot be drunk; and the reason of the change is the same as has led Luke altogether to omit the word over the cup, so that even where Paul appears more closely to approach Mark and Matthew, he is really nearer to Luke. Spitta finds in Paul's version of the words *τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ αἷμά μου* a proof that these words are genuine, and that they did not originally refer to the death of Christ. It is interesting further to contrast the reference to the *διαθήκη* in the words of Jesus with Paul's version. Jesus speaks of *eating and drinking* in which the promise of the Davidic-Messianic covenant will be *fulfilled*; Paul points to a *sacrifice* by which a new covenant is instituted, which *sets aside* the old forms of the Jewish religion. The close connexion between the body and blood of Christ and eating and drinking, which is emphasized in Mark and Matthew, is not preserved by Paul, who has no *λάβετε, φάγετε, πίνετε*. Bread and the cup are to him symbols fraught with a certain meaning. Of appropriation of Christ and the blessings of the new covenant by eating and drinking there is no thought.

It is evident that so far in Paul's version we have the two traditions, the apostolical and the ecclesiastical of Luke, crossing one another. That the latter preponderates is due to the fact that Paul was not an eye-witness, but himself belonged to the circle for whom Luke's account was designed. At the same time we can trace the influ-



ence of Paul's account on the later versions of the apostolical tradition, notably in Matthew's addition *εἰς ἄφῃσιν ἀμαρτιῶν* to the *τὸ ἐκχυννόμενον ὑπὲρ πολλῶν* of Mark.

But we have a different view of the Lord's Supper presented in 1 Corinthians x. (cf. xii. 13). Here there is no reference to the death of Christ; it is the eating and drinking that is prominent. Bread and wine are regarded as the media whereby the participant is brought into communion with the pneumatic Christ. We cannot fail to find here a reminiscence of the apostolical tradition, even while we note how great is the difference between the earlier view, which regards the bread and wine as *symbols* of pneumatic blessings, and Paul's view, which accepts them as *media* of the same. That we should have these two different views of the Lord's Supper in Paul, that even when he approaches to the earlier tradition he should yet depart so far from the simplicity of it—these things are a proof to Spitta that Paul no longer stands at the source of the tradition regarding the Lord's Supper, but at a point where that tradition has already become divided and obscured.

In concluding his paper, Spitta deals briefly with the practical consequences of the position he has sought to establish. That the view he has presented differs from that set forth in all creeds and confessions is evident. On the negative side, in so far *i.e.* as he denies the institution by Jesus of a rite in commemoration of His death, he is aware that he is opposed to the universal doctrine of the Church. But, on the other hand, on the positive side, in so far *i.e.* as he emphasizes participation in the spiritual blessings which the Messiah bestows, he contends that the view of the Lord's Supper he has set forth has many points of contact with the evangelical piety of the Church, as it finds expression in its hymns. Certainly those hymns have been written from a different standpoint; but in

spite of this the fact remains—and Spitta quotes many instances to prove it—that among the hymns dealing with the Lord's Supper, the meaning which he has assigned to the rite is that which is most frequently and most effectively adopted in giving expression to the devotion of the believer.

G. WAUCHOPE STEWART.

THE EASY YOKE.

WHEN Jesus said, "My yoke is easy," He probably had in His view a contrast between His teaching and that of the scribes. Be that as it may, it is certain that His "yoke," compared with theirs, was easy. Therefore we may fitly adopt "the Easy Yoke" as a title for this paper, in which it is proposed to consider some of the sayings uttered by our Lord in connection with His various encounters with the religious teachers of Israel. This study will form a suitable sequel to the preceding one on the *Disciple-Logia*. The latter, curiously enough, exhibit Christ as a Master in a light which might readily suggest that His yoke was the reverse of easy, though no instructed disciple would ascribe to it such a character; for such an one understands that severity and gentleness are not incompatible. But the fact remains that to see clearly with what justice Jesus claims to be a genial, reasonable Master we must study the words in which His moral and religious ideas are set in sharp antagonism to the doctrine of the scribes.

These words are many, as we learn from Matthew's Gospel, which contains the fullest account of our Lord's anti-scribal polemic. To consider them all, even in the most cursory manner, is impossible within our limits. It is also quite unnecessary for our purpose. It will suffice to weigh the import of those words that have been preserved in the Gospel of Mark, which, meagre as its report of our

Lord's teaching is, nevertheless contains materials sufficient to define His position as against that of the scribes.

The sayings preserved in Mark have all a stamp of genuineness which leaves no room for doubt that they form together a little treasure of veritable utterances of the great Master. They are, one and all, of permanent value; perennial light for Christians, not merely temporary lightning directed against an evil system prevalent in Israel eighteen hundred years ago. The apostolic Church from the first perceived their importance, and felt their light-giving power; hence their sure place in the primitive tradition, and in the written page of the archaic Gospel which bears the name of Mark.

The collection of relative *Logia* consists of eight in all. Five of these are contained in the section Mark ii.-iii. 1-6, whose general heading might be "sundry conflicts with scribes and Pharisees." Briefly indicated, they are as follows :

1. "Power on earth to forgive sins," chapter ii. 10.
2. "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners," ii. 17.
3. "New wine into new bottles," ii. 22.
4. "The Sabbath for man, not man for the Sabbath," ii. 27.
5. "Always lawful to do good," iii. 4.

To this group of five have to be added the following three :

6. "Not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out, defileth," vii. 15.
7. "What God hath joined together let not man put asunder," x. 9.
8. "To Cæsar Cæsar's, to God God's," xii. 17.

Matthew has all these *Logia*; Luke omits (6) and gives (7) in a very imperfect form.¹

The first two announce the advent of the era of grace;

¹ Luke xvi. 18.

the next four contain the charter of spiritual liberty ; the last two lay the foundations of social health by proclaiming the sanctity of the marriage tie and by assigning to the State its legitimate sphere.

1. "Power on earth to forgive sins."

I take these words to be the essential part of the sentence in which they are embedded : "But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins." Pardon on *earth*, not merely in heaven ; pardon abundant, everywhere like the air, not a scarce commodity relegated as to its exercise to the upper celestial world, and not much of it even there, or even of the will to pardon. Such is the latent antithesis. It marks the difference between the old era of legalism and the new era of grace ; between the God of the scribes and the God of Jesus. Under the old regime of legalism God was conceived of simply as a Moral Governor, rendering to every man according to his works. Under such a system there was little room for pardon, which was crowded out of the universe by retributive Justice. God did not exercise it, men did not expect it, neither did they practise it. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," was the law for God and for man. Such was the conception of the moral order which had possession of the minds of the fault-finding scribes, who called Jesus a blasphemer because He had said to the palsied man, "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee." It was under the inspiration of an utterly diverse conception of that order that Jesus spoke the cheering word, and his reply to the fault-finders was meant as a vindication of the new anti-legal view. Formally a dispute as to His personal right to forgive, the question at issue between Him and His critics was really one involving a great principle. A whole world of new religious thought is covered by the brief phrase "power on earth to forgive sin." It meant : "God is not a mere Governor and Judge. He is more characteristically, more divinely, a God who de-

lighteth in mercy. Nor does He look on the exercise of mercy in the light, chiefly, of a prerogative to be jealously guarded, but rather of a virtue to be imitated and a pleasure to be shared by all who have received His Spirit. Law was the watchword of old, let grace be the watchword now. Let all men know that God multiplieth pardons. Let all men who believe this strive to inspire hope by preaching, as they have opportunity, the forgiveness of sins. To a fellow-man, suffering grievously, and looking on his suffering as the penalty of special sin, speak the cheering word: Brother, thy sins are forgiven. This is always true in the sense that past misconduct need in no case be an inevitable doom; and when general unbelief prevails in the forgivableness of transgression, it is a truth worth proclaiming. Proclaim it, in spite of the disease which seems to be the standing evidence that sin has not been forgiven. Heal the man's soul by the beneficent proclamation if you cannot heal his body, and so break the spell of the false theory which has too long held sway over men's minds, that particular forms of physical evil are always the penalty of particular forms of moral evil. Heal the soul by the Gospel of pardon; that any son of man can do, if it be reserved for the Son of man to heal the body. Nay, heal the soul, I say, and thereby you may help not a little to heal the body; for hope in the heart and peace in the conscience are precious medicines for the whole nature of man."

2. "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners."

This second Logion gains in significance by juxtaposition with the first. The resulting meaning is: sin not only pardonable abundantly, but sinners rather than the righteous, in some ways, the favoured ones. How inconceivable this to the scribe mind accustomed to legalistic ways of thinking! "To whom can the favour of God and the blessings of the Messianic kingdom belong but to the righteous? Doth not God reward every man according to

his works, bestowing on the just all desirable good, and visiting the unjust with punitive evil? Yet here is one who is ever talking about the kingdom of God, and gives Himself out as its herald, yet has the effrontery to tell us that He invites to its benefits, by preference, sinners, such as these publicans and their dissolute companions, with whom He has just been associating. We called Him a blasphemer before when He said, 'Son, thy sins are forgiven'; may we not with even better reason call Him a blasphemer now, nay, one who abolishes moral distinctions, upsets the moral order, overturns the very foundations of God's throne?"

The distress of the legal pedants was, doubtless, great, but what of that? The word that scandalized them has brought deep abiding comfort to the great heart of mankind, to the hearts of sinners, who are ever the great majority. The kingdom for sinners, not for righteous men or saints—it is a beneficent, epoch-making, eventful revolution. It puts all good things within the reach of the erring, even of those who have greatly erred. All things, not merely pardon, but power to be and to do good—eminent attainment in sanctity and wisdom. For, of course, the new policy does not undervalue righteousness; it simply adopts a new method of propagating it. The kingdom is for sinners in order that they may be saints, and for producing sanctity reliance is placed on the effect of magnanimous treatment. In the new era of grace retributive justice is superseded by divine generosity. God forgives that He may be feared. Divine goodness is trusted to as the great power making for repentance. The new way is better than the old, which simply told men what to do under penalties, and left them to themselves. The old way failed, Jeremiah being witness. The new way may fail in many instances also, but on the whole it works well. Forgiveness does foster piety. Men love God because He is gracious. The human heart bounds passionately towards goodness under the inspiration of un-

merited favour. So the greatest sinner may become the greatest saint; forgiven much, he greatly loves. No such devotees as Paul and Augustine and Bunyan. Divine rigour never produced such men. "If Thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?" Who shall stand, I say, not in judgment, but even in moral integrity? Strictness, severe judicial rigour, is depressing and repressing. It chills the soul, freezes up the moral energies, produces only two types of men: the moral pedant, the Pharisee, who addicts himself to petty duties, and in his blindness thinks thereby to fulfil all righteousness; and the profligate, who, despairing of pleasing the exacting Taskmaster, gives up trying, and abandons himself to lawless impulse.

The foregoing words of Jesus throw open a career of spiritual life full of great possibilities to all, even to the most degraded. The effect of the next group of four is to set free that life from the hampering power of artificial restrictions connected with ascetic practices, holy times, and ritual rules. By the new evangelic policy of pardon, transgressors are set free from the bonds of an accusing conscience and of evil habit; by the charter of liberty contained in the four words next to be considered, pardoned, regenerate men are set free from the not less serious bonds of conventional religion. Emancipation in the latter form is not less necessary than in the former. The two together constitute complete redemption. Such complete redemption Jesus provided for in His teaching.

3. "New wine into new bottles."

The old bottle into which it was proposed to put the new wine was "fasting." "Why," they asked, "do Thy disciples fast not?" Who the interrogants were, whether John's disciples or Pharisees, or both together, matters not, in this practice there was agreement between them. They fasted on system, and thought that all religious

people should do the same. It was an old pious custom, and it was good for the soul, and on both grounds observance was desirable. Not content with observing the practice themselves, they attempted, with the characteristic intolerance of zealots, to concuss the Jesus-circle into conformity. Jesus firmly resisted pressure, and defended nonconformity with weighty argument embodied in parabolic forms of thought. "Would you have a wedding party fast? Who would patch an old garment with a piece of undressed cloth, or pour new wine into old skins?" The principle implied is: in religion, practice must correspond to spirit; and the latent reason annexed: when this law of congruity is disregarded, practice becomes mechanical to the detriment of the spirit. But this only throws us back on a previous question: Why should the spirit of the Jesus-circle be different from that of Johannine and Pharisaic circles? A similar question arises at all transition times bringing new departures. Lovers of old ways cannot understand the plea of innovators. The claim to be new wine appears to them simply conceit; is not religion essentially ever the same? It may be conceit, but it may also be something very different. As a matter of fact, religions are not all alike. There are religions of fear and religions of faith, servile religions and filial religions; and their ways are of necessity diverse. Such a wide difference existed between the religion of Jesus and His disciples, and that of John and the Pharisees. The religion of John and the Pharisees was legal; the religion of Jesus and His disciples was evangelic. The former was a service rendered in fear to a severe Taskmaster; the latter was a service rendered in gladness of heart to a gracious, benignant Father in heaven. Naturally the one resolved itself into scrupulous task-work, and crystallized into a round of duties periodically, painfully, punctiliously, or perchance, in the long run, perfunctorily and mechanically,

performed. As naturally the other abhorred task-work, rejoiced in spontaneity, would not suffer hands and feet to be shackled by incongruous custom, that it might be free to run in the way of God's commandments, and to do His will with both hands earnestly. This is the evangelic spirit. It is the spirit which answers to the new era of grace. Jesus asserted its rights as the inbringer of that era, and the true sons of that era will ever be jealous for these rights. Tame submission, fond clinging to old custom, means lapse into legalism, with its enfeebled energies and unheroic timidities. Doubtless there is something to fear. The liberty of the spirit may degenerate into license, and issue in a wild religion of wayward, fitful impulse. But the risk must be run. The world cannot do without fresh inspiration, and impetuous, passionate enthusiasm—all that is within roused into activity, giving birth to new thoughts, new songs, new ways of acting, to the glory of the Father in heaven. Are we not dying for lack of the new wine at this hour? Oh for a breath of the Jesus-spirit to heal our weariness and languor, and free us from the yoke of routine!

4. "The Sabbath for man, not man for the Sabbath."

In Mark alone; one of two quite invaluable words of Jesus we owe to the archaic realistic Gospel, the other being the Parable of the *Blade, the Ear, and the Full Corn* (iv. 26-29). The saying preserved by the other two synoptical Evangelists in common with Mark, "the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath," would not have compensated for the loss of this word. For that saying, taken by itself, contains an exceptional statement about one person claiming lordly prerogative for the unique Man, whereas the word peculiar to Mark enunciates in clear, crisp style a great principle applicable to the human race. It is an important contribution to Christ's doctrine concerning the sovereign worth of man. Setting him, by

other sayings, above the animal creation—better than bird or beast ; assigning to his soul, or moral being, more value than the whole world, He here sets man above important religious institutions, and declares the interest of humanity to be the supreme end which these institutions must serve as means. “A greater than the Sabbath is here,” He virtually affirms. This attitude of championship for the human interest as against the divine, falsely conceived to be a rival interest, was characteristic of Jesus. It was the natural, inevitable attitude for one who conceived of God as a Father, and of gracious love as the most central attribute of the divine nature. For Jesus the divine interest and the human interest were coincident ; if He seemed to set the human above the divine, as when He said, “First be reconciled with thy brother, then offer sacrifice,” it was only because the religious teachers of Israel, past and present, had so grievously mismanaged their business as to give to the divine an anti-human aspect.

The Sabbath afforded a peculiarly favourable and important opportunity of asserting the just claims of the human against a falsely and mischievously conceived divine. In the first place, to state that the Sabbath was made for man was to state a simple, undeniable fact, of which any one could satisfy himself by an intelligent, unbiassed reading of the fourth commandment of the Decalogue. By the statute of institution the Sabbath was a divinely-given resting-day for weary men and beasts, humane in its intention, and having men’s good for its *raison d’être*. Then, secondly, the Sabbath was a very obtrusive institution. Once every seven days it came round with its call to men to cease from toil, to remember that man was more than a drudge, and that human life was more than labour with the sweat of the brow for daily bread, and to lift up their hearts with thankfulness to the God by whose considerate providence it came to pass

that there was such a thing as a Sabbath. To say that the oft-recurring day of rest, so differently spent from the other six, was made for man, was a very impressive way of saying: Man is not the slave of sacred institutions; they exist for his benefit. Then, once more, no sacred institution had been more utterly *dehumanised* than the Sabbath. Therefore in connection with none was it more needful to formulate the true, normal, wholesome relation between man and religious institutions.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that this famous *logion* implied a certain amount of *disparagement* of the Sabbath. The effect of such a supposition would simply be to lessen the value of the principle proclaimed. The very point of the declaration lies in this, that man's superiority is affirmed *in connection with an institution whose great worth is acknowledged*. Man greater even than the Sabbath; the Sabbath, with its beneficent provision for rest, there for man's benefit. The more valuable the institution, the better fitted to illustrate the principle: the *raison d'être* of religious institutions serviceableness to the higher interests of humanity. Hence, what Jesus here says of the Sabbath He would, on proper occasion, have said of any sacred object whatsoever, even of one whose value was beyond dispute. He might have said, The temple is made for man, not man for the temple; or even, The Bible is made for man, not man for the Bible. All such things are subject to the test of utility, which is freely applied in the New Testament. In the Epistle to the Hebrews "unprofitableness" is assigned as a reason for the discontinuance of the Levitical ritual (vii. 18). Of the Holy Scriptures, on the other hand, it is affirmed by the Apostle Paul that they are *profitable* for the edification of the man of God (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17). They *are* profitable, and they *must be*; that is the very reason of their existence. If, therefore, by perverted use, *e.g.*,

through Rabbinical interpretation, they cease to be useful, it then becomes seasonable to say, "The Scriptures were made for man, not man for the Scriptures." That was said in effect by the Reformers when they translated the Scriptures into the common tongues. It is said to-day, when the rights of criticism are asserted against the conservatism of traditional reverence, and an endeavour is made to ascertain the true history of the sacred literature with a view to a better understanding of its meaning. The Bible must, by all means, be made a useful book, and not allowed to become the fetish of uninstructed piety.

5. "Always lawful to do good."

This saying does not so much enunciate an independent principle with reference to Sabbath observance, as state a corollary from the great truth just considered. If the very reason for the existence of the Sabbath is to promote man's good, then it cannot be incompatible with true Sabbath keeping to do good. In instituting the day of rest God acted the part of a *benefactor*, and in doing beneficent work man simply becomes an imitator of God. But it goes without saying that the beneficence of man must not take such a shape as to frustrate the beneficence of God by depriving toiling men of their much-needed, divinely-given boon of rest. Doing good might be so widely construed as to include all useful labour carried on on other days of the week. That would mean the abolition of the weekly rest; therefore such comprehensive definition must be disallowed. Ordinary bread-earning labour must be suspended, if the rest is to remain; and no one will object to the suspension who in his heart believes that the weekly rest was made for man's benefit, or that it is of truly beneficial tendency. In the nature of things the suspension cannot be complete, but every humane man will consent to its being as complete as possible. He will say, Let the one day in the week, con-

separated from time immemorial to recreative leisure, be a *bonâ fide* resting-day for weary men. But in proportion as he has entered into the spiritual freedom of Christ's wise teaching he will also demand that rest be rationally defined, that pedantic, superstitious, tyrannical rules prohibitory of so-called "work" shall not be imposed, rules such as that which interdicted rubbing ears of corn between the hands as a species of threshing. More generally, he will insist that the category of permissible acts classifiable as Sabbath well-doing cannot be authoritatively fixed, and that every Christian must be free to exercise his own judgment under law to Christ. Christ did not ask leave of the Pharisees to heal a withered hand; He did what His heart dictated, and let them blame Him as they pleased. A little more of this Christ-like boldness would not be amiss. Abstinence from deeds which conscience does not condemn, from fear of criticism, is a line of conduct that has no value in the kingdom of God, and its prevalence in a religious community is neither a sign nor a cause of spiritual health.

6. "Not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out, defileth."

The fourth *logion* states the true relation of man to sacred things of real and permanent value. They are made for man, must be such as to promote his moral and spiritual interests; therefore when, by abuse, they fail to do that, there is need of reform. So the matter stands in reference to Sabbath, Bible, Church, clergy, etc. The *logion* now to be considered states the relation of man to religious institutions of no intrinsic permanent value, but at best serving only a temporary educational use to man in the period of his spiritual minority. The institution in connection with which the *logion* was spoken was the system of rules for securing ceremonial purity as interpreted and enforced by Rabbinical tradition. With reference to these rules, and all sacred things of similar character, the formula

must be, ceremonial made for man *in his minority*. This implies ultimate abrogation, whereas the *logion* concerning the Sabbath implies perpetuity, subject always, however, to correction of abuse. Accordingly, the terms in which Jesus expressed His view of ceremonial ablution virtually point to eventual abrogation. "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth" (though taken with unwashed hands) means that ceremonial uncleanness is an imaginary evil. It may have been necessary in a time of moral rudeness to treat it as a reality, as a method of impressing on men in their spiritual childhood the distinction between holy and unholy; but from the point of view of an enlightened conscience the insignificance of ceremonial is the eternal truth. Hence if it can be said, even of the Sabbath, "Not man for the Sabbath," *a fortiori* it may be said, Not man for ceremonial ablutions, or for anything of merely symbolic, ritual nature. Ritual being in its nature transient, subjection of man to it permanently will involve arrest of his moral growth, keeping him for ever in a state of childhood. Yet perpetuation of the ceremonial yoke was what the scribes aimed at. It never entered into their minds that religious usages might serve a useful purpose for a time, and be the reverse of wholesome when continued beyond the destined hour of abrogation. Nay, with the characteristic perversity of their kind, they were more zealous in enforcing the unconditional and everlasting obligation to observe ritual and ceremonial than in inculcating the duty of keeping the Sabbath, though their zeal in that work was sufficiently intense. Hence the encounter between Jesus and the scribes in reference to washing of hands was the bitterest of all the encounters recorded in the Gospels. It finally fixed the purpose of the religious guides of Israel to destroy the dangerous revolutionary Teacher of Galilee on the earliest possible opportunity. Jesus understood that they aimed at His life, and that they sought in the neglect

of His disciples a fitting justification for murderous intentions. But He felt that on such a matter there could be no compromise. The hour for abolishing the yoke of ceremonialism had come, and the emancipating word must be spoken. And spoken it was, not merely to the scribes or to the disciples, but to the multitude, who were invited to "hear and understand." When He said in their hearing, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man," Jesus literally gave His life a ransom for the many. It was a great redemptive word, spoken at that cost to the Speaker. Would that all who bear Christ's name understood its import! But how many, even at this hour, are doing their utmost to bring the Church again into bondage!

The foregoing group of four sayings make for the redemption of the individual conscience. The remaining two make for the redemption of society, or for Christian civilization.

7. "What God hath joined together let not man put asunder."

Christ's doctrine of marriage was characteristically generous. It expressed manly sympathy with the gentler sex—with woman, weak, helpless, defenceless, unfairly treated, at the mercy of a husband's caprices, and with no redress, when put away, save a document declaring, "She is no longer my wife; she may marry another if she pleases." But it was more than generous, even the enunciation of a clear, distinct principle concerning the conjugal relation, to the effect that it was of such an intimate nature as to be indissoluble, so long at least as both parties were faithful to each other. "Marriage," said Jesus, "makes two one, in flesh, in heart, in interest, for life. Such is God's will, such the will of *nature*; for man and woman are made for each other, need each other physically and spiritually, complete each other." In taking up this high ground He appealed from the imperfect statute concerning the bill of divorce-

ment, meant to mitigate an existing evil, to the lofty ideal of the marriage tie set forth in the book of Origins (Genesis ii. 23-25). The scribes lost sight of the ideal, and busied themselves with the bill of divorcement: by all means let that be in due order. Not a word spoken by them against the bad custom of unjust putting away, but only cheap, safe zeal to insure that the unjust, unmanly putting away be gone about with due legal formality. It was left to Jesus to speak the brave word, and it was spoken by Him without any thanks from the men of the legal schools. But what cause Christendom has to thank Him! His protest against putting away has given woman status, and so has put it within her power to bless the stronger, rougher sex with the sweet refining influences of her finer tastes and sensibilities. The protest is a two-edged sword, defending woman at once against the caprice of lust and against the caprice of religion. For both lust and religion have been enemies of woman's marriage rights, the one by saying, I put away this woman that I may have another I love more; the other by saying, I put away or forsake this woman that I may spend the rest of my days in solitude, devoting myself entirely to the culture of sanctity and the saving of my soul. Over against the two extremes, which meet in a common inhumanity, Jesus sets the ideal, "the two one for life," so defending society against the degrading influence of lawless appetite on the one hand, and against the less repulsive, but not less anti-social, influence of ascetic sanctity on the other.

8. "To Cæsar Cæsar's, to God God's."

This famous word is doubly admirable: for its controversial dexterity, as addressed to adversaries bent on deadly mischief, and for its permanent didactic value. From a polemical point of view it is simply evasive, adroitly refusing the direct answer desired by the crafty interrogants, and so rescuing their intended victim from their toils. They came,

sent by their masters—for, as Matthew tells us, they were *disciples*, young men who might be presumed to be candid enquirers, and therefore the more likely to put Jesus off His guard—they came asking, “Is it lawful and religiously right to give tribute to Cæsar? shall we give or shall we not give?” How finely they simulate earnestness in that “*shall we give or shall we not give?*” and at the same time virtually dictate the form in which the answer must be given. It must be yes or no, give or do not give. Either answer will bring Jesus into disfavour with persons whose power is to be feared. “Yes” will make Him unpopular with those who desire Jewish independence; “No” will expose Him to the displeasure of the Roman authorities; no answer at all will make Him an object of suspicion to both parties. The answer actually given rescues Him from all these risks, and, for the rest, leaves the question where it found it. The tribute penny, with Cæsar’s image and superscription, showed that Cæsar was ruler in Palestine *de facto*, but it did not prove that he ruled *de jure*, and that was the question at issue. It was well that Jesus answered His malignant questioners evasively, for such men did not deserve an answer such as they wished. Yet the beauty of Christ’s reply is that, while it said nothing to them, it says much to us. It tells us that Cæsar has his place, that theocracy does not exclude secular government, that Messianic ideas and hopes do not necessarily mean political independence. Broadly viewed, it is another vindication of the human as against the falsely conceived divine; for while it assigns both to God and to Cæsar a distinct sphere, the emphasis is on “Cæsar.” The inmost leanings of all Pharisees and scribes was against the Roman yoke. Their attitude on this question was simply a particular application of the principle, the Divine interest all-absorbing, “No room for both God and Cæsar in this Holy Land!” “Nay,” said Jesus, “room for both, in this land and in the world; Divine Rule

not the foe of human rule ; a great reality, yet not needing jealously to assert its rights as against civil governments, able rather to assert itself within these, and through them." Wholesome, beneficent teaching ! For of all forms of misgovernment, the worst is a theocracy administered by professional religionists, which is what it always comes to. The reign of God sounds well ; but when it means the reign of Rabbis, scribes, zealots, priests, ecclesiastics, the despotism of the basest Cæsar that ever abused imperial power is to be preferred. This kills the body, that kills the soul.

A. B. BRUCE.

*A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE GALATIANS.*

XIII. SPIRIT OF CHAPTERS III., IV.

THE historical questions connected with the second chapter are the most difficult and most keenly debated in the whole Epistle ; and it seems best to leave them aside for the moment, in order to examine them with more advantage after having discussed all the other chapters. We assume, then, at present, that in his autobiographical retrospect Paul has impressed upon his Galatian readers the direct divine origin of the message which he had brought to them. God had spoken to him, and he had delivered the message to them, as he had been commissioned to do. Some private communications had passed between himself and the older Apostles ; but these had been simply a declaration of his intentions and views, and there had been no communication made by them to him of any ideas which he should transmit to his converts.

Paul's aim now is to revivify among the Galatians the memory of their first condition, before any contradictory

and confusing messages had affected them. He must touch their hearts, and make them feel for themselves the divine word in their own souls. He reminds them, by many subtle touches of their original experience, how the divine message worked in them, raised them to a higher nature, made them instinct with divine life, implanted marvellous powers in them. If he can work them up again into that frame of mind in which he had left them fresh from his first message, his immediate purpose will be gained. Thereafter, other steps would be required. But, for the moment, he must work on their nature and conscience: he must appeal to their true selves: they had known in themselves how they had begun by simple faith, and whither it had led them. Paul knew what Goethe knew when he said,—

“Oh! never yet hath mortal drunk
A draught restorative,
That welled not from the depths of his own soul!”

How utterly out of place in effecting this purpose would laborious proofs of his own rectitude and consistency be! “Timeserver” is he? Think of the marks of Christ his owner branded on his body! “Preacher of the Law” is he? Then he is false to his own message, and the cross which he placarded before their eyes is set aside by him as no more needed! But they know from their own experience what has made them Christians! If he has been untrue to his message, he is accursed, but let them hold to what they have felt and known!

The letter is not logically argumentative. To look for proofs addressed to the intellect, and to criticise the reasoning on the question as to whether it is or is not intellectually convincing, is merely futile. Each new paragraph, each fresh train of thought, is intended to quicken and reinvigorate the early Christian experiences of his readers. Naturally, we cannot fully appreciate the effect of every

paragraph. In many of them we can see that he is referring to facts in the past relations between them and himself, facts otherwise unknown to us, and guessed only from the brief, pregnant words which he here uses, words full of reminiscence to the Galatians, but sadly obscure to us. In other paragraphs we can be sure he is referring to something which we can hardly even guess at. The effect of the letter depended to a great degree on circumstances which are to us quite unknown. Here, if ever in this world, heart speaks to heart: the man, as he was, appeals direct to the men, as they were.

"If feeling does not prompt, in vain you strive;
If from the soul the language does not come,
By its own impulse, to impel the hearts
Of hearers, with communicated power,
In vain you strive. . . .
Never hope to stir the hearts of men,
And mould the souls of many into one,
By words which come not native from the heart."

Thus Paul reiterates his blows, and heaps appeal on appeal and illustration on illustration, all for the one sole end. He must rekindle the flame of faith, languishing for the moment, under misapprehension, doubt as to Paul's purpose, doubt as to his character, suspicion as to the witness and work of the other Apostles. If the flame leaps up fresh and strong in their souls, it will melt all suspicions and solve all doubts. They will once more know the truth.

Such is the spirit in which we must try to interpret chapters iii. and iv. I cannot do it. Probably no one will ever do it completely. In some cases, I fancy, I can in a small degree catch the tone in which the words ought to be recited, if the meaning is to be brought out of them; and by the hope thus to contribute something to the understanding of this, the most wonderful and enigmatical self-

revelation in literature, I have been driven to publish these pages (many of which have been written long ago, and kept back from consciousness of their inadequacy).

XIV. "GALATIANS" IN III. 1.

The opening three words of the chapter, "O foolish Galatians," have in Paul's mouth, if I estimate him and them correctly, a strongly pathetic effect. It is, I think, customary to say that here his anger speaks, and he sharply censures the senseless conduct of the Galatians.¹ The most curious development of this idea is seen in Deissmann, *Bibelstudien*, p. 263 ff. After the harsh and angry tone of the earlier pages of the letter, according to Deissmann, Paul concludes, in vi. 11, with a little joke, so that the Galatians, his "dear silly children" (*liebe unverständige Kinder*), may understand that his anger has not been lasting, and that it is no longer the severe schoolmaster who is addressing them: he therefore makes the jocular remark about "big letters," which are more impressive to children than the smaller letters of the secretary who wrote most of the Epistle: "When Paul spoke thus, the Galatians knew that the last traces of the seriousness of the punishing schoolmaster had vanished from his features!"

Not anger, but pathos, on the contrary, seems to be the prominent note in this apostrophe. The authoritative tone, of course, is there; but the feeling is that of love, sorrow, and pathos, not anger.

It is only on rare occasions that Paul addresses his

¹ *Scharfrügender Ausdruck* is Dr. Zöckler's expression. Lightfoot, in his edition, p. 64, evidently reckons this apostrophe among those "outbursts of indignant remonstrance," by which "the argument is interrupted every now and then. Rebuke may prevail where reason will be powerless." That the tone is "severe" (in Lightfoot's previous phrase) is quite true; but to take "indignation" as its prominent note seems to me to be a misreading of the purpose and drift. This misconception is one of the many wrong consequences of the North-Galatian view.

hearers, as in this case, directly by the general appellation that embraces them all and sums them all up in one class. But in certain states of emotion the necessity comes upon him to use this direct appeal, so that every individual shall feel that he is personally addressed. The only other cases in the Epistles of Paul are 2 *Corinthians* vi. 11, and *Philippians* iv. 15. Let us compare the three.

To show the tone of 1 *Corinthians* vi. 11, it is only necessary to recall the intensely emotional words (vv. 1-10) describing Paul's life as an evangelist, and his prayer "that ye receive not the grace of God in vain," and then to read v. 11, "Our mouth is open unto you, O Corinthians, our heart is enlarged." He goes on to address them as his children. But though he is censuring them, it is not anger that prompts the apostrophe; deep yearning affection dictates the direct personal appeal.

So again in *Philippians* iv. 15. Paul's feelings are deeply moved as he recalls that Philippi was the one Church which sent and forced on him money for his pressing wants. Here again the apostrophe, "Philippians," follows upon an autobiographical passage, describing how "I can do all things in Him that strengtheneth me."

Thus in all three cases we notice the same conditions leading Paul up to the direct address. He has been for a time putting forward prominently his own work and the spirit in which he does it. Compare the words of *Philippians* just quoted with *Galatians* ii. 20, "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live: and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me," etc., and with 2 *Corinthians* vi. 9, 10, "as dying, and behold we live; as chastened, not killed; as poor, yet making many rich," etc. Wrought up to a high pitch of emotion in this retrospect of his life in death as a servant and minister, he turns direct on his hearers, and places them face to face with himself, "Galatians," or "Philippians," or "Corinthians." The man who reads

anger into this address as its prominent characteristic is for the moment losing his comprehension of Paul's mind. Pathos is the characteristic, not indignation.

It is not exactly the same situation, but is at least analogous, when Paul directly appeals by name to a single correspondent. This he only does in 1 *Timothy* i. 18; vi. 20. In the former case there is exactly the same movement of thought and emotion as in the three cases just quoted. He casts a glance over his own career as the "chief of sinners," who "obtained mercy, that in me might Jesus Christ show forth all His longsuffering, for an example of them which should hereafter believe on Him unto eternal life"—the same idea, life gained through the divine patience (though the idea of Paul's personal suffering and affliction is not made so prominent here). Then he continues, as in the other cases, "This charge I commit unto thee, my child Timothy."

Incidentally, we remark here that no one who trusts to his literary sense, could attribute this passage in 1 *Timothy*, with its deep feeling, to a forger, who put on the mask of Paul in order to gain currency for his theological ideas. If you permit your feeling for literature to guide you, you know that the friend and spiritual father of Timothy is speaking to him in these words.

The other passage in which Paul addresses Timothy by name, vi. 20, is different in type. Towards the end of a long series of instructions to Timothy about his work, Paul sums up earnestly, "O Timothy, guard that which is committed unto thee." Here it is the concluding sentence; and the letter ends, as it began, with the direct address to Timothy.

But, it will be asked, Was Paul not expecting too much, when he thought that the Galatians would understand these delicate shades of feeling, which escape many modern readers? Are we not trying to read our own fancies into

the Epistle? I think not. Paul was a great orator, not in the sense of elaborate artistic composition—as to which he felt with Goethe, who makes his Faust sneer at mere “expression, graceful utterance” (which the silly pupil considered “the first and best acquirement of the orator”), because they

“Are unrefreshing, as the wind that whistles
In autumn, ’mong the dry and wrinkled leaves”—

but in the sense that he knew exactly what he could count upon in his audience. He swept over their hearts as the musician sweeps over the strings of his instrument, knowing exactly what music he can bring from them, and what he must not attempt with them. Let us read the letter to the Galatians without the misconceptions and preconceived theories which lead most commentators astray; and let us acquire beforehand some idea of the political and religious situation, and the character of the Galatians. Then the meaning will strike us plainly between the eyes, and we shall no longer talk of anger as influencing the expression of the writer (except for the moment, and on a special point, in i. 8 f., v. 12). You never understand Paul's motives or purposes unless you take them on the highest level possible: when you read in them any mixture of poorer or smaller purpose, you are merely misunderstanding Paul and losing your grasp of him. But they who talk so much about his indignation in *Galatians* are missing the real emotion that drives him on: it is intense and overpowering love and pity for specially beloved children.

In iii. 1, then, the movement of feeling in the writer's mind forces him to apostrophize his readers in one general address. But by what appellation could he sum up the whole body whom he addressed in Antioch, Iconium, Derbe, and Lystra? There was only one name common to them all. They all belonged to the Roman province.

The Churches addressed had already been summed up as "the Churches of Galatia." The one title common to the hearers was "men of (the province) Galatia," *i.e.* Galatae.

Here we find ourselves on ground that has been disputed. Those who hold the North-Galatian view have advanced three separate arguments on this point, and each demands a short consideration. They ask, in the first place, what reason there was why Paul should have sought for some common appellation for the people of the four cities: they say that, if he were addressing Antioch, Iconium, Derbe, and Lystra, he might have contented himself with the superscription (in i. 2), as he does in many other letters. In the second place, they say (or, at least, used to say) that the name Galatia was not applied to the country in which these four cities were situated. In the third place, even if it be admitted that the four cities were in Galatia, they maintain that their inhabitants could not be called Galatae, for none who were not Gauls by race could be called Galatae.¹

The first argument has already been answered, when we showed how the march of emotion brought Paul to the point where he must apostrophize his audience.

The second and third arguments demand separate consideration.

XV. GALATIA THE PROVINCE.

The one decisive argument that Paul's "Galatia" must be the province, and not simply the region inhabited by the Gauls, is stated by Zahn. Paul never uses any geographical names except Roman provincial. This has been stated above, § xii., where additional arguments are given

¹ *Errarunt qui Galatas Pauli intellegi voluerunt Lycaonas, quippe qui a Romanis Galatiæ provinciae essent attributi; neque enim, ut mittam alia, ea re ex Lycaonibus Galli facti erant (Gal. iii. 1),* says one of the most learned and scholarly supporters of the North-Galatian view.

to strengthen Zahn's observation: not merely did Paul use the Roman provincial names, but he even used them in the Latin form, transliterating them into Greek, and in one case employing a Latin form which was avoided by Greek writers and never occurs elsewhere in Greek. Paul writes as a Roman and a citizen of the Empire.

Here we note that Paul is much more Roman in his tone than the Greek Luke. The latter never uses the term "Galatia," he mentions only the "Galatic Territory." Now, if Paul and Luke had been speaking of North Galatia, the country of the three Gallic Tribes, it is impossible to understand why they should differ as to the name. Among the immense number of references to North Galatia made by Greek and Latin writers,¹ I do not know a single case where any other name than Galatia is used for the country. Why should Luke alone employ everywhere a different name for the country, diverging from the universal usage of Greek and Latin writers, and also from his master Paul? No possible reason can be given. It would simply be an unintelligible freak of Luke's; he chose to differ from everybody, because—he chose to do so.

But, on the South-Galatian view, it was almost unavoidable that he should differ from Paul as to the name of the country. The custom of naming the province varied according as one wrote from the Roman or the Greek point of view. Now it has been shown in page after page of my *St. Paul* that Luke follows the Greek popular and colloquial usage, as it was current among the more educated half of society in the cities of the Ægean land. So far as evidence goes, that class of persons never used "Galatia" to denominate the Roman Province; only persons who consciously and intentionally adopted the Roman Imperial point of view did so. The Greeks generally repeated the list of regions comprised in the Province (or, at least, as

¹ Most are collected in Holder's *Altkeitscher Sprachschatz*, s.v. *Galatia*.

many of the regions as served their immediate purpose), thus: "Galatia (*i.e.* North Galatia), Phrygia, Lycaonia, Pisidia, Isauria, Pontus, Paphlagonia"; but occasionally they employed an expression like "the Galatic Eparchy." This is exactly what Luke does. Sometimes he speaks of the region or regions with which he is concerned, Pisidia, Phrygia, Lycaonia; sometimes he employs the expression, "the Galatic territory."

Further, take into consideration that the adjective "Galatic" is frequently applied, in inscriptions and the geographical writer Ptolemy, to countries like Pontus and Phrygia, which were included in the Province, but that this adjective is never used in a geographical way to designate by a circumlocution North Galatia;¹ and you can only marvel that scholars could ever conceal the facts from themselves so far as to think that Luke meant "Galatic territory" to indicate North Galatia.²

In truth, nothing except the obscurity in which Asia Minor was enveloped, combined with the general lack of interest taken by scholars in mere geographical matters—which are commonly regarded as beneath the dignity of true scholarship—made the North-Galatian view ever seem tenable. And now it stands only because its supporters among "the great scholars" of Germany will not look into the facts. Their minds have long ago been made up, and there is so much to do in other directions that they

¹ It is naturally used in such ways as *ἔργα Γαλατικά*, deeds like those of the Galatæi, *πόλις Γαλατική*, a Galatian city like Ancyra.

² An Englishman who caught the words, "At this point he entered British territory," would at once understand that a journey was described not in Great Britain, but in Africa or Asia or America. A German, however, unless English was very well and accurately known to him, might hesitate as to the meaning. So a Greek of Paul's time would unhesitatingly understand "Galatic territory" in the sense in which the inscriptions and Ptolemy use it. One might write a chapter on the geographical use of adjectives in *-ικός*. Compare, *e.g.*, Thucydides on the sense of "Laconic land" (*γῆ Λακωνική*), in which he includes not merely Laconia proper, but also Messenia and Pylos; in short, all the territory added to Laconia during previous history.

cannot reconsider *choses jugées*. The appearance of Prof. Zahn's *Einleitung*, with its frank acceptance of the main points in the South-Galatian view, will, as we may hope, produce a change in Germany, and show that the subject cannot be pushed aside.

The great difficulty for the moment is that the North-Galatian theorists have committed themselves to such sweeping statements in geography and history, in order to prove the South-Galatian view impossible, that they have, as it were, burned their boats and must fight to the last, no longer for truth, but merely for victory: *es wäre wenig rühmlich, wenn die Theologen, welche mit ihren Mitteln in der Geschichte des Urchristenthums und der alten Kirche jahrzehntelang gearbeitet haben, ehe Ramsay seine Mittel auf dieselbe Gegenstände anwandte, zu allem . . . Ja sagen würden*. Take one example, which is typical of the present situation. Learning that many inscriptions designate the Province by the list of regions composing it, a distinguished German Professor wrote an elaborate article, boldly asserting that the name Galatia was never rightly applied to the whole Province, and therefore drawing the inference, as final and conclusive, that Paul could not have called Antioch, Iconium, etc., "Churches of Galatia." Now this was a real danger to scholarship. Many English theologians are accustomed to regard that distinguished Professor as one whom "no one would accuse of error in a field which he has made peculiarly his own."¹ He was understood to have gone and investigated the subject with the true German thoroughness so characteristic of him, and the paper was considered by many as closing the question; if he was right, there was no more to say, and no one would even think of attributing error to him. Yet he had written

¹ I quote the words of a distinguished English Professor writing on this topic. The inerrancy once attributed to the text has been transferred by some theologians to the German commentators.

that bold and sweeping negative without looking into the familiar Roman treatises on geography, which must be the foundation of all reasoning on the subject; and, as soon as his attention was called to Pliny and Ptolemy, he retracted the assertion. In truth, his assertion could not be entertained for a moment; it was flatly contradicted by the fundamental authorities. Had any English scholar made it, what scorn would have been poured on English superficiality! how the moral would have been drawn that he should study German!

Even, after the German Professor has withdrawn his statement and confessed his error, and other prominent German adherents of the North-Galatian theory have frankly acknowledged that Iconium, etc., were in Galatia, some English theologians continue to quote the original article as authoritative.¹ If that is the case, after the article has been retracted, what would be the case if no one had ventured to charge its author with error?

XVI. GALATIANS AND GAULS.

But the distinguished author, while briefly retracting his statement about Galatia, committed himself to another equally sweeping negative—the title *Galatae* could not be used to designate the people of Roman Galatia (being presumably confined to those who had the blood-right² to it). Before making this sweeping negative, it is clear that the learned Professor did not take the trouble to review the passages mentioning the *Galatae*, or to recall the facts. Had he done so, he could not have made the statement. But, apart from that, no scholar outside the North-Galatian ranks, would even ask for proof that, when the Romans called a

¹ See, for example, the paper of a distinguished Cambridge scholar, Dr. Cheetham, in *Classical Review*, 1894, p. 396, a paper never retracted, and therefore presumably maintained by the learned author.

² See the quotation from another great scholar, note on p. 125.

Province by a definite name, they summed up the inhabitants of the Province by the ethnic derived from the name. That is an axiom from which all historical and archaeological students start. It was necessary in the administration of a Province to have some designation for the whole body of Provincials: *Afri* all the people of Africa Provincia, whatever their race; *Baetici* of Baetica Hispania; *Asiani* of Asia; and *Galatae* of Galatia.

A single case is sufficient.¹ Tacitus, with his love for variation in expression, speaks of *dilectus per Galatiam Cappadociamque* and *Galatarum Cappadocumque auxilia*. When this was quoted as an example, the North-Galatian champion replied that these troops were obviously recruited among the Gaulish tribes (as the most warlike), and not from the Province as a whole. Once more he spoke without investigating the facts, simply inventing reasons to prop up a theological theory. The evidence has been fully collected and tabulated by Mommsen,² and it is to the opposite effect. Recruits were drawn from all parts of the Province, and (so far as the evidence reaches) in larger numbers from the parts outside of North Galatia; there were, at least, three auxiliary cohorts styled *cohortes Paphlagonum*, but no auxiliary cohort takes its name from the *Galatae*.³

The details of this argument are quoted as a specimen of the straits to which the North-Galatian theory reduces

¹ Other examples are given in *Studia Biblica*, iv. p. 26 ff.; and Dr. Zahn says that the discussion there given *handelt hievon ausführlich und überzeugend* (*Einleitung*, p. 130). See also *Galatia* in Hastings, *Bible Dictionary of the Bible*, II.

² *Observat. Epigraph.* xxxviii., *Militum Provincialium Patriae*, p. 190 f. (*Eph. Epigr.*, vol. v.).

³ In the names of auxiliary cohorts, words like *Galatarum*, *Cilicum*, must be taken in the sense of nation, not of Province, according to Mommsen's acute distinction. Auxiliary cohorts were in theory assumed to originate from foreign tribes (as in truth they once did originate), not from Roman Provinces; and they bore names national and non-Roman after they were recruited entirely from the Provinces.

its defenders. They fall into error after error, when they try to make any statement about the facts of Galatian history in favour of their theory.

But, further, even before the formation of the Roman Province, the name "Galatian" had ceased to imply Gaulish descent. We must remember that the Gauls who settled in Galatia were a very small body. The first great horde that entered Asia Minor is said to have numbered 20,000, of whom only half were fighting men.¹ Though others followed, yet the constant wars, with some serious defeats, which they had to face must have kept their numbers down; and the total number who settled in Galatia, a country nearly 200 miles long by 80 broad, can only have been a very small conquering and aristocratic caste amid a great subject population. Especially the trading population of the great cities must have been mainly native Phrygian, mixed with Greeks (Romans and Jews later) and an upper class of Gauls. That is the conclusion of Van Gelder and of Staehelin, who are the chief authorities on the subject. The former says that the Gauls lived almost wholly in the open country as nomads and shepherds; but that perhaps restricts the Gauls too narrowly. Tavium was, probably, mainly Gaulish, and Ancyra also was a Gaulish capital. Possibly, at the first, neighbouring peoples distinguished Galatae from native Phrygians in Galatia; but it is impossible to suppose that the distinction was long maintained. The mixed population of the country soon came to be called the Galatian people.

First, consider the natural probabilities. The conquerors seized, according to the usual principle² (which is believed by ordinary scholars to have been observed by the Gauls in Galatia), one-third of the land, leaving two-thirds to the old population. But the older population had all trade

¹ Livy (who represents the authority of Polybius), xxxviii. 16.

² *Cæsar, Bell. Gall.*, I. 81.

in their hands, for the conquerors were mere barbarians, fighting naked, and scorning manual labour. Thus there is every probability that the wealth of the non-Gaulish population would increase, while that of the territorial aristocracy would decrease, until they adopted civilized habits and ways, and lost their Gaulish pride. It would appear that during the latter part of the second century Galatia fell under the power of the Pontic kings,¹ and continued so until the Romans aided them to gain their freedom in the Mithradatic wars. Such circumstances were calculated to strengthen the native element and to weaken the aristocratic Gaulish caste, though the Gauls retained their vigour and individuality sufficiently to reassert themselves with Roman help, 84-64 B.C., and regain their ascendancy (though probably not so thoroughly as before the Pontic rule).

But now began tetrarchic and then monarchic rule, which was necessarily unfavourable to the freedom-loving aristocracy, and supported itself on Greek connexion and Greek civilization. The Roman rule, which succeeded the monarchic, was still more unfavourable to class distinctions among the people of the Province; all the people were summed up as Provincials, and we need not doubt that a wealthy Greek-speaking merchant of the city was more important in the eyes of the Romans than an impecunious landowner of the country. At the same time there is evidence that the Gaulish aristocracy still maintained itself, and must therefore have adapted itself in some degree to the new conditions. In such a situation it is wholly improbable that the name "Galatians" was restricted to the small body of Gauls, and denied to the mass of the Phrygian population.

But we are not left to mere general estimate of prob-

¹ Van Gelder, *de Gallis in Graecia et Asia*, p. 183.

abilities. Pausanias, vii. 17, 10, says that "the Galatians of Pessinus abstain from swine." Evidently, he is speaking of the general population of Pessinus, not merely of the Gaulish part of it. Now, Pessinus was free, and hostile to the Gauls, until some time between 189 and 164 B.C.¹ It then probably made a compromise with the Gauls, for half the places in the college of priests were retained by the old Phrygian priestly families.² Thus the Gaulish element in the city is likely to have been much slighter than in Ancyra or Tavium; yet its population was summed up as "Galatae."

Again, during the second century before Christ we find that among the slaves manumitted at Delphi Galatians were most numerous after Syrians and Thracians, more numerous than Phrygians, that race of born slaves. Are we to believe that that proud aristocracy sold their own children into slavery, and not rather that they sold their subjects, and that the Greeks classed all who came from Galatia as Galatians?³ Or are we to think that Gaulish warriors taken prisoners in battle were common as slaves among their Greek conquerors? It was well known to the Greeks that the Gauls were untamable barbarians, preferring death to capture. But the slaves manumitted at Delphi got their freedom because they were well-behaved, industrious, and able to earn money, and to be more useful to their masters free than enslaved. One of them was a shoemaker, another a skilled workwoman: the former was set free between 150 and 140 B.C., the other between 150 and 100 B.C. No one can fancy that the Gauls of whom Polybius was writing with such admiration for their proud

¹ Körte, in *Athenische Mittheilungen*, 1897, pp. 16, 39.

² Körte, in *Philolog. Wochenschr.*, 1898, p. 3.

³ It must be remembered that the term Galatian in the Delphic inscription means one purchased from abroad: the child of a foreign slave born in the Greek country is classed as *ἐνδογενής* or *οἰκογενής*.

and noble character were more familiar as well-behaved slaves and shoemakers in Greece than any race except Syrians and Thracians.

Moreover, the names prove that these slaves were taken from the old Phrygian population of Galatia. Though slave names depended on the master's caprice, they were commonly characteristic of the slaves' origin and language, as Strabo says, p. 304. Among the Delphic Galatians is Maiphates, set free 170-157 B.C. That is a pure Anatolian name, found in Phrygia and in Pontus; and the first syllable is peculiarly characteristic of Phrygian and Lydian names.¹ We find also among them Sosias, the name of the Phrygian slave in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes:² Sosias of Delphi was a shoemaker. But none of the names shows any trace of Gaulish origin. Now, while foreign slaves were often renamed by their Greek owners, some, apparently, were allowed to retain their original names; and that is evidently the case with Maiphates. Many other examples might be given.³ One is interesting here: we find a Jewess Antigona, with two daughters, Theodora and Dorothea, and we cannot doubt that these names are chosen in the family and not given by her owner. The love of the Jews for names containing the element *θεός* is well known:⁴ these were the translation of Hebrew names, as has been illustrated fully by Dr. Herzog in an elaborate paper.⁵ Besides such names, the Jews were fond of taking names from the Greek royal families of Alexander and his successors: hence the mother was Antigona.

¹ Probably Ma, Maia, the Mother, the Earth, the Great Goddess. The subject will be treated more fully in "Varia III.," *Classical Review*, Oct., 1898.

² See "Varia I.," in *Classical Review*, *loc. cit.*

³ At Delphi, e.g., Phrygian Menophilos, Cappadocian Menophilos and Mithradates, Illyrian Ana and Ammia, Syrian Libanos and Enome and Ladika, Thracian Bithys, etc. See "Varia III."

⁴ So afterwards among the Christians, *Cities and Bish. of Phr.*, pt. ii., p. 500, note and no. 250.

⁵ *Philologus*, lvi. p. 50 ff.; see also S. Reinach, *Rev. Ét. Juives*, 1893, p. 126 ff.

These illustrations bring out the principle that in the first century the Greeks in ordinary usage thought not about blood, but simply about country, when they called a person "Galatian." He who sprang from Galatia was Galatian. Still more was that the case with Romans, who summed up all persons in a Province as provincials.

XVII. ST. PAUL'S ROMAN POINT OF VIEW.

When he uses the terms Galatia and Galatians, Paul speaks as no mere Greek spoke: he speaks as the Roman. If so, we must look to find this view ruling both in this Epistle and through his whole policy. That principle I have attempted to illustrate throughout my *St. Paul the Traveller*. Here it remains to illustrate it in the following paragraphs of the Epistle.

The use of *Galatae* in the Roman sense may be illustrated by the term *Φιλιππησίου*. The commentators on *Philippians* iv. 15 do not observe that this form is not Greek, but Latin. It is the Greek representative of the Latin *Philippensis*, according to a rule familiar to archaeologists: thus, *e.g.*, *Mutinensis* becomes *Μουτουνήσιος*. So thoroughly does Paul take the Roman view that he avoids the Greek ethnic, which was *Φιλιππεύς* or *Φιλιππηνός*: he would not address the inhabitants of a Roman colony by a Greek name, but only by a Latin form. How else, then, would he address the united people of the colonies Antioch and Lystra, of the cities that bore officially an Emperor's name Claud-iconium and Claudio-Derbe, except by the one title which indicated their common Roman connexion, "ye of the Province Galatia," *Galatae*?

W. M. RAMSAY.

THE ARTICLES OF THE APOSTLES' CREED.

XI. "THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS."

THE origin and the original meaning of *sanctorum communionem* are still obscure. The oldest commentator of whom we can say with tolerable certainty that he not only made use of this idea in this connection, but that he also possessed it in his Creed, is Nicetas, about the year 400,¹ to whom we have often already referred. We see that he understood *sanctorum* of persons, and indeed, as it appears from the context, of all the saints and believers of all times. Further, *communio* is an abstract term to him, a relationship of each individual to these saints, and therefore a communion with them. Finally, it counts with him as a blessing to which the believer in *one* Church shall hereafter attain by virtue of his belonging to it and on the supposition that he will hold fast to this communion with the Catholic Church.² This reference to the future gives a

¹ I do not know of any exhaustive dissertation on this obscure personage. I assume that the sermon published in Caspari, *Anecdota*, pp. 341-360, is identical with that mentioned by Gennadius, *Vir. ill.* 22, and called *liber de symbolo*, and that the author was really Niceas or Nicetas, Bishop of Romatiana. Romatiana (or Romesiana, Remesiana, etc.) was situated where Bela or Ak-Palanka now stands, between Nisch and Pirot in Serbia. It seems to me that the author of the sermon cannot be identified with the Bishop Nicetas of Aquileia, to whom Leo the Great wrote in 458, because it seems incomprehensible that the Creed of Aquileia should have been so fully developed in the time between Rufinus and this Bishop of Aquileia as we must then assume. For example, we find missing the *unicum* of the second Article and the *descensus* which Rufinus possessed, and which the Church of Aquileia, according to the notice in Venantius Fortunatus in the 6th century had again, or rather had always possessed. Our Nicetas is much more probably the missionary bishop of Dacia, who is praised by Paulinus of Nola (*Ep.* 29, 14; *Poema* 17 and 27, Migne 61, col. 321, 483, 652). This theory is not affected by the fact that this sermon on the Creed is ten years older than the *Expositio* of Rufinus, and that Rufinus meant to include Nicetas among the earlier preachers on the Creed. (See p. 10 n. 1, Germ. ed.).

² At the conclusion of the sentences translated above, p. 87 (Germ. ed.), and a quotation from Col. 1, 20, he says: "*Ergo in hac una ecclesia crede te communionem consecuturum esse sanctorum. Scito unam hanc esse ecclesiam*

narrower meaning to the idea than would appear from the context. The saints with whom the Christian first hopes to have this communion in the future, that is to say if he dies in a state of salvation, can only be those with whom he stood in no direct communication here on earth, that is those already dead. This connection is elsewhere more clearly expressed but presented in such a manner that the confession of "the communion of saints" expresses the hope and the wish to be preserved with departed Christians in the enjoyment and fellowship of hope during the whole earthly life.¹ Again, another old commentator remarks that whereas during this life the gifts of the Holy Spirit appear to be unequally divided, they will be shared in common in eternity, so that each single saint will receive yonder that which was lacking in him of spiritual gifts in this life by participation in the virtues of others;² that is to say in a concrete form—the thief on the cross will not be conscious of any defect in eternity when he compares himself with an Apostle John, who, during a long and holy life, returned the love of Him who had first loved him, Martha will not stand behind Mary. A spiritual community of goods, amongst all the members of the Church, is set forth as the goal of the Christian's hope. Whilst here, the saints, according to the Biblical view and that of the ancient Church, are referred to as plainly as possible as members of the community of believers, Faustus of Riez interprets the saints in a much narrower sense, and makes

catholicam in omni orbe terræ constitutam, cuius *communione* debes firmiter tenere." A *Missale Florentinum* in Caspari, IV. 301 f., seems to be dependent on Nicetas. But the text is probably not in order. Cf. Mone, *Lateinische und griechische Messen*, p. 85, "[*da nobis*] in *communione* omnium sanctorum remissionem omnium nostrorum criminum."

¹ *Pseudoaugust. Sermo* 242 (ed. Bass, XVI. 1802 [falsely 243], 1304): "Sanctorum *communione*, id est cum illis Sanctis, qui in hac, quam suscepimus fide defuncti sunt, societate et spei *communione* teneamur." The conjunctive is afterwards "*credamus*." The address *de symbolo* (Bass, XVII. 1960), which is compiled out of this amongst many others, mixes all together.

² *Pseudoaugust. Sermo* 240.

use of this opportunity to speak of the worship of saints and their relics.¹ He does not give any explanation of this view; for it need not be said that *sanctorum communionem* cannot be interpreted "the worship of saints." We only see that Faustus had narrowed the meaning of saints. But this remained, I imagine, an isolated case. Others, again, move in quite another direction, making *sanctorum* neuter and referring it to the Sacraments, especially to the Lord's Supper. They understand *sanctorum communionem* as the participation in the holy things and holy gifts offered in the Sacraments. This is the view, if I rightly understand it, of a sermon wrongly attributed to Augustine,² of a free paraphrase of the younger Apostles' Creed from the old Irish Church,³ and of an old French translation.⁴ The

¹ *Hom. II. de symbolo* (Caspari, *Anecd.* p. 338), a warning against exaggeration; *tract. de symbolo* (Caspari, IV. 273), controverting the opponents of saint worship. Caspari's warning in the introduction of the latter volume, p. iv., "against hasty conclusions" seems to have been given in vain.

² *Pseudoaugust. Sermo 241*: "Credentes ergo sanctam ecclesiam catholicam, sanctorum habentes communionem, quia, ubi est fides sancta, ibi est et *sancta communio*, credere vos quoque in corpore resurrectionem et remissionem peccatorum oportet. Omne *sacramentum baptismi* in hoc constat, ut resurrectionem corporum et remissionem peccatorum nobis a deo praestanda credamus." I understand by *sancta communio* the right celebration of the Lord's Supper, which is set in relation to the resurrection and the forgiveness of sins, just as baptism is set subsequently.

³ It cannot be understood in any other way, since in this creed, which is contained in a MS. of the 7th century, *abremissa peccatorum* is placed before *sanctorum communio*, so that the latter is separated from *ecclesiam catholicam* (Caspari, II. 284). Forgiveness of sins is placed first because it refers to baptism, while "participation in holy things" is naturally placed second because it refers to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. I do not entirely understand Caspari's objection to this view, II. 287, which he derives from capital letters in *Sanctorum* instead of *sanctorum* (is this in the MS. itself?). Lastly, the form *abremissa* instead of *remissio*, and the last sentence, *haec omnia credo in deum*, point to an intimate connection with the circles from which the younger Apostles' Creed went forth. Compare Faustus in Caspari, *Anecd.* p. 338 n. 11; *de spir. s.* 1, 2 (Engelbrecht, p. 104, 25-27, where both may be read). It remains unexplained how a later Armenian Creed coincides with the Irish order in "ecclesiam sanctam, remissionem peccatorum, communionem sanctorum" (Catargian, *De fidei symbolo, quo Armeni utuntur*, Viennae, 1893, p. 39; it is given otherwise in German in Caspari, II. 11, cf. p. 46).

⁴ See Hahn, p. 58: *La communion des saintes choses*. Theobaldus Brito

great variety of translations in comparatively ancient times proves at all events that the formula itself must be much older than the explanations which differ so widely from each other. It was an old heirloom even in the time of Nicetas of Romatiana and still more so in the time of Faustus of Riez,¹ of which the meaning was no longer clear and certain.

It is very remarkable that not one of the old commentators on the Creed give the meaning which the words unquestionably possessed in the language of the African Church about the year 400.² The Donatists, like the Catholics, understand *communio* to signify community of the Churches and indeed in the concrete sense of this word of ours. They called the fellowship of orthodox Christians, the Church itself, *sanctorum communio*. It was therefore synonymous there with *congregatio sanctorum* or *ecclesia*. If we might accept this as the meaning of the same words in the Creed, it would be, as Luther and the Evangelicals generally understand it, an explanation in apposition to *sanctam ecclesiam catholicam*. But it is very improbable that this was the original meaning, for then the disappearance from tradition as early as 400 of the exact original meaning, and the luxuriant growth of the most diverse meanings in after times would remain an unsolved riddle.

(Caspari, *Anecd.* p. 300), in his commentary, lays great stress at all events on the Sacraments, but appears to understand *sancti* of the blessed dead.

¹ This is confirmed by the fact that not a few commentaries pass it over in silence; for example, one belonging to Carovingian times, quoted by Caspari, IV. 285; also that in the *Missale Gallie. vetus* in Mabillon, *Liturg. Gall.* p. 342. Even Nicetas and Faustus do not give a real explanation (see above, p. 136).

² G. v. Zezschwitz, in his *System of Catechising*, II.² 1. 123, mentions as the only three passages which have as yet been referred to: the letter of the Donatists to Flavius Marcellinus (Aug. ed. Bass, XVII. 2532); the Donatist decree of excommunication in August., *Enarr. in psalm.* 36, *sermo* 2. 20 (Bass, V. 369); and a passage in Augustine (*sermo* 52. 6; Bass, VII. 304). The meaning in all these passages is quite clear; synonymous expressions are heaped up in the first. Perhaps Mone's Fragment, which is mentioned on p. 136, note ² should be placed here.

The prevailing practice in the African language is of little use as a proof, for the African Church did not possess this article in their Creed. The interpretation of these words in the Creed which have been quoted have this in common, that all unite in taking *communio* in an abstract sense. May not this be the origin of the tradition which has become so vague? Further, if for the reasons given this article of the Creed must have been contained even in very early times in the creed of some one Church and very probably in the South-Gallican, it is not impossible, but rather highly probable, that the Latin words are the translation of a Greek original. This could scarcely have been anything else than τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν ἁγίων, or better, ἁγίων κοινωνίαν,¹ which, according to the language of the Greek Church, could only be interpreted as "Participation in the holy things." The belief was thus expressed that in the Sacraments and through the same, especially in the Holy Communion, the gifts offered therein were really received. For it is not the Sacrament as an action but the consecrated elements and the miraculous gifts offered therein which are τὰ ἅγια.² And yet it is remarkable that Augustine, who had not *sanctorum communio* either in his native Milanese Creed or in the African, should speak of *communio sacramentorum* in one of his sermons on the former, placing it just where Nicetas and others speak of *sanctorum communio*. He, unlike the Donatist sect, extols the holy

¹ Cf. the Greek translations in Caspari, II. 12, 20, 23. With reference to the meaning of the Greek expression itself see Caspari, II. 46; v. Zezschwitz, *passim*, p. 122, and the treatise of Caspari, which he quotes, but which I cannot obtain at present.

² Already *The Teaching of the Apostles* (c. 9) refers the verse Matt. vii. 6 (τὰ ἅγια) to the Lord's Supper. The holy gift offered in the Lord's Supper belongs only to those made holy by Baptism. According to ancient Liturgies like that of Jerusalem in the time of Cyril (*Catech. mystag.* v. 18), and that of Antioch in the time of Chrysostom (Hammond, *The Ancient Liturgy of Antioch*, p. 17), the Priest immediately before the Administration called: τὰ ἅγια τοῖς ἁγίοις. Cf. *Const. Apost.* viii. 12, ed. Lagarde, p. 259, 13; Swainson, *Greek Liturgies*, p. 64, 136, 169.

Church for allowing even the wicked to remain in sacramental fellowship, and committing judgment of them to God.¹ When he uses side by side with this the expression *sacramentorum participatio*² for the same thing, it seems as though it must be a different translation of the same Greek original. In Latin as in German it is difficult to give an exact translation of *κοινωνία*.³ *Ἁγία* would certainly first suggest to Greeks the Lord's Supper; still the comprehensiveness of the term would admit quite as well of a reference to the gifts offered in Baptism, and therefore to the thought of both Sacraments. In many Oriental creeds Baptism is referred to just in this place.⁴ Besides, who can deny that the mention of the Sacraments in the Creed, and specially after the Church, is quite in place? If this was the original meaning of *sanctorum communio*, it is plain that it did not mean: I believe that Sacraments exist, but I believe that I in the Sacraments partake of the holy things of the other world; the Consecrated Bread which I eat with the community that keeps the feast and the Consecrated Cup which I drink with them are truly the Communion of the Body and Blood of Christ; I believe that

¹ *Sermo* 214, 11 (Bass, VIII. 948); cf. *Epist. contra Donat. de unitate eccl.* 74 (Bass, XII. 488). I may remark in passing that the Cod. Remigiensis, on which the printed text of the sermon in the Benedictine edition solely depends, is now in Bamberg (E. III. 21).

² *De catechiz. rud.* 8 (§ 12, Bass, XI. 665); *de baptismo contra Donat.* VII. 93 (Bass, XII. 254).

³ Cf. my dissertation on Phil. i. 3-11 in the *Zeitschr. f. Kirchl. Wissenschaft*, 1885, p. 190, esp. n. 4.

⁴ Cf. the Creed of Jerusalem, p. 390 *supra*, and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan, besides Caspari, I. 3, 5, 117; II. 7. To this belongs also the conclusion of the rule of faith in Aphraates, *Hom.* I. p. 22: "and that we believe in the resurrection of the dead, and further believe in the mystery (sacrament) of baptism. That is the faith of the Church of God." Cf. further, in spite of its legendary setting, the very original Creed in the appendix of the *Sacramentary of Bobbio* (Mabillon, *Mus. ital.* I. 2, 396): "Credo in ecclesiam sanctam.—Per baptismum sanctum remissionem peccatorum.—Carnis resurrectionem in vitam eternam. This points, just like the Canon of the Bible which follows, to Eastern influences. Cf. *Hist. of the Canon*, II. 287.

the water of Baptism is not mere water but a bath of the New Birth.

Though I, for the reasons which I have given and suggested, consider it very probable that this Article was originally intended to witness to belief in the efficacy of the Sacraments, there is nothing I should consider so foolish as to desire to build practical conclusions upon this interpretation of such a disputable and abstruse view. Amongst such we must reckon the early introduction of another translation instead of that which Luther introduced and brought into prominence, "The community of Saints."¹ The thoughts which Luther worked out in the long Catechism, together with the justification of his translation and his view of the Article "as a gloss or explanation" of the Article on the Church, are much more valuable than a translation which may possibly, though only just possibly, represent more exactly the original meaning. The omission of the words on account of the uncertainty about their original meaning would be just as foolish as would be the mutilation of the whole Creed on the same grounds. What would become of the Bible if analogous principles were applied to it? The community confesses in these words of the Creed, according to the interpretation and meaning in use amongst us, a truly Christian and Evangelical truth. To this all would gladly subscribe, who think that the author of this Article of the Creed wished to express by it a belief, which is just as Christian and not less Evangelical, that the Sacraments which Jesus insti-

¹ In opposition to the translation which preceded his "The Communion of Saints," of which he says "that it has so worked its way into use that it would be difficult to eradicate it, and the alteration of one word might soon be called heresy" (Müller, p. 457). The Roman Catechism, it is true, also takes *sanctorum communio* as a kind of explanation of the article on the Church (§ 65, *veluti explanationem quandam*), but explains the idea itself in an abstract sense of the inner communion of Christians with each other and with God and Christ (§ 164) in which they participate by love (§ 166-169) and by fellowship in the Sacraments (§ 165).

tuted in the Church still have the same efficacy by virtue of His Institution and transmit the holy gifts which were connected with them by His promise.

THEOD. ZAHN.

DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN ROMANS.

VI. THROUGH OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

IN Romans iii. 21, 22 St. Paul asserted his first fundamental doctrine of righteousness or justification through faith; and in verses 24–26 a second doctrine inseparable from it, viz. justification through the death of Christ. The former of these doctrines he illustrated in chapter iv. by comparison with the story of Abraham, who through faith obtained fulfilment of a divine promise and became father of many nations. He also shows in chapter v. 1, 2 that justification through faith involves peace with God and gives exultant hope of glory. In the rest of the chapter the apostle draws from his second great doctrine important inferences personal and collective.

The dominating thought giving unity to the whole chapter finds expression in the phrase *through our Lord Jesus Christ* in verse 1, in verse 11 at the close of the first division of the chapter, and again, with slight change of order, in verse 21 at the end of the chapter. Equivalent expressions, keeping before us the same thought, are found in verses 2, 9, 17. More specific phrases are found in verse 10, *through the death of His Son*; in verse 18, *through one decree of righteousness*; and in verse 19, *through the obedience of the one*. This use of *διὰ* with gen. to describe Christ's relation to the work of salvation is a conspicuous feature of St. Paul's teaching. So 2 Corinthians v. 18, "reconciled us to Himself through Christ"; Ephesians i.

5, ii. 18, Colossians i. 20, etc. It represents Christ and His death, not as the ultimate source of salvation, but as the channel or means *through* which the purposes of God pass into realization. And this is a chief thought of this chapter.

While speaking of the believer's exultation, St. Paul could not ignore *the afflictions* or hardships which were in his day so conspicuous a feature of the Christian life. But he speaks of them, if not as a ground of exultation, as is the "hope of the glory of God," yet as the environment, and therefore in some sense a matter, of exultation: ἐπ' ἐλπίδι . . . ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν. This exultation amid afflictions comes from knowledge that they *work out endurance*: ὑπομονή. Under these hardships the believer holds his ground: he does not sink or flee. This steadfastness works out *proof*: δοκιμή, a good appearance after trial. It puts to the test, and proves the reality and worth of, his new relation to God. And this proof works out *hope*, i.e. a sure expectation of blessing to come. Just so, a storm through which a ship passes uninjured proves its seaworthiness, and thus gives hope of a successful voyage. In other words, the hardships of life, the new element in verse 3, strengthen the hope and the exultation in hope to which justification through faith, as we read in verse 2, at once gives rise.

Many hopes cover with shame those who indulge them. But an abiding characteristic of the Christian hope is that it *does not put to shame*. Of this statement St. Paul gives, in verses 5-11, a carefully reasoned proof. A chief element of this proof is *the love of God*; evidently, God's love to us, as we learn from verse 8, "God commendeth His own love towards us." This love is said to have been *poured out in our hearts*. These words can only mean an inward revelation from God filling the consciousness of those to whom it is given and moulding their thoughts and lives. It may

perhaps be compared to perfume poured out and filling a room.

This inward revelation of God's love is brought about by the agency of *the Holy Spirit*. Notice here the first mention in this epistle, except the passing reference in chapter ii. 29, of the Holy Spirit. Hitherto the writer has dealt only with a changed relation of man to God brought about by the death of Christ. Not until this chapter has he mentioned an inward change. And even here the Holy Spirit is mentioned only for a moment. In chapter viii. the work of the Spirit will be expounded at length. Of this fuller teaching, this passing mention of the Spirit is a forerunner. Notice the full statement that the Holy Spirit *was given to us*, calling attention to this great gift of God.

"The love of God" as the ground of "hope" needs further illustration and proof: and this it receives in verses 6-11. Verse 6 is simply a restatement of chapter iii. 24-26. That He was "set forth in His blood," implies that *Christ died*. Since, as we read in chapter iii. 23, all men have sinned, and since God set forth Christ in His blood in order that God might be Himself just and a justifier of him that has faith, it is correct to say that Christ died *on behalf of ungodly ones*: *ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν*. Since God set forth Christ for a proof of His righteousness "in the present season," it is correct to say that He died *in due season*: *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ . . . κατὰ καιρὸν*. In other words, in verse 6 St. Paul brings to bear, as a proof of the love of God said in verse 5 to have been inwardly revealed by the Holy Spirit, and in support of the hope expressed in verses 2 and 4, his second great doctrine of justification through the death of Christ.

This practical and experimental application of one of the great doctrines of the Gospel is expounded with much logical force in verses 7-11. The greatness of God's love manifested in the death of Christ for sinners is made

conspicuous by comparison and contrast with the most that man will do for man. Then follows in verse 9 a compact statement of the argument in support of the hope which does not put to shame. The words *justified now in His blood* restate in graphic and awful terms the doctrine on which the argument is based. The words *much more* indicate an argument *a fortiori*, a further step in the main argument even more certain than the safe steps already taken. The future tense *we shall be saved*, in contrast to "now justified," describes final salvation from the dangers of the Christian life into the safety of heaven. So chapter xiii. 11, "now is our salvation nearer than when we believed"; compare 2 Timothy iv. 18, "the Lord will rescue me from every evil work, and will save me into His heavenly kingdom."

Verse 10 is a fuller repetition still further supporting the argument stated in verse 9. The words *when we were enemies*, recall the persons described in verses 6 and 8 as "ungodly" and as "sinners." The phrase "justified in His blood" is now replaced by *reconciled to God through the death of His Son*. This brings in an essential point in the argument. That He who died for us and thus obtained our pardon is the Son of God, reveals the greatness of the love of Him who on our behalf gave up Christ to die. The words "we shall be saved through Him" are replaced by *we shall be saved in His life*. These last words remind us that, whereas what Christ has already done for us has cost the shedding of His blood, what remains to be done in order to *save* us from all evil will involve no further sacrifice on His part, but will be accomplished *in His life*, i.e. by the putting forth of His living power. He who once died for us now lives to intercede for us, and thus, as we read in 1 Thessalonians i. 10, "rescueth us from the coming wrath." The *a fortiori* argument implied in the conspicuous repetition of the phrase *much more* is that He who at great cost

has begun a work will not leave it unfinished when to finish it will cost Him nothing and to leave it unfinished will involve waste of that which cost Him so much. In other words, the infinite cost of the justification we have already received assures us that it will be followed by salvation into the glory which God has designed for His people. Thus the fact that Christ died for ungodly men, taken in connection with His relation to God as "His Son," and this revealing the infinite "love of God," affords sure proof that the "hope" of the justified "doth not put to shame."

Notice that our knowledge of "the love of God" rests upon historic fact, expounded by logical argument, yet is imparted to us "through the Holy Spirit." For He opens our eyes to read the significance of the fact, and our hearts to understand the argument. In other words, our confidence rests on historic evidence capable of logical statement; and is nevertheless derived from an inward and spiritual source.

Verse 11 strengthens the argument of verses 9 and 10. Not only have we been reconciled to God through the death of His Son, but we are now *exulting in God through Christ*. Thus the present participle *καυχώμενοι* is parallel to the aorist participle *καταλλαγέντες*. That we exult in God is a strong presumption that we are in the way of life. For such exultation is the normal relation of an intelligent creature to his Creator. And it is inconceivable that God will leave to perish those who thus exult in Him. In this way inward experience becomes a pledge of future glory. The dominating note of the chapter finds conspicuous expression twice in this verse, which closes the first division of it: *through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom now we have received the reconciliation*. These last words are a final restatement of the chief point of the main argument.

Notice that St. Paul's second doctrine, justification through the death of Christ, has wonderfully strengthened his first, viz. justification through faith, and has given to it immense moral force. The costliness of our pardon leaves no room to doubt that it will be followed by eternal life. Notice also that the moral influence of the death of Christ reaches us through our knowledge of His relation to God as in a unique sense the Son of God. This relation to God was asserted in the first sentence of this epistle, as attested by the resurrection of Christ from the dead. Thus are the great doctrines of justification through faith and through the death of Christ, and of the divinity of Christ, and the historic fact of His resurrection, inseparably interwoven. Taken together, they are a supreme proof of the infinite love of God and a sure ground of hope in God and hope of the glory of God.

In verse 12 we pass into a new topic, still dominated however by the thought expressed in the phrase "through Jesus Christ." The specific note of this new topic is the word *évós*, which in verses 12-19 occurs twelve times. In marked contrast to *the one man* stand, as recipients of evil or good coming through Adam and through Christ, *all men* and *the many*, each phrase used four times.

The word *world* denotes the entire realm of things around. In this sense, as we read in 1 Timothy i. 15, "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." But since in this realm the only element capable of sin is the human race, to this race specially these words refer. Similarly, in Romans iii. 6 we read, "How will God judge the world?" and in verse 19, "that all the world may become guilty before God." That sin "entered into the world," implies that the human race once existed in a state of sinlessness.

The words *through sin death* recall Genesis ii. 17, "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die";

and chapter iii. 19, "dust thou art, and to dust thou shalt return." The words following, *and in this way to all men death passed through*, assert that the present universality of death was a result of the one man's sin. This is stated also in 1 Corinthians xv. 22, "in Adam all die." And it is the easiest interpretation of the words of Christ recorded in John viii. 44, "he (the devil) was a murderer from the beginning." The same doctrine is taught in Wisdom ii. 23, 24: "God created man for incorruption, and made him an image of his own proper being; but by envy of the devil death entered into the world." Similarly Sirach xxv. 24, "from the woman was the beginning of sin; and because of her we all die." These last passages prove that the doctrine of St. Paul now before us was known in Israel during the interval between the writing of the books of the Old Testament, where it is not definitely taught, and the appearance of Christ.

The somewhat uncommon form ἐφ' ᾧ seems to be an attraction for ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅτι; and represents universal sin as a cause or condition of universal death. In what sense all sinned, is expounded in the argument of verses 15-19, especially in verse 19, "through the disobedience of the one man the many were constituted sinners." The last words of verse 12 merely assert, for further discussion, the solidarity of the race, in sin and in death.

Verse 12 is manifestly incomplete. Only one side of the comparison is given. To take καὶ οὕτως κ.τ.λ. as the beginning of the second side of it would make these words almost meaningless; whereas they are needed to complete the former side of the comparison. For in both sides we have, as we find in the complete statement in verse 18, the contrast of *one man* and *all men*. Such incomplete sentences are not uncommon with St. Paul: cf. Galatians ii. 7-9, Ephesians ii. 1-5, 1 Timothy i. 3; also Matthew xxv. 14. The reason in the passage before us for this

broken construction is not far to seek. After stating in verse 12 one side of the comparison, viz. that through one man came sin and death, the writer postpones the other side in order to prove the first side just stated. This proof occupies verses 13, 14. At the close of verse 14 we have mention of Another who becomes the Head of the second side of the comparison; and in verses 15-19 the whole comparison is fully stated and expounded.

That in verses 13, 14 St. Paul proves that through Adam all die, suggests that this doctrine was not so widely known and generally accepted as to make proof needless.

The word *until* in verse 13 is not a perfect rendering of the Greek word *ἄχρι*. But it is difficult to find a better. The Greek word denotes extension in time, as here, or space, as in 2 Corinthians x. 13, 14, up to a definite point. Its meaning is practically the same as *μέχρι*, in the parallel statement in verse 14. During the whole time between Adam's sin and the law of Moses sin was in the world, and death reigned as king over all men. Now both in Paradise and in the Law death was the penalty of disobedience. But although there was sin in the world all the time up to the giving of the law, and all men died, their death could not be the punishment of their own sins; for there was then no written law prescribing death as the penalty of transgression. It must therefore have been the penalty threatened in Paradise. In other words, from the universal reign of death before the law was given St. Paul infers that the punishment threatened to Adam was inflicted on his offspring. God treated them as though they had been sharers of their father's sin. In this sense "all sinned."

A similar argument might be derived from the death of infants. For their death cannot be a consequence of their own sin, inasmuch as they had no personal action. It must therefore be a consequence of Adam's sin. But St. Paul, who looked at everything in the light of the Law of

Moses, prefers to give the argument in a form bearing upon the Law.

The precise theological value of this argument, it is not easy now to determine. That all men die because Adam sinned, is plainly and conspicuously taught in two epistles which indisputably came from the pen of St. Paul. It is suggested in casual words of Christ recorded in John viii. 44, and is plainly stated in two important books of the Apocrypha. But it is not supported by the overwhelming Biblical evidence which attests the great doctrines taught in Romans iii. 21-26. On the other hand, it receives strong support from the unnaturalness of whatever belongs to death, and especially to the death of man. That animals died long before man appeared is abundantly proved by geological evidence: and indisputably their death stands related to that of man. But between animals and man is a broad interval which Natural Science utterly fails to span. It therefore cannot disprove the assertion of St. Paul about the death of man. To attempt to harmonize these apparently contradictory witnesses is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. It is a problem which deserves from theologians more attention than it has yet received.

In verses 15-19 there seems at first sight to be needless and meaningless repetition. But on further examination this appearance of repetition vanishes. The second side of the comparison is first suggested by a relative clause at the end of verse 14: *who is a type of Him that was to come*. Then follows a corrective limiting the comparison thus suggested, but stating while limiting it: *but not as the trespass (or moral fall) so also the gift of grace*. The comparison implied in these words is explained and supported in the rest of verse 15. Indeed this verse is the first statement of the great theme of verses 12-19. To say, as here, that *by the trespass of the one, the many died*, is

simply to repeat the assertion in verse 12. The word *trespass* (παράπτωμα) takes up the same word in verse 15a. *The grace of God and the free gift in grace* recalls the gift-of-grace in the same verse: χάρις and χάρισμα. The words *much more* denote, as in verses 9 and 10, greater certainty or greater importance. The words *abounded for* (ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς) denote, as in chapter iii. 7, abundant results in the direction mentioned. The writer contents himself with saying *the many*, instead of "all men" as in verse 12. The definite article teaches that *the many* of whom he writes was a definite object of thought. But we have no right to assume that *the many* here are equivalent to "all men" in verse 12. The reason for the change of expression will soon appear. Through the one man's moral fall the many died; how many the readers knew. A still more important truth is that the undeserved favour of God and the gift bestowed in undeserved favour of the One Man have produced abundant results for the many; for how many, we learn in chapter iii. 22.

Verse 16a goes on to assert that the similarity does not run through the whole comparison, and indicates a point in which the second factor is unlike the first, viz. the number who sinned: *and not as through one having sinned*: δι' ἑνὸς ἀμαρτήσαντος. These words are taken up by the words ἐξ ἑνός in the clause following. As a result proceeding from one man, brought about by means of one man having sinned, the sentence which must needs be pronounced upon man placed under probation became a sentence of condemnation. But the gift-of-grace (as in verse 15) follows many moral falls and becomes a sentence of justification. Notice that δικαίωμα, a favourable judgment, stands opposed to κατὰκριμα, an unfavourable judgment. In other words, the former side of the comparison deals only with the action of one man, who sinned and fell under condemnation: the latter deals with the consequences of many tres-

passes, and yet leads to *justification*. Notice in verse 16b a new element, *judgment*, and its two forms of *condemnation* and *justification*. It looks at the consequences of Adam's sin and of Christ's work from the judge's point of view. The one led to condemnation; the other to justification. These consequences, *through the one*, verse 17 states in language similar to that in verse 14, "death reigned from Adam until Moses." *If by the one man's trespass*, as there stated, *death became king and reigned as king, through the one, much more they who receive the abundance of the grace and of the gift of righteousness will reign in life through the one Jesus Christ*. Here the reign of death through one is replaced by a reign in life through One.

The numbers affected are not the same in both sides of the above comparison. But in each case they may fairly be described as *the many*. For in each case we have a large number forming a definite object of thought. With the multitudes who now through Adam's sin die, St. Paul compares the multitudes who through Christ will reign in endless life. The point of comparison and of triumph is that the many who accept the Gospel offered to all men on the one condition of faith will in spite of their many sins reign in life. For them, Christ has reversed the result, not only of their first father's sin, but of each one's own sin.

The point in which the parallel of Adam and Christ is not exact, viz. that on the one side "one man sinned," on the other side were "many trespasses," is now sufficiently expounded. St. Paul, therefore, goes on, after the digression in verses 13, 14, inserted to prove the former side of his great comparison, and the second digression in verses 15-17, in which he stops to show that the parallel does not extend to all details, to complete the comparison broken off at the end of verse 12. The resumed thread is indicated by

the phrase εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, already used in verse 12 in the former side of the comparison and now for the first time used in both sides of it. This phrase could not be used in verses 15-17: for here the comparison is not between two universals, but between two large and unequal groups. The only common description available is *the many* and *the many*.

The words ἅπα ὄν denote a logical summing up and inference, as in chapter vii. 3, 25, viii. 12, ix. 16, 18, xiv. 12, 19. The words *through one trespass* take up "through one man" and "through sin" in verse 12, and "by one man's trespass" in verse 17. The word δικαίωμα is, as in verse 16, put in contrast to κατὰκριμα. Etymologically each word denotes a result of the cognate verb, to *justify* or to *condemn*, i.e. the sentence of justification or condemnation. Moreover, since in the Greek Bible the former verb is used in a sense not found elsewhere, a sense very frequent with St. Paul, the word δικαίωμα derives from this use of the verb a peculiar meaning. It denotes apparently, in this chapter, a judge's award in one's favour, this being the exact opposite of *condemnation*. This gives good sense in verse 16. Through one man who sinned, a sentence was pronounced of condemnation to bodily death: but by the grace of God, even after many transgressions, was proclaimed a decree of pardon. In verse 18 the δικαίωμα is contrasted with the *one trespass* through which came influences resulting in *condemnation*. We may take it to mean, as in verse 16, the decree of justification proclaimed by God in view of the death of Christ. The δικαίωσις ζωῆς is the divine act of acquittal leading to life eternal.

The preposition εἰς, already used twice in verse 12, again in verse 15, and twice more in verse 16, is a conspicuous feature, used four times, in verse 18. It denotes primarily motion towards the inside of something, then, by easy mental transference, tendency towards a definite object,

most frequently the conscious tendency of purpose, but sometimes a mere result, with or without purpose. In this transferred sense, its nearest English equivalent is *for*. The precise significance must in each case be determined by the context. In the former part of the comparison in verse 18, it denotes both result and purpose, for, as matter of fact, influences operating through the one trespass of Adam have actually reached and affected all men. "By the one man's trespass the many died": and this result must have been by the deliberate purpose of God. Moreover, using the legal phraseology adopted in verse 16, their death may be described as *condemnation*.

In the second part of verse 18, the preposition *eis* denotes tendency and purpose, but not result. For, according to the teaching of St. Paul, *e.g.* Philippians iii. 19, "whose end is destruction," the influences tending towards justification and life eternal will not actually save all men. Or, rather, the common use of this preposition to denote purpose without actual result forbids us to infer from this verse the final salvation of all men.

A good example of this preposition used in one short sentence, once for purpose without result and once for result without purpose, but in both cases denoting tendency, is found in chapter vii. 10: "the commandment which was *for* life, this was found by me to be *for* death."

It is worthy of note that in verse 19, where St. Paul speaks of actual results in the future indicative, the words *all men* are replaced twice by *the many*. These words are explained in verse 17, where again we find the indicative future: "they who receive the abundance of the grace and of the gift of righteousness will reign in life." These are *many*: but they are not *all men*. In consequence of *the disobedience of the one man, the many were constituted sinners* in the sense that the punishment of death threatened to Adam has been actually inflicted on all his many descend-

ants. In consequence of Christ's *obedience*, even to death,¹ *the many will be constituted righteous*, as from time to time each one obtains justification through faith.

That the contrasted groups in verses 15, 17, 19 are not coextensive, is immaterial. In each case we have evil and good, through the action of *one*, received by *the many*. And St. Paul taught, *e.g.* in Titus ii. 11, that "the saving grace of God was manifested for all men."

We will now build up St. Paul's arguments from his own premises. God created man without sin, and gave him a law of which death was the penalty. Adam broke the law, and was condemned to die. We find the sentence inflicted also upon his descendants. It is true that they are sinners. But, since no law prescribing death has been given to them, their death cannot be the punishment of their own sins. We therefore infer that the condemnation pronounced on Adam was designed for them, and that God treated them as sharers of Adam's sin. In later days, another man appears. He is obedient, even when obedience involves death. Through His death, pardon is proclaimed for all who believe. Through Him believers enjoy God's favour, and will reign in endless life. Since the Gospel offers salvation to all, and is designed for all, we have in it a parallel, in an opposite direction, to the condemnation pronounced in Paradise; and in Adam a pattern of Christ. But we have more than a parallel. We, like Adam, have broken definite commands of God. For our own sins, we deserve to die. Through Christ we shall escape the result, not only of Adam's sin, but of our own many trespasses. Therefore to all men the blessing is equal to the curse: for it offers eternal life to all. To believers, it is infinitely greater.

The whole argument in 1 Corinthians xv. implies that the words "in Adam all die" refer to the death of the

¹ Phil. ii. 8.

body. And we have no indication throughout the chapter of any other meaning. Nor have we in Romans v. The assertion in verse 14 that "Death reigned from Adam to Moses," supporting the statement in verse 12 that through one man "death passed through to all men," refer evidently to the visible reign of natural death. And the whole comparison of Adam and Christ requires no other meaning. Through one man's sin the race was condemned to go down into the grave. Through one man's obedience, and through one divine proclamation, believers will obtain a life beyond the grave.

Nor have we here any direct reference to man's depravity as a result of Adam's sin. Indeed, of any inward change, good or bad, we have as yet in this epistle heard nothing. But this inward result of Adam's sin may, I think, be inferred with confidence from St. Paul's argument here. He teaches in chapter vi. that all men are, or have been, slaves to sin; and in Ephesians ii. 3 that, like the rest of men, he and his readers once "were by nature children of wrath." This last statement implies that in them were born influences tending to sin. Now this cannot have been the original state of a race created by God. When, therefore, we learn that the universality of death was a result of Adam's sin, we cannot doubt that to the same cause must be attributed this universal bondage to sin. In other words, the doctrine of Original Sin is taught implicitly, though not explicitly, in the passage before us.

Romans v. 1-11 develops the doctrine of salvation through faith and through the death of Christ in its bearing on the individual; verses 12-19 develop the same in its bearing on the race as a whole. In the reversal, not merely of evils which we have brought upon ourselves, but of those which come from a curse pronounced in the infancy of mankind, we see the importance and the triumph of the Gospel. Moreover, in Romans v. 12-19 the Gospel is

shown to be a solution of what would otherwise be an inexplicable mystery. Apart from the Gospel St. Paul has proved, in harmony with the teaching of still earlier Jewish writers, that men suffer and die because of the sin of one who lived long ages before they were born. If this were the whole case, it would be difficult to harmonize with the justice of God. This difficulty the Gospel of eternal life removes. The pardon proclaimed by Christ for all men justifies the curse pronounced on all because of Adam's sin.

In the comparison of Adam and Christ, nothing has been said about the *Law*. In verse 20 we read that a *Law* (viz. that of Moses) *came in alongside*, i.e. between the curse and the blessing. Its immediate purpose was that the one *trespass* might be multiplied into many; its ultimate aim (verse 21) was the reign of *grace* leading up to *life eternal through Jesus Christ our Lord*. Thus the chapter concludes with its dominating thought.

The spiritual significance of the Law will come before us in another paper, in which I hope to expound the chief teaching of chapter vii. where the Law holds a conspicuous place.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

NOTE ON "ANCIENT HEBREW TRADITION."

DR. HOMMEL (on page 196 of his *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, Eng. edn.) gives some extracts in translation from K. 3,500, a tablet in the British Museum. I do not know whether the general reader is convinced, by the other arguments brought forward to support the conjecture, that the Babylonian original of Genesis xiv. contained the name Malgu, or something like it. What support K. 3,500 could give to such a theory in any case passes my powers of imagination. If Baal-sameme, Baal-malagie, and Baal-

šapunu be gods of the "Westland," their names do not go far to establish the existence of the towns Sameme, Malagî, and Šapunu, still less to locate those towns near Sodom and Gomorrah.

Dr. Hommel somewhat doubtfully ascribed the tablet to Aššur-bel-kala or Aššurnasir-pal. He does not appear to have seen the original, but relied solely upon a copy by Pinches. Some time ago I was attracted by Dr. Bezold's description of it in the Museum Catalogue as "a prayer (?) of an Assyrian king for the destruction of his enemies." The column from which the extracts in the Catalogue were made contains the imprecations of the Assyrian king upon the violators of the treaty of which that column is the close. Last summer Dr. J. A. Craig called my attention to the fact that Dr. Hommel had used the tablet, and gave me to understand that the Munich Professor had gone widely astray in his understanding of the contents. As Dr. Craig intimated that he was about to publish the text, I gave no further heed to the question. Dr. H. Winckler's *Altorientalische Forschungen* (Bd. I. Heft. 1, Sec. Series) has just come to hand, and there, on page 10f., I see the much-abused tablet given in transcription and translation. It is most instructive to see how the doctors disagree.

The "prayer" part Dr. Winckler puts as Col. 1, and it appears to be all that Dr. Hommel had seen. Since Mr. Pinches sent his copy off, two large additional fragments have been joined, and the whole purport of the tablet is now beyond question.

It contains a copy or draft of the treaty between Esarhaddon and Baal, king of Tyre.

Dr. Winckler's text appears to me very fair, but perpetuates some errors in a way one does not expect from a second edition.

Lines 17-20 of his Col. 1 are written on the lower

edge of the tablet. The curious word given by Dr. Winckler after *duppi* in line 20 should be *a-di-e*, i.e. "compacts," "agreements," "treaty."

Line 20 is therefore the "colophon" or title of the document written at its foot, and should give a clue to the first line.

This Col. 1 of Dr. Winckler's is therefore really Col. 4 of the document.

With this clue from the colophon one expects the first line of the treaty to begin "(duppi adi)e ša Aššur-aḫ-iddin šar mât Aššur," etc.; and unless my eyes deceived me, that is what line 1 of Dr. Winckler's Col. 4 does contain. If so, his Shalmaneser disappears.

There are many small points of difference between Dr. Winckler's text and mine, which can hardly be discussed here. One only seems of general interest. The name which Dr. Hommel gave as Milgi, Dr. Winckler corrects to Milgišu, which is nearer the truth. It is really Mi-il-ḫar-tu, as anyone can see for himself now it is pointed out. Instead of some mysterious god of Milgi-Malagi, [it is our old friend Melqart.

I may add that, naturally, neither Sameme, Malagi, Šapunu nor Milgi have the determinative prefix of city before them.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

A STUDY IN LETTER-WRITING.

THE masses of papyri which have been exhumed in recent years are regarded by most of those who take an interest in their recovery as being of the nature of mines, from which may be extracted lost literature, either in the nuggets of whole documents or the gold-dust of identified fragments. Hence when any great mass of such papyri has been accumulated, the question as to the contents of the pile is a literary enquiry, a demand, on the part of theological students, to know whether it is the Logia of Papias, or some other collection of our Lord's sayings that has come to light ; and, on the part of classical scholars, whether it is true that fragments of Sappho have been seen amongst the *débris*. And such an attitude is proper and reasonable for the enquirer, because our greatest losses intimate to us the direction of our greatest conceivable gains, and every student has decided ideas as to what constitutes the literary deficit in his own line of study. Every patristic student, for instance, hungers and thirsts after Papias, whether he be apologist or rationalist ; nor will either school be happy, except in a restricted sense, until it is recovered.

But these discoveries of papyri are not merely valuable for the accretion which they make to our classified literature ; they contain an immense amount of information which does not properly belong to literature at all, but which is of the highest value for the historical and literary student. It is difficult, for instance, to find a place for tax receipts, or wills, or agreements for letting of houses, in

literature; they are sub-literary rather than literary; valuable enough for the light they throw on geography, on history, and on law, even though no one should exult over the finding of a thousand of them. And in the same way the fragments of letters which come to light are of the first importance in that they take us, which literature so seldom does, into the very heart of the popular life in its most natural forms of expression. Yet such letters do not properly constitute literature; they were never intended to do so. We might as well describe conversation as literature, for letters of the everyday sort are only an awkward substitute for conversation; they are *præ-literary* rather than literary. And it might be thought that such documents would scarcely pay for printing from the point of view of the critic; for who would venture in the present day, if he were given the run of the post-office, to print five hundred letters taken at random from the multitudinous pseudo-conversation that goes on from day to day and from hour to hour in every country where civilization has established itself? The reason for this low esteem lies in the fact that they add nothing, or almost nothing, to what we know or want to know about our own time. But put the case that it were some other age or time than our own, concerning which our information is scanty and our judgment ill-informed, and how readily may such trifling matters acquire a critical or a historical value!

I propose to show that much light in an unexpected direction is obtained from the examination of some of these trifling documents by using them to illustrate the structure of the Pauline Epistles. It occurred to me in reading some of the papyri preserved in the British Museum and elsewhere that they furnished singular parallels to sentences in the Pauline Epistles, especially with the opening and closing parts of them. There was clearly a conventional element in the compositions referred to, and one could not read,

for example, a Greek letter in which the writer spoke of making a constant remembrance, usually in some religious sense, of the person addressed, without feeling that there was something of a common sentiment in the writer of such an epistle and in the Apostle who was so in the habit of telling his disciples that he made mention of them unceasingly in his prayers.

It was, therefore, with a great deal of interest that I found that Deissmann had, in his recent *Bibel-Studien*, discussed the whole question that had opened before my own mind, and that he had done it with a subtlety and a thoroughness that I despair of ever attaining. To Deissmann we owe our grateful thanks for his very successful attempt to co-ordinate the letters which have come down out of the Greek remains in Egypt with the literature that has come down out of the same periods as the letters themselves, and to use the recovered documents for the criticism of similar compositions which make up so large a part of our New Testament. It is no small service to bring back Pauline correspondence into the atmosphere of daily life after it has been so persistently relegated to the region of theology.

We do not mean to say that Deissmann *discovered* the existence of a human element in the apostolic writings; it must always have been sensible, in some degree at least, to those who spoke and wrote Greek. For instance, Theodore of Mopsuestia, in his Commentary upon Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, remarks at the outset that Paul's opening sentence is cast in the mould which we use ourselves, as when we say in writing a letter, "So-and-so to So-and-so greeting."¹ Theodore was right in his comparison of the Pauline salutation with those which are current in ordinary

¹ ἐν τούτῳ κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τὴν προγραφὴν συνεπέρανεν, παραπλήσιον τι τῇ παρ' ἡμῶν συνηθείᾳ ποιῶν ὡς δταν ἐπιστέλλοντες λέγομεν 'Ὁ δέῃνα τῷ δέῃνι χαίρειν.

correspondence; for either they are directly coincident with them, or derived from the Greek salutations, such as *χαίρειν* and *τὰ πλείστα χαίρειν*, by a reference to *χάρις* as underlying the expressions in common use.

Let us then see how far the conventional epistolary parallels go to which Deissmann has drawn attention. One of his letters is dated 172 B.C., and is written by an Egyptian lady named Isias to her brother (which probably means husband), who has gone into retreat in the Serapeum at Memphis, leaving his family to take care of themselves, while he enjoys a religious holiday. The letter begins: ¹ "Isias to her brother Hephæstion greeting. If

¹ The whole of the letter is as follows:—

"Isias to her brother greeting:

"If you are well and other things happen as you wish, it would be in accordance with my constant prayer to the gods. I too am in good health, and so is the boy; and all at home make constant remembrance of you. When I got your letter through Horus, in which you explain that you are in sanctuary at the Serapeum in Memphis, I straightway gave thanks to the gods for your being in good health, but as for your not coming to us when the evils that threatened you there have passed away, I am disconsolate because such a long time I have been keeping myself and the child, and am come to the lowest point on account of the price of bread, and I did think that now you were coming I should find a little relief, but you seem to have no idea of coming to us nor to have an eye to our circumstances, as you would if you were still here. We are in need of everything, not only because such a long time and so many seasons have passed since you were here, but because you have not sent us anything. And besides that, Horus, who brought me your letter, tells me further that you are released from sanctuary, and I am perfectly miserable.

"No, indeed! and your mother, too, takes it very hard, and you will do well to come for her sake as well as ours to the city, unless some more pressing need draws you elsewhere. Farewell, then, and have a care of your body, so as to be in health.

"Good-bye.

"Dated on the 30th of the month Epiph
in the ninth year."

It will conduce to the understanding of the argument in the following pages if the reader will observe the traces of Hephæstion's letter which are discernible behind the letter of Isias. She clearly distinguishes the direct information which Horus has brought her over and above the letter. But she has had a letter, and the letter began with a formula saying that the writer was in good health, probably wished her the same, but wished her to know that he was in retreat, and not coming home at present. So much of Hephæstion's letter can be restored from the reply of Isias.

you are well, and other things happen as you would wish, it would be in accordance with my constant prayer to the gods. I myself am well, and the boy and all at home make constant remembrance of you (*οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ πάντες σου διαπαντὸς μνείαν ποιούμενοι*).” We naturally compare, as Deissmann directs us to do, such expressions as Philemon 1: “Always making mention of you in my prayers”; 1 Thessalonians i. 2, “Making mention of you in my prayers unceasingly” (*ἀδιαλείπτως*);¹ Romans i. 9, “How unceasingly (*ἀδιαλείπτως*) I make mention of you always in my prayers”; Ephesians i. 16, “Making mention of you in my prayers,” etc.

Here the conventional element in the apostolic introduction is perfectly clear. The modification of the traditional usage does not consist in the addition of the words “in my prayers,” for it is clear that these are involved in the letter of Isias, both as regards herself and the rest of the family. The only change is in the address of the prayers. We are, therefore, entitled to consider the apostolic introduction, to which we have referred, as in the main a conventional one. It is his Greek environment and his Greek education that are responsible for the expressions which he uses.

We shall see the same formula underlying another expression which turns up in the papyri. For example, we have in a letter of invitation to a child's birthday party, written in the second or third century A.D.,² the sentence:

“Before everything I pray that you may be in health, and daily I

¹ We alter the punctuation of Westcott and Hort.

² The whole letter runs as follows:

“ . . . Before everything I pray that you may be in health, and daily I make the act of worship for you before our lord Serapis. Certainly do your best to come to us, if possible, for the birthday of my son Serapion. But I wrote you previously on this point. . . . Your daughter greets you and Leonides . . . and Serapion . . . and your sister and Hermione and her children; I pray that you may be well and strong.”

make the act of worship (*προσκύνημα*) for you before our lord Serapis" (*Berlin papyri*, No. 6836).

The same language appears in the letter of a certain Ammonios to his sister Tachnumi¹ :—

"Ammonios to his sister Tachnumi abundant greeting :

Before all things I pray that you may be in health, and each day I make the act of worship for you" (*Paris papyri*, No. 18).

Here, then, we get a secondary form of the affirmation of constant prayer on behalf of the beloved person. And not only so, but we disentangle a third formula, the prayer for health, in the form which coincides almost exactly with that which we find in the third Epistle of John. The spirituality of the Apostolic address lies in the expansion of the sentiment by the words "even as thy soul prospereth." Compare, for a contrast, the conclusion of the letter of Isias to her husband, in which she says, "Farewell, and have a care of your body, that you may be in health." The same turn of speech appears in a number of other papyri, *e.g.* :

¹ The whole letter is to the following effect :

"Ammonios to his sister Tachnumi much greeting :

"Before all things I pray that you may be in health, and each day I make the act of worship for you. I salute heartily my goodest (*ἀγαθώτατον*) little boy Leo. I am jolly, and so is the horse and Melas. Don't neglect my son. I salute Senohris, and I salute your mother. I likewise salute Pachnumi and Pachnumi junior. I salute . . . and Amenothis. 'Hurry up' about the boy until we go to my place. If I come to the place and see the place I will send for you, and you shall come to Pelusium, and I will come to you at Pelusium. I salute Steches, the son of Pancrates. I salute Psemmonthis and Plato. If your brothers dispute with you, come to my house and stay there until we see what to do. Don't neglect it. Write me of your own welfare and of my boy's. Hurry up over the matter of the farm. I wrote this letter in Thmuis on the fifth of the month Phamenoth. We have two days more, and then we will arrive at Pelusium. Melas greets you all by name. I salute Psenchnumi the son of Psentermout. I pray that you may be well and strong."

¹ *Τάπησσον* : the Americanism has recently been introduced into English by our first literary authority!

"Lykarion to his father Emphoues, greeting :

Before all things I pray that you may be strong, you and all yours, and may prosper continually" (*Berlin papyri*, No. 6875).

"Serapias to her children Ptolemy and Apollinaria, abundant greeting :

Before all things I pray that you may be in health," etc. (*Berlin papyri*, No. 6811).

The recurrence of the formula renders it almost certain that in 3 John 2 we should correct the expression, Ἀγαπητέ, περὶ πάντων εὐχομαί σε εὐδοῦσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, so as to read πρὸ πάντων.

The final salutations and closing prayers of many of the Epistles of Paul can also be paralleled from the papyri. Compare, for example, in the epistle of Ammonios, mentioned above, such expressions as—

"I salute Senchris, and I salute thy mother. I salute Pachnoumi, likewise Pachnoumi junior. . . . Melas [perhaps the coloured servant] salutes you all by name"

with the obvious parallels in the New Testament, and we shall see how life-like the Pauline and Johannine letters become. In the same way we compare the expression in the letter of Serapias, "Greet Ammonios and his children and wife, and those who love me (?) with Titus iii. 15, "Greet those who love us in faith"; or the expression in 2 Corinthians xii., "All the saints salute you," with *Berlin Papyri*, 6811, "Cyrilla salutes you . . . and all who are here," etc., etc.

We shall apply the information which we have thus gained with regard to the structure of an ordinary Greek letter to the criticism of the oldest of the Pauline Epistles, the first Epistle to the Thessalonians. But before doing so, let us recall what was said in the opening sentences (a point which Deissmann so well elucidates), that the simplest and most primitive letters are a form of conversation. It follows from this that any letter which forms part of a

series, which either constitutes a reply or involves one, can only be understood thoroughly by studying its relation to what has preceded it and what follows it. Otherwise we should be engaged upon questions without answers, or answers without questions, the reconstruction of whose conjugate elements must necessarily be involved in a good deal of uncertainty. In the case, however, of a good letter-writer (and St. Paul was certainly that) the single letters have always a tendency to so incorporate elements from what they are trying to answer, that the conversational basis of letter-writing reasserts itself, and a large part of the document may easily be restored into dialogue. A very interesting case of this kind will be found in a recent study of Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, by Mr. Walter Lock, in the *EXPOSITOR* for July, 1897. Turning then to the first Epistle to the Thessalonians, we can immediately recognise a formal element in the addresses and in the salutations, and determine some further facts which might easily escape the casual reader. For we not only find that he makes mention of them incessantly in his prayers (*μνείαν ποιούμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν ἡμῶν ἀδιαλείπτως*), and has a remembrance (*μνημονεύοντες*) of their love;¹ but when we read further in the Epistle, we find in iii. 6 the statement that Timothy came to us, and brought the good news that you have always a good remembrance of us, and that you long to see us as we do to see you (*ὅτι ἔχετε μνείαν ἡμῶν ἀγαθὴν πάντοτε ἐπιποθοῦντες ἡμᾶς ἰδεῖν καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς*), we are sure from the expressions used that the communication was in the form of a letter which Timothy brought, and that Paul had this letter before him when he penned the first Epistle to the Thessalonians. We thus arrive at the information that *there is a lost Epistle of the Thessalonians to St. Paul*. The form

¹ The recognition of the conventional element in the Epistle relieves the Commentaries upon it from a good deal of well-intentioned subtlety.

of the good news which they send is epistolary, both as regards their remembrance of him and their longing to see him.

Nor is it difficult to unravel from the web of the existing epistle some threads of the prior communication.

In the first place it contained an expression of thanksgiving to God ; for we find in ii. 13 the Apostle says :

"And on this account *we also* give thanks to God unceasingly," etc.¹

The Thessalonians had done so in their letter, and apparently this was the motive, not only for the expression which the Apostle uses in ii. 13, but also for the opening words in i. 2 (εὐχαριστοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ πάντοτε). But however this may be, the expression διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς betrays the fact that he had something before him which was similar to what he was saying himself.

In the second place, observe how the Apostle plays upon certain leading thoughts with regard to his work in Thessalonica. In ii. 1 we are told that "ye yourselves know, brethren, what sort of *an entrance* we had to you that it was *not in vain*." The same expression is involved in the previous verses (i. 9, 10), where we are advised that "they know what kind of *an entrance* we had to you"; and in iii. 5 the Apostle reminds them that he had sent Timothy to them to know concerning their faith, lest perchance by the work of the tempter his toil amongst them *had been in vain*. Now it is clear that the letter of the Thessalonians to Paul must have contained the expression that "his labour amongst them had not been fruitless, nor his

¹ The A.V. has wrongly, "For this cause also thank we God without ceasing," and the R.V. corrects to "And for this cause we also thank," etc. Findlay (*Camb. Bible for Schools*) remarks the emphatic "we," but misses the meaning. He says, "The Apostle has already given thanks for the Christian worth of the Thessalonians (c. i. 2 ff.): his thanksgiving is renewed when he considers that this is the fruit of his own and his companions' labours amongst them." Hence "we" is emphasized here (in the Greek), but not in c. i. 2."

entrance to them in vain," or something very like this. It must have had *εἰσοδος* in it, and *οὐ κενή*.

And this brings to light a number of other curious facts. It appears that when in ii. 1 the Apostle uses the expression, *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε, ἀδελφοί, τὴν εἰσοδὸν ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν*, the expression "ye know" must be understood in the sense "ye have admitted in your letter," or "ye have testified." Now it is characteristic of this Epistle that the expressions *καθὼς οἶδατε*, *ὁμοίως οἶδατε* and the like recur again and again with suspicious regularity.

Thus in i. 5, *καθὼς οἶδατε οἶοι ἐγενήθημεν ὑμῖν δι' ὑμᾶς*; in ii. 5, *οὕτε γὰρ ποτε ἐν λόγῳ κολακίας ἐγενήθημεν, καθὼς οἶδατε*¹; in ii. 10, *καθάπερ οἶδατε ὡς ἓνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν ὡς πατήρ, κ.τ.λ.*²

In the same way when in iii. 3, 4 we have the expression *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε ὅτι εἰς τοῦτο κείμεθα* followed by *καὶ ἐγένετο καὶ οἶδατε*, the repeated appeal to the knowledge of the Thessalonians implies more than a historical reminiscence; it means that they had made the historical reminder themselves in their letter to him.

Return now to i. 9, and see whether the effect of the scrutiny which we have made of these appeals to the Thessalonian conscience, as witnessed by the letter which they had sent to the Apostle, does not lead us to believe that a slight reformation of the text is necessary at that point. As it stands we have the statement:

"Αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὅποιαν εἰσοδὸν ἔσχομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., 'For they declare what sort of entrance we had to you.'"

¹ The verse continues—*οὕτε προφάσει πλεονεξίας, θεὸς μάρτυς*, which confirms the interpretation of *καθὼς οἶδατε* by "ye attest." Bengel says of the two clauses, "haec duo inter se respondent." They are, indeed, very like a Hebrew parallelism.

² Here again the testimony of the Thessalonians is appealed to in parallelism with the Divine witness, for the previous verse introduces the matter by saying, *ὁμοίως μάρτυρες καὶ ὁ θεός*, so that *ὁμοίως μάρτυρες* is an anticipation of *καθάπερ οἶδατε* which follows.

This is usually taken to mean that the people throughout the regions of Macedonia and Achaia report what kind of an entrance we had amongst you. It seems to me that we ought to read *αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀπαγγέλλετε*, "ye yourselves report," and take it as an exact parallel to what follows in ii. 1, "ye yourselves admit that our entrance was not in vain." The alteration is a conjectural one, having only the support, as far as I know, of a single Latin copy, but it seems to me to add greatly to the force of the reply.

The fact is that this passage, as ordinarily read, has always been a *crux interpretum*. The Apostle seems to say that the regions of Macedonia and Achaia are reporters on the matter of his mission to Thessalonica, and that the whole world is also in evidence on the same point. But, as Baur acutely remarked, "How can it be said of Christians, belonging to a Church only lately founded, that they were patterns to all the believers in Macedonia and Achaia, that the fame of their reception of the word of the Lord has not only gone abroad in Macedonia and Achaia, but that . . . people of every place were speaking of them, how they were converted, and turned from their idols to God?"

Evidently the right explanation is that given by Dr. Gloag in his commentary, that the passage "does not intimate that the Thessalonians, by their missionary activity, disseminated the Gospel, but that from them locally the Gospel had spread." And he adds, "The sentence is complete without the addition 'your faith to Godward is spread abroad,' and therefore we must consider these words as equivalent to 'from you sounded out the word of the Lord.'" The whole passage would seem to be much clearer with this explanation, and there is no longer any need to regard the Macedonians and Achaians as giving evidence, in other than a general sense, to the Christianity of the Thessalonians. The special evidence which Paul was in quest of came from Thessalonica direct.

In the next place we find in ii. 9 the expression, *μνημονεύετε γὰρ, ἀδελφοί, τὸν κόπον ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν μόχθον*. This is not to be regarded as an imperative, or a suggestion equivalent to an imperative; the Thessalonians had alluded to his toils amongst them in their letter, and the fact that they had done so is confirmed by the opening sentences of the Pauline Epistle, in which he tells them that he unceasingly remembers *their* faith-work and *their* love-labour. The motive for these expressions is to be sought in the letter before him, just as we suggested that *καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐχαριστοῦμεν* in ii. 13 was provoked by a sentence in the Thessalonian epistle, which also furnished the suggestion for the opening sentences in i. 2.

But, perhaps, by this time we are in a position to make a rough reconstruction of the lost Epistle of the Thessalonians to St. Paul: it may have run something as follows:

“The church of the Thessalonians to the beloved Paul, greeting.

We give thanks to God on thy behalf continually,¹ and have an unceasing remembrance of thee in our prayers,² desiring earnestly to see thy face. For thy entrance to us has not been in vain,³ but thou hast spoken to us the words of God in truth, without flattery and without covetousness,⁴ and we remember thy labour and thy toil on our behalf.⁵

And we have turned from the worship of dead idols to serve a true and living God, and to wait for the return of His Son from heaven. And we have become imitators of thee,⁶ and of the churches of God in Judea, and of thy patience and of theirs in those afflictions whereunto we are appointed. And thou hast been to us as a nursing father,⁷ even as Moses carried the people in the wilderness, exhorting us to walk worthily of the kingdom and glory of God. And even as thou didst declare to us that we should suffer for the kingdom of God, so it came to pass.

¹ Cf. ii. 13.

² Cf. iii. 6: Τιμοθέου εὐαγγελισαμένου ἡμῶν ὅτι μείλαν, κ.τ.λ.

³ Cf. ii. 1.

⁴ Cf. ii. 5.

⁵ Cf. ii. 9.

⁶ Involved in the repetition—

i. 6. καὶ ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ κυρίου.

ii. 14. ὑμεῖς γὰρ μιμηταὶ ἐγενήθητε, ἀδελφοί, τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν οὐσῶν ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ.

⁷ The idea is involved in τρόφος ὡς πατήρ (ii. 11) τέκνα ἐαυτοῦ (ii. 7).

"But we desire to know¹ concerning them that are fallen asleep before the coming of the day of God, and what will be their portion when that day cometh suddenly as a thief² upon the inhabitants of the earth, etc., etc.

"All our friends salute thee."

Something like this, then, may have been the Epistle which Timothy brought from the Thessalonians. But may we not go one step further? The letter was in the form of a reply to enquiries which Timothy brought. May it not be that Timothy carried a letter to Thessalonica as well as brought one?

In that case we shall perhaps find some reference to it in the letter of the Thessalonians, or in Paul's reply to it. For instance, in ii. 17 he says that he was "deprived of them in appearance, but not in heart, and that in consequence he had been eager with a great longing to see their faces. It was for that reason that he had sent Timothy, etc." Timothy comes back and brings the information that "they long to see his face as he did to see theirs"; and Paul goes on, after quoting this information, to tell them that "night and day over-exceedingly he prays to see their face." Does it not look as if something of the same sentiment had coloured the whole of the correspondence?

Again, when he sent Timothy, it was that he might know concerning their faith, and whether his preaching had been lost labour (*κενή*). This provokes the reply that "his entrance has not been in vain," and the rejoinder that "yourselves admit that our entrance has not been in vain."

¹ Hence, perhaps, St. Paul's "I do not wish you to be ignorant, brethren, c. iv. 13: but the expression occurs elsewhere.

² In c. v. 2 *ἀκριβὲς ἄδare* involves the thought "you are rightly informed": so there must have been a statement about the last things in the Thessalonian letter. It is curious how near Findlay came to the detection of this letter and of its peculiar feature. He says, p. 108: "1 Thess. v. 8. *Perfectly* is a somewhat vague rendering of an adverb that with verbs of *knowing* signifies *precisely* or *accurately*. . . . Possibly the Thessalonians in sending the query had used this very word: "We should like to know more precisely," they may have said, "about the times and seasons," etc.

Then there is a strong probability that the first enquiry was in writing, and contained an expression concerning the success and permanence of his work amongst them, which the Thessalonians had taken up in their reply. And so we can discern behind the present first Epistle to the Thessalonians another and earlier one (the real first Epistle to the Thessalonians), like a double palimpsest, very faint indeed, beneath the top-writing of what we call the first Epistle to the Thessalonians, and the fairly legible first palimpsest of the reply which the Thessalonians made to his enquiries.

So much follows, then, from a knowledge of early epistolography with regard to the critical and homiletic interpretation of what is, probably, the oldest document of the New Testament. Nor is there anything strange in the recovery of these lost documents by means of the recurring formulæ and expressions in the extant letter.

Jowett came near to the discovery in his *Essay on the Probability that many of St. Paul's Epistles have been Lost*. He takes as his text in this essay the expression "in every epistle" in 2 Thessalonians iii. 17, which involves the Apostle in a correspondence far more extensive than is covered by the two extant Epistles to the Thessalonians. He points out that in the same Epistle Paul twice speaks of "a letter from us." Further, in the second Epistle to the Corinthians his opponents are credited with the opinion that "his letters are weighty and powerful," which certainly implies that in Corinth also there was more Pauline correspondence than has been preserved to us. Jowett also points out that for the first ten or fifteen years of Paul's ministry no epistle is extant; and that within a single year he wrote more than half of his extant correspondence. It is certainly difficult to believe that the original letters of the Apostle are fairly represented by what has come down to us.

It is surprising that when Jowett makes these pertinent

remarks he should have failed to suspect earlier written communications between Paul and the Thessalonians; he says that it is "improbable (observe, however, 2 Thess. ii. 15) that a previous epistle could have interposed itself between the visit of the Apostle and chapters ii. and iii. of the first Epistle." We venture to think that the word "improbable" must be replaced by its direct contrary, or by an even stronger word.

Now if the arguments which we have advanced be valid, we are in a position to clear both the text of the Epistle and its commentaries from a good deal of residual misunderstanding. For example, in chapter i. 2 we should correct the punctuation, so as to connect *ἀδιαλείπτως* with the previous clause, as in the epistles which make allusion to constant prayers or daily adorations before Serapis, which we quoted above. We must also, I think, follow Lachmann in correcting the punctuation in chapter i. 8, so as to place a colon after *ἐξηγήλυθεν*, and carry the clause *ὥστε μὴ χρεῖαν, κ.τ.λ.*, into close connexion with v. 9.

We shall be able to free ourselves from such exegetical subtleties as have attached to those parts of the text which we have shown to be either wholly or in great part conventional. There will be no longer any need to say with Findlay (*Camb. Bible for Schools*, p. 24) that "on the whole the confidence [of the Thessalonians in St. Paul] had not been shaken. 'You have good remembrance of us at all times,' so Timothy (chap. iii. 6) had assured St. Paul. But the Apostles show themselves in chapter ii. 1-12 most anxious to increase this good remembrance." Imagine any one making similar comments on the letter of Isias to the effect that "on the whole the confidence of Hephæstion's family in him had not been shaken"!

A similar reflection would show how groundless is Jowett's argument for the authenticity of the Epistle which is based upon the salutatory formulæ; he says: "Without

laying greater stress on this argument than it deserves, we pass on to enumerate other internal evidence that the Epistle is St. Paul's. Such are (i.) the desire to see the face of his converts, iii. 6, 10," etc. An examination of the text will show that this desire occurs on both sides of the correspondence, and is, again, largely formal in character in spite of the apparent heat of the language. We do not mean that it is not sincere on both sides, but a large formal element has to be allowed for before we can recognise the personality of St. Paul in the language.

But if this particular argument for authenticity is weakened, the general argument is immeasurably strengthened by our enquiry. If we can disentangle from the extant first Epistle to the Thessalonians the shreds of two previous letters, then it is idle to imagine any longer that this peculiar letter is the work of a forger. There may be, and probably is, room for the existence of an interpolator; but the letter itself must be in the main a piece of an actual correspondence, and not the simulation of a literary hand.

The acute criticism to which this Epistle was subjected by Baur in his *Paulus*, and again in his discussion of the Thessalonian Epistles in the *Theol. Jahrbuch* for 1855, is thus seen to be largely a series of misunderstandings, and his attempts to prove that 1 Thessalonians borrows expressions from 1 and 2 Corinthians a failure. Amongst the linguistic proofs of loan-script we find the following examples: "The passages analogous to these [from 1 and 2 Corinthians] in 1 Thessalonians are i. 9, αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ὅποιαν εἴσοδον ἔσχομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς; ii. 1, αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε, ἀδελφοὶ τὴν εἴσοδον ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν; v. 5, καθὼς οἶδατε; v. 9, μνημονεύετε γὰρ; v. 10, ὑμεῖς μάρτυρες; v. 11, καθάπερ οἶδατε, etc. As in the Corinthian Epistles, so here, the meaning and aim of all the passages of this kind is to be found in the Apostle's defence of himself against the imputations of his

opponents." The whole of this series of passages has been shown by us to be a part of an actual correspondence, in which the inquiries and the replies can be separated from one another. There is, therefore, no room left for Baur's acute and, in many ways, attractive criticism, except in so far as this, that he rightly held the expressions in question to be of the nature of replies. It is not possible that this series of passages can be excerpts from, or imitations of, the Corinthian Epistles.

The foregoing method of study of the Pauline Epistles is likely to be fruitful beyond the immediate application that we have made of it to the first Epistle to the Thessalonians.

It is something to the credit of criticism if it points out to us a natural and conventional and conversational element in the Apostolic writings. We are better off when, in consequence of a more careful study of the literary environment of the early Christian teachers, we are able to take them off from artificial pedestals, and make them verify what they were so fond of impressing upon their hearers in their lifetime, that they are men of like passions with ourselves, and in no respect dehumanized by the processes of Divine grace. That which is most human about them, the common speeches of life, appears transfigured as we watch the colouring which the writers give to the every-day thoughts, turning assurances of every-day remembrance into the formulæ of Christian intercession, and urging the claims of the soul in terms borrowed from the welfare of the body.

It is a gain, also, to make a Pauline Epistle translucent enough to let us see through it the previous interchange of ideas which has been going on between himself and his correspondents; for we acquire from such observations new tests of genuineness and apostolicity which are not to be undervalued at a time when the criticism of the Pauline

Epistles is beginning afresh, and with microscopic keenness.

The method which we apply is not limited to the single case that we study: there are other Epistles which will yield similar results, though, perhaps, not in as striking a manner. Let us briefly test, for instance, the second Epistle to the Corinthians, an Epistle of which the criticism is becoming more and more difficult, complicated as it is by the confusion in the order of the text, and the apparent want of unity of its composition.

In 2 Corinthians i. 12 we find that Paul is playing on a Greek word (*καύχησης*) which means "a state of glorying, boasting, or exultation," and in i. 14 upon another word (*καύχημα*) which means "an object of such glorying." He says "our glorying [*i.e.*, considered subjectively] is the testimony of our conscience," and "we are your glorying [*i.e.*, considered objectively] as ye are ours in the day of the Lord Jesus Christ." Here the repetition of the idea is suggestive; we notice that in v. 12 the pronoun can be taken emphatically (almost like the words "we also" in 1 Thess. ii. 13); and if taken that way, they imply that the Corinthians had been expressing *καύχησης* to St. Paul. But this is distinctly stated to be the case in the 14th verse, where the writer says, "Ye did acknowledge us in part, so far as to say that we are your exultation." And the inference is clear that Paul had the acknowledgment before him in a letter, whose opening sentences had addressed him as their *καύχημα*.

It would seem to be a conventional thing to say, and was probably common enough in the affectionate correspondence of friends and lovers in that day, but it ceases to be conventional when it passes into St. Paul's hands, and is played upon, over and over, like a sweetly sounding string. He had himself said something like it in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians (ii. 19) when he called them "his

hope, his joy, and his crown of exultation." Apostolic utterances readily fall under Paul Sabatier's rule—that the language of religion is the language of love.

Assuming, then, that we have recovered a trait from the Epistle of the Corinthians to Paul, we have to follow up the hint in the structure of Paul's reply, and also to get any further idea that we can of the correspondence. The first part is not very difficult. When, for example, we find Paul saying in iv. 11 that he hopes he is also manifested in their consciences, and that, though he is not commending himself to them (a thing which he has disclaimed), he is furnishing them with materials for glorying (*καύχημα*) on his account, we must connect this with the previously detected statement of theirs, and understand him to say, that if they talk of boasting over him, he will himself feed the flame of that passion. But then we go a step further, and noting the connected words in which he expresses the hope that he is manifested in their conscience, we must connect these also with the parallel in i. 14, "the testimony of our conscience that in holiness and divine transparency we walked in the world, and especially towards you." From which it appears probable that the Greek text of this verse is in error; it should read "the testimony of *your* conscience" is our matter of exultation. So that the Corinthian letter contained a statement as to their conviction of the apostolic sincerity, very similar to that of the Thessalonians, which we unearthed from 1 Thessalonians ii. 10. And the explanation is confirmed by what follows: "We do not write anything which you do not read or admit." Most of these three verses, 1 Corinthians 12-14, is, therefore, based upon an actual communication from Corinth to Paul.

Precisely as in the case of the Thessalonian letter, the cause of the correspondence was a previous letter from Paul to Corinth; this is recognised in vii. 8, where he says, "I

grieved you in the letter," and again, "if that letter grieved you."

In the case of the Thessalonians the correspondence was carried by Timothy, as far as relates to the two lost letters; in the case of the Corinthians the postman is Titus. In 2 Corinthians vii. 7 we are told of the joy which was caused by the arrival of Titus. He announced to us your ardent longing (*ἐπιπόθῃσω*), your lament, your zeal, etc. How did he announce it?

In the case of the Thessalonians we had the expression (1 Thess. iii. 6), "ardently longing to see us (*ἐπιποθοῦντες ἡμᾶς ἰδεῖν* . . .), as we to see you"; and we were able to isolate the expression as a submerged epistolary formula. But if *ἐπιπόθῃσις*, or "ardent longing," is epistolary in one case, the chances are that it is so in the other; that is to say, the probability is that it was a letter which told of this earnest desire; and this enables us to restore another sentence or two in the lost Epistle of the Corinthians.

We are now well on our way toward the recovery of the part of the correspondence between Paul and the Church at Corinth, which underlies the second Epistle to the Corinthians. And we may claim to have verified one statement—that the method which we adopted in dealing with the first Epistle to the Thessalonians is susceptible of a wider application. Perhaps enough has now been said in illustration of the method of our enquiry, and we may leave the matter for the present with the hope that our entrance (*εἰσοδος ἡμῶν*) into the field of the commentator (which is properly not a portion of our fatherland) has not been altogether in vain.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

THE EXCLUSION OF CHANCE FROM THE BIBLE.

THERE is, perhaps, no point more impressively dwelt upon by the Hebrew Prophets in their interpretation of history or of human life than the exclusion of chance as an element to be taken into account. This teaching of a Divine purpose in all things is given in clear and even in remarkable terms, as, for instance, when Amos says (iii. 6) : " Shall there be evil in a city and the Lord hath not done it ? " the unmistakable inference is that, whatever may have been the secondary cause, Divine purpose ultimately determined the event. Again, the point of Habakkuk's complaint, " Why dost thou shew me iniquity, and cause me to behold grievance ? " (i. 3) lies in the conception that calamity is due not to some chance or turn of fortune, but to the direct ruling of Divine providence. The same perplexity is expressed several times by the patriarch Job, as when he says, " God hath made my heart faint " (xxiii. 16), *i.e.* it is God and not any cause external to Him that brings the sense of terror into my soul. Citations to the same effect might be multiplied. But it is unnecessary. The pervading prophetic interpretation of history and of men's lives is that events are ordered and determined by the Divine will, and not by luck or chance or happy accident. We see this in the image of the potter (Jer. xviii. 1-17), and in the ordering, whether of the stern Nebuchadnezzar (Jer xxvii. 6), or of the humane Cyrus (Isa. xlv. 28), to execute the purposes of Jehovah.

It is manifest that such an interpretation of events, or, as it might be termed, such a philosophy of sacred history, would (1) identify purpose and result in the Hebrew mind, and (2) would leave no place for chance or fortune in any theory of life or in religious terms.

The object of this paper is to show how the influence of

this thought has made itself felt in the grammar of Hellenistic Greek, and in the language of the Old and New Testaments. And, secondly, to indicate the prevalence of the worship of Good Fortune, and consequently the need of such protest against it as is found in the language, and in the omissions of Holy Scripture.

1. Greek grammar, in its purest and most exact phase, kept the distinction clear between final and consecutive clauses. In other words, it indicated by separate particles or forms of expression the difference between result and fulfilled intention. But since, in the case of Divine action, the Hebrew mind, as we have seen, conceived all results as purposed, it follows that there would be a tendency for grammatical forms, as expressions of thought, to merge the distinction between intention and result. To illustrate by an example: the sentence, "the vessels approached so closely as to come within range," marks result; but "the vessels approached in order to come within range," marks intention or purpose. In the first form the circumstance might be accidental or it might imply purpose. The second form definitely expresses intention. But to a mind which excludes the possibility of accident in events, the distinction vanishes. This is what happened when the Greek language came to be moulded by the Hebrew intellect. To a large extent the distinction between final and consecutive particles was lost.

In classical Greek the intention, purpose or aim is indicated by the final particles *ἵνα*, *ὅφρα*, *ὅπως* and *ὥς*; or, later, by the genitive of the article with the infinitive; and result is expressed by *ὥστε* with the indicative or infinitive mood. In the Greek of the LXX. and New Testament *ὅφρα* is not found; *ὅπως*, *ὥς* and the genitive of the infinitive retain their final signification, but *ἵνα* has acquired a consecutive force, and, on the other, hand, *ὥστε* has come to be used in final sentences.

It is true that the consecutive force of *ἵνα* has been denied by some scholars, as Winer (with the possible exception of Rev. xiii. 13), and by Meyer and Alford; on the other hand, it is maintained by Lightfoot on Gal. v. 17, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντικεῖται, ἵνα μὴ, ἂ ἐὰν θέλητε, ταῦτα ποιήτε, comparing 1 Thess. v. 4, οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σκότει, ἵνα ἡ ἡμέρα ὑμᾶς ὡς κλέπτας καταλάβῃ; and by Ellicott on Eph. i. 17, μνεῖαν ποιούμενος ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου, ἵνα ὁ θεὸς . . . δώῃ ὑμῖν πνεῦμα σοφίας. To these may be added an example from the LXX. Gen. xxii. 14, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν Ἀβραὰμ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου Κύριος εἶδεν ἵνα εἴπωσι σήμερον, Ἐν τῷ ὄρει Κύριος ὤφθη. Readers of the EXPOSITOR will also remember the able and convincing argument to the same effect of Canon T. S. Evans in vol. iii., second series, of this periodical.

The use of ὥστε to mark design is admitted even by Winer (p. iii., § xlv. 1). Instances are, St. Matthew xxvii. 1, συμβούλιον ἔλαβον . . . ὥστε θανατῶσαι αὐτόν; and St. Luke ix. 52, ἀπέστειλεν ἀγγέλους . . . ὥστε (B. ὡς) ἐτοιμάσαι αὐτῷ.

This evidence of the subtle influence of Hebrew thought on the grammar of Hellenistic Greek is supported by the clearer testimony of language. It is remarkable that neither τύχη nor any other word signifying luck or chance or accident occurs in the New Testament. The seeming exception of the adverbial expression, *by chance* (κατὰ συντυχίαν) a certain priest was going down that way (St. Luke x. 31), is not really an instance to the contrary. We meet with the same phenomenon in the Old Testament. The Hebrew וַל and its Greek equivalent τύχη occur in two passages only of the Old Testament, namely, Genesis xxx. 11, and Isaiah lxv. 11. An examination of these passages will show that they are instances where *exceptio probat regulam*.

From the language of the Authorised Version it might

seem that a third passage should be added, where a Syrian warrior is described as "drawing his bow at a venture" (1 Kings xxii. 34); but the literal rendering "in his simplicity" only implies the unconsciousness of the instrument in carrying out the Divine purpose, and certainly conveys no thought of chance, for never was weapon more divinely guided in its aim. In Ecclesiastes ix. 11, "chance," ἀπάντημα LXX., is simply an occurrence, and in 2 Sam. vi. 9 the expression is adverbial. In Genesis xxx. 11, where the A.V. reads: "And Leah said, A troop cometh: and she called his name Gad," the R.V., with much greater probability, renders, "And Leah said, Fortunate! (Γῦν) and she called his name Gad" (*marg.*, that is, *Fortune*). So also the LXX. καὶ εἶπε Δεία· Ἐν τύχῃ καὶ ἐπωνόμασε τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Γάδ, which the Vulgate follows: Dixit: Felicitas; et idcirco vocabit nomen ejus Gad. Whether Leah's exclamation refers to the Syrian God of Fortune, as has been conjectured, or whether *Gad* is an abstract term for prosperity or happiness, there is certainly nothing in the expression to imply a formal recognition of good luck or fortune as a force determining events.

The second passage where the word *Gad* occurs (Isa. lxxv. 11) is more important, and contains a direct protest by the prophet Isaiah against the worship of Fortune or Good Luck as a divinity. In the A.V. the words are: "That prepare a table for that troop, and furnish the drink offering unto that number." The correction of the R.V. is clearly right: "That prepare a table for Fortune (*marg.* Heb. *Gad*), and that fill up mingled wine unto Destiny." The LXX. renders: καὶ ἐτοιμάζοντες τῷ δαιμονίῳ τράπεζαν καὶ πληροῦντες τῇ τύχῃ κέραςμα; and the Vulgate: Qui ponitis Fortunæ mensam, et libatis super eam.

It will be observed that in the LXX. version the Hebrew *Gad* is represented by τῷ δαιμονίῳ, and that τῇ τύχῃ is used

to translate the Hebrew *Meni*. In the Vulgate *Meni* is not represented. According to Schleusner, however (*sub voc. τύχη*) the positions of τῷ δαιμονίῳ and τῇ τύχῃ were reversed in some MSS., and in the Old Latin version, on which Jerome comments, "fortunæ" appears in the first clause, and "dæmoni" in the second. And in his notes he expressly states that the LXX. translated *Meni* by τῷ δαιμονίῳ. But in any case the parallelism of the Hebrew text shows that *Gad* and *Meni* are synonymous terms, signifying divinities who represented or personified fortune or good luck.

The passage is invaluable not only as giving evidence of the existence of such divinities and of the temptation which their cult offered to the Jews, but also as supplying a reason why the very word *τύχη*, together with the theory of life which it involves, is studiously excluded from the Biblical vocabulary.

It requires only a glance at Greek literature to understand how remarkable this omission is. To cite one out of numberless possible quotations, how natural is the expression of the messenger in the *Antigone* (l. 1158) :

τύχη γὰρ ὀρθοὶ καὶ τύχη καταρρέπει
τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα τὸν τε δυστυχοῦντ' ἀεί.

And yet prevalent and natural as such an expression is with the Greek dramatists, the idea of Chance is as foreign to the primitive theology of Greece as to that of Israel. *τύχη* does not occur in the Homeric Epos. We find it indeed in the fragment of a hymn to Athene, probably post-Homeric :

χαῖρε, θεά, δὸς δ' ἄμμι τύχην εὐδαιμονίην τε.

And there it is used in the sense of prosperity or success rather than of lucky accident. And indeed in its original significance *τύχη* did not imply undetermined luck or chance. Etymologically, it is connected with τέκνον, child ;

τέκμαρ, goal; τόξον, bow; τέχνη, art; τέκτων, carpenter (Curtius, *Greek Etymology*, § 235, vol. i. p. 271).

The root idea of the word then is achieved purpose, an end arrived at by deliberate aim, so success. To begin with, therefore, the word would express precisely the Hebrew thought of destiny moulded by Divine operation, to which ultimately it was opposed. For in course of time τύχη came to signify an element or force in the movement of life and history distinct from the ordered course of Divine government, and incalculable in its action. And this is the sense in which it is ordinarily used, and in which it became personified, and afterwards identified with the Syrian divinity Gad.

The passage in Isaiah plainly indicates that the Jews of the Exile had been attracted by the cult of Fortune; and external research has shown how widespread this cult was in all ages under different forms and names.

Gesenius, *sub voc.*, identifies Gad and Meni with the planets Jupiter and Venus, which are called by the Arabs "the Greater" and "the Lesser Fortune." It is somewhat surprising, as Baethgen remarks (*Beiträge zur Semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, p. 79), that the name of Gad does not occur in the Babylonish *Pantheon* so far as has yet been discovered. It is however probable that the name of the divinity may have been imported into Chaldæa from Syria, where the cult was especially prevalent. There are, says Baethgen, numerous traces of the cult of Tyche, the Greek equivalent of the Semitic Gad, in the Greek inscriptions of the Hauran. Temples called τυχαῖα, in honour of the goddess, were built in the cities of Syria and Phœnicia, often at the expense of the community, sometimes by private liberality. In Palestine itself evidence of this worship is found in such place-names as Baal-Gad (Josh. xi. 17, xii. 7, xiii. 5) and Migdal-Gad (Josh. xv. 37). The name Azgad ("strong is God"), Ezra ii. 12, may indicate

that a Jewish family had at one time devoted itself to the service of Fortune.

The origin and identification of Meni are more obscure. It is however clear that this also was a title under which Fortune or Destiny was worshipped. The meaning of the word "number" connects it with the numerical calculations of Chaldean astrology, and suggests the words of Horace (*Od.* i.-xi. 1-3) :

Tu ne quæsieris, scire nefas, quem mihi, quem tibi,
Finem Di dederint, Leuconoe; nec Babylonios,
Tentaris numeros.

Movers (*Die Phönizier*, p. 650) traces the root in the Etruscan and Roman Minerva, and points out its occurrence in Cappadocian and Persian names. He also refers to a curious passage in Strabo, xii. p. 31, where there is a possible identification between *τύχη* and *Μήν*. Speaking of a temple of the moon named *Μήν Φαρνάκου* in the city of Sebaste, he adds: *ἐτίμησαν δὲ οἱ βασιλεῖς τὸ ἱερόν τοῦτο οὕτως εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὥστε τὸν βασιλικὸν καλούμενον ὄρκον τοῦτον ἀπέφηναν, τύχην βασιλέως, καὶ, Μῆνα Φαρνάκου.*

But apart from the question of identification of Gad and Meni there is abundant evidence that the worship of *τύχη* or Fortune was widely prevalent.

We learn from Macrobius (*Sat.* i. 19) that among the Egyptians two of the four deities who preside at birth were *δαίμων* and *τύχη*. This corresponds with the *δαιμόνιον* and *τύχη* of the LXX. (*Isa.* lxx. 11), and illustrates the exclamation of Leah on the birth of her son. *Τύχη* had a recognised place in Greek philosophy. Plato speaks of it as ruling all things in conjunction with God: *μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τὰνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι συμπάντα* (*De Legibus*, iv. p. 709). Aristotle also cites the opinion of those who hold that *τύχη* is a cause of things, obscure (*ἄδηλος*) to the human understanding, having a divine existence and nature: *θεῖόν τι οὐσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον*

(*Physic.* lib. ii. c. 4). On which the ancient commentator Simplicius remarks that the divine nature of Fortune may be clearly inferred from the worship paid to her (ἐκ τοῦ προσκυνεῖν τὴν τύχην ὡς θεάν), the temples raised in her honour, and the songs sung in her praise. Selden (*De Diis Syris*, p. 273) cites a striking passage from Pliny to the same effect: Toto Mundo et locis omnibus, omnibusque horis, omnium vocibus Fortuna sola invocatur et una nominatur, una accusatur, una agitur rea, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arquitur, et cum conviciis colitur, etc.¹

The Romans attached the epithet "primigenia" to the goddess Fortune, and in her honour a temple was dedicated on the Quirinal B.C. 193. The same designation, which is also found in inscriptions at Præneste and elsewhere, seems to indicate the primitive character of the worship, or else the connexion of Fortune with birth and with the progress of life. "Up to the latest times," writes Döllinger (*Gentile and Jew*, i. 99), "Tyché was revered as the dispenser of the affairs of cities and people. The division of one goddess into a number of little Tychai was pressed so far, that by degrees a Tyché of their own was attached to each family, and to each individual member of a family."

The above quotations may suffice to show how abundantly τύχη entered into the life and literature and the worship of the ancient world; but one must be added from Pindar—the first of the poets to address Τύχη as a goddess—to illustrate an element in this cult of Fortune which is connected with the Jewish recognition of the goddess. Pindar writes (*Ol.* xii.):

Λίσσομαι, παῖ Ζητὸς Ἐλευθερίου,
Ἰμέραν, εὐρυσθενέ ἀμφιπόλει, Σώτειρα Τύχα.
τὴν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ κυβερνῶνται θεαὶ
ναῖες.

¹ Fortune is included in eleven out of thirty-one groups of gods named on the Phœnician dedication tablets in the British Museum.

"I pray thee, Saviour Fortune, daughter of Zeus Eleutherius, protect wide-ruling Himera, for by thee are swift ships steered in ocean." Now in regard to the epithet Σώτεια Dr. Donaldson has pointed out that "gods who particularly favoured the mariner in his difficulties were called σωτήρες,"—*e.g.* τύχη δὲ σωτὴρ ναυστολοῦσ' ἐφέζετο (*Æsch. Agam.* 664). Τύχη therefore and the divinities who possessed her attributes "would be regarded as the special saviours and protectors, not only of sailors, but of all who were engaged in the risky operations of trade." Now it has been suggested with great probability by Rev. G. A. Smith that this practice of "preparing a table for Gad, and filling up mixed wine to Meni," may be closely connected with the commercial spirit which the Jews imbibed for the first time during the Exile. "The merchants of Mesopotamia had their own patron gods. In completing business contracts a man had to swear by the idols, and might have to enter their temples" (G. A. Smith's *Book of Isaiah*, ii. 62). In this way the Jewish trader would be drawn into idolatry.

If this conjecture be true,—and it carries with it the highest probability,—how closely does the whole subject connect itself not only with the commercial transactions of the present day on their speculative side, but with the spirit of gambling generally. It was quite in accordance with the teaching of Holy Scripture that games of chance were repudiated by the stricter Jews (Schürer, ii. 1, 36). Indeed so pernicious and so prevalent had the custom become that even pagan morality was shocked, and gambling repressed by law (*Hor. Od.* iii. 24, 58: *vetita legibus alea*).

It has sometimes been thought difficult to discover a principle on which to base a general condemnation of games of chance. However this may be, a sufficient justification will be found for discountenancing and condemning

what Bishop Cosin calls "inordinate gaming," not only in the stern reproof of the prophet (Isa. lxxv. 11), but in the whole of the remarkable and suggestive contrast presented to the life and literature of pagan civilization by the thought and utterance and silence of the Bible.

ARTHUR CARR.

*A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE GALATIANS.*

XVIII. FOOLISH GALATIANS.

Now that we have fixed the precise sense of the word Galatians as "men of the Roman Province Galatia," and therefore pointedly distinguished from "men of the Lycaonian, or of the Phrygian nation," the question is as to the meaning and innuendo of the address "foolish Galatians."

First, perhaps, one must notice the objection, that one ought not to lay too much stress on a mere name in an apostrophe of this kind. That is the objection of one who sits in a study and comments on the text, not of one who recognises what use the orator or the preacher can make of a name. The very rarity and unusualness of the word "Galatians" in the Pauline sense, the very fact that only Romans or persons speaking decidedly and pointedly from the Roman point of view employed the name in that sense, made it a word that arrested the attention of the audience, conveyed a wealth of meaning to them, and placed them at a certain point of view.

Let those who do not feel the force of the word "Galatae" in Paul's mouth, imagine what difference it would make to an audience in this country whether a speaker used the word "English" or "British" as an apostrophe: it might make all the difference with some audiences between the success or failure of the speech.

The force of the name that Paul uses depends on the state of society and feeling in South Galatia at the time; the contest that was in progress has been

described elsewhere.¹ On the one side was the native and national spirit, allied with the power of the priesthood and the great temples, the spirit of orientalism, of stagnation, of contented and happy ignorance of deep-rooted superstition. On the other side was the desire for education, the perception that Greece and Rome stood on a higher intellectual platform than the native religion and customs, the revolt from the ignorant and enslaving native superstition. It has been pointed out that the influence of the new religion was, necessarily and inevitably, on the side of Græco-Roman education and order, and that it proved far more powerful than either Greek or Roman government in spreading the use of the Greek language (which was the chief agent in Græco-Roman culture). The "men of the Province Galatia" are, therefore, those who desire education, who have shaken off the benumbing and degrading influence of the native magic and superstition, who judge for themselves as to the real value of the facts of life, who lay claim to insight and *Noesis*. There is a telling innuendo in the juxtaposition *ἀνόητοι Γαλάται*, "you who are showing yourselves devoid of *Noesis*," "Galatæ who fail in the first characteristic of Galatæ."

The apostrophe is, in short, a concentration into two words of the sting that lies in the whole paragraph, iii. 1-5. Your present conduct is irrational, you are sinking back to the old level of superstition and ignorance when you think to attain perfection by the flesh, by the physical acts and works of man, after you had for a time been on the higher level of the spiritual life.

¹ *St. Paul the Trav.*, chapter VI.

XIX. THE TWO STAGES, III. 3.

Are you so devoid of rational perception of the real value of things, so wanting in insight and Noesis? Having begun in the Spirit, are ye now perfected in the flesh?

It is clearly implied that the Galatian Christians had been led astray by a theory of lower and higher stages in Christianity. They were, of course, familiar from their pagan days with this idea of progress through an intermediate to a higher stage of religious life, reaching the perfect knowledge through an imperfect knowledge. They had, in perfect honesty but in utter want of true insight, been led to the idea that their former stage of Paulinism and spiritual religion was a preliminary. Those who were strong enough should proceed to the hard but ennobling stage of works, of troublesome and difficult service with their body and their flesh.

This idea had evidently been communicated to the Galatian Churches by the Judaizing emissaries. That shows that these emissaries accepted the Apostolic Decree, *Acts* xv., quite as much as Paul himself did, but read it in a different sense. They did not contend, as many Jews previous to the Council and the Decree had contended, that in order to be a Christian the pagan convert must accept the whole Mosaic Law, they did not say "except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved" (*Acts* xvi.) It had been decided, formally and finally, that that contention was wrong and wicked, "subverting the souls" of the pagan converts (*Acts* xv. 24), and that such converts could be received into the Church without accepting more than the four necessary conditions (*Acts* xv. 29).

But the Decree readily lends itself to a quite plausible interpretation that the four conditions are a minimum, a mere concession to the weakness of those who were unfit to bear a "greater burden"; and that those who had strength to bear more should voluntarily go on to the perfect stage of bearing the whole burden.

The Galatian Churches were honestly convinced that such was the meaning of the Decree that Paul himself had brought them. They had, in the next place, easily been brought to regard him as the mere subordinate and messenger of the Apostles, and especially of the leaders among them. After these misconceptions had taken root, it was easy to lead on the Galatians to the last error—that Paul from jealousy was keeping most of them on the lower stage, that he was their "Enemy" when he told them to neglect ceremonial and stand fast in the spiritual stage,¹ while he carried on only some special favourites like Timothy to the perfect stage (*Gal.* v. 11).

XX. THE MARVELLOUS POWERS, III. 25.

The ultimate test and the indubitable proof that the Divine power had been working through Paul among the Galatians from the beginning, and that the Spirit had been given them, lay in the marvellous powers which had been imparted to them, and which they had exhibited in action.

It is beyond question that Paul believed not merely in the superhuman powers which he himself occasionally exerted, but also in the communication of similar powers to many of his converts. He appeals to the memory of

¹ It is clear that the word "enemy" in *Gal.* iv. 16 ought to be printed in inverted commas, if one follows the modern punctuation, as being the very word which was being used in Galatia about him. See the remarks in *EXPOSITOR*, July, p. 23, carrying out Professor Locke's idea.

the Galatians. They know that such powers have been exercised among them.

Tell me then (he says), you who received the Spirit, does He that liberally equips you with the Spirit and plants in you marvellous and extraordinary powers—does He, I say, do so because of the deeds of the Law or because you have been the listeners and disciples to the preaching of Faith? I do not need to supply the answer. You yourselves know the facts (which the historian has not failed to record), and you can answer the question. You remember the lame man at Lystra, who had the faith of salvation (as the historian says, *Acts* xiv. 9); you remember the disciples at Antioch filled with joy and with the Holy Spirit (xiii. 52); you remember the signs and wonders that were done at Iconium (xiv. 3),¹ and among the Gentiles in general (xv. 12), and you know that Barnabas and I could do such works only where there was in you "the faith of being saved"²; you have learned in your own case that "God has borne you witness, giving you the Holy Spirit even as He did unto us Jews, and has made no distinction between us and you, cleansing your hearts by faith" (xv. 8, 9). All this you remember; and further, you know that these mighty gifts were granted you before you had heard of this new Gospel of works of the Law, and when you knew only and believed only in the Gospel of Faith which alone had been preached to you during my earlier visit.

Are you, then, so void of insight into the truth of actual facts that, after having received such powers through the faith in which you began, you now seek to attain a more perfect stage of Christian life through physical ceremonies and acts? Has it done nothing for you that the Spirit acted so powerfully on you and in you? Nothing, do I

¹ Assuming that this verse is Lukan: see *St. Paul the Trav.* p. 108. The differences of text in the Iconian episode are very great.

² See note, p. 200.

say? Perchance it has really been the worse for you that you have received and then fallen away from the Spirit.

XXI. THE TEACHING OF PAUL.

In the following sections it is necessary to study a number of sayings and arguments in the Epistle involving the whole theology of Paul. Our purpose must be properly understood, lest it be thought that the attempt is too bold and presumptuous. The aim of these sections is not to discuss from the theological or the philosophic point of view the real meaning and nature of Paul's doctrines. My purpose is much humbler. It is simply to try to determine what thoughts and feelings and memories Paul's words roused in the Galatians, what meaning his teaching had had for them. Our purpose is historical; and we are treating a small part, yet one of the most important and most difficult parts, of the general problem, What did Christianity accomplish in the Roman world during the first century?

The materials for forming a judgment are (1) what we know about the religious ideas of the peoples of Asia Minor, especially in the districts which had been least affected by Greek influence and were most purely native¹; (2) the information given by Luke in *Acts*, which, however, is very slight, as it lay quite outside of his purpose to record for future generations a picture of the character and mind of Paul's converts; (3) the information given by Paul himself in his Epistle to the Galatians. In *Colossians* and *Ephesians* we find teaching of a more advanced

¹ The evidence bearing on this point is or will be collected in the *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* (see especially I. 51 f., 89 ff., 134 ff., 262 ff., 292 ff.; II. 356 ff., 414 f., 625 f., 630 f.). Many details may also be found in various other works, especially Buresch's *Aus Lydien*, 1898. Some papers in the *Expository Times*, October, etc., 1898, will discuss the analogy between many of the forms and words of the pagan-ritual and the language of the early Church.

character; but in *Galatians* the intention is to rouse afresh the emotions and sentiments which characterized the Galatian Churches in their first years, to appeal from their later selves to their earlier selves. Hence Paul's arguments here have to a certain extent the character of reminiscences, for they are designed to rouse memories among his readers.

XXII. THE MESSAGE TO THE GALATIANS.

Paul had set before the Galatians from the first that the spiritual life was the true and final and perfect Christianity; and the way by which they entered this spiritual life was explained by "setting forth openly before their eyes Jesus Christ crucified." This brief phrase recalled to them many memories. We, on our part, cannot fail to ask what were these memories. How was this remarkable expression made intelligible to the pagan audiences to whom Paul had appealed? Let us try to imagine to ourselves the mind of such pagans, when such an absolutely novel form of words was first presented to them; in what way was it made to convey a distinct idea to them? We are so familiar with such phrases from childhood, that we accept them as full of meaning and power, often perhaps taking them on credit rather than really understanding what they mean. But Paul was not merely expressing this idea to pagans who had never heard it, he was expressing it for the first time in the world's history; he had stepped on to a new plane in the development of thought, beyond what any of the other Apostles had reached previously.

It was certainly not by skilful philosophic exposition of an abstruse doctrine that Paul expounded his idea of life gained through the death of Christ. Nowhere else does he allude so plainly and pointedly to his method as in the

sentences that form the transition from the autobiographical retrospect that occupies most of chapter ii. to the doctrinal exposition of chapter iii.

Observe, too, with what art, and yet how naturally, this reminiscence of his method is introduced. The public address to Peter before the whole Antiochian Church, ii. 14, passes by imperceptible stages into a recital of his own experience in his conversion and the beginning of his new life. The reader begins the recital, ii. 15, with the idea that Paul is relating what he said among the Antiochians. He ends it, ii. 21, feeling that Paul has drifted away from a mere narrative of the Antiochian crisis into the memory of that crisis in his own life, which was ever present to his mind. The Galatians recognised in the recital the exact form of his message and gospel to them; they saw at the same time that it was the message spoken in Antioch; and they had the assurance given at the outset of the letter that the whole Antiochian Church joined with Paul in writing to them, and endorsed this recital as a statement of the gospel which they also had heard.

Much of the effect of this paragraph, ii. 14-21, depends on the place whence the letter was written. The Church in Syrian Antioch is relating to the Churches in Galatia what Paul always had preached to it and had said briefly to Peter. Thus it was impressed on the Galatians that Paul's Gospel was everywhere exactly the same, always sufficient in itself for all occasions, powerful even in face of Peter, absolutely simple and perfectly complete.

No one can really understand that idea except him in whom it has been made part of his life; and Paul explained it to the Galatians by looking back into his own life and speaking out of his own heart. As usual, we come again to what was stated above,¹ "you understand nothing in Paul unless you take it in its relation to his conversion"; "on

¹ EXPOSITOR, July, p. 28.

our conception of that one event depends our whole view of Paul's life." It would be out of place here to study fully the historical and biographical aspect of the problems connected with the conversion; but the terms in which Paul refers to it here, ii. 19, 20, compel us to try to realize the manner in which he had set it before the Galatians if we want to get any clear conception of the effect that this and the following paragraphs produced on them.

The idea had come to Paul through revelation, *i.e.* through direct intercourse of man with the Divine nature. In such intercourse there is involved not merely the willingness of the Divine nature to manifest itself (for that condition always exists), but also willingness and fitness of the man to become sensitive to the manifestation—a certain state of the mind and of the body is needed. The required conditions existed in Paul on several occasions; and it is in every case interesting to observe them so far as we can.

It is evident in these words of v. 19, "I through law died to law," that Paul had been originally a man profoundly convinced of sin, and eager to escape from it by zealous obedience to the Law. With that strong consciousness ever present in his mind, he was travelling to Damascus, bent on annihilating the effect produced by that Impostor, who had outraged the Law, and rightly had suffered death as the due penalty, but had left behind Him some misguided followers, who continued to outrage the Law. As he came along "the way of the sea," and reached the crest of the very gentle elevation which bounds the plain of Damascus on the south,¹ the view of the scene

¹ I follow the old tradition as to the locality—a tradition which commended itself to the judgment of Sir Charles Wilson, and which seems to me to have every appearance of truth and unbroken continuance. The situation, however, at Kaukab, near 10 or 12 miles from Damascus, was found to be very inconvenient for pilgrims; and the Latins therefore moved the site in modern times to a spot close to the city, and on the East side of it, not on the South!

of his coming work produced naturally a strong effect on his peculiar and susceptible temperament. The long journey, day after day, with nothing to do except to count the miles that still divided him from his goal and to think of the work that lay before him, inevitably produced an intense concentration of purpose, which gave the mind supreme sovereignty over the body. This effect was accentuated by the spare diet, inevitable in Eastern travel—diet sufficient to keep the mind alert and the body in health, but not sufficient to enable “this muddy vesture of decay” to “grossly close in” the soul and screen it more effectually from perceiving the spiritual world by which we are always, but generally unconsciously, surrounded—just sufficient to produce an exaltation and stimulation of the faculties, which is as far removed from the unhealthy and morbid excitation induced by extreme over-fatigue, or by unnatural starvation and fasting, as it is from the dulled and contented state that results from a full and generous diet.

Few, if any, persons can have much experience of travel in such circumstances, with the sun watching them day after day in pitiless and unvarying calmness from its rising to its setting, without having their nature deeply affected, and even passing permanently into a new life and temper. But in a nature which was already so sensitive to the Divine world around it as Paul's, all the conditions were fulfilled which raised him above the ordinary limitations of humanity. It was a supreme crisis in his life, like that in the hall of the proconsul at Paphos, like that when he perceived the “faith of being saved”¹ which looked through the eyes of the lame man at Lystra. In the bright light that shone about him, he saw and heard what none of his

¹ πιστιν τοῦ σωθῆναι, an untranslatable expression. It indicates that state of the will and temperament which made a person capable of being cured or saved, able to respond to the word of Paul.

travelling companions could see or hear. He saw as a living, Divine reality Him whom he had believed to be a dead Impostor. Paul's whole theory of life had been founded on the belief that Jesus was dead; but when he recognised that Jesus was living, the theory crumbled into dust. If He was not dead, He was not an Impostor. He had suffered the last penalty of the Law, He had submitted to the curse pronounced on "every one that hangeth on a tree" (*Gal.* iii. 13); but yet He was not accursed, but living and glorified. The Law, by being satisfied, had no longer any effect upon Him: it had ceased to exist for Him when He through its operation died to it.

Vividly and deeply conscious that he was a sinner before the Law, Paul accepted the full penalty of his sin: through the operation of the Law, he died to it: he received the curse upon him, taking to him the crucifixion of Christ. By so doing he ceased to exist for the Law, and the Law no longer existed for him: he entered on a new life. But this new life became his only through his belief in Jesus as the living God: the rest of his life was given him through his faith in the Son of God, whose voluntary death had opened to Paul this new life free from the terrors of the Law and the ever-present fear of death. Had it been possible to attain through the Law this new life, this life free from the curse pronounced by the Law against every one who failed to walk in it (*Gal.* iii. 10), Christ's death would have been useless. Paul had found for himself that the new life could not be attained by striving to obey the Law; he knew that nothing could give it except the perfect and soul-possessing recognition that Christ had died voluntarily on his behalf and yet was still living.

The power which Paul's Gospel had over the Galatians lay in its origin out of his own experience. He was the living proof that it was true. It had given him his new life. What it did for him it could do for all.

Therein lay the sufficient answer to any mere abstract philosophical objection: how can the death of one man gain pardon for the sins of another? In reply Paul narrated the facts. That shame and curse of the Crucifixion he had embraced as his own; he had grasped it and taken it into his own soul; he had made it the deepest part of his own nature; he had founded his entire consciousness and his entire mind upon it. It remade the universe for him; it recreated his life and thought and soul and energy; the simple fact that he stood and spoke before them was the unanswerable proof that his message was true.

But Paul had preached in Syrian Antioch, and it was involved in the truth of his message, that the Law ceased to have any power over him, when he accepted the penalty and the shame, and died to the Law. If, therefore, he should "build up again those things which he had destroyed" (*Gal.* ii. 18), if he should begin once more to recognise the Law as existing for him, he would "prove himself a transgressor," he would sacrifice the justifying effect of his belief in Jesus, he would be bringing himself back into the former condition of vivid, intense consciousness of sin and inability to escape from the penalty; he would "make void the grace of God" (ii. 21), he would be experiencing in vain the Divine power (iii. 4). If he made the Law a power over him, Christ would profit him nothing (v. 2).

The Law had produced in him that intense and overpowering consciousness of guilt and sin, which was a necessary stage in the way of salvation. But by satisfying it, he annihilated it as a power over himself.

Those who would be saved must go through the same process: first the intense consciousness of sin; then the actual experience how belief in Christ enabled them to die with Him to the Law, and enter on the new life, which

thus was opened to them. How irrational it was thereafter to restore for themselves the power which the Law exerted over those who were under it and suffering the hopeless consciousness of guilt which it produced, and worse than irrational! Their experience of the Spirit would be vain and useless to them, and would perhaps be a positive disadvantage to them, if they now began to build up again what they had destroyed (*Gal.* ii. 4). "If ye receive circumcision, Christ will profit you nothing" (v. 2), "Christ died for naught" (i. 21).

XXIII. SONS OF ABRAHAM, III. 6-9.

As Abraham's faith in God was counted to him for righteousness, so your faith in Jesus was counted to you. You know, then, that they who cleave to the rule of Faith, inherit Abraham's Faith, and are his sons (for he that inherits is a son).

The idea that they who follow the principle of Faith are sons of Abraham, whatever family they belonged to by nature, would certainly be understood by the Galatians as referring to the legal process called *νόθεωσις*. In cities like Pisidian Antioch the Greek law on this subject certainly existed previous to the Roman period.¹ When Antioch became a Roman colony, the Roman law was introduced, but it is well established that in the East the Roman law was much affected by native customs.² The essential

¹ Antioch was a Greek foundation; but similarly every true *polis* in Asia Minor older than the Roman conquest probably used Greek law; for the *polis* was a purely Greek institution, and not of native growth.

² On this subject see Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*. The excellent paper by Dr. W. E. Ball in the *Contemporary Review*, Aug., 1891, p. 278 ff., suffers from his assumption that Paul must be referring purely to Roman law. In the Latin-speaking Provinces of the West, it would be safe to make that assumption; but in the Greek-speaking Eastern Provinces, where the Romans came in contact with an old-standing civilization and law, they were too good administrators to try to overturn the entire native system and set their own in its place. Mitteis has shown how much *Volksrecht* affected *Reichsrecht* in the Eastern Provinces.

legal characteristics of the Greek process *νόθευσις* do not materially differ from the original Roman theory of Adoption; but the language here and in other parts of chapters iii. and iv. suits better the Greek than the Roman idea as they actually existed at this period.

Mitteis, *l. c.*, p. 339 f., *apropos* of a passage in the fifth-century Syrian-Roman Lawbook, has discussed the same question which meets us here, and has decided it on grounds which are perfectly applicable here, though, naturally, he does not notice the parallel case in Paul's letter. In several places his argument might almost be taken as a reply to Dr. W. E. Ball's paper (quoted above in a footnote); though in all probability he never saw that paper. Applying his reasoning, we observe that Paul and the Galatians would neither use nor understand arguments founded on the original character of Roman Adoption: they could know Roman law only as it was in their time, when Roman heirship had become quite dissociated from the idea of sonship. But the forms of language in Asiatic states continued long after Paul's time to follow the ancient Greek expression that the heir is the son, that the family of the deceased lives on in the heirs, that heir and son are interchangeable terms, that "to make a will" means "to adopt a son." In the Greek view it was a calamity both to the individual and to the State, if a citizen died without leaving an heir to carry on the family and continue the family religion: the State, which was an association of families, lost one of its members, the gods of the family lost their worship, and the dead citizen lost the rights and gifts which he was entitled to receive from the surviving family. The State, therefore, looked after the continuance of the family, if the individual citizen had neglected his duty. The only way in which a childless individual could acquire an heir was by adopting him: hence to adopt, *εἰσποιεῖσθαι*, and to bequeath, *διατίθεσθαι*,

are used as equivalent terms: childless, *ἄπαις*, and intestate are practically the same idea.¹ In Roman law adoption imitated nature, and the adopted son was assimilated as much as possible to the son by birth. In Athens, in order to keep the property in the family, the adopted son was permitted and encouraged to marry the daughter of the deceased, thus saving the dowry which she would otherwise require. In Asiatic countries where some traces of succession in the female line persisted, it is highly probable that the same marriage custom prevailed, on the theory that the adopted son acquired the right of the daughter to inherit by marrying her.²

The adopted heir, then, succeeds to all the religious obligations and position of the deceased. Conversely, he who succeeds to the religious position of any man is his son: there was no other form under which succession could be made, except through adoption. He who succeeds to the faith of Abraham is the son of Abraham. He could not acquire possession of Abraham's faith in any other way than as his son. "Ye know therefore that they which be of faith, the same are sons of Abraham."

Among the Jews adoption had no importance, and hardly any existence. The perpetuity of the family, when a man died childless, was secured in another way, viz., the *levirate*. Only sons by blood were esteemed in the Hebrew view: only such sons could carry on the true succession, and be in a true sense heirs. From every point of view the

¹ See Daremberg et Saglio, *Dict. des Antig.*, art. *Adoption*.

² In the Asiatic countries this was not felt to make any difference between the position of the son by nature and the son by adoption, for apparently both kinds of sons according to the primitive religious law acquired right of inheritance by marrying the heiress, their sister by nature or by adoption. The spread of Greek customs tended to discourage marriage between natural brother and sister, except in cases where something peculiarly sacred, such as the right to the throne, was concerned. How far the Athenian custom of marrying the adopted son to the heiress was a survival of an ancient social custom we need not here enquire.

thought in iii. 7 is abhorrent to Hebrew feeling. It is one of the passages which show how far removed Paul was from the mere Jewish way of thinking; he differed in the theory of life, and not merely in the religious view. Quite apart from the fact that the Jews naturally abhorred the idea that the Gentiles could become sons of Abraham, the very thought that the possessing of a man's property implied sonship was unnatural to them. Paul had grown up amid the surroundings and law of Græco-Roman society; otherwise the expression of iii. 7 could not come so lightly and easily from him.

Such passages as this have led some very learned Jewish scholars of my acquaintance, whose names I may not quote, to declare in conversation their conviction that the letters attributed to Paul were all forgeries, because no Jew of that age could write like that, whether he were Christian or no. So far as I may judge, they undervalue the cosmopolitan effect, produced on the Jewish-Roman and Greek citizens living for generations in Greek and Roman cities, just as much as many distinguished European scholars do, when they fancy that Paul is a pure Jew, unaffected except in the most superficial way by Greek thought.

Further, a distinct and well-marked stage in the development of law is implied as existing among the audience to which Paul addresses himself. In what part of Asia Minor may we expect to find such ideas of legal usage current during the first century after Christ? That question now demands consideration.

W. M. RAMSAY.

THE ALPHABETIC POEM IN NAHUM.

THE Old Testament contains a number of acrostic poems. The two laws of such acrostics are that the initial letters of the several sections should follow the order of the alphabet, and that the sections or stanzas devoted to each letter should be of (at least approximately) the same length. Different poems differ in the length of the stanza, but within the same poem the length must be the same. Thus in Psalm cxix. the length of each stanza is sixteen lines,¹ in Psalm xxxvii. four, in Lamentations cc. i., ii., iii.² three long ("ḳinah" ³) lines, in Lamentations c. iv. two "ḳinah" lines, in Psalms xxv., xxxiv., cxlv. two lines, in Psalms cxi., cxii. one line. Slight deviations from each of these two laws occur in the present text of the poems. In some cases the deviation is clearly due to textual corruption. As a generally recognised instance the absence of the line beginning with ṽ in Psalm xxxvii. may be cited. Whether the absence of the ṽ verse in Psalm xxv., of the ḏ verse in Psalm cxlv., or the fact that in Psalm xxv. only a single line is devoted to Ḥ be original or the result of transcriptional error cannot be said with certainty. But even if the originality of the irregularities in question be admitted, the few exceptions simply serve to prove the two general laws already stated.

The case is different with Psalms ix. and x., which constituted originally, as they still do in the Septuagint, a

¹ In this example every other line within each stanza begins with the same letter. The verse in English most frequently contains two lines of the original; but as it sometimes contains more, sometimes less, the relation between different acrostics can only be satisfactorily described by reckoning lines. The English reader will find the structure of the acrostic Psalms indicated by marginal letters in the recently issued English translation of the Book of Psalms (*Sacred Books of the Old Testament*) by Wellhausen and Furness.

² In Lamentations c. iii. each of the three lines of the several stanzas begins with the same letter.

³ Cf. Driver, *Introduction*,⁶ pp. 457 f.

single poem. It is now generally admitted that the succession of certain letters at fixed intervals is not accidental; in other words, that this poem is based on an acrostic. The facts are these: the first three and the last four letters of the Hebrew alphabet form the initial letters in regular succession of four-lined stanzas (Psalm ix. 1-6 [Heb. vv. 2-7], א-ג; x. 12-18, ד-ז). In addition to these seven sections we find the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th letters (ח-ק) following one another in ix. 11-17 (Heb. vv. 12-18); the י and כ verses are of four, the ל verse of five lines.

It is a matter of more recent observation and, at least in England, of much less general recognition that the book of Nahum, like Psalms ix., x., contains in whole or in part a mutilated acrostic. Following up earlier suggestions by a German pastor of the name of Frohnmeyer and Franz Delitzsch, Bickell¹ and Gunkel² have ventured to reconstruct out of Nahum i. 1-ii. 3 a complete acrostic in which each stanza consists of two lines; and Nowack, in his excellent commentary on the Minor Prophets published last year, has indicated the structure of the poem in his translation, and defended the requisite emendations in his notes. Three of the leading Old Testament scholars in our own country have recently had occasion to refer to the subject. It has received at once the fullest and the most sceptical discussion from Dr. Davidson,³ who appears to doubt the existence of any intentional alphabetic arrangement in Nahum c. i., and certainly discountenances any attempt to restore the latent acrostic, if such exist. Dr. Driver's judgment is expressed as follows in the last

¹ In the *Zeitschr. d. deutschen morgenländischen Gesellsch.*, 1880, pp. 559 f.; *Carmina Vet. Test. metrica* (1882), p. 212 f.; and *Beiträge zur sem. Metrik* in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna Academy (Phil. Hist. Series), vol. 131, Abhandlung V. (1890).

² In the *Zeitschr. für AT. Wissenschaft*, 1893, pp. 223-244, and *Schöpfung und Chaos* (1895), pp. 102 f.

³ *Nahum, Habakkuk, and Zephaniah* (Camb. Bible for Schools), 1896, pp. 18-20.

edition of his *Introduction*: "In Nahum i. 2-ii. 2 . . . traces of an acrostich . . . seem to be discernible." In a subsequent review of Nowack's commentary he has expressed himself somewhat more fully, but not more approvingly. After admitting that "undoubtedly there are traces of an alphabetic arrangement in the successive half verses," he expresses great doubt "whether this was ever intended to be carried systematically through, or whether it is due to anything more than the fact that the author allowed himself here and there, perhaps half accidentally, to follow the alphabetical order."¹ Dr. G. A. Smith,² while agreeing with the two scholars whose views have been just cited that much of the reconstruction of Bickell and Gunkel is arbitrary, quite decisively admits that the traces of an acrostic are real. To cite his own words: "The text of chapters i.-ii. 4 has been badly mauled, and is clamant for reconstruction of some kind. As it lies, there are traces of an alphabetical arrangement as far as the beginning of ver. 9" (p. 82). At the same time Dr. Smith minimizes, as it appears to me, the force of the evidence and fails to take full account of what he himself admits.

Under these circumstances a fresh discussion of the subject will hardly be considered uncalled for. It may be true of the last part of the poem that the restoration of the acrostic "can never be more than an academic exercise" (Davidson); but the establishment of the fact, if fact it be, that parts or the whole of a regularly and consciously constructed acrostic poem lie latent in the book of Nahum cannot remain without effect on the exegesis of the passage and on certain not unimportant critical problems.

Where too much is attempted it frequently happens

¹ *Expository Times*, Dec., 1897, p. 119. Compare also *Introd.*,⁶ p. xxi.

² *Book of the Twelve Prophets*, vol. ii. (1898), pp. 81-84.

that too little gains recognition. Both Bickell and Gunkel have attempted to reconstruct an entire acrostic. Much of the detail is of necessity uncertain. The consequence is that, as we have seen, it is still doubted whether the chapter contains even any fragments of an acrostic. We must therefore distinguish between the proof that Nahum contains traces of an acrostic which, when the evidence is duly presented, is cogent and certain details of reconstruction, which are requisite if an entire acrostic is to be restored but for which the evidence is in one or two cases strong, in many slight, and in some nil.

The proof that Nahum contains at least parts of an acrostic must be based on the phenomena presented by the Hebrew text and the versions of the first nine verses of chapter i. Any one who is unconvinced by these will remain unconvinced by the much less conspicuous and significant phenomena of the following verses. The influence of the two laws of the acrostic — alphabetical succession of initial letters and equal lengths of the several verses or sections—can best be made clear to those unfamiliar with Hebrew by a translation arranged in parallel lines. Variations from the Hebrew consonantal text are printed in italics. The initial letters are printed on the left hand together with a numeral indicating the position of the letter in the Hebrew alphabet; and these are inserted in brackets when they are only gained by rearrangement of the order of words or lines. For convenience of reference in the subsequent discussion, the number of the lines of the translation are placed on the right hand.

1. א A God jealous and avenging is Yahwè,
 Yahwè taketh vengeance and is full of wrath;
 [Yahwè taketh vengeance on his adversaries,
 and retaineth anger for his enemies.
 Yahwè is longsuffering and great in strength, 5
 but ¹ Yahwè will not wholly acquit.]

¹ I follow the Syriac in connecting Yahwè with this line; cf. LXX. as

2. ב In whirlwind and storm is his way,
and clouds are the dust of his feet.
3. ג He rebuketh the sea and drieth it up,
and parcheth all the rivers. 10
- (4. ד) Bashan and Carmel *languish*,¹
and the growth of Lebanon withers.
5. ה Mountains quake because of him,
and *all* the hills melt.
6. ו So the earth becomes desolate² before him, 15
the world and all that dwell therein.
- (7. ז) Before his indignation who can stand?
and who can endure the heat of his anger?
8. ח His wrath pours out like fire,
and rocks are *kindled*³ by him. 20
9. ט Good is Yahwè to *those who wait for him*,⁴
a stronghold in the day of distress.
- (10. י) He knoweth those who trust in him,
and in the overflowing flood *delivers them*.⁵
- (11. יא) An utter end he maketh of them that rise against him, 25
and he *thrusts*⁶ his enemies into the darkness.
- (12. יב) *Not twice does he take vengeance on his adversaries,*⁷
an utter end he maketh.
- (13. יג) *Why do ye plan against Yahwè?*⁸

punctuated in Swete's edition. MT., and consequently E.V., connect it with the following line.

¹ See below.

² Point וְהִשָּׁא (the word used of desolate cities in Isa. vi. 11) instead of וְהִשָּׁא. The R.V. rendering of the latter word is hazardous. In favour of the emendation, cf. Targ. וְהִרְוִיחַ. Vg. *contremuit* is at least no support of MT.

³ MT. נִפְצְלוּ means "are thrown down," not "are broken asunder" (R.V.); by a transposition of the second and third letters we get נִפְצְלוּ = are kindled.

⁴ LXX. τοῖς ἐπόμενοις αὐτῷ = לִקְיוֹי (cf. e.g. Isa. xlix. 23). It has sometimes been supposed that לִקְיוֹי is a simple misreading of לִמְעוֹי (Hebrew text) or *vice versa*. But this is unlikely. The individual letters are not very similar. More probably the present Hebrew and Greek texts have each arisen by the intentional or accidental omission of one of the two words. The Targum is too free to afford convincing evidence. But their translation would be easily explained by the text assumed above. It runs thus: "Good is Yahwè to Israel that they may stay themselves upon him in time of distress"—Israel = לִקְיוֹי; that they may stay themselves upon him = לִמְעוֹי.

⁵ Supply וְצִילָם. ⁶ Reading יִהְרֶף for יִרְדֵּף; cf. Job xviii. 18.

⁷ Reading יָקוּם and בְּצִרְיוֹ for יָקוּם and צָרָה, after LXX. ἐκδικήσεται, ἐν ὀλίγῃ.

⁸ The order of these lines is different in MT. Otherwise the text is unchanged.

The foregoing translation represents to the eye the original structure of the poem, which is quite obscured by the unoriginal and, indeed, very late verse division found in E.V. The fact that any of the alphabetic letters occurs in the middle of a *verse* is a matter of entire indifference to our argument. The question is, How frequently and with what regularity do they occur at the beginning of *lines*? The main and indisputable facts can be seen by a glance at the marginal letters accompanying the translation. Before discussing some of the more ambiguous phenomena it will be well to point out that the lines are, for Hebrew poetry, remarkably regular in length. The case for the reality of metre in Hebrew poetry does not appear to me to be made out. But there is no question that in many poems the lines consist of approximately the same number of words. This is the case with the present passage. The regular length of the line is three or four independent words. In one case only (l. 14) the number of words is only two.¹ In line 5, which, as we shall see below, is probably part of a gloss, the number is five. Unless the emendations adopted in lines 21, 24 be accepted, two other lines also extended to five words.² The effect of the emendations is in each case to make out of a single line of five words two lines of three words (ll. 21, 22; 24, 25). With the exceptions mentioned the emendations adopted do not affect the length of the lines. Even in the Hebrew text as it stands, out of twenty-seven lines all but four consist either of three or four independent words. A great tendency to approximate regularity of length must therefore be admitted.

¹ i.e. in the Hebrew text. In the translation I have adopted Gunkel's suggestion. He inserts כל before הַגְּבִעוֹת (cf. Ps. cxlviii. 9; Jer. iv. 24; Amos ix. 13).

² The dissimilarity in length of these lines to the others appears in Prof. Smith's translation, *Book of the Twelve*, II. p. 93, 4th and 2nd line from bottom.

Turning now to the occurrence and position of the acrostic letters, it will again be well to proceed from the certain to the uncertain.

As the Hebrew text stands apart from any, even the slightest emendation, the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th letters of the Hebrew alphabet stand at the beginning of the 7th, 9th, 13th, 15th, 19th, and 21st lines respectively; in other words, they stand separated from one another by precisely the same *constant* interval which would separate them in an acrostic poem so constructed that two lines should be given to each successive letter; actual instances of similarly constructed and virtually unmutated poems are, as we have seen, Psalms xxv., xxxiv., cxlv., and Proverbs xxxi. 10-31. This single fact, when duly considered, appears to me to necessitate the conclusion that we have in this passage the result of fully conscious design, and in these lines, as in those that intervene, parts of an acrostic. Previous English presentations of this subject, so far as known to me, have not brought into sufficient relief the evidence of the influence on this passage of *both* laws of the acrostic—the occurrence of the letters of the alphabet in regular succession *at regular intervals*. That the occurrence of the six letters just referred to in alphabetical order at fixed intervals is due to mere accident or even to half-conscious design, appears to me in the highest degree improbable.

In the Hebrew text as it now stands the 11th and 17th lines do not begin with ך and ם respectively, as they should do if they formed part of an acrostic. Nor, again, does the 23rd line begin with ך, as it should do if the acrostic or the fragment thereof extended so far. Is there anything apart from the acrostic theory which suggests that at these points the Hebrew text is corrupt? Or failing that, can the acrostic theory be satisfied by simple and probable conjectural emendation? If this should be so, the evidence

of the uncorrected Hebrew text, in itself so strong as to be almost irresistible, receives some further support.

In the case of what should be the *daleth* verse (ll. 11, 12), but which in our present text begins with an *aleph*, the versions are certainly interesting and suggestive. In the two parallel lines (11, 12) the Hebrew text has the same verb (למלל); in *all* the early versions (LXX., Syr., Targ., Vulg.), the verbs in the two lines are different.¹ Thus the double occurrence of the same word in the two parallel lines is on grounds of textual criticism open to grave suspicion.² On the same grounds, however, it must be admitted that all these versions read למלל with initial *aleph* at the beginning of the former of the two lines,³ where the acrostic requires a word beginning with *daleth*. This is a fact which ought to be frankly faced and duly considered in deciding to what extent Nahum c. 1 preserves an acrostic poem. But it must be noted further that the verbs used by the LXX. and Syriac versions in the second line of the same parallel (l. 12 in the above translation) never occur elsewhere as translations of למלל, although in each of these versions several equivalents of למלל are found⁴ one of which might have been

¹ LXX., ὀλιγώθη . . ἐξέλιπεν; Syr., ܐܠܠܐ . . ܠܠܐ; Targ., ܠܠܐ . . ܠܠܐ; Vulg., "Infirmatus est . . elanguit." This cannot well be attributed to a mere desire for variation, for just below, in lines 17, 18, both Syr. and LXX. translate *different* Hebrew words by the same Greek (ὀργή) or Syriac (ܐܝܪܥܐ).

² I question whether the mere fact of the repetition of the same word in the second line could reasonably be regarded as suspicious. There are too many similar instances in our present Hebrew text for it to be safely assumed that a Hebrew poet never used the same verb in two parallel lines.

³ In each case the words, used by the versions in this place, occur elsewhere as translations of למלל: thus ὀλιγώθη in Joel i. 10, 12; ܐܠܠܐ in the Pesch. of Isaiah xxiv. 4, 7, Jeremiah xv. 9, Hosea iv. 3; ܠܠܐ (in the Targums as printed in Walton's Polyglot) in Isaiah xix. 8, xxiv. 4, Jeremiah xv. 9 (cf. 1 Sam. ii. 5; and the Pesch. use of ܠܠܐ in 1 Sam. ii. 5, Jer. xiv. 2, Lam. ii. 8); in-firmatus (or infirmus) est in the Vulgate of 1 Samuel ii. 5, Isaiah xxiv. 4 (*bis*), 7, Jeremiah xv. 9, Hosea iv. 3, Psalm vi. 3.

⁴ In addition to the words mentioned in the last note, the LXX. uses ἀσθενής

used had the translators merely desired variant renderings in the two lines of the same verb.

It is, therefore, improbable that **אמלל** stood in the Hebrew text of line 12 at the times when the LXX. and Syriac versions were made.¹ On the other hand there is reason for believing that the actual reading of the Hebrew text which lay before at least the Greek translators was **דלל** (*dālāl*). For (1) this verb is translated by the same Greek word that is found in line 12 in Isaiah xxxviii. 14, and probably also in Isaiah xix. 6; compare also Isaiah xvii. 4; (2) the two final letters of **דלל** are the same as of **אמלל**; this would have facilitated an accidental copying of the verb of the previous line. The chief question that remains is whether the verb **דלל** would be appropriate. Certainly there is no other instance of its being used of foliage, but in Isaiah xxxviii. 14 it is used of languishing eyes, in Isaiah xvii. 4 (Niphal) of the glory of Jacob, and in Post-Biblical Hebrew (Hiphil) of thinning out vines or olives.²

But beyond this not unimportant suggestion the versions do not help us. Already when they were made lines 11, 17, 23 began with other letters than those required by the acrostic. In line 23, however, the initial word is **וידע**; the acrostic is at once satisfied by the simple omission of **ו**, which leaves **ידע**. That **ו** was constantly added through

(or verb) Psalm vi. 3, Lamentations ii. 8, 1 Samuel ii. 5; *πενθεῖν* Isaiah xvi. 8, xix. 8, xxiv. 4, 7, xxxiii. 9 (?); *κενοῦσθαι* Jeremiah xiv. 2, xv. 9; *μικρύνεσθαι* Hosea iv. 3; and the Syriac uses **ܕܠܠ** 1 Samuel ii. 5, Jeremiah xiv. 2, Lamentations ii. 8 (cf. also the usage of **דלל** in the Targ.—see preceding note); **ܕܠܠ** Psalm vi. 3 and (Ethpeel of verb) Isaiah xix. 8; **ܕܠܠ** Joel i. 10, 12, Isaiah xvi. 8.

¹ It is less improbable that the Targ. and Vulg. read **אמלל** here as well as in the preceding line, though of course the difference in the translations still constitutes a considerable presumption against identity in the original. But both words used in Targ. and Vulg. also appear elsewhere as translations of **אמלל**. On **ידע** and *infirmatus est*, see preceding note; for **נתר** cf. Joel i. 10, 12, and for *elanguit* Joel i. 10, 12, Isaiah xxxiii. 9.

² See *Peah* iii. 3, vii. 5; *Shebi'ith* iv. 4.

dittography or overlooked before another ך or ך, with which latter letter it is frequently confused, becomes clear from a comparison of the LXX. and Hebrew texts. In assuming then that the ך at the beginning of line 23 is intrusive, we are simply assuming what we know for certain frequently happened in similar cases.

The recovery of the initial ך and ך require us to assume two¹ cases of transposition of words in the course of the transcription of the Hebrew text prior to the Greek translation. Once again no one questions that transpositions have taken place in the course of transcription. That the three initial letters wanting in the present text reappear by means of such comparatively simple emendations, thus giving us nine successive letters of the alphabet as initial letters at remarkably constant intervals turns a prior great probability into virtual certainty.

If then the case is made out that lines 7-24 are nine successive stanzas of an acrostic poem which has suffered in three cases at the beginning of lines, and at least three or four times elsewhere from transcriptional error, how much may we infer with regard to the rest of this poem, of which at least this considerable fragment has survived without serious mutilation? Is the rest of the poem to be found in the remainder of the passage? Has it also suffered merely from the chances and accidents of transcription? Or has it been in parts obliterated, in parts interpolated?

That it has received some interpolation no one will question. The prophetic formula, "Thus saith Yahwè"

¹ In lines 11, 12 we must assume that the verbs of the two lines became transposed and that the original Hebrew ran דלל בשן וכרמל ופרח לבנון אמלל. In line 17 the fourth word of the line (לפניו) became transposed (having lost its final letter) to the beginning; for the present text זעמו מי יעמר לפני read therefore לפני זעמו מי יעמר לפניו. The sense remains the same, but the Hebrew becomes more idiomatic; cf. Driver, *Tenses*, §§ 196f.

(v. 12), never formed part of an acrostic poem; and its presence can hardly help suggesting that the latter part of the poem, even if it survive in the main, has been to some extent recast by the inserter of these words. We have then to reckon with the probability of intentional as well as transcriptional changes in such parts of the poem as may be discovered after these words.

As it is the purpose of the present article to distinguish what is certain or very probable from details which are uncertain and only gain what varying degrees of probability they may severally possess in the light of that which is more certain, it will be sufficient from this point on to make brief notes on some of the more uncertain details and some of the questions which a careful study of Nahum i. 1-ii. 3 must necessarily raise.

(1) In the translation I have ventured to indicate the acrostic letters of the next three stanzas to those already discussed. Their restoration involves greater assumptions than did the restoration of the initial נ, י, and י'. But the emendation which gives the כ stanza (ll. 25, 26) seems to me very probable, and the transposition that places the ל stanza (ll. 27, 28) in its right place and gives us a first line of the כ stanza (l. 29) probable. The כ stanza immediately appears if we assume that a single word (יְצִילם = he delivers them) has dropped out after the words "with an overflowing flood." Not only so; the same emendation gives us two parallel lines of three words each instead of a single line of five words—a length which we have seen above in itself raises suspicion. The ל stanza and the first line of the כ stanza reappear on a mere rearrangement of lines. Lines 27, 28, 29 in the above translation stand in the Hebrew text in the order 29, 28, 27. On exegetical grounds the rearrangement appears to me an improvement, and thus far gains independent support.¹ But, of course,

¹ The translation adopted by Dr. G. A. Smith and Prof. Nowack of line 29,

the main reason for all the emendations referred to in this paragraph is the prior conclusion that the previous verses are parts of an acrostic.

(2) From the first line of the \mathfrak{D} stanza onwards the acrostic can only be restored by much more radical alterations, and any particular suggestion can be regarded as little more than a possibility. At the same time the general fact that at least parts of the remainder of the poem lie embedded in the following verses appears probable. It is just in this part of the passage that the text is frequently so corrupt as to be unintelligible. It is, for instance, difficult to believe that any one can seriously consider v. 10 in its present form to have been written by an intelligent Hebrew.¹ Of details, the most probable appears to me that the \mathfrak{D} stanza began with the סִירִים of v. 10. In v. 12 the sense almost requires us to omit the ו of וְעַתָּה, so that we may translate "I have afflicted thee, but will afflict thee no more"; עַתָּה might then be considered the commencement of the \mathfrak{Y} stanza. Transpositions and omissions can seldom be dismissed as impossible; for apart from any acrostic theory it is very difficult to believe that the sudden transitions from Judah to Nineveh (?) as the person addressed in i. 8-15 (Heb i. 8—ii. 1) is original. Prof. G. A. Smith, who never suffers himself to be controlled by the acrostic theory, nevertheless finds it necessary to "disentangle" i. 13, ii. 1-3, from the rest, and print these verses by themselves as an address to Judah. The same writer's question, "If this passage was originally alphabetic, that is, furnished with so fixed and easily recognised a

"What think ye of Yahwè?" is, to say the least, hazardous—more especially if with the former scholar we regard v. 11 as genuine. Partly on this ground, partly on others, I am not inclined to follow Prof. Nowack in transposing lines 8, 5, 4 so that they follow line 29, and form the answer to the question.

¹ "These [*read there*] are parts of Nahum i. (as vv. 10-12) in which the text is desperately corrupt" (Driver, *Expos. Times*, p. 119 footnote). Cf. also Davidson's notes on i. 10, 12, 15.

frame, why has it so fallen to pieces?" (p. 83) would be more to the point, if we had not the parallel case of a mutilated acrostic in Ps. ix., x. And again, why should Dr. Smith put such a question when he has admitted that a passage written in the easily recognisable "Qinah or elegiac measure" "has suffered sadly both by dilapidation and rebuilding" (p. 61 on Zeph. ii. 4-15)? The fact that particular suggestions are inconclusive does not render it impossible or even improbable that the alphabetic arrangement which extends to v. 9 extended further. It simply leaves the matter uncertain.

(3) The first line of the translation begins in the Hebrew, as it should do, with an *aleph*; it and the following line constituted the first stanza of the poem. But as the stanza must not exceed two lines, lines 3-6 cannot be original—at least in their present position. I have little doubt myself that Gunkel is right in regarding them as a gloss intended to limit explicitly the absolute assertion of the preceding lines.¹ It is worth noticing that line 5 is suspiciously long, consisting as it does of five words.

(4) Lines 1, 2 and 7-29 thus constitute the first 25 lines or the first $12\frac{1}{2}$ stanzas of an acrostic poem of 44 lines or 22 stanzas; some of the remaining 19 lines may survive mutilated and in disorder in chapters i. 10-ii. 3. The translation as given above (with the omission of ll. 3-6) in all probability approximates very closely to the sense and form of the first half of the original poem.

(5) Nahum i. 1-ii. 3 is at most only in part the work of the prophet Nahum. The main alternatives are these: (a) Nahum recast and in places expanded an existing acrostic poem. (b) Nahum composed an acrostic poem which has suffered much in transcription and has been in places

¹ "This is not obvious, and would hardly have been alleged apart from the needs of the alphabetic scheme" (G. A. Smith, p. 83). Perfectly true; but if the alphabetical scheme in parts be independently proved a reality, the view of v. 1 taken above, though not immediately obvious, becomes the most probable.

expanded by some subsequent editor. (c) Some fragments of Nahum (? part of i. 11, ii. 3) have been combined with parts of an acrostic poem. (d) An acrostic poem which, either before or after, suffered transcriptional corruption and interpolation has been incorporated in the book of Nahum by an editor, just as a short Psalm (Isa. xii.) was incorporated in a book of Isaiah, and a longer Psalm in the book of Habakkuk (c. iii.). Alternative (a) is very improbable; nor is (b) likely. But if either of these be adopted, this poem would be the earliest Hebrew acrostic of certain date, the next earliest being chapters i.-iv. of Lamentations.

(6) In view of the doubt that attaches to the chapter, evidence for the date of Nahum drawn from chapters ii. and iii. should be allowed to outweigh any counter evidence in chapter i. The effect of this is to strengthen the strong arguments which have induced recent writers¹ to assign the prophecy to the year 608 rather than *circa* 660 or 623.

The present article contains, I am well aware, comparatively few details that will be new to those who are acquainted with the German discussions to which I have referred, and to which I have throughout been greatly indebted, although I hope that my suggestion, based as it is on the evidence of the LXX., that the verb of the *daleth* stanza is דלל, rather than דצק (Bick.), or דנח (Gunkel, Nowack) may find acceptance. But I shall have achieved my purpose if I have succeeded in proving that it must henceforth be accepted as a fixed point for the criticism and interpretation of Nahum that the position of certain initial letters in the first chapter is not fortuitous, but the result of a fully conscious design; and, therefore, that this chapter contains at least considerable parts of an acrostic poem.

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¹ Davidson, *Nahum, Habakkuk, and Zephaniah*, pp. 13-18; G. A. Smith, *Book of the Twelve Prophets*, II. pp. 85-88. Cf. Driver, *Introduction*, p. 335f.

*SACRAMENTALISM THE TRUE REMEDY FOR
SACERDOTALISM.*

I.

IF it were asked how non-sacerdotalists regard the Communion rite, the first answer of many, if not most, would tend to replace the word Communion altogether by the term Commemoration, just as for the word Baptism many would substitute a term like Dedication. The result in each case is to avoid magical interpretation by emptying the rite of all mystic value; and the protest against superstition is effected by parting with all spiritual intimacy and profundity not realisable by the plain good man in the street. To some, indeed, a Sacrament is no more than an object lesson or spectacle, exhibiting certain truths in a condensed form, and clothing them with more or less impressiveness—and mostly less.

Let us come to closer quarters with our facts and truths, and assay what gold there is in this white stone ruddy-veined which we have inherited with our spiritual estate.

Let it be first observed that the Communion is an *act*. It is not simply a feeling nor a contemplation. So far it may be described as an *opus operatum*. "Do this," is the word, not, "consider this." The Saviour in that hour certainly did not think of Himself æsthetically, as an object of contemplation. Nor is it simply "remember Me." The reminiscence is subordinated to the act enjoined. It is more than a reminiscence; it is at least a reminiscent act. The very variations in the form of instituting words only direct attention on the centre of the occasion as an act. Something is done. It is the worship of bowed wills even more than of changed hearts. And its expression is less the streaming eye of emotion than the bent head of obedience and obeisance.

Moreover, it is an act of the Church more than of the individual. It was not to a group of individuals that the command was given, but to a body already implicitly organised into a unity by the life and purpose standing in their midst. They were not united to each other except in so far as each was united to Him. What was done was not the act of so many units in combination. It was the act first of Christ, and then of a living community capable by a common soul of a unitary act. These disciples, forming the first Church, were not a faggot, but a tree; not a basket of summer fruit, but a cluster on the true vine.

Further, it is a *responsive* act, not merely reminiscent but reverberant. Its quality is fixed by the act it answers. It is a response in kind to the central, unique, eternal act which makes the Church, viz., the death of Christ, as something once done and ever doing. Its nature is not met by sitting round a table or kneeling at the altar, partaking of the elements, and calling the history before our moved minds. That might commemorate the Last Supper, but it would not re-echo, it would not show forth, the Lord's death. The true response to such an act must be another act more after its own kind. A history may be commemorated by a feast, but it is really followed up by acts done in its own nature. The Last Supper itself stood for something else; and it is that something else which has its own note returned in the Communion rite.

The Communion, then, is more than either contemplation or commemoration. "Do this" makes it an act and not a meditation. It gives a moral value to its spiritual quality. "In remembrance of Me" seems indeed to stamp a mere commemoration-sense upon the rite—till the longer word in the phrase shrink to its true place for us behind the mightier and the less. "In remembrance of ME." Everything about the remembrance turns on the Personality to be recalled, and the action in which that whole Personality

took complete effect. "*Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit Sacramentum.*" But the word is really Christ, and Christ as God's organ of grace and redemption—Christ in His eternal redeeming act of the Cross. The precept therefore sounds, Do this in remembrance of Him who first did this, who gave Himself to begin with (for God asks no sacrifice which He cannot inspire and has not outdone), and who put His whole self into this act and gift. Do it remembering Him who is with you always; always, therefore, doing this, giving Himself in an eternal act which utters His whole self, ever crucified, ever broken, ever poured, ever rising, ever gathering, by His Spirit and Kingdom, all things into the immortal, infrangible unity of His own infinite Person. Do this, therefore (we are carried on), in remembrance of Him who, continuous in our repeated act, offers Himself to both Church and world as its broken Redeemer, ever living, ever acting Himself out, ever renewing in time the indelible nature of His eternal, crucial act, because ever present and prolonged in this responsive act of ours which His work stirred and inspires. If the Communion is inspired by the continuous Cross, it must be an energy, a function, of that Cross. And as the Cross means the Crucified, it is a function, not merely a memory, of the Lamb slain. There is an act of the Lord Himself in our Communion—not merely a visitation, a presence, but an act. The Cross is not merely remembered, but re-enacted. Not indeed in any sense in which the sacrifice is offered afresh to God. That is one of the many ways that lead to Rome. But the sacrifice, offered once for all, functions afresh (if I must use a disagreeable phrase). It presents itself afresh. It writes itself large in the history of the Eucharist. Christ presents Himself as the crucified, intuitively on Calvary, discursively in the Sacrament. But He presents Himself in the latter less to God than to man. Not to God, for the sacrifice once in time offered to the

Eternal was eternally offered, and once for all and for ever so far as Christ's action was concerned ; nor *for* man, which is the precious finished thing in the fontal act ; but *to* man, which is the nature of its repeated manifestations through the historic Church and *its* action. We must recognise more than a real presence of Christ in the Sacrament, namely, a real act. If He is there (and we believe He is there), He is not inert. He can never be inert where His Cross takes effect. *He* is in action, His death is in action, and not a mere influence from Him. He in His death is acting through His Church upon men. His determining¹ action upon God was not, and is not, through His Church ; but His action on men is. And in a central spiritual act like Communion He is especially acting so. It is a great practical evangelical sermon, practical in the great sense (so desirable in more sermons) of *being* a real act, and not simply leading to acts. In Communion it is not simply that we offer ourselves through the Eternal Spirit to God in grateful response to the offering of Christ, but Christ actually and historically offers Himself as crucified to us and to the world. If the world to-day can crucify Him afresh, surely He can offer Himself afresh in the midst of it. He does so in the continuity of His body, the Church.

There is a deep distinction between this and other acts of worship like prayer or praise. In these we chiefly go to God, but in Communion God chiefly comes to us, and speaks to us and through us. In Communion there is more that is akin to preaching than there is in prayer. It is the *enacted* word of the Gospel. Christ in our act, (which is His more than ours,) offers Himself, offers His great offering, to the Church and to the world. The very commemoration of a Christ *who is our life* is worlds more than

¹ It will be pointed out later that in the Sacrament there is an offering of Christ to God by the Church, and so an action upon God in a guarded sense.

commemoration. It must be an act in the completed life of such a Christ Himself. And if so, it is in some sense the action of His death. For His own remembrance of His death must be, to Him whose thoughts are acts, in some sense a re-enacting of His death. And not the less so because it may take place in our communal experience, however inadequately conscious we may be individually of all we do.

At any rate, to realise our Christ as also our life, in any form of Christianity which holds to Sacraments at all, is fatal to the bare, hard, Swiss, burgher Zwinglianism,¹ the soul-sterilising, and Church-destroying memorialism which starves and palters with the rite without the courage either of taking it in earnest or of letting it go. Such paltering is mere ritualism. It clings to a rite which has become little more than a rite, and is slowly ceasing to be either a pledge, a seal, or a power. It has neither the mystic depths of Luther nor the real insight of Calvin. It is simplicity of the wrong and thin order, like Theism, dwarfed to meet the individual, pietist or rationalist, instead of rich to meet a Church, or full to fit a Revelation of grace. It is salvation debased to common sense, faith dropped to the bathos of the plain man, piety desiccated and blanched by mere polemical intelligence and attenuated by excessive protest. And it lowers the whole pitch of piety and worship in any community where it becomes the key-note. It prepares the ground for the priest by stirring a need of the soul which the priest at least recognises and attempts to fill. And so it makes sacerdotalists by the soulless vigour and rigour of its protest against Sacerdotalism. It is not possible for any Church which has its experienced life in Christ crucified to go on thus teaching the Sacrament as a mere souvenir. A mere commemorative Sacrament is but the relic of a dead Christ, and the badge of a dying Church.

The tendency to make little of this act is one which

¹ More Zwinglian than Zwingli.

exists even among many whose piety is unquestioned, but it is usually associated with but slight regard for the Christian life as life in a Church. Some, who are drawn to Christianity chiefly by its ethical and philanthropic side, tend to reduce the practical act of Communion to somewhat low dimensions in order to enhance the superior sacrament of Christian conduct, and to express its independence of specific forms of worship. But this tendency is after all only one aspect of the alarming baldness and poverty which have overspread much of our services, taking the rapt soul out of our prayers, and the warm worship out of our praise. And it is in great measure the cause of this declension. It is because our associations with Communion are neither solemn nor rich enough that our other worship has been so often flat and poor, our services casual, familiar, or humdrum. And in the efforts we do make to purify and enhance Communion we have sometimes gone the wrong way to work. We have tried to secure purity by testing the communicants, and the purity we get is neither complete, nor is it imposing. We have sifted the participants instead of subliming the rite and Presence. Give it its true value, its most solemn interpretation, hedge it with no fictitious rigour of precaution, but transfigure it with a real solemnity of meaning, and it will become a self-acting test. It will exert its native affinities, and do its own spiritual selection. And its own severe glory will warn off the unconsecrate in heart and soul, as from the death-dawn in the face of Christ the soldiers fell back who would have lifted up on Him unholy hands.

Again, something like a true Sacramentalism as distinct from a pious reminiscence might help to cure that Sentimentalism which is so ineffective in the humaner developments of Christianity. The worst weakness of Liberal Christianity is not that it is negative or destructive, for it is neither ; nor that it is untrue, for it exists by the Spirit

to release the truth and undo the falsehoods of the past. It is the instinct of self-preservation in Christianity, and the habit of self-examination, which is a grace of the Spirit. But one of its great weaknesses is that it is, in so many of its more popular advocates, sentimental, feminine, and subjective. A more masculine and commanding faith would follow an increased emphasis upon the objective side of the Sacrament. *For mere commemoration must always be subjective and individualist in the main.* The reminiscence by the worshipping subject will always be more prominent than the object itself, which is not real because not present but only fetched from the ghostly past by the affection of the hour. In a true Sacrament we have an act rather than a sentiment, and an objective presence more real than any subjective state of ours.

It may be objected that what closes the door to Sentimentalism opens it to Sacerdotalism. To which the reply is, only if a magical instead of an ethically-spiritual transaction is believed to take place; only if we lose the evangelical view of the Cross as the active ethical centre, and Redemption as the permanent ethical principle of the race, and its moral soul. The safeguard against priestism is not the attenuation of the Sacraments but their true interpretation. Our error often is to starve the idea till it lose its strange power over a whole side of the human soul, and so we drive to the priest all who need food for the spiritual imagination and are fascinated by the saddest solemnities, the most hushed pieties, and the darkest beauties of the cross and its unearthly strain.

To venture a little way into explanation, we have three pairs of terms :—

- (1) The body of Christ, and the material world.
- (2) The Act of Christ in His death, and the act of the human will in Christian devotion.
- (3) The person of Christ, and the person of the Christian.

The truth in the Sacrament consists in the true relation among these terms.

(1) Taking the first pair, the body of Christ and the material world (bread and wine). It is here that the magical theory chiefly operates. So long as men attempt to set up in the Sacrament a real relation between this pair of terms it must issue in magic with the priest for the wizard. *Hoc est corpus*, becomes *hocus-pocus*. What we must say is, that with our possible knowledge we can set up no relation between these terms. About the body of Christ in this sense we know nothing. A local and spacial heaven is a representation now valuable chiefly for pædagogic purposes. That on the one hand. And on the other, we know too little about the ultimate constitution of matter. We have no knowledge which will enable us to bring a heavenly body of Christ and the material world into valid relation, or to give Transubstantiation any meaning for thought. Calvin even, who was the truest of all the Reformers on the Sacrament, seems, in his views, to have suffered much from the local and material theories of his time about the future state and the world unseen. Even he took the body of Christ and its ubiquity too literally. And it was largely due to the error, popular then as now, which understands by Spirit only highly rarefied substance and by a Spirit a ghost.

(2) Taking the second pair of terms—the sacrificial act of Christ and the sacrificial act of Christian men. The Catholic theory here is that the human act in the Sacrament (the priest's act in the Mass), is a *duplicate* of Christ's act upon the cross; especially in this, that it is a sacrifice offered to God by man rather than a sacrifice proffered to man by God. I do not say that the Catholics would admit the statement baldly made, but I mean that their doctrine amounts to this in effect (particularly with their view of the Church as Christ Himself in a permanent incarna-

tion). And I refer to the distinction between an act which simply repeats another, and one which is a constituent part and organic factor of that other, extending and actualising it. In Catholicism the two terms of the relation have an excessive and fatal independence of each other. The Mass repeats the Cross. The act of the priest has a direct action and effect in the invisible world (as when Masses release a soul from purgatory)—a directness at least so great as to compromise the mediation of Christ and aggrandise the officiating priesthood. The Protestant theory on the contrary relates the two terms in no such parallel and irreverent way. It relates them as the body is related to its members, not by way of repetition but by way of functional contribution. The human act is to Christ's act as a living cell is to the living organism. Our act of sacrifice is a vital factor, infinitesimal in its own value, but infinite in its worth as organised into that eternal life of sacrifice which is the redemptive spirit of the world. And our devotion, whether in rite or conduct, is an ethical thing, a part of our moral and spiritual constitution in Jesus Christ. It is through Christ as our Mediator—as Mediator of Universal Humanity, not as any mere individual intermediary—it is through Him (meaning *in* Him), and not directly as individuals, that we pray and act into the unseen. It is through Him that our human cross with its devotions and renunciations has any action upon the world of spirit. It is the completeness of His Sacrifice that at once requires ours and gives ours validity. He only is the one priest, and it is the Son of Man's sole and sufficient priesthood that requires that we should be priests to be men. Just as because He lives we live also. It is one of the functions which go to constitute His life, and are by that life made possible. If Christ be not our life, but only our teacher, our example, or even our ideal, then it is but metaphorical to hold speech of this sort.

In no real sense is our act His act. Nor do we in our cross reproduce an Eternal Cross from within, but only imitate from without and afar a historic martyr. Our act in that case has but an external and accidental connexion with His—a historic connexion, if you will, but not any connexion organic, or, in a real sense, spiritual. In the *real* sense it is not spiritual. It may proceed from a spiritual temper and affection, but not consciously from the ultimate spiritual ground. For religion it may be spiritual, for the deeper considerations of positive faith it is not. But if Christ be our life then our act is His act, our life as practical is one with His as practical. And we are not only at one, but we are one. We not only commemorate His act, or even imitate it, but we *do His works*. And so strong an expression is only justifiable on the ground that it is not we who live, but Christ that liveth in us.

(3) This brings us to the third pair of terms, and to the relation between the person of Christ and the person of the Christian.

It is in this region that the real union and transubstantiation takes place. The body of Christ really and finally means the person of Christ. Bread and wine are symbols of the flesh and blood in which matter is raised to an organism. But flesh and blood are themselves but symbols of an organism higher still, the organised personality, the Spirit. "They two shall be one flesh," means one spiritual personality, slaying the spirit of individualism. And we are reminded of the saying that in Christ is neither male nor female, because He is both, because He is the universal personality in whom all individuals are saved, and gain their individuality by losing their individualism. That is to say, in simpler words but more enigmatical phrase, they gain their souls by losing them.

The essence of the Christian life is personal union with the person of Christ. There are Christians who suspect

such phrases as these of mysticism, who dislike mysticism, and who accordingly explain the phrases away, or simply ignore them. But they will not be ignored. And fortunately the sole alternative is not mysticism. If common sense, with its rough methods, thinks not of union but merely of attachment, the mystic is apt to err in the other direction, and think not really of union but of fusion, which is a very different and more dangerous thing. The mystic is often a pantheist without knowing it; he loses his self without finding it, and merges in the general soul. His piety loses both measure, modesty, and virility. The word of the cross, however, is Reconciliation, and its end is a Union which subsists upon the ethical conditions of fixed personality, and upon an intimacy of communion and being far profounder than is possible by any crude ideas of mystic fusion or personal erasure. "Christ liveth in me" may be the word of the Christian mystic. But the word of the Christian saint and apostle of Reconciliation is, "*I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.*" The life of Christ is the ground of the Christian life, not its substitute, nor its mere material. This phrase of Paul's is the key-note of the Christian's experience. The real objective ground in true Christian life is the person of Christ. This is the Real Presence, substantial but not corporal, spiritual but truly objective. We have a communion not of act only, nor of work, but of life and being; and Redemption and Faith are, so to speak, but the two poles in one completed spiritual sphere.

The person of Christ is our true objective. But the key to the person of Christ is in the cross; for the cross is the principle of God's Revelation, no less than of our Redemption. The cross is the bond of all bonds, the unity of all unities. It consummates the internal unity of God. It consummates the internal unity of man. It consummates the unity between God and man. The grand bond be-

tween person and person, heart and heart, is the cross with its renunciation, its sorrow, its holy, atoning power. Just as between husband and wife, for example, no common joy deepens the bond like the loss of a child, or the danger of losing each other. The key to the depths of our personal union with Christ is the cross and the fellowship of His death.

Hence the rite of the cross has a special and unique significance in Christian culture, in the working out of the union set before us.

But is there a special presence of Christ in this rite? The expression, special presence, like special providence, is if not self-contradictory, at least unhappy. It is always the same unchanging Christ, who never leaves us nor forsakes us. It is the same Christ in our prostrate worship as in the minor awe of our reflection, and in the sobriety of our walk and conversation. But to the question so put it is more true to answer yes than no. It seems at least a different presence—the same Christ in a different presence. Perhaps a better expression would be the more immediate presence. But is Christ more immediately present in this rite than in the depths of our solitary communion with Him? Yes, the whole, the divinest Christ, is—the Redeemer of the world and not of our single soul. The speciality of the presence in the Sacrament is the *community* of so near a *Redeemer*. It is the universal Saviour, the common Christ, that we worshipfully realise, not the individual's. And Communion differs from other acts of common worship in this—in the solemn immediacy of His common presence as Redeemer. He is as immediate as in private worship, and as universal as in public. Hence the Sacrament is the blessed mean and meeting-point of public and private prayer. In private worship we are apt to be self-engrossed. In public we are too dependent on the leader of the devotion, or the preacher who strives to kindle the

common flame. In the Communion (especially if it be to any extent liturgical), the leader sinks away, becomes but the voice, becomes the echo of a voice, whose echoes have been multiplied in every age, the channel (although the living channel) of the voice of Jesus walking in calm light upon the world's wild waves, "Come unto Me." As a community we are then in the immediate presence of the Universal Redeemer, the real presence, as Calvin says, and yet not the local presence, as Zwingle truly against Luther declares. And the elements, while they are *signa*, are no more *nuda signa*, or bare suggestions, but *signa mystica*, not indeed changed into what they signify, but lost and irradiated in a halo or corona of spirit, visible only to the eye assisted by faith.

But if this be so, then the true doctrine of the real and immediate presence of Christ in the Sacrament, so far from opening the door to priestism, is of all doctrines that which makes priestism impossible. For it is there we realise most the immediate universality of Christ in the Church as Saviour. We have each our equal ground in His sufficiency, and because He is complete we are, each one of us, alike indispensable. We realise there especially the unity of men in His Redemption, His immediacy to each soul in the common presence, and the consequent impossibility of a privileged Sacerdotal caste with a magical prerogative or a historic commission to mediate between Him and us.

Finally, we shall thus preserve the real and powerful objectivity which is the truth whereon priestly superstition builds; we shall give our doctrine that air of positive actuality which meets a realistic age; and, on the other hand, we shall exert more influence than we have done upon the beautiful night-side of the spirit, we shall feed the starving spiritual imagination, and stir the trembling praise from the shadiest coverts of the wounded soul.

P. T. FORSYTH.

(To be continued.)

THE NAME OF NAMES.

A CRITICISM.

ALL that Dr. Watson puts to paper is written with such gracefulness as well as force as may like enough disarm criticism. Perhaps, however, room may be found in the *EXPOSITOR* for a friendly protest by one of his admirers against some of the statements and conclusions made and drawn in his article of February last on the "Name of Names."

An examination of this paper shows the emphasis laid by the writer on four main points.

(i.) The view stated that there is now a current feeling against the free and frank employment of the personal name of our Lord in any address to Him.

(ii.) Secondly, that those who share this feeling against "the unguarded use" of the name Jesus assume, at least in certain quarters of religious thought, "that the person who calls the Master Jesus too constantly may fairly be suspected of false doctrine."

(iii.) Thirdly, that the phraseology of the Gospel narrative offers a vindication and a plea "for this birthright of the Christian," viz., the use of the name Jesus "with perfect freedom."

(iv.) That the protection and "adornment" of the Name of Names by other titles in the Pauline Epistles, is (so I understand Dr. Watson) an unsafe guide for Christians only because the Apostle found the "unadorned Name" not pronounced enough for arguments and creeds, for Apologetic and Dogmatic.

We deal with these issues in their order.

I am at one with Dr. Watson in his observation of a habit of reserve in regard to the use of the name Jesus. It is widespread, in this and that instance it may enwrap an

individual Christian too closely. So much may frankly be conceded. Dr. Watson wholly condemns and deplotes this reserve. Has he however truly traced its cause and origin? He appears to think that those to whom this habit is second nature are for ever on the look out for the modern Arian, and anxious to enter into the lists with those who as venturing to speak of the Lord as Jesus "derogate from His divine honour." There is no need for controversy here—it has no place. To adopt or to refrain from a custom in an issue which is not so vital as Dr. Watson's eloquent words might lead readers to suppose, implies no violent antagonism with others whose use is different. But those to whom the habit of reserve appears comely as well as reasonable are entitled, and may be expected to show to what they owe it. It is simply to a feeling of reverence. One does not declare that a great deal of Roman Catholic devotional literature, or many of our hymns, have necessarily an Arian tendency, because a sober-minded judgment will often find in the passionate repetition of the single name Jesus a hindrance rather than a help to the worship. It is indeed noteworthy that this frequent and fervent address to our Lord as Jesus attaches itself, as a characteristic note, to those who differ widely on certain features of the Christian faith. It is at once mediæval and intensely modern. As the monk flings himself at the foot of his crucifix, this is the only name by which he will address God in prayer. As the Salvation Army "Captain" pours forth his ecstatic utterances, one might listen in vain for any idea of the Fatherhood of God, while allusions to the person and office of the Holy Spirit would certainly be faint and precarious. This constant use of the Name of Names has thus the danger besetting it not only of a possible irreverence, but also of a probable disturbance of the balance of the Christian faith. The tendency of much of the preaching of to-day, reflected as it is in extempore

prayers and many of our most popular hymns, would lead many a worshipper to the conclusion that Christian people could dispense with any reference to the First and Third Persons of the Trinity. This may for the moment seem to make the teaching of Christianity easier to embrace, but at what a cost of the proportion and fulness of its truths!

If however the issue were merely a matter of sentiment, its discussion would be hardly suitable in the pages of the EXPOSITOR. But the invitation to follow the record of the Gospel narrative in order to discover which of the two is the better way in which we may use the "Name of Names" is a welcome one to students of the New Testament. Shall we be nearer the example of Evangelist and Apostle by freest use of the name Jesus, or by a somewhat guarded use of the single Name, preferring others which mark His sovereignty, His Messianic dignity, His Divine sonship, His act of redemption, or adding these titles to the solitary personal name? This opens up an enquiry as interesting as it is suggestive. The point, be it remembered, is not how our Lord is spoken of by the narrators of His earthly life, nor how He calls Himself, but how His disciples should speak of Him and address Him. There is no doubt that the Evangelists do exhibit a preference for the "simple and unadorned" Name. There is also no manner of doubt that the Apostolic writers show an equally marked preference for adding titles to the simple name; the unadorned Name with them "passes into a more stately form." Thus Jesus is joined with Lord twenty-two times in the usage of these writers; with Lord and Christ thirty-three times; with Christ fifty times. Again as alternative titles Christ is used singly ninety-seven times; Son of God, fifteen times; Lord, eight times; Saviour, nineteen times. The difference of usage is a remarkable one between the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament. Dr. Watson accounts for the change by saying that the Gospels repre-

sent "the feeling of the first period, of faith without controversy, of religion before theology."

Is not the difference much more simply accounted for by a close observance of the capital literary distinctions between the Gospels and the rest of the canon of the New Testament? The former are biographical in subject; the latter, with the exceptions of the Acts and the Apocalypse, epistolary in character and purpose. The standpoint of the writers sufficiently explains the striking variance in the employment of the Name of Names. In the early material out of which the Gospels were constructed, whether such material were oral or written, the solitary name Jesus would be used. The simplicity of the facts stated answers to the simplicity of the personal title. But as soon as ever Apostolic writers speak or preach or pray or plead in the Name of Jesus then it appears (with exceptions so rare as almost to be ignored) together with such titles as a deep reverence would suggest, or an alternative title is used that all might know the majesty of Him whose bond-servants they were. This change of use was clearly deliberate and advised. If the matter stood merely thus that the Evangelists use the single Name while St. Paul adopts more stately forms, then something might be said for the inference that the former "was not pronounced enough for arguments and creeds, for Apologetic and Dogmatic." The issue does not however rest on such a comparison alone. It is now generally conceded that St. Luke is the author of the Acts of the Apostles; it is certain that the writer of the Fourth Gospel also indited the three letters which bear his name. It is very interesting to observe that as the standpoint and attitude of each of these two vary, so does their employment of the Name of Names. Writing as Evangelists, as biographers, they mainly, though not exclusively, use the historic personal Jesus. But when St. Luke appears as the historian of the origins of the Church, as

the honest chronicler of the apology of the Protomartyr, of the speeches of St. Peter and St. Paul, then the change, with rarest exception,¹ is made into fuller or alternative titles.

St. John's writings provide us with still more convincing evidence upon the point. A distance in time of not more than ten years may separate the composition of the Fourth Gospel and the first of his three Epistles. As a narrator of the words and life of His Master he employs with a remarkable uniformity the single Name. In his three letters, when he is making impassioned pleas for Light and Life, for Truth and Love, the name Jesus never stands alone.² In a word, when New Testament writers are simple narrators, they normally use the name Jesus; when they preach or teach, when they are engaged in actions of intercession, of prayer, of praise, when they plead His cause before friend or foe, with a Church or individual, they have precisely that reserve and hesitancy about its single employment which characterise thousands of the not least devout of the Master's disciples to-day.

The employment of the personal name in a biographical narrative appears natural, inevitable. It is however highly pertinent to observe that in the Gospels our Lord is never once addressed by the single name Jesus. The feeling of reverence which prompted His own to forbear to address Him so, appears to have been shared in a measure by His foes. Even they, it seems, could not make so free with Him. We know how His disciples spoke of Him, and to Him, not merely by a collection and comparison of the converse between themselves and Him, or with themselves about Him, but from His own immediate and direct indication as to their general usage.

Ῥμεις φωνειτε με Ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ Ὁ κύριος, καὶ καλῶς

¹ One occurs in Acts i. 11, but the words are those of angelic beings.

² 1 St. John iv. 15 is not really an exception.

λέγετε, εἰμὶ γάρ.¹ He notes with commendation the honour which they paid to Him, and at once draws a lesson of their duty therefrom. Of the titles here quoted the former marks sometimes a free, at others a partial, concession of our Lord's position and authority as a Teacher. He was, at least to those who appealed to Him, a Rabbi.² Hence this title, which is found about fifty times in the Gospels, occurs chiefly in passages where our Lord's teaching function is in question, or appealed to. If He were to be addressed in respectful terms, this one of Teacher would be natural and would not greatly compromise the secret foes who used it. It is not so, however, with the title Lord, for although, as in some of the parables, it is applied to men, it is one of unquestioned dignity, it would be a compromising title; hence though it is found some two hundred times in the Gospel narrative it rarely passes the lips of a foe. It is the usual mode of address by the inner circle of Christ's own followers, it passes the lips of all those who felt themselves open to the hospital of His divine pity. This is the way in which in His absence the Apostolic college refers to its Head. They love thus to admit His supremacy, to acknowledge His ownership. Of other modes of address which respect or reverence to Him suggested, two may be briefly referred to. Son of David is found eleven times in the Synoptic Gospels, and Master³ six times, but only in the Gospel according to St. Luke. The detection, therefore, of what Dr. Watson describes as "a vague dislike" to the use of the name of Jesus in referring to Him, or in speaking to Him, is a very simple matter when recourse is had to the evangelical record. It is there not indeed vague, but strongly in evidence. The very aspect and bearing, the

¹ St. John xiii. 13.

² St. John i. 38; cf. xx. 16.

³ The confusion in the A.V. between the titles *Kypios* and *Ἐπιστάτης* is regrettable.

look and the speech of Him who was and is Vere Deus forbade the employment to Him or in regard to Him of the single Name.

This rough survey of the evidence of the New Testament would seem therefore to lead to a conclusion quite opposite to that which Dr. Watson's eloquence suggests.

In the present day may be read with pleasure and profit not a few Lives of Christ. Writers of such lives will be seen to follow unconsciously the practice of the Evangelists in speaking of our Lord as Jesus, as they follow the passage of His blessed feet in the Holy Land. But it may be held for certain that such writers, if heard in the pulpit, or overheard in the intimacies of Christian friendship, would as unconsciously adorn and protect the single Name with other titles. The Name which was so called by the angel before He was conceived in the womb,¹ the Name which is above every other, must needs have a dignity so awful about it, that its less familiar employment is no unreasonable result. If here and there a passionate discipleship to Christ claims and exercises a complete liberty in the matter, such freedom to speak so is not to be denied. It is always perilous to discourage enthusiasm whether it is exhibited in word or in deed, yet those who use the Name of Names with a lowly caution and tender reserve are not far from the example of those who were His nearest and dearest in His earthly life, —of those who first published abroad His Gospel, and lived, strove, and died for His Name's sake.

B. WHITEFOORD.

¹ S. Luke ii. 21.

THE GENESIS OF DEUTERONOMY.

THE Book of Deuteronomy occupies a position of singular importance in the criticism of the Old Testament inasmuch as upon one's conclusions concerning its date depend largely his views concerning the origin of the Pentateuch, indeed the whole course of Israel's religion and history. The Book of Deuteronomy in fact is the real basis of Pentateuchal criticism—the true starting-point of the new theory of reconstruction. This was the opinion of Graf,¹ who in order to show the late origin of the Priestly Laws in Exodus-Numbers says, "We must have a definite standpoint from which we can look with steady eye both forwards and backwards. This definite standpoint is the time of the appearance of Deuteronomy." Dillmann² declares that "Deuteronomy must be the starting-point, partly because its character and date are most certainly determined, partly because the decision of the other codes really depends upon their relation to Deuteronomy." Wellhausen³ also allows that "Deuteronomy is the starting-point not in the sense that without it nothing could be done, but in the sense only that being established on historical grounds, it requires the Priester-codex, also on historical grounds, to be placed after it." The same view is shared by others. Thus Kittel⁴ regards Deuteronomy "as the fixed point from which we can work both backwards and forwards";

¹ *Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments*, 1866, p. 4.

² *Die Bücher Numeri, Deuteronomium und Josua*, 2. Aufl., 1886, p. 599.

³ *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 4. Ausg., 1895, p. 14.

⁴ *A History of the Hebrews*, translated by Taylor, vol. i., 1895, p. 48.

Westphal,¹ as "the Ariadne's thread" in the historical problem of the Pentateuch; Cornill,² as the one "fixed point" in determining the dates of the different documents; Addis,³ as "the fixed point from which all other points in the chronology of the Hexateuch must be determined"; Buhl,⁴ as the firm "basis of operation"; and similarly, Klostermann⁵ and others.

The history of the criticism of Deuteronomy is brief. In 1805 De Wette⁶ argued for the first time on internal grounds that the kernel of Deuteronomy was written in the reign of Josiah, king of Judah. A half-century after, Riehm⁷ practically set at rest the question of Deuteronomy's separate existence. Twenty-two years later, Graf⁸ fixed the late date of its publication, viz., the eighteenth year of King Josiah. Since Graf there has been a remarkable unanimity of opinion among Old Testament scholars in favour of its 7th century origin, some assigning its composition to the reign of Manasseh,⁹ others to the early years of Josiah,¹⁰ but both agreeing that the date of its publication is the eighteenth year of King Josiah (621 B.C.).

Graf¹¹ pronounced (in 1866) this one of the most universally recognised conclusions of historical criticism con-

¹ *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, ii., Le Problème Historique, 1892, p. xxiv.

² *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 2. Aufl., 1892, p. 31.

³ *The Documents of the Hexateuch*, Part I., 1893, p. lxxiv.

⁴ *Ueber die bleibende Bedeutung des Alten Testaments*, 1896.

⁵ *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1892, p. 421. Cf. De Wette, *Beiträge*, i., 1806, p. 167 f.; *Studien und Kritiken*, 1837, p. 953; Kleinert, *Das Deuteronomium und der Deuteronomiker*, 1872, p. 3.

⁶ *Dissertatio qua Deut. a prioribus Pentateuchi libris diversum alius cujusdam recentioris auctoris opus esse monstratur*, Jena, 1805.

⁷ *Die Gesetzgebung Mosis im Lande Moab*, 1854.

⁸ *Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments*, 1866.

⁹ Time of Manasseh: Ewald, Riehm (earlier, in 1854), Bleek, W. R. Smith, Kittel, Valetton, Kautzsch, Byle, Montet, Wildeboer, Driver, and others.

¹⁰ Early years of Josiah: De Wette, George, von Bohlen, Langerke, Knobel, Graf, Schrader, Reuss, Kayser, Kuenen, Dillmann, Cheyne, Wellhausen, Stade, Cornill, Montefiore, Baudissien, Holzinger, and others.

¹¹ *Ut supra*, pp. 1, 2.

cerning which scholars are of one mind. Writing a year later, Rosenberg,¹ remarks, "That Deuteronomy was composed in Josiah's time is almost an axiom already in the theological world." More recently Carpenter² asserts, "The Book of Deuteronomy can be assigned with practical certainty to a given date"; adding, "it thus provides in a peculiar manner the key to the criticism of the whole Pentateuch." Steuernagel³ opens his study of Deuteronomy's origin and growth with the claim that "it is one of the surest results of the new critical investigation that the law-book of Moses which lay at the basis of Josiah's reformation of religion is closely allied to our Deuteronomy, though not identical with it." Bacon⁴ further alleges that "Deuteronomy as an attempt to formulate the *Torah* of Moses, as then understood, at a period not long previous to 620, has, since De Wette, acquired the force of an axiom among critics." While Wellhausen⁵ more recently maintains that "concerning the origin of Deuteronomy there exists still but little doubt."

There does exist, however, considerable doubt still, we believe, as to whether the new view is the correct one. For not only is the *ordinary* opinion still in favour of an early date, as Andrew Harper⁶ allows, but also in the opinion of many *specialists* it is doubtful whether, all things considered, the 7th century really accounts best for its origin. One may even speak with considerable justification of the *discontent of criticism* concerning it. Klostermann,⁷ for example, complains that the age and place of Deuteronomy should be more carefully investigated before definite

¹ *Die Mosaische Echtheit der Königs-Urkunde in Deut. 17. 14-20*, 1867, p. 5.

² *The Modern Review*, iv., 1883, art. "The Book of Deuteronomy," p. 253.

³ *Der Rahmen des Deuteronomiums*, 1894, p. 1.

⁴ *The Genesis of Genesis*, 1892, p. 46.

⁵ *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 4. Ausg., 1895, p. 9.

⁶ *The Book of Deuteronomy (Expositor's Bible)*, 1895, p. 4.

⁷ "Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Pents.," in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1892.

conclusions are drawn. Hommel¹ boldly declares that "it has yet to be proved that we have any right to assume that Deuteronomy first came into existence at the time in which it was discovered, *i.e.* in the latter half of the 7th century B.C., or, in other words, some 650 years after the death of Moses." While Vos² ventures to demand criticism to establish "that the Code does not fit into the historical situation by which, according to its own testimony, it was called forth."

Others, opposed to the Wellhausen view, date it either earlier or later than the seventh century. Thus, certain writers³ assign it to the reign of Hezekiah in order to account for the reformation ascribed to him in 2 Kings 18. 4f. König⁴ places it shortly after 722 B.C.; Delitzsch,⁵ just anterior to Isaiah; Schlatter,⁶ in the time of Jehoshaphat; Vater, in the time of David and Solomon; Kleinert,⁷ in the time of Samuel; Stähelin, in the period of the Judges. On the other hand, there are those who would assign to the book of Deuteronomy a later date in the development of Hebrew literature. For example, Vatke⁸ and Horst⁹ make Deuteronomy the *result* rather than the cause of Josiah's reformation, the former placing it in the last ten years of Judah's existence as a kingdom.

¹ *The Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, transl. by McClure and Crosslé, 1897, p. 10.

² *The Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuchal Codes*, 1886, p. 90.

³ Riehm (later), Oettli (*Das Deut. und die Bücher Josua und Richter*, 1893, pp. 19, 20); Westphal (*Les Sources du Pentateuque*, II., *Le Problème Historique*, 1892, p. 305); Vaihinger (*Real-Encyc.*, xi., p. 315 f.); and J. von Bunsen (*Bibelwerk*, Abtheilung II., *Bibelurkunden*, I. 1860, p. 270 f.).

⁴ *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1893, pp. 215, 217.

⁵ Cf. his "Pentateuch-kritische Studien" in the *Zeits. für Kirchliche Wissenschaft*, etc., 1880-2; and also his *New Comm. on Genesis*, Eng. transl., vol. i, 1888, p. 40.

⁶ *Einleitung in die Bibel*, 2. Aufl., 1894, p. 58.

⁷ *Das Deuteronomium und der Deuteronomiker*, 1872 ff., 136-7, 153-4.

⁸ *Biblische Theologie*, vol. i., 1835, p. 504 f.

⁹ Cf. art. "Études sur le deutérôme," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, xxiii., 1891.

Vernes¹ and D'Eichthal² place it after the Exile in the Persian period, claiming that it was composed in the interests of the reform carried out by Ezra and Nehemiah. Also the more recent writers, Staerk³ and Steuernagel, who trace in Deuteronomy certain ancient "thou" and "ye" sources, are likewise opposed to the date assigned to it by the Wellhausen hypothesis.

Yet, notwithstanding all the doubts which have been raised from time to time concerning the 7th century origin of the book, men are still content to carry on the critical battle concerning P's date, on the tacit assumption that D's date is fixed, apparently forgetting that the ground on which they stand contending is unsafe.⁵

This is, in our judgment at least, the real *status quo* of the criticism of the Pentateuch to-day. It is to a re-examination, therefore, of the entire question of Deuteronomy's origin that we devote our attention in the following study.

In a problem of this character, to which there are at least two very possible solutions—either the Mosaic or 7th century origin,—it is of course quite natural that men who take different standpoints come to different conclusions. It was a Dutch philosopher who said, "Stand within a circle and it looks concave; stand without and it appears convex." Similarly with Deuteronomy. Looked at from the standpoint of the 7th century, it seems to have been written expressly with a view to meet 7th century needs; whereas looked at from the standpoint of a new-born nation

¹ Cf. *Sur la Composition et l'Origine du Deut.*, 1887. An examination of D'Eichthal.

² *Mélanges de Critique Biblique*, 1886, pp. 94 and 291.

³ *Das Deuteronomium, sein Inhalt u. seine literarische Form*, 1894.

⁴ *Die Entstehung des deuteronomischen Gesetzes*, 1896.

⁵ Wellhausen (*Proleg.*,⁴ p. 14, 1895) is careful not to condition the entire validity of his arguments for the post-exilic origin of P on the date assumed for Deuteronomy, yet he treats the latter as a fact.

it appears to be the most appropriate instruction possible in the mouth of the nation's Begetter. No one of course would assert that it is necessary to believe in the new hypothesis in order to test it. The only essential is that the critic assume the attitude of an earnest inquirer, whose chief and only aim is carefully and judiciously to examine the facts. On this point all fair-minded men are agreed. Indeed, there is much in common between the two opposing schools of criticism. For example, almost everybody would admit that the book of Deuteronomy is a popular law-book; that it is prophetic; that it was not intended for the desert but for Palestine; that it is Mosaic in spirit; that it contains ancient material, and that it stands closely related to the book of Covenant (Exod. 20. 23-23. 33). And further, almost any one would be willing also to admit that some part of Deuteronomy was contained in the "book" found by Hilkiah in Josiah's eighteenth year (2 Kings 22. 8), and that as a law-book it was well adapted to the needs of Josiah's age. The question really at issue, therefore, is none of these things. Neither is it one of authorship, primarily, though that to some is an important matter; neither is it one of unity, though the unity of Deuteronomy is easier to demonstrate than that of some other Old Testament books; nor yet a question of the origin of the *kernel* only, for after a book has been analyzed and disintegrated, it is much simpler to account for the origin of a part than of the whole; but the real question in the criticism of Deuteronomy, for us at least, is its *date*. When was it composed? What was the motive? Was it written late and put into the mouth of Moses *in order to bring about a reformation*? In its conception and genesis was it written long after Moses with the *intention to reform*, or is it rather an ancient law-code *carrying with it the potentiality of reform*? In other words, is the book of Deuteronomy the product of *Mosaism* or of 8th century

Prophecy? And if ancient, does it contain nothing but what is demonstrably ancient? These are the primary questions at issue, and the points above all others to be kept constantly in mind in the following discussion.

I.

THE BASIS OF CRITICISM.

The fundamental justification of criticism in attempting to change the traditional date of Deuteronomy's composition lies in the *facts* themselves. The problem we have set before us accordingly involves a re-examination of these facts. This we propose to conduct along three different lines of investigation quite independent of one another, viz., *A*, Deuteronomy and its relation to the middle books of the Pentateuch; *B*, Deuteronomy and its relation to the historical and prophetic books of the Old Testament; *C*, Deuteronomy's witness to itself.

A. Deuteronomy and its relation to the middle books of the Pentateuch. Herein lies the primary justification of criticism. Variations exist between Deuteronomy and the other books of the Law which can only with the greatest difficulty be reconciled.¹ Were they numerous, and could they be shown to be actual discrepancies or contradictions either in history or law, they would necessarily have a most important bearing both upon the unity of the Pentateuch and the origin of its component parts. On the other hand, if the variations are unimportant, or if in the majority of cases they are obviously doubtful, then the greatest caution must be used in deducting conclusions from them. Indeed, the examination of such facts requires the utmost care. For in any code of Law, be it Hebrew or be it Roman,

¹ Dr. Driver, in his *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy*, 1895, pp. xxxiv. ff., having collected the most striking variations between Deuteronomy and the preceding books of the Pentateuch, discusses them *seriatim*.

*apparent discrepancies may seem to exist when in fact none can with certainty be demonstrated. "Each case must be considered with reference to its own particular circumstances."*¹

1. *Discrepancies in History.* Are the following variations real discrepancies? (1) Concerning the appointment of judges (Deut. 1. 9-13 and Exod. 18. 13-26). In Deuteronomy *Moses* suggests to Israel the choosing of wise men to assist him in judging the people, whereas in Exodus *his father-in-law*, Jethro, first suggests the idea, whereupon Moses chooses them without consulting Israel. The variation here obviously enough is not a real discrepancy, because incompleteness of statement is not necessarily a defect. The author's *motives* must be studied. In Deuteronomy it is evident that the author is too intent upon his object to enter into unimportant details; for example, later in the same chapter he does not pause to say that the spies searched out the *whole* country of Palestine as far as Hamath (cf. Num. 13. 21-25), but simply states that they went "unto the valley of Eshcol and searched it out" (Deut. 1. 24). So in the case before us the author might have inserted the name of Jethro for the sake of completeness, but, being unnecessary from his standpoint, it would have only lessened (by entering into details) the cogency of his argument and weakened the force of his oratory. (2) Concerning the plan of sending spies (Deut. 1. 22, 23, and Num. 13. 1-3). In Deuteronomy the plan of sending spies is represented as having been made by the people; in Numbers as due to the commandment of the Lord. Thus in Deuteronomy it is stated that the suggestion had the approval of Moses (1. 23), but it is not stated that it had

¹ Cf. Lord Mackenzie's *Studies in Roman Law*, pp. 1, 23, 28, quoted by the anonymous author (now known to be James Sime) of *Deuteronomy the People's Book*, 1877, pp. 279-80. Cf. also Knötel on Wolf's self-contradictions in *Homer. Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct., 1897, p. 697.

Jehovah's also. It is, however, almost unthinkable that the author of Deuteronomy here endeavours to represent Moses as taking advantage of the people through possible ignorance on their part that the plan was also approved of by God. The two accounts are separately incomplete rather than discrepant. (3) The grounds given for preventing Moses from entering Canaan (Deut. 1. 37, 38; cf. 3. 26, 4. 21; and Num. 20. 12; cf. 27. 13, 14). In Deuteronomy Moses is prohibited from entering Canaan on account of the people; in Numbers, on account of his presumption in striking the rock in Kadesh. But both codes teach plainly that *Israel* sinned (Deut. 1. 37) in chiding with Moses (Num. 20. 3) through rebellion (Num. 20. 10) and by striving with the Lord (Num. 20. 13); and, what is equally important, both codes explicitly affirm that Moses was prevented from entering Canaan on account of *his own* presumption (Num. 20. 12, Deut. 32. 50, 51—the latter denied to D on insufficient grounds). The time element in both passages (Deut. 1. 37, 38, Num. 20. 12) is uncertain. It cannot be shown that in the one case the event is connected with the second year of the Exodus, whereas in the other with the thirty-ninth. (4) The time spent in Kadesh (Deut. 1. 46, 2. 1, 14, and Num. 14. 28–37). According to Deuteronomy it might be thought to appear that Israel spent the thirty-eight years in the wilderness *away from* Kadesh (2. 14) in wandering about Edom (2. 1); while in Numbers the thirty-eight years were spent *in* Kadesh (14. 28 f.). But, on the contrary, both codes agree that Israel “abode” an indefinite period in Kadesh (Num. 20. 1, Deut. 1. 46); and both teach quite explicitly that Israel spent a long time away from Kadesh “in the wilderness” wandering (Num. 14. 33, “thirty-nine years”; Deut. 2. 1, “many days”).¹ And besides this, we are not justified

¹ Kittel (*A History of the Hebrews*, vol. i., transl. by Taylor, pp., 231–238), remarks on this point: “The sources are unanimous as to Israel’s having

perhaps in confounding "Kadesh" in Deuteronomy 1. 46, Numbers 13. 26, 20. 1, 14, etc.,¹ with "Kadesh-barnea" in Deuteronomy 2. 14, Numbers 32. 8, 34. 4, etc. Kadesh was the *region about Kadesh-barnea*—a wilderness like the desert of Bered (cf. Gen. 16. 14, Ps. 29. 8). Moses himself may have spent some time in the immediate vicinity of Kadesh-barnea where the fountains of water were, but for the sake of pasturage Israel's hosts would be forced to scatter throughout the neighbouring wilderness. (5) Moses' fasting in the Mount (Deut. 9. 9 and Exod. 32.-34.). In Deuteronomy Moses is described as having fasted on the occasion of his *first* visit to the Mount; in Exodus, on the *second* visit only (Exod. 34. 28).² The difficulty is, Deuteronomy implies that Moses fasted on both occasions (9. 9, 10. 10), whereas Exodus records the second instance only; another case in which one account is *more complete* than the other but not necessarily at variance. (6) The terms of Moses' intercession (Deut. 9. 25-29). The difficulty here is not that any discrepancy exists between Deuteronomy 9. 25-29 and any other parallel passage, but rather why "the terms of Moses' own intercession," as here reproduced, are borrowed not from either Exodus 32. 31 f. or Exodus 34. 9, 28, but from Exodus 32. 11-13. This, however, involves the hypothesis of a *third* visit to the mountain, which, as we have seen, is unwarranted. Moreover,

dwelt a long time in Kadesh and the neighbourhood before setting out for the field of Moab."

¹ The only apparent exception is Num. 20. 16, in which עִיר (translated "city") is to be taken as a word of broader significance, embracing the idea of "encampment," "surrounded place," or "fortified camp" (cf. H. C. Trumbull, *Kadesh-Barnea*, 1884, pp. 83, 84).

² Dr. Driver (*Critical Comm. on Deut.*, 1895, p. xxxvi.) supposes that, "according to Exod. 32.-34., Moses was *three* times in the mount (32. 1 f., 32. 31, 34. 4)"; but in one of these passages (Exod. 32. 31) the return of Moses is "unto the Lord" (presumably in prayer), not unto the Lord (in the mount). This interpretation is confirmed by the use of the word הָלַךְ (32. 31), "go," not יָרַד, "go, get thee down," as in 32. 7 (cf. 34. 29). Moses was, therefore, very probably but *twice* in the mount.

the circumstances connected with the intercession mentioned in Deuteronomy 9. 25-29 (as in Exod. 32. 30-32) do not demand that we regard it as an intercession *in the mount*. (7) The ark of the covenant (Deut. 10. 1-5 and Exod. 25. 10 f.; cf. Exod. 34. 1-4, 28, 37. 1 f.). Two difficulties exist here: first, as to *who* made the ark, Moses or Bezaleel (but it is hardly necessary to show that Moses may still have *made* it, though Bezaleel performed the manual labour); second, as to the *time* when Moses received and executed the divine command to make it. In Deuteronomy 10. 1-5 Moses is commanded to make the ark *after* the destruction of the calf; he obeys, and re-ascends the mount to receive the new tables of the law. In Exodus 25. 10 f., on the other hand, he was commanded to do so apparently during his first sojourn in the mount, *before* the episode of the golden calf, but its fulfilment was delayed till his second return from the mount.¹ There is a real difficulty here, but unimportant because the expression "at that time," in Deuteronomy 10. 1, renders it very uncertain as regards *when* the command was actually given. There is also a degree of uncertainty as to *time* in Exodus 25. 10, 37. 1, though the contexts relieve the difficulty to a large extent. The chronology of events is very probably as follows: God commanded Moses to make an ark when He was with him in the mount on the first visit (cf. Exod. 24. 12, 18, 25. 10), and at the same time designated Bezaleel to make it (Exod. 31. 2, 7). Moses then descended from the mount, the tables are broken at the sight of the golden calf, the people are punished, and, after long communion with God in the tabernacle (Exod. 33. 9-11), Moses is bidden to make two other tables. He does so, and, at God's command, leaves orders with Bezaleel for the ark to be constructed, and goes again up into the mount (Deut.

¹ Cf. J. E. Carpenter's article, "The Book of Deuteronomy," in the *Modern Review*, iv., 1883, p. 264; also Driver's *Comm. on Deut.*, 1895, p. xxxvi.

10. 1, Exod. 34. 1). On the second visit Moses receives the tables, brings them down, and puts them into the ark which Bezaleel had meanwhile made and prepared (Deut. 10. 5). The accounts contained in Exodus 36.-40. respecting the construction of the tabernacle, ark, altar, etc., are not necessarily chronological, but are arranged by the historian rather in order of their importance—tabernacle, ark, altar, the priestly attire, etc. Hence the records given in the two codes are not necessarily discrepant, but mutually supplementary; our difficulty in interpreting them being due largely to our inability to grasp the motives and varying situations of the author, be he one or more. (8) Israel's journeyings in the wilderness (Deut. 10. 6, 7 and Num. 33. 31-33, 38). One difficulty here is the present position of verses 6 and 7 in Deuteronomy 10. They better belong between verses 11 and 12, where they very possibly originally stood. Or these verses (6 and 7), being of a parenthetical character (not including verses 8 and 9 as in R.V.), it is even quite possible that they never really belonged to the original text of Deuteronomy. Second, the stations are not mentioned in the same order (cf. Deut. 10. 6, 7, and Num. 33. 31-33). However, the two accounts are not necessarily parallels; neither do they claim to be catalogues of Israel's movements at any given or definite time; nor in truth can the names of the places be identified. A third difficulty is the fact that, according to Deuteronomy 10. 6, Aaron dies in *Moserah*, whereas, according to Numbers 33. 38, he dies in *Mount Hor*. But nothing is known concerning the place called Moserah, and until we have evidence that there was no place in Mount Hor with that name, we cannot justly claim that there is a discrepancy between the account in Deuteronomy and that in Numbers. (9) The consecration of the tribe of Levi (Deut. 10. 8, 9, Exod. 28.-29., Lev. 8., Num. 3. 5-10). According to Deuteronomy 10. 8, 9, the consecration of the

tribe of Levi must be dated much later than the other passages in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers would imply. Here again the troublesome point is one of *time*. But aside from the ambiguous expression, "at that time" (v. 8), which is too indefinite to build a theory of "divergent traditions" upon, the difficulty is quite removed, as in the former instance, by placing verses 6 and 7 between verses 11 and 12.

2. *Variations in Law.* (a) Modifications in Deuteronomy of the laws of JE (Exod. 20-23). Dr. Driver¹ points out four of importance: (1) Concerning Hebrew bondmen and bondwomen (Exod. 21. 2-11 and Deut. 15. 12).² In this case the supposition is that the law of Deuteronomy originated in a later stage of society than that of Exodus. Thus in Exodus a bondman and his wife, after serving six years, are granted freedom in the seventh (vv. 2, 3); but a "daughter" sold by her father as a maid-servant is not allowed to go free as the men-servants do (v. 7). In Deuteronomy 15. 12 (cf. v. 17), on the other hand, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, after serving six years, are likewise allowed to go free and without limitation. Up to this point the two versions of this law in Exodus and Deuteronomy correspond and are parallel. The law, however, concerning "a daughter" sold by her father as a maid-servant (Exod. 21. 7-11, which is quite another paragraph), *has no parallel in Deuteronomy 15. 12 f.*, hence cannot, in our judgment, be considered modified to suit a later stage of society. (2) Asylum for manslaughter (Exod. 21. 13 and Deut. 19. 1-3). From Exodus 21. 14 (cf. 1 Kings 1. 50 f., 2. 28) it is obviously to be inferred that, in the desert at least, Israel's asylum for manslaughter was Jehovah's altar (אלֹהֵינוּ); in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, definite cities are set apart. But Exodus 21. 13 also provides that

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy*, 1895, pp. xxxvii. f.

² Cf. Kleinert's *Das Deuteronomium u. der Deuteronomiker*, 1872, pp. 55 f.

a "place" (מִקְדָּשׁ, not a מִזְבֵּחַ) shall be appointed, whither the man-slayer may flee. Deuteronomy 19. 7, 9, goes a step further, and provides for three cities definitely to be set apart as places of refuge, with other possible three besides these three. There is confessedly a modification here, but not one which requires two hundred, or even two, years to account for it—only a different standpoint and a new motive. (3) The law of seduction (Exod. 22. 15, 16 (Eng. 16, 17), and Deut. 22. 28, 29). In this instance two difficulties are thought to exist: first, the *position* of the law; second, the *price* paid to the father as a compensation for the loss of a daughter. In Exodus the law stands at the close of a list of cases specifying pecuniary compensations for injury to property, implying that a seduced daughter is looked upon in Exodus as so much loss of *property* to her father; in Deuteronomy seduction is regarded rather as an offence against the laws of *moral purity*. In Exodus, again, the price (כֶּהֱרָ) of a virgin is indefinite and variable; whereas in Deuteronomy it is a fixed fine of fifty shekels of silver. But first, the *order* in Exodus is not so significant, inasmuch as the law of seduction stands not only at the *close* of a list of cases relating to pecuniary compensations for injury to property, but at the *beginning* also of a list of regulations concerning moral purity. And second as to the price of a virgin, it is not known how much a כֶּהֱרָ was; it may have fluctuated, or it may always have been fifty shekels of silver. (4) The Sabbatical year (Exod. 23. 10, 11, and Deut. 15. 1-6). In Exodus the provisions obviously are purely *agricultural*; in Deuteronomy, on the other hand, it is thought that these agricultural provisions are applied so as to form a check on the power of the creditor. But this modification cannot be said to be obvious, inasmuch as there is no hint of *land* or *agriculture* in the law of Deuteronomy. They are rather two independent laws touching the same general principle,

but codified under different circumstances and with different aims, both too utopian to be very late.

(β) Contradictions between the laws of D and P.¹ *Contradictions* are, if real, of much more serious character than either discrepancies or modifications, and argue strongly in favour of the new theory of the origin of the Pentateuch. (1) Concerning Priests and Levites (Deut. 18. 1a, 6-8 and Num. 16. 10, 35, 40). In Numbers a sharp distinction is drawn between priests (sons of Aaron) and common Levites: in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, priests and Levites are not distinguished carefully. The force of any possible contradiction between these passages, however, is broken by the fact that Deuteronomy 18. 6-8, as a matter of fact, does not invest a Levite with *priestly* but *Levitical* functions (cf. v. 7). Moreover, the book of Deuteronomy throughout teaches that not *all* the tribe, but *only* the tribe of Levi may exercise priestly functions, thus restricting the exercise of priestly prerogatives to one tribe. This, too, was perfectly consonant with the teaching of Leviticus and Numbers, because in the tribe of Levi were included both priests and common Levites. Furthermore the expression in Deuteronomy 18. 5, "him and his sons for ever," implies a *hereditary* priesthood, which is absolutely inexplicable apart from Leviticus and Numbers. (2) The maintenance of the priests and Levites (Deut. 18. 3 and Lev. 7. 32-34). On the supposition that these two accounts are meant to be parallel laws (which is not altogether certain), the variation concerning priestly dues is significant. In Deuteronomy "the shoulder and the cheeks and the maw" are specified as the priest's perquisites in a peace-offering; but in Leviticus "the wave breast and the

¹ That criticism should claim to have discovered "irreconcilable contradictions" between Deuteronomy (which *ex hypothesi* is the prophetic ideal of the 7th century) and P (which legalizes the praxis of pre-exilic times) is, of course, not impossible.

heave shoulder" (cf. Num. 18. 8-19). That is to say, both Deuteronomy and Leviticus agree that the priests' portions shall consist of a *shoulder* (all the different Hebrew terms employed being equivalent to this in meaning, cf. Lev. 7. 32, R.V. *marg.*); but as to the other parts, Leviticus 7. 34 prescribes "the wave breast," whereas Deuteronomy 18. 3, "the two cheeks and the maw (?)." The word translated "maw" is doubtful, being ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. It is, nevertheless, difficult to say that "the wave breast" = "the two cheeks and the maw." Perhaps the priestly dues in Deuteronomy were not intended to stand parallel to those prescribed in Leviticus, but were meant to be given *in addition* to them. So Schultz,¹ following Jewish tradition from Philo and Josephus on down. This interpretation is confirmed by the clause, "The Lord is their inheritance, as He hath said unto them" (Deut. 18. 2), which implies not only the prior existence of a statute on the subject of priestly maintenance (cf. Num. 18. 20), but also that Israel was *already* acquainted with it.² (3) The country Levite and Levitical cities (Deut. 18. 6 and Num. 35. 1-8). The Deuteronomic passage describes the Levite as a "sojourner," having no settled residence, and, as some think, destitute of adequate maintenance; whereas in Numbers forty-eight cities are assigned to the tribe of Levi as places of residence. But it is not to be inferred from the latter passage (Num. 35. 1-8) that these forty-eight cities should be occupied by Levites exclusively. On the contrary, the Levites were not the sole occupants of the fields and towns assigned to them; they lived rather *among their brethren*, the other Israelites, having inheritance assigned to them

¹ *Das Deuteronomium erklart*, 1859, p. 59.

² W. L. Alexander (*The Pulpit Comm.*, "Deuteronomy," new edit., 1897, p. xxiv.) regards the relation of these laws as not discordant for the reason that "in either case the portions assigned to the priests were a gift from the people, distinct from and in addition to what the priest claimed as a part of his inheritance from the Lord."

for residence, and suburbs for their cattle. Hence the description, "The Levite within thy gates" (Deut. 12. 12, 18; 14. 27, etc.), which implies "not that the Levite was homeless, but that his home was within the precincts of one of the cities of Israel."¹ The regulation in Deut. 18. 6-8, therefore, is in all probability to be interpreted as a *special* law (in addition to that in Num. 35. 1-8, which is general) providing for any Levite not employed at the central sanctuary, who might sincerely choose to serve in holy rather than in secular (not necessarily semi-idolatrous) things, and who might come from "out of all Israel where he sojourned"—i.e. out of any of the forty-eight cities in which the tribe of Levi had residence either permanently or temporarily—and wish to serve in the central sanctuary. Such an one might come, according to the law of Deuteronomy, unto the place which the Lord should choose, minister like his brethren the Levites (not the priests), and receive like portions to eat, beside (and this is of special importance) the "private sources of his income," i.e. his inherited patrimony—viz. in the forty-eight Levitical cities. For what was a Levite's "patrimony" but his inheritance from God?² (4) Firstlings (Deut. 12. 6, 17-19; 15. 19, 20 and Num. 18. 18). In Deuteronomy the firstlings of oxen and sheep are to be eaten at the central sanctuary by the owner and his household; in Numbers the firstlings are to be brought unto the Lord (18. 15), and, having been duly dedicated, their flesh is placed by law at the disposal of the priests (18. 17, 18). But not *all* of their flesh was given to be eaten by the priests, as clearly appears from the clause, "as the wave breast and as the right shoulder are thine" (18. 18); nor in Deuteronomy,

¹ So W. L. Alexander, *Idem*, p. xxvi., who quotes Keil, *Comm. on Joshua*, p. 211, and Kitto, *Cyclopædia*, vol. ii., p. 828.

² Cf. W. H. Green, *Moses and the Prophets*, 1891, pp. 82, 83, n. 1.

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has been sold to his brother and has served him six years as a slave (עֶבֶד), to release him in the seventh year; in Leviticus, on the other hand, if *through poverty* a man has been sold to his brother, the buyer is forbidden to make him serve as a slave (עֶבֶד), but is commanded to treat him as a *hired servant* (שָׂכִיר) and as a sojourner (תּוֹשָׁב), and dismiss him in the year of jubilee. The two laws clearly treat of different and independent cases, and accordingly, having nothing to do with each other, cannot be said to conflict. The true parallel to Leviticus 25. 39-43 is to be found in Deuteronomy 24. 14, 15, where, in terms similar to Leviticus, the command is given not to oppress the *hired servant* (שָׂכִיר) who is poor (עָנִי) or needy (אֲבִיּוֹן), making likewise no distinction between a brother Hebrew and any stranger dwelling within Israel's gates. (7) The flesh of an animal dying of itself (Deut. 14. 21 and Lev. 17. 15). In Leviticus the Israelite, or the stranger, who eats that which has died of itself (נֶבֶלָה) is required to wash his clothes and be unclean until the evening (nothing being explicitly said whether such flesh should be eaten or not, but perfectly obvious that a *prohibition* and not a *permission* is in view, inasmuch as an action that must be atoned for by purification cannot be spoken of as allowed);¹ in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, laws of diet are prescribed for the Israelites, among which it is explicitly stated that the flesh of an animal dying of itself shall not be eaten by an Israelite (which is quite consonant with the implication contained in Lev. 17. 15, 16), because Israel is to be a holy people; such flesh either to be given to the stranger or sold to the alien (but without specifying who the stranger or the alien might be). From which it is clearly obvious that the variation is unimportant, not even approximating the nature of a contradiction. (8) The paschal sacrifice (Deut.

¹ Cf. Prof. Hommel's comment on *Nebhelah* in the *Expos. Times*, July, 1897, p. 473.

on the other hand, that the people are to eat *all* of it.¹ In other words, according to Numbers, the flesh of firstlings is not to be eaten by the priests alone; nor, according to Deuteronomy, by the owner alone. The contradiction, therefore, between these separate laws is only apparent. (5) Tithes (Deut. 14. 22-29 and Num. 18. 21-28). In Numbers 18. 21-24 the tithes of the heave offerings are assigned to the Levites, a tenth of which the Levites are commanded to offer as their heave offering through Aaron the priest unto the Lord (18. 26-28). In Deuteronomy a *yearly* tithe is enjoined to be consumed by the owner, his household, and the Levite within his gates (14. 22-27); and in addition every *third* year a tithe to be laid up within their gates for the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow (14. 28, 29). The variation in statement here between Deuteronomy and Numbers is confessedly very confusing; but, at the same time, it is not as contradictory as the language of two passages in the *legal* portion of Deuteronomy itself (viz. Deut. 14. 22 and 26. 12). In the first the author speaks of a *yearly* tithe only; in the second, of a *triennial*; e.g. "the third year, the year of tithing," in language which implies that the author knew of no other tithe. Yet no one, in view of the contexts, concludes that the two passages are contradictory (cf. 14. 28). So also with the case in hand. The apparent contradiction between the law of Numbers and that of Deuteronomy arises from the failure to see that Deuteronomy recognises the right of the Levites to partake of the tithes received from the people, in view of the fact that their inheritance is the Lord (cf. Deut. 10. 9; 18. 2). (6) The release of Hebrew slaves (Deut. 15. 12-18 and Lev. 25. 39-43). In Deuteronomy it is enjoined, in the case of a Hebrew who

¹ Cf. W. L. Alexander, *Idem*, p. xxiii. Curtis, *The Levitical Priests*, 1877, p. 40. Also Douglas' Essay on "The Deuteronomical Code" in the *Lex Mosaica*, 1894, p. 91.

has been sold to his brother and has served him six years as a slave (עֶבֶד), to release him in the seventh year; in Leviticus, on the other hand, if *through poverty* a man has been sold to his brother, the buyer is forbidden to make him serve as a slave (עֶבֶד), but is commanded to treat him as a *hired servant* (שָׂכִיר) and as a sojourner (תָּשׁוּב), and dismiss him in the year of jubilee. The two laws clearly treat of different and independent cases, and accordingly, having nothing to do with each other, cannot be said to conflict. The true parallel to Leviticus 25. 39-43 is to be found in Deuteronomy 24. 14, 15, where, in terms similar to Leviticus, the command is given not to oppress the *hired servant* (שָׂכִיר) who is poor (עָנִי) or needy (אֲבִיּוֹן), making likewise no distinction between a brother Hebrew and any stranger dwelling within Israel's gates. (7) The flesh of an animal dying of itself (Deut. 14. 21 and Lev. 17. 15). In Leviticus the Israelite, or the stranger, who eats that which has died of itself (נֶבֶלֶה) is required to wash his clothes and be unclean until the evening (nothing being explicitly said whether such flesh should be eaten or not, but perfectly obvious that a *prohibition* and not a *permission* is in view, inasmuch as an action that must be atoned for by purification cannot be spoken of as allowed);¹ in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, laws of diet are prescribed for the Israelites, among which it is explicitly stated that the flesh of an animal dying of itself shall not be eaten by an Israelite (which is quite consonant with the implication contained in Lev. 17. 15, 16), because Israel is to be a holy people; such flesh either to be given to the stranger or sold to the alien (but without specifying who the stranger or the alien might be). From which it is clearly obvious that the variation is unimportant, not even approximating the nature of a contradiction. (8) The paschal sacrifice (Deut.

¹ Cf. Prof. Hommel's comment on *Nebhelah* in the *Expos. Times*, July, 1897, p. 473.

16. 2 and Exod. 12. 3-6). According to Exodus, when the Passover was instituted in Egypt, Israel were bidden to take a lamb (לֵךְ) from among the sheep (צֹאן) and from among the goats (עִזִּים); according to Deuteronomy, on the other hand, Israel are commanded, in celebrating the Passover, to sacrifice to Jehovah flock (צֹאן) and herd (בָּקָר). The alleged difference between the two accounts consists in this: in Exodus 12. 3-6 the paschal sacrifice is limited to a lamb; in Deuteronomy 16. 2 it may be either a sheep or an ox. But the word for lamb (לֵךְ) cannot be restricted. It may mean either a lamb or a young goat,¹ i.e. one of the צֹאן or בָּקָר. Furthermore, in both passages the sheep are described, not as pasturing alone, but, in keeping with Oriental custom even to-day, *along with cattle* both large and small.

These are the only important variations existing between Deuteronomy and the other books of the Pentateuch. We recognise the difficulty involved in attempting to harmonize some of them. At the same time we appeal to the common everyday judgment of thinking men, and ask, with all seriousness, Is there a single variation among them all which is deserving of the name "contradiction"? Is it true that among them there are "discrepancies which cannot be reconciled"? Do they, after all that has been said, necessarily "bear witness to the existence of divergent traditions in our present Pentateuch"? The writer confesses that, though liberally inclined, he feels the deductions made from them by criticism are not fully warranted by the facts. Moreover, he experiences a certain unsatisfactoriness in making discrepancies the basis of procedure on any theory. For even if real discrepancies and contradictions actually existed between Deuteronomy and the other books of the *Torah*, that fact does not necessarily

¹ So Dillmann, *Die Bücher Exodus u. Leviticus*, 2. Aufl., 1880, p. 101.

imply that they are due to difference of authorship. The author might quite as easily have made such slips himself as the editor or editors. A single writer is capable of unadjusted and even of conflicting conceptions and statements. Beside, it is one of the easiest of tasks to point the finger at *apparent* discrepancies. Apparent contradictions may indeed be found in Deuteronomy alone.¹

On this point, therefore, we conclude, not with Carpenter,² that "the history of Israel's law codes is in fact an epitome of the history of Israel's religion," in that "they represent successive stages of belief and practice," but that variations, quite as great and difficult (to us) to harmonize as those just discussed above, might exist in a code drawn up by a *single* hand and promulgated in a *single* lifetime; for in every case the alleged conflict partakes of the character of a critical *inference* based upon a more or less doubtful interpretation of the passages in hand.

G. L. ROBINSON.

¹ E.g. 7. 22 and 9. 8 (Dillmann); 19. 1-10 and 4. 41-43 (Wellhausen, *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, 2. Ausg., 1889, p. 207, n.); 5. 5 and 5. 4; 10. 4; 4. 12, 15, 86 (Kosters); 7. 7 and 10. 12 (D'Eichthal, *Mélanges de Critique Biblique*, 1896, p. 292); 2. 14-16 and 8. 2-4; 9. 2-7 (Carpenter); 31. 2 and 34. 7 (Kayser, *Das vorexilische Buch*, etc., 1874, pp. 145-6); also 7. 3 and 21. 10-14; 11. 2 f. and 2. 15, etc.

² *Ut supra*, p. 253; cf. Kleinert, p. 77, and Driver, pp. xxxix.-xli.

*SACRAMENTALISM THE TRUE REMEDY FOR
SACERDOTALISM.*

II.

WE are robbed of some due sense of the true place of Communion by our misuse of the word symbol. The elements alone are not symbolical. Symbol, at its best, is something that not only *reminds* us of reality in the significance, but by its living nature *passes us on* to the reality. Then Communion is organic, and not arbitrary—not a mere matter of association. It is not through the mere elements that we touch the reality, else Rome were right, and we are lost in all the metaphysics in which transubstantiation has smothered faith. The elements are but the material which the true symbol employs in passing us on to the reality. That reality is in the region where all reality must accrue at last, and be found for ever at home with itself, in the region of will and of action. It is, of course, the person and work of Christ. Now the elements are not so symbolical of this as is the action performed on them. It is the breaking, the pouring out, the partaking that are the true symbols. That is to say, the true symbol is not an element, but an act. It is only thus that it can be a symbol of the great act which is its reality, the act of the cross. It was so at the Last Supper. It is so in our Sacrament. The symbolism is in the Church's act. It is therefore a symbol which itself belongs to reality. It has the reality of will—of our will, and of Christ's dying will acting through ours.

There is no fear of any superstition in emphasizing *this* real presence, so long as we urge that it is a reality of present act and will, and not of mere substance. We renew our first decisive dedication of ourselves to Christ, and Christ renews His first decisive offering of Himself for us.

It is a real renewal of the devoted act ; and it is equally real on both sides.

Much of the strife that has arisen about the Last Supper might have been avoided, and much may be laid, by a true grasp of the principle by which the Old Testament explains the New. The Old Testament explains the New as the New Testament lights up the Old. The Old Testament interprets the New ; the New Testament reveals the Old. We cannot understand the Old Testament without the New, and we cannot account for the New Testament without the Old.

The best clue to this act of Christ is in the Old Testament ; and it is in that part of the Old Testament which was most in Christ's own thoughts, and is therefore most fertile for understanding Him and His work. It is not in the law, where it has been sought to excess and to strife, but in the prophets. The New Testament men altogether were not priestly, but prophetic in their strain.

The key to Christ's intent will therefore be best found perhaps in the method, used so often by the prophets, of symbolical action. The overlaid thought passes beyond the power of words (as thought inspired by love and passion must at its height always do), and is driven into the symbolism of an act. It craves an enacted instead of a spoken symbol ; a parable in startling deed instead of stale word. Love surcharged passes through the broken alabaster into silent sacrifice for its full vent ; and inspiration at its height forsakes the word and takes up the work. Signs become more eloquent than speech. To threaten calamity and captivity, with a force for which words had failed, Jeremiah lays a yoke on his shoulder, and Isaiah goes barefoot. To express victory another puts on horns, the symbol of power. To represent the rending of the kingdom, Ahijah rends his garment and gives ten pieces to Jeroboam. In like fashion the events and calamities of the prophet's domestic life

cease to be private, and become prophetic symbols of public affairs, as with Hosea and Isaiah. The cases are numerous enough, and not unfamiliar. We only move along the same path when Mary meets us with her costly spikenard and her tears. We go farther, and find the Saviour Himself kneeling in masterful humility to wash the disciples' feet. And at the end we look into the upper room and behold the Last Supper, the incipient Passion, and the symbolic act in which the burthen of His gathering agony found relief. This was, as has been said, "Christ's last parable." It was a parable translated now from word to deed—a twin parable (as the Lord was used to group His parables in pairs) by the action with the bread and with the wine. The word that constitutes the Church was a deed. *Im Anfang war die That*. The divine Teacher had done His work, and was rising into the divine Doer, the Redeemer. The lesson, taught but unlearned, must now be conveyed by an action which will not fail. The great act of the Cross was impending, of which only another act, and not a word, could be the symbol. The central point, therefore, in the Last Supper is not the symbolism of the elements, but the symbolism of the action. It is on this line only, perhaps, that we can hope for a happy issue from the vast controversies that have gathered here.

The symbolism does not lie in the elements, but in the act. That is the exact point. To remember Him was to "do this," to "take and eat." The stress of the situation falls not on "body," but on "broken"; not on "blood," but on "shed." What was symbolised on the occasion was not a mere manifestation on the cross, but a decisive act there; something not only exhibited, but done. Revelation is Redemption. Wherever our thought wanders from this aspect of the cross, and sees in it only a declaration, or an epiphany, of the love of God, the Sacrament shares in the loss of tone. A theology of mere revelation produces a

Church of mere sympathies. It fails in faith, sanctity and power. And amid a disillusioned world the Church sinks, sweetly vapid and witlessly content, to its amiable, ignoble end.

(1) We note first, then, that it was an action that was to be symbolised. It was the work done for us by Christ—our Redemption. The eternal Christ, who is an everlasting Now, anticipates in the Supper His finished work, and in symbol says "it is done." The value of our Lord's actual flesh and blood was little before God. It was in no symbols of these that the sanctity lay. It is only metaphysical theories that have made them of such account. The precious and sacred thing was His holy, God-beloved will and its complete obedience of faith. There is the nerve of personality, there is the seat of sanctity. There the great, eternal, final Redemption transpired. The value of the cross lies in its value as an act of Christ's soul and will. That act was the thing to be symbolised.

(2) It was, therefore, an act which symbolised it: it was not the elements. An act is a spiritual thing. Its truest symbol is another act. The elements are no more than materials to enable the symbolic act to be done, as the body itself is but a finer material in the service of that act. When shall we take it fully home that as the Incarnation was not a physical act in the first place, so neither was the Atonement? The accent falls neither on the physical entrance of Christ into the world in the one case, nor on His physical sufferings of exit in the other. The secret of the Incarnation lies in the personality of Christ, whose centre is the holy Will.

And we may illustrate thus. A spoken word is the symbol of a thought: the visible letters only enable us to convey the symbol. They are not the symbol itself. What the letters are to the word, that the bread and wine are to the Sacrament, *στοιχεῖα*, *litteræ*, *elementa*. What the

word is to the thought, that is the Sacrament to the cross. Only that the Sacrament, as it symbolises not a truth or thought, but an act, is an *acted* word, a deed, the community's response in kind to the act that made a community of it; and being an act, it has a reality in it, symbol though it be, which no material elements could have.

We repeat the word often; the thought is there once for all. The music is performed often: the composer's work stands there as a spiritual totality of achievement, render it as often as you will. We repeat often the symbolic act, but the work of Christ which is rendered in it is done once and for ever. That work, in a true (if guarded) sense, repeats itself in us when we obey in the memorial act. It is misleading to speak of the action in the Sacrament as merely symbolical, and not reiterant at all. It is not symbolical in any sense that would impair its relative reality. As the Romanists, with their false start from the elements, are forced to place under them the Lord's real body, so, starting from the true base of the action, we must own in it the real acting of the ever present Christ, the real operation of His work and cross, the real self-utterance of His undying death. It was the same will, in the same effort, that both died and enacted at the Supper the symbol of His death. And it is the same death which acted backwards, if we may so say, in the *institution* of the Sacrament, and which acts onwards in our *observance* of it. The Last Supper and Gethsemane forefelt and foredid the cross; rehearsed it, if such a word may fitly be applied to anything so absolutely real and so little dramatic in each case. Neither was a mere rehearsal, any more than our observance is, a mere repetition or commemoration. It is the same act and will uttering its fundamental reality in both, in its preludes as in our aftersong.

(3) We have, therefore, really a symbol behind a symbol. The broken bread stands for the broken body; the broken

body stands for the broken, bowed, but invincible will. The ultimate reality is the will's act. The great symbolism and sanctity, therefore, must be sought in the *breaking* of the bread and the *breaking* of the body, and the *partaking*, not in the bread or the body as elements *per se*. The true vehicle and symbol of an act is not an element, but a living body capable of acting. A substance might symbolise a substance, as bread the body. But only an act can symbolise an act, the material act the spiritual. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, but that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. But every act is a spiritual thing. It is an act that the symbolism ends in, and therefore action is the region it all moves in. The acted symbol, especially at the first supper, is thus more than a symbol. It is part of the reality symbolised. It is the utterance of the same act of will. It was the same will that broke the bread and bowed on the cross. And it did both in the strain and exercise of the one spiritual act that redeemed, the *actus purus* extended through Christ's total personality as its characteristic energy. The symbolism of the occasion, I repeat, lies in the action, not in the elements; and the real presence is the present action of the Saviour's will, not of His substance. It is there not for contemplation or adoration so much as for communion. We all hold to Christ's real presence in Communion; but if it is not in the substance, it must be in the act. The real presence of Christ is not in the elements nor in the air, but it is His act within our faithful act. Christianity means nothing if spirit cannot thus interpenetrate spirit, and act act. It is not on the altar He dwells, but in the common will surrendered and united to Him. It is not in the temple space, but in the community of the obedient Church. This points to a Sacramentalism which is much other than commemoration, and yet is the deathblow to Sacerdotalism. It ends the worship of the elements, and the monopoly by the priest of the consecrat-

ing function of the community. It is the faith of the present community that completes the act. The essence of the Sacrament is the common act of the common indwelling Lord, and the symbolic act ceases to be symbolic merely. It is profoundly real, and therefore alone profoundly religious. Our worship is no more subjective and sentimental, as commemoration must become. It is positive and objective. It is the act of God in its return to God; the Holy Spirit in sublime death returning to God that gave it. Every act of a revealing God is reflex, and is incomplete till it return in congenial response. The finished work includes a Church and a Church's acts.

The action is real on both sides. It is a real assignment of ourselves to Christ crucified; and it is a real assignment by Himself of Christ crucified for us, as I shall shortly show. I quite accept the old illustration given by Dr. Dale, and the validity of its distinction between a surrender of the keys by the governor of a besieged town, and a ceremony in which the forces of the besieger present him with keys emblematic of those he has won or is to win. It is a case of real offering and surrender in the Sacrament, both on our side and on Christ's. It is not dramatic, not ceremonial, not commemorative alone. As Christ *was* God's act of grace, and did not merely announce it, so our central worship is a real offering in return, and not the mere expression of surrender effected somewhere and sometime else. We offer ourselves anew. We utter in a solemn detail and special function the compendious act of consecration, which is the standing and decisive relation of our soul to God in Christ.

(4) But we do more. Such a view is still too subjective; it tends to be too introspective, and ends by being too sentimental. We make a more objective offering. Something in our hands we bring—something not ourselves which makes our righteousness. We bring Christ, and

offer Him far more truly than is done in the Mass. The great hold and power of that rite is due to the objectivity of the offering. This overrules for many a soul its falsity in that which is offered. Well, we do not offer His body and blood, but we do offer Himself and His act of death. We make His *soul* an offering for sin.

Men once offered Him up on the altar of their rage and hate. Man will go on now to offer Him for ever on the altar of his repentance, gratitude, and adoration. We have nothing else to give, and worship is giving. We can but bring to God what He has provided. What is the value of our sin-stained thanks in themselves to Him? What is the worth of our mere emotions, our faltering resolves? The broken, contrite mood is not necessarily the contrite heart which has broken with self and sin. What at least is the value of these things as a return for all that is meant by grace, forgiveness, redemption? We are not worthy even to thank Him but in a worthiness He Himself gives. That worth is Christ in us, in our praises, thanksgivings, Eucharists. It is only Christ in our praises and prayers that makes them worship. This is a truth which may seem to æsthetic, literary, or (most odious of all) stagey piety both narrow and inhumane. And, indeed, to a religion which is in the first place humanist and only sympathetic it must so seem. The sorrow of Christ is the agony of a strait gate. But it is mankind's only avenue to the Kingdom of Heaven; and it is this kingdom, and not Humanity, that is the ideal and principle of Christian faith. And the kingdom of God draws its value from Christ and Christ's death. The prophet was hallowed by the kingdom, but the kingdom is hallowed by the Christ. It is He in us who consecrates any feelings or deeds of ours to God. We have nothing to offer God but Christ and His Cross. It is not our warmth of feeling towards God that makes it welcome to Him, nor our obedience of act, nor our

sincerity of intention. This is the work of God to believe in Jesus Christ. It is our warmth, strength, or reality of faith that wings our worship. And faith makes us feel that no penitence, praise, prayer, or sincerity of ours is worth anything to God as worship except in the midst of them there is the Sacrifice of Christ once offered in time, and in the world of spirit continually being offered, especially in the life of souls dead in His death. In all our worship we are but giving Christ back to God. We are making His soul an offering who first offered Himself as God's offering. We are not simply remembering Him, but renewing in our spiritual experience that perpetual experience of His in which by faith we share. Our union with Him aspires to share His spiritual experience to-day, an experience in which the cross of Calvary is surely something much more integral and potent than a reminiscence; while its expression by us is for Him who acts through us surely far more than a memorial. His intercession, as the prolongation of His redeeming act, is surely more than that He—

“Still remembers in the skies
His tears, His agonies, and cries.”

All this is especially so in partaking of the Sacrament of His death. We are made priests unto God. We take Christ's offered soul in our hands, as it were, and offer Him to God, in no material fashion but in our redeemed experience as wills united with Him. All communicants have not come to realise this height of the matter as yet. They have stages to run, and initiations to undergo. But such is the goal and idea of the Church's Communion. We make His offered soul our soul's offering. We hallow into worship all our subjective experience by His objective work and its real presence. He not only stirs our emotions by His memory, but being in us, mingled with our experi-

ence, He consecrates them and carries them to God. He makes worship of them by creating them, and by incorporating our act with its parent act, with the sole, sufficient, and all-hallowing act of worship ever done to God, namely, His own soul's obedience, agony, victory, and praise. No religious excitement or energy is worship till sanctified thus, either within our knowledge or beyond.

(5) But I would go farther still, and say that in the Sacrament we have a real offering from Christ's part also. We can never, never hold against the sacerdotal churches till we are sacramentarian enough in our worship to go beyond them in the reality of the offering by exceeding them in its truth. We must offer, as I have said, not ourselves only to Christ, but Christ Himself to God. But also, going farther, we must furnish opportunity for Christ's renewed offering of Himself through us to the world. We have to do more than announce His gospel. We must transmit it. We have not only to preach Him, but give Him effect. We cannot redeem men to God, but we can do much to reconcile. That is a great sacramental function. It is Christ acting through His Church on the world. And with most Christians and many churches life is so little sacramental in its tone and reconciling in its effects because we are so far below the sacramental in our central worship. Our weakness before Rome and all that is Romeward lies in the poverty and subjectivity of our sacramental faith. Our churches are not in earnest with a sacramental view of life because we are nervous about a sacramental view of worship. We are more afraid of the priest than sure of the Presence. Mere protest is conducting us through Zwinglian attenuation to Socinian negation. We do not act in worship or life as if we were men in whom Christ crucified is offering Himself to the world, through the Church as its hope. We turn often from the sacraments with an impatience so rugged that it is more self-willed than honest,

and we say we will not observe them but live them. And certainly we succeed so far as that our living of them is without observation.

The Communion is an act of the Church moved by Christ in its midst. But if He is present in the act to which He inspires His Church, then He is acting by His Church, He is doing something. And on such an occasion that something can only be in some real sense the act of the Cross. The Cross is the central energy of His spiritual world, the focus of all the influences that constitute the kingdom of God. It is the real point of departure for the Holy Spirit, even if the resurrection was the point of emergence, and Pentecost the point of attachment for the Church. In such an act of the Church, therefore, Christ is in a real sense offering Himself. He is at least offering Himself continuously to the world as the Crucified, who was once, but for ever, offered *for* it. The Sacrament is always some real function of His Sacrifice—that is, of Himself in sacrifice, and not simply of us in response. It is a great act of preaching by the Church, which is the hierophant of an undying inspiration. It is practical preaching in the great sense of the term—which (as I have said) is not, in the day's phrase, preaching "conduct," but preaching by a great act, by a word which is really a deed, as the gospel word in its essence is. We do not repeat His Sacrifice as the Mass professes to do, but we do re-echo it in the only way an act can be re-echoed—by another act in which the initial act returns upon itself in kind as a real act of spiritual will, and not of institutional ritual. The priest *offers* a real sacrifice in each Mass. We in each Communion but *proffer* the real sacrifice offered once and always by Christ alone. But it is His offering all the same that is the active and efficient element in our proffering. His action is our real presence and power. We are not mere participants but factors in

the mighty act. It is by an act which is ours, but also and still more, Christ's own act in us. It is the living Christ re-asserting by act, through the Church which His death made, that one unique, infinite, sufficient death, never to be repeated even by Him, yet never to cease acting and reproducing itself in our will and deed. His death is, in our act as a Church, not simply recalled, not simply related, not simply witnessed to by us, as a report of old, forgotten, far-off things. To show forth the Lord's death, is, in a sense we are too timid about grasping, to re-enact it, to let it re-present itself in us as real action within real action, a real presence in real effect where the last reality lies—in the spiritual will. It is an act and energy of Christ Himself if He be His Church's life, if the outgoing focus of His life in the redeemed community be the act of redemption, and if the ingathered focus of our worship be the rite in which we act purely and only as souls redeemed. It is a function of Christ's ever vibrating act of present, undying death ever offered through the Church in the heart's region of spiritual reality to the soul, to the world, and to God.

The acting subject in the Sacrament, then, is first, Christ, and, second, the Church. "It is God that baptizes us," says the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, "and the minister only in His name." And the like applies to the real agent in the other Sacrament. But the Church acts as a community of individual believers. And on the part of each soul there is action which, symbolic as it is, is not prophetic or predicative, as the act of the community is, but appropriative. In the act of consuming the elements there is a symbol of that union between the person of Christ and the believer which is the soul of Christian faith. And it is a symbol which is not mere symbol, but such a function of loving union that in the act of commerce the reality is consummated and deepened. Here, again, it is

not so much the elements that are symbolic but the act. It is not the substances that meet—the spiritual substance of Christ under the elements and the spiritual substance of our soul. Such an idea is really materialist, however refined. It turns sacramental grace into something that can be infused in a sense too literal for spiritual safety. It opens the way to believe in an infusion of grace which incorporates it with our nature in a sub-conscious region independent of any intelligent spiritual activity of ours. The mysticism then becomes magic. We are transmuted without being converted, consecrated without being sanctified. It is not thus that grace works. It is not the Saviour's corporeity that is conveyed, however glorified. It is His Person and work acting from the eternal world on our person in its responsive work and receptive energy. Spirit with spirit meets, life with life. His flesh means His personality, His blood its distinctive native energy, namely, His redeeming work. It is on these we feed. His spirit and energy pass into ours in conscious communion. What meets is here again two wills in an act, two personalities in blended function. We may call this union mystic if we will, but it has none of the dangers of a mysticism conceived as the blending of two substances, however ethereal. It is intelligent, interpersonal, not fusion but interpenetration, the union of two moral beings in an act which is none the less a moral act that it transcends the limits of such a term. It is spiritual in the sense in which only beings of a moral nature destined for love and trust can be spiritual. It has the spirituality possible only to living persons. We appropriate Christ in the Sacrament, therefore, in no other way or measure than as we appropriate the gospel, the work of Christ for the conscience and on the conscience. The Sacrament of the word is the key to each Christian Sacrament. They exist for the sake of the word of the gospel. They have value according to the extent to which

they are charged with that and give it effect. And what the Lord's Supper conveys is not only the word made flesh, but still more made sin for us, the word as a living, acting, redeeming personality, in contact with our faith. What it effects is this union with the like personality in those who partake, who are forgiven, and who become the righteousness of God in Him.

It is the gospel which interprets the Sacraments, not the Sacraments the gospel. That is the grand principle of a Protestant sacramentarianism. The Sacraments depend on our idea of Redemption, on our kind of faith.

If we thus fix our symbolism on the proper point, and find it in the act rather than the elements, we gain two things. We transcend the jejune idea of a mere commemoration, upon which no Church can live, however a school, sect, or society may perpetuate it. And we escape from the evil sacramentalism which historically goes hand in hand with priestly prerogative, and which philosophically materialises heavenly things by spiritual ideas really drawn from the qualities of substance. It is impossible in course of time to escape the dangers of either extreme. Commemoration dries into lean Socinianism and a piety of parched commonsense. And the veiled materialism of the Mass appears in the general soul as a paganism and superstition which are a correct translation of the false sense underlying all.

A profound sacramentalism is the only exit from a false sacerdotalism.

And the writer cannot veil his conviction that much objection to it is more polemical than positive, more protesting than informed, and that it proceeds, in many pious cases, not from spiritual freedom, volume, or vitality, but from the autodidact's lack of spiritual depth, seriousness, and sequacity of thought.

P. T. FORSYTH.

THE ARTICLES OF THE APOSTLES' CREED.

XII. "THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS."

"THE forgiveness of sins," the greatest of the gifts of grace, and that which presupposes all others, has stood in this place from time immemorial. It describes the present state of salvation, in opposition to the state of guilt before believing, and outside the Holy Church, as well as in opposition to the state of perfection, in which no sin and no more remembrance of sin affecting the life of men will exist. Certainly where "forgiveness of sins" is there is also life and blessedness, and as certainly the new life, belonging to this present time, of the justified and reconciled longs for and reaches forth to its completion. Therefore the Confession cannot end better than with the attestation of this hope. But every one must also acknowledge that our Creed is to be preferred to the Roman, because it does not end with the attainments of "the resurrection of the dead" but with "eternal life." Those also who adhere to the Roman Creed, which has not got this beautiful conclusion, have endeavoured in many ways to supply the deficiency.¹ This conclusion is not original, for then it would be inexplicable why it should have been cut off in Rome. However it is immaterial that we do not know when and where it was added. "The resurrection of the flesh," which gives to the Christian hope of an everlasting life its peculiar character, has, so far as we know, never been wanting. We cannot well contradict our great Reformer when he says in the long Catechism that this is not well

¹ So Marcellus (see p. 390 n. 1, vol. vii.); so Augustine twice in commentaries on the Milanese form, *i.e.* the Roman Creed; so also many creeds which in other respects are essentially identical with the Roman, or are more nearly related to it than to our Apostles' Creed, such as that of Ravenna (Hahn, p. 25) the African (Hahn, pp. 31, 33, 34); also a similar one in the Appendix to the Sacramentary of Bobbio (see p. 141, n. 4, *supra*).

expressed in German, and when he goes on to say: "In good German we should speak of the resurrection of the body or of the corpse, but this is of no great importance as long as we understand the word rightly." It is to be noticed that Luther as a translator of the Bible did not hesitate to write "flesh"¹ in countless passages where the Bible, like the Creed, uses the Semitic word "flesh" in a sense which deviates much more from the common German and the Western mode of speech in general. Further, it is obvious that Luther's scruple has nothing to do with criticisms of the hopes of the resurrection of the flesh which have been founded on the Resurrection of Christ and before that on Christ's word and deed. They raise the question on their own account. The plain and unequivocal expression of it had already in Apostolic times been very needful. Where heathen views, as in Corinth, still exercised power over the modes of thought of the newly converted, natural reflection, after their first acceptance of the Gospel, immediately withstood this portion of it. They acquiesced in the Resurrection of Christ, and without exactly disputing life after death they denied the future resurrection of the dead. We know from St. Paul's refutation that this expectation was looked upon as absurd. Others were more careful in their opposition to the Christian Confession. They gave out that they also on their side believed in a resurrection of the dead, only it must be rightly understood. The resurrection of the dead had already taken place,² clearly not in the special sense which the preaching of Jesus and His Apostles connected with the words, "the dead will rise again." This was only a figurative expression for an event of quite another nature, which often repeated itself.

¹ *E.g.* John 8. 15; 17. 2; Romans 8. 20; 11. 14. Elsewhere he translates it "man," *e.g.* Matt. 24. 22.

² 2 Tim. 2. 18. On the misinterpretations here supposed, cf. *Hist. of the Canon*, II. 901 f.

Early enough we hear of allegorical misinterpretations by which this marvellous statement was justified. The dead were raised when unbelieving heathen attained to a Christian confession of God, and a certain kind of resurrection from the dead is experienced by many men who beget children; while they themselves are tottering to the grave they live again, and when they are dead they live on in their children. There was thus a resurrection of the flesh side by side with a resurrection of the spirit. Marcion had already before him the testimony of Jesus and of the Apostle Paul, which had been committed to writing. He remodelled both from what was, according to his idea, an uncorrupted gospel, but it was one which had never been written before his time. He disputed the resurrection of the flesh, that is of the body, and maintained that the soul only would be saved. St. Paul's judgment (1 Cor. 15. 50) that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God"¹ furnished him and others with their chief argument, but it was one which had been used by others before Marcion to controvert the real Resurrection of the buried Body of Jesus.² In the time of Irenæus all the opponents of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection appealed to this statement.³ It was also the hobby-horse of the Manicheans.⁴ But many who pretend to be theologians in the nineteenth century ride it still more proudly than their predecessors, when they maintain that the confession of "the resurrection of the flesh" is in direct opposition to the doctrine of St. Paul. The Fathers of the Church from Justin to Augustine have already given the right answer: Only that

¹ Tertull. *de carne Christi*, 48; c. *Marc.* V. 9, 10. Cf. *Hist. of the Canon*, I. 615, and the fragment of Justin's work on the Resurrection in Methodius, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.* VIII. 6; Bonwetsch, *Methodius*, p. 232.

² Iren. 1, 30, 13. The disciples are said to have misinterpreted the appearances of the Risen One from ignorance of this saying.

³ Iren. V. 9, 1; Tertull. *de carne Christi*, 48.

⁴ August. c. *Faustum*, XVI. 29; c. *Adimantum*, 12. 4; c. *advers. legis*, 6. 22; cf. *de agone christ.* 31. 33; *retract.* I. 17, 22; II. 8.

which has fallen can rise again. It is therefore meaningless to talk of the resurrection of the dead when all that is meant by it is a continuation of the life of the spirit when freed from the body by death. As Augustine says, with reference to St. Paul's statement, the chapter in which it is found should be read right through instead of deceitfully tearing a sentence from the context and holding fast to that alone. "Only read it through," says Augustine; "a commentary is needless, for the matter is not obscure." "Flesh and blood" here, as everywhere else in the Bible, means man as he is by birth and nature. Since such an one, as Jesus Himself taught, cannot inherit the kingdom of God, St. Paul exhorts all to bear the likeness of the second Adam, the risen and glorified Saviour, in this life.¹ But on this same truth is also founded the confident hope that the bodily life, which Christians shall win again through the resurrection, will not be a repetition of that which became theirs by birth, but will be like unto the Body of the Risen Jesus, transformed, spiritualized, transfigured, and yet a bodily life and therefore flesh. The verse 1 Corinthians 15. 39 shows that St. Paul includes in the expression "the flesh" the spiritual body of the Risen Christ and that of the Christians who attain to the Resurrection. For he shows by examples taken from ordinary natural history that "all flesh is not the same flesh," in the very passage in which he opposes the absurd consequences which would arise from the complete identity and similarity of the present body with the future. He then exchanges the word "flesh" for its synonym "body," and shows how, even in this world, the most varied degrees of glory may exist in bodily appearances. All this must be taken into account in speaking of the resurrection of the dead. A

¹ Thus especially Tertullian *c. Marc.* V. 10, on the ground of the right reading (*portemus, inquit, non portabimus, præceptive non promissive*). Cf. Col. iii. 9 Eph. iv. 22 ff.

spiritual body, a body of flesh that has been changed and transfigured by the spirit, is, according to St. Paul, to be looked for at the return of the Lord for those Christians who shall be living upon the earth as well as for the dead. These are in substance the thoughts with which the Fathers from the second to the fifth century opposed the attempts that were made to set aside by means of Biblical words the doctrine of the Bible on the resurrection of the dead. They still suffice to-day.

It cannot be said that the expression "resurrection of the flesh," which is founded on the Bible,¹ and which is familiar in the Creed and in early Church literature, ever gave rise to serious misapprehension. The Church of Lyons records, with the calmness born of the faith which has overcome the world, that in the year 177 the heathen persecutors burnt the bodies of the martyrs and threw their ashes into the Rhone. The chroniclers add only: "This they did as though they could overcome God and rob the martyrs of the new birth (of their bodies). They did it, as they say, that they might have no hope of the resurrection, in the confidence of which they have introduced a new and a strange religion amongst us, despising torments and ready to face death with joy. Now let us see whether they will rise again, and whether their God will help them and deliver them out of our hands."

It was the custom in some Churches, when the baptismal confession was made, to say, "I believe in the resurrection of this flesh."² The confessor made at the same time the sign of the cross on his forehead or his breast, meaning

¹ Cf. Luke 24. 39; Acts 2. 26, 31; Clem. I. Cor. 26 (in which a quotation from Job 19. 26 is introduced); Herm. Sim. V. 7, 2 (This thy flesh, the same); Clem. II. Cor. 9; Ign. Smyrn. 3; Justin, *dial.* 80 *extr.*; the fragments of a genuine history of his on the resurrection, c. 2 ff. (Otto II.³, 214 ff.).

² Rufinus, c. 36, 41, 43, 45-47; Nicetas (Caspary, *Anecd.* p. 357 f.); *Pseudo-aug. Sermo* 242; *Liturgia Mozar.* (Hahn, p. 36); *Missale Florentinum* in Caspary, IV. 302 (n. 73).

thereby: This my mortal body shall be made worthy of eternal life. That might have given rise to misconceptions, but I do not know that the literature of the early Church contains any words on the resurrection so ambiguous as those contained in one verse of the glorious hymn on the resurrection composed by the Electress Louisa Henrietta. The preachers who accept that formula and comment on it do not neglect to remind us that the body which we hope for is a spiritual body, raised above all the meanness and weakness of this present life. Only the fervour of the personal appropriation of the confession of the community could find expression in this definition of the Creed. If ever the danger should arise that the faith of the confessing community were to draw unwholesome nourishment from the words "resurrection of the flesh," which degenerated into the superstition, that our life in eternity would be similar to our life on earth, there would be nothing to prevent the substitution of "a resurrection of the body" for these words, as Luther wished; or, as is the practice of many Eastern creeds, "the resurrection of the dead." It is even quite possible that the latter expression in the Creed was the original one, and was only later explained by the plainer expression, "resurrection of the flesh," in opposition to the various misinterpretations which have been cropping up ever since the days of S. Paul.¹ But I have never seen the slightest sign of that danger, and I imagine that in this and many other respects we find ourselves in a similar position to the Christians of the second century, who expressly confessed "the resurrection of the flesh" in order that they might not give up that which was peculiar to their Christian hope.

The results of this investigation may be summed up as

¹ Cf. the reflections of Caspari, III. 154-161, which do not exhaust the subject.

follows. Judging from its contents our Creed has a full right to the title Apostolical. It does not contain one sentence which cannot be well derived from the history and teaching of Jesus and the explanatory and illustrative teaching and preaching of the Apostles. It answers also in a remarkable manner to its original use as a baptismal confession, and as a plain, popular confession of the Christian faith of the community. For it does not contain a single sentence which does not correspond with an event in the historical revelation of God essential for sanctifying faith. It contains in classic brevity, in rhythmic melody, and with a completeness attained by no other confession, all that a Christian ought to remember if he would find all his consolation and his joy in that which God has done through Christ,—in this must be included the creation,—and in all that He has promised yet to do for our complete redemption through Christ. The picture of Jesus going in and out amongst His people as teacher and benefactor has been found wanting. Must a confession that is used at Baptisms and Confirmations relate Bible history? This history will not admit of a compendious abridgment in a few words. Its charm and its winning credibility are found in its epic breadth. Surely a "character sketch" of Jesus does not belong to a formula of confession. Who could draw it so that all would believe in it? What has already been said in olden times of the pictorial representation of Jesus applies also here: "It is well that the painters have not been able to paint a single picture of the Lord that is satisfactory to all."¹ Jesus Himself has made known His character for us as far as was necessary, above all in the good confession which He witnessed, suffering before Pontius Pilate, and through the sacrifice of His life on the Cross, to which His whole life of service pointed

¹ Cf. my *Acta Joannis*, p. 214, 7.

from the very beginning.¹ The Cross is the best compendium of the Gospel history. St. Paul as a mission-preacher at times confined himself exclusively to this compendium of the Gospel (1 Cor. 2. 2). Whoever has taken the story of the Cross to heart will also know how to value the history which took place between the Virgin birth and the Crucifixion, and will willingly listen to the Evangelists, while they relate it to him again in its manifold fullness of life. Neither will he find fault with the Evangelists because they are almost silent on the first thirty years of the life of Jesus, on "the formation of His character" and His "moral development."

It has been said that an instructive explanation of the deeds recorded and the expression of their evangelical meaning are wanting. But is not this supposed deficiency in the Creed really an advantage? As long as our Gospels (Evangelien) bear this name we may call the simple recital of facts Evangelical (evangelisch), instead of framing them with wordy reflections. For the educational purposes for which the Creed still serves it is really an advantage that it allows the teacher freedom of movement. Also for the continual liturgical use of the Creed it is a great blessing that it does not express reflections resting on instructive thoughts, which we should be obliged to make our own in thought and word, but that it places before our eyes in broad outline the wonderful works of God. As long as we cherish these in faith and appropriate them to ourselves they are as little likely to grow old and wearisome as the rising and setting of the sun every day on which God permits us to behold the beauty of His works. How many priceless productions of Christian thought we owe to this quality of our Creed! To mention only one example, which has not yet grown

¹ Matt. 20. 28; cf. John 1. 29; 2. 17-22.

old. L. A. Petri's meditations on the Creed,¹ according to my view contain infinitely more understanding of Christian truth and experience of the heights and depths of human life and the strength of healthy, sound thought, than all the literature as yet produced by the advanced theological school of the present day, and that too in language which derives its strength and dignity from its truthfulness.

When we consider the importance of the Creed as "a rule of truth" for the community and its teachers, the matter-of-fact nature of its contents is another advantage over which we may well rejoice. The more reflections on the nature of faith that a creed contains the more it bears traces of the common modes of thought, the theological culture and the ecclesiastical conflicts of the period in which it arose. The more transitory it is in its nature the less does it serve as the suitable expression of Christian faith for all times, which the Lord when He comes again hopes to find, not in many, it is true, but in some. The later Church confessions were an historical necessity in order to preserve the faith against distortion and misrepresentation. But higher than all these formulæ of Christian truth as opposed to error stands the ancient, simple confession of Christianity. It states what God has done for us in Christ, what He daily does in us and will yet do if we cast not away our trust but hold fast to our confession.

Finally, the Creed has one advantage over most of the other confessions, which divide those who bear the name of Christians, in that it unites them. The Creed maintains in Western Christendom the same out-and-out predominating superiority over all others as a popular confession that it does with us. It is not even true that the Greek Church has never acknowledged the Western Creed, nor allowed the Apostolic origin of their own baptismal confession.

¹ Dr. L. A. Petri, *The Faith in Short Meditations*, 3rd ed., Hanover, 1872.

The fable of the composition of the original Creed by the united deliberations of the Apostles¹ was certainly not invented by Ambrose and Rufinus and other men of Latin speech, who may have related it before them, but was brought over from the East. We find its characteristic features in a treatise of the third century, originally written in Greek, which is called *The Catholic Teaching of the Twelve Apostles and Holy Disciples of the Redeemer*. It is described as a work composed by the Apostles themselves very soon after the Council of the Apostles A.D. 5. This book, commonly called the "Didascalia," does not contain the exact words of a fixed baptismal confession as it had been composed by the Apostles, only many points of agreement with such a confession.² But the germ of the fable is to be found in the following narrative in the Didascalia: "We, the Apostles, gathered ourselves together in Jerusalem and consulted what should be done. We agreed unanimously to write this Catholic Didascalia for the strengthening of you all in that which we hold fast. You must honour God the Almighty and Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost, and you must exercise yourselves in the Holy Scriptures and believe in the resurrection of the dead, and use all creatures with thanksgiving." The confession of the Triune God is placed foremost among the doctrines enumerated by the Apostolic Council. I am unable to trace back the further development of this idea in the Greek Church. Nevertheless it lived on there. In the letter of Leo the Great to Flavian, the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Roman Creed of that time is spoken of as "the purest source of the Christian faith." It is praised as the common confession of all the baptized on earth, quoted in sections word for word, solemnly approved

¹ Cf. pp. 4, 10 n. 1, Germ. ed.

² Cf. p. 47, n. 1 (Germ. ed.). I have translated Lagarde's text, p. 102 ff., without giving the additions of the second hand.

and formally canonized by the fourth General Council of Chalcedon (451). The Greek Bishops at the Council exclaimed directly after it had been read: "This is the faith of the Fathers. This is the faith of the Apostles."¹

Even more than this was done at the Trullan Council of the year 692, the so-called *Concilium quini-sextum*. The fathers of this council in their first canon confess "that which was delivered by the eye-witnesses and servants of the Word, the Apostles of the Church chosen by God. They then acknowledge the faith more exactly determined by the 318 fathers of Nicæa against Arius, as well as the five Œcumenical Councils which followed."² We can only understand by this that the Greeks wished to point to that confession which was in use among them as a baptismal confession, before and for a considerable time after the Council of Nicæa, as an inheritance from the times of the Apostles, even as a work of the Apostles. This opinion of the bishops in the year 692 is of as little importance as the Eastern legend of the composition of the Creed from the contributions of the twelve Apostles. But both views are nevertheless embodiments of the historical truth that the first outline of the Creed arose in the time of the Apostles, and therefore most certainly not without their aid. History, not legend, gives us a right to the ennobling thought that in and with our Creed we confess that which since the days of the Apostles has been the faith of united Christendom.

THEOD. ZAHN.

¹ Hefele, *Hist. of Councils*, II.², 440 ff., 453 f., 547. The scruples of some bishops did not refer to this.

² Bruns' *Canones apost. et conc.* I. 34. Professor Fr. Nieldson, of Copenhagen, was kind enough to point this out to me. No other explanation is satisfactory. Cf. Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, III.² 330. "The declaration of their adherence to the Apostolic Creed," etc. The difference between this canon and the first canon of the Council of Chalcedon should be noticed. Bruns, p. 25; and also Hefele, II. 505.

DELIVERING TO SATAN.

THERE are two passages in the Epistles in which the phrase, "to deliver unto Satan," is used in the one with reference to the incestuous Corinthian (1 Cor. v. 3-5), in the other with reference to Hymenæus and Alexander, who had thrust from themselves (I use the language of R.V.) faith and a good conscience, and had made shipwreck concerning the faith (1 Tim. i. 20). I propose to examine these passages, more particularly the first. They run thus:

For I verily, being absent in body but present in spirit, have already, as though I were present, judged him that hath so wrought this thing, in the name of our Lord Jesus, ye being gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus, to deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.

. . . Hymenæus and Alexander; whom I delivered unto Satan, that they might be taught not to blaspheme.

It is obvious, on the slightest perusal of the passage, that we have portrayed to us a very solemn and awful ecclesiastical function. The whole ecclesia, or assembly, of the Church, the entire body of those that "are sanctified in Christ Jesus called to be saints" (1 Cor. i. 2), is to gather together in solemn conclave. This the Apostle has determined upon after due consideration, for this, I think, is implied in the word "already." He was far away from the Corinthians at Ephesus, but had had them constantly in his mind. Though he was absent from them in the body, his spirit was, as it were, present with them, and he had discussed the matter with himself as to what he would have done if he had been present with them. This was his decision. His whole spirit was on fire with righteous indignation. They had not half realized the guiltiness of

the sinner. "Ye are puffed up, and did not rather mourn, that he that had done this thing might be taken away from among you" (1 Cor. v. 2). He knew what ought to be done to the man who had "so wrought this thing." They must remember that, when they met in this solemn way, they were to be gathered together "in the name of our Lord Jesus." They were to realize that Jesus Christ, who had promised to be with two or three gathered together in His Name, would be there present with them "with power." St. Paul tells them what to do, claiming authority for himself as an Apostle, but with the deepest conviction that in what he is saying he has the spirit of Jesus. The guilty person, and any like him—for St. Paul seems here to be laying down a general rule—are to be delivered unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh. Handed over to Satan; but what for? That this punishment may result in the spirit being saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. It is St. Paul's sentence which the Christian community ratify (for so it must be taken) and adopt as their own.

A similar conclave we must imagine to have been held in the case of Hymenæus and Alexander. It is St. Paul's sentence again, "whom I delivered unto Satan." There is no direct mention here of the temporal character of the punishment, but it is implied in the object of the delivering to Satan: "that they might be taught not to blaspheme." Whether these three guilty persons were led to repentance through bodily suffering or not we know not; Hymenæus, at any rate, about two years later, seems still to have been occupied in overthrowing the faith of others (2 Tim. ii. 18).

I do not propose to go any further into the character of the punishment or its relation to ecclesiastical excommunication. I desire rather to look backwards. Was there anything which suggested to St. Paul to do exactly what he did do? There certainly was. The infliction of temporary

bodily afflictions is attributed both in the Old and in the New Testament to Satan, notably in the case of Job in the Old Testament. But the parallel which can be drawn between this delivering to Satan and what we are told in the Book of Job has never been, to my knowledge, fully drawn out. When it is, it seems to suggest that the Apostle had this, at any rate, in his mind when he issued his instructions to the Corinthian Church.

In the New Testament the sanctified in Christ Jesus, those who have been made "children of God" and admitted into His Church, are to assemble together. In the Old Testament "the sons of God" assemble themselves, those who are dedicated to God's service. None would be absent in this assembly any more than in the other. It is such a solemn occasion as that of which Micaiah spoke: "I saw the Lord sitting on His throne, and all the host of heaven standing by Him on His right hand and on His left" (1 Kings xxii. 19), and in both cases the evil spirit, or Satan, was close at hand. In the New Testament the assembly is to be held as if it were acting with the Lord present in bodily form with it. In the Old Testament "the Lord" (the title used in the case of any manifestation of the Godhead; see, *e.g.*, Gen. xviii.) is there present in visible form, presiding over the assembly of the sons of God. "The Lord" was present in that assembly "with power," just as St. Paul said His power was to be present with the Corinthians. In the New Testament the person dealt with had sinned. In the Old Testament, though we are told that in the time of trial Job did not sin, and that there was "none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and escheweth evil" (Job i. 8, 22), yet Job himself is the first to acknowledge his own unworthiness, and, while still undelivered, to repent in dust and ashes. In both cases the person arraigned is delivered to Satan. Job's affliction was for

his perfecting. The object in the New Testament was the salvation of the sinner, that, on his repentance, his soul might be saved in the day of the Lord and have infinite blessings. In the Old Testament, when Job has undergone his godly discipline, the Lord accepts Job, as He will accept every true penitent, and blesses his latter end more than his beginning. In this way the comparison between the story of Job and the directions of St. Paul to the Corinthian Church can be drawn out. The resemblance, of course, is not exact; just as type and anti-type never exactly correspond. But enough has surely been said to show that there is apparently some connection between St. Paul's mode of dealing with the open transgressors of his time and the mode of action in the heavenly Court as depicted in the Book of Job.

HENRY A. REDPATH.

*A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE GALATIANS.*

XXIV. GREEK LAW IN GALATIAN CITIES.

IN the preceding section we noticed that Paul assumes among his Galatian readers familiarity with a certain system and state of legal procedure. They are expected to catch at once the sense of an allusion to the identity and equivalence of the ideas Adoption and Heirship. There must therefore have existed around them in actual practice a system of law, according to which an heir was called a son in ordinary language and usage. To what part of Asia Minor does this fact point?

The mere fact that a regular testamentary system is implied proves that the old native condition of society had been replaced in the Galatian territory by a western civilization: the system of wills and will-making, wherever

it is traceable at that period, was derived either from Greece or from Rome.¹ This consideration shuts out those parts of Asia Minor where there is reason to think that the native Anatolian society still continued almost wholly free from admixture of western manners. Such parts were, *e.g.*, Cappadocia, inner Pontus (*i.e.* Galatic Pontus and Cappadocic Pontus), Cilicia Tracheia, and, in general, all the country districts—as distinguished from the cities—over almost the whole of Asia Minor (except perhaps the *Ægean* coast-lands, where even the rustics may perhaps have been to a certain extent Græcized at an early time). Western manners and ideas were confined to the cities, and hardly penetrated into the rustic parts until they were carried there by Christianity. Paul, therefore, must have been addressing churches situated in the cities, not in the rural portions of Asia Minor.

Again, Roman manners had not been superimposed directly on native ways among the people whom Paul addressed. They were familiar with Greek rather than with Roman procedure; and Paul's illustration is drawn from Greek legal expression. It is therefore obvious that, as Greek law would not be introduced after the Romans had occupied the country, there must have been a period before the Roman conquest when Greek law ruled in the Galatic territory.

Such would be the case with the country ruled by the Seleucid, or the Pergamenian, or the Bithynian kings. All of them, including even the Bithynian princes, had, beyond a doubt, established the Greek principles of society and law in their dominions. These principles, of course, were pretty much confined to the cities, and did not affect the rural population. But in these countries it is clear

¹ The excellent paper of Dr. W. E. Ball, already quoted, suffers from the assumption that a system of will-making must have been learned from Rome. He forgot Greece. See *Contemporary Review*, Aug., 1891, p. 278.

from the inscriptions that the cities possessed an organized municipal government of the Greek type, cultivated Greek manners and education, and used the Greek language.

The Pontic and Cappadocian kings are more doubtful ; but, in all probability, Greek civilization was spread very little by their influence in their dominions. It is true that Greek was spoken at their courts to a certain (or uncertain) extent, and their coins bore Greek legends, but hardly the slightest trace of Greek city organization, except in the Greek colonies of the coast, can be detected dating from their time. Amasia is called a city by Strabo (about A.D. 19), and a *polis* may probably be understood to have enjoyed something of a Greek organization ; but this was probably due rather to the natural expansion of Greek manners and trade than to the intention of any Mithridates. Similarly, in Cappadocia, Mazaka and Tyana are called cities by Strabo.

But as to Galatia Proper, the country of the Gauls, the case is almost free from doubt. The sketch of Galatian administration drawn by Strabo as existing before the Roman conquest is purely Gallic, and shows not a trace of the Greek character. Even Ancyra, the Galatian capital, he speaks about as a "fortress" (*φρούριον*), avoiding the title *polis*. So far as natural probability and formal evidence go, we must say that in Galatia Roman principles of organization were superinduced directly on the Gallic social customs without the intervention of a period of Greek society and law.

The only time during which any attempt to introduce Greek law into Galatia can possibly be looked for is during the reign of Amyntas, 37-25 B.C. But Amyntas was a dependent and creature of Rome ; he was intended to prepare the country for absorption by Rome ; and his reign was spent in making conquests and waging wars rather than in spreading Greek among the Gauls.

Naturally, even in North Galatia, Greek trade had probably spread Greek manners to some degree in the towns, but none of them except Pessinus¹ seems to have any Greek municipal organization. The whole evidence, such as it is, points to the view that the Græco-Roman constitution was first imparted to them under Roman government. It is the natural and probable view that the character of North-Galatian institutions was more like the condition of Roman Gaul than that of the surrounding Asiatic districts. Hence Galatia Proper long continued to hold a unique position in Asia; and, as we see in Basil of Cæsarea and Gregory of Nyssa,² the Galatians were disliked and despised by their neighbours as being rude, *i.e.* less Greek than the other nations. Ancyra was one of the greatest and most splendid cities of Asia Minor, but it seems to have been far more western and Roman than the cities of Asia. The evidence of Jerome, who recognised the Gallic dialect spoken in North Galatia as similar to that spoken among the Treveri, is one of those conclusive pieces of evidence which cannot be eluded or minimized. The only way open to those who refuse to accept the necessary inference from it is to say that Jerome deserves no credit, and to treat his statement as a blunder or a falsehood; but this unscientific and "barbarian" method of treating historical evidence will probably not be persisted in, since Mommsen has accepted and justified Jerome's testimony.

A writer who had lived among the Galatians would not be likely to draw his illustrations from Greek law, but from

¹ Strabo calls Pessinus an *emporion* and a *polis*; but any municipal organization that existed in the town would be due to its partial freedom from Gallic rule. Strabo describes it as ruled formerly after the Anatolian fashion by priest-dynasts: in his own time the priests had lost much of their power, and we may suppose that Greek and Gallic fashions had both come in alongside of the native. Half of the priests at this late time were Gauls, and half, presumably, of the old families (see art. *Galatia* in Hastings' *Dict. Bib.*, and Körte in *Philolog. Wochenschrift*, 1898, p. 8).

² See *Hist. Geogr. of Asia Minor*, p. 288, and Basil, *Ep.* 207, 1.

Roman law ; and the Roman law that was known in Galatia must have been that which was current in the period after the province was constituted, B.C. 25.

From this point of view, as from every other, we find that the Epistle was not addressed to a people of Gallic origin, but to the cities of Southern Galatia, Antiocheia, the Seleucid foundation, and the neighbouring cities, ruled for a century by the Greek kings, lying on one of the main thoroughfares of Greek trade, and exposed to Greek influence almost continuously after the conquest by Alexander the Great.¹ It is indeed probable (as I believe, though no one else as yet has expressed the opinion) that the Galatian chiefs, and thereafter the Pontic kings, ruled Iconium in the latter part of the second and the early part of the first century B.C. ; but Greek customs, once established, were too vigorous to yield to barbarism, and were maintained by the trading connexion.

XXV. THE METAPHOR IN ROMANS IV. 11.

The objection will, perhaps, be made that in the Epistle to the Romans there occurs the same idea, that the common possession of faith constitutes a relationship of father and sons between Abraham and the Gentile Christians. Hence it may be argued that, if the idea could be expressed to a people who lived in Rome, its statement to the Galatians does not imply that they lived under Greek law.

But the analogy between the language of *Galatians* and *Romans* in this point is only apparent ; and the difference between them furnishes a conclusive proof of our case.

Paul has to explain the same idea in both letters ; but he does it in different ways and by different illustrations. To the Galatians he says, Your possession of Abraham's property proves that you are his sons. To the Romans he

¹ Even in the time of Xenophon, Iconium was a *polis*, *Anab.* I. 2, 19.

says, Abraham's possession of the same quality that you possess fits him to be your father; and "circumcision was given to Abraham, like a seal affixed to a document; the reason being that he might be the spiritual father alike of two divergent classes—believing Gentiles and believing Jews."¹

The two expressions are only different metaphors to express the same fact; but the metaphor in each case is chosen to suit the reader—for the Galatians, a metaphor founded on Greek law; for the Romans, a metaphor founded on the customary usage of the word *pater*. Both in law and in common language *pater* in Rome had a much wider sense than "father" in English: the *pater* is the chief, the lord, the master, the leader. Æneas is the *pater* of all his followers. He who has the proper qualifications becomes the *pater* of all to whom his qualifications constitute him a guide and leader and protector.

XXVI. *Οἱ ἐκ πίστεως.*

In this phrase and the opposite, *οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς*, we have two remarkable expressions, which we can trace in their genesis, until they gradually harden almost into technical terms and badges of two opposite parties. In fact, that is entirely the case with *οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς* in *Acts* xi. 2, where a long history is concentrated in a phrase.

The following words are practically only an expansion and re-expression, after it has passed through the medium of my own mind, of a letter, which Dr. Gifford kindly sent in answer to my questions, reviewing the stages of the development of the two phrases.

The phrase *ἐκ πίστεως* is used only once in the Septuagint—*Habakkuk* ii. 4—"The just shall live by his faith." Paul took this saying, connected it with *Genesis* xv. 6—

¹ Sanday and Headlam, p. 106.

"Abraham believed in the Lord, and He counted it to him for righteousness"—and founded on the two his doctrine of the righteousness that is of faith—*δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ πίστεως*.

It is plain that Paul had used these two sayings in his former preaching to the Galatians, for they are quoted as familiar truths, whose origin does not need to be formally mentioned, iii. 6-11. His doctrine, therefore, must have been explicitly set forth to them orally, and in the letter was merely recalled to their memory: faith is the source or root in man of righteousness and of life, which is an expression from a different point of view of the principle studied in Section XXII., that the belief in Christ becomes a life-giving power, ruling the nature of him who feels it.

Comparing the language of the whole passage, beginning ii. 15, we see that *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως* is an abbreviated expression equivalent to *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοθέντες*; see ii. 16, *ἵνα δικαιοθῶμεν ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*; iii. 2, *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου τὸ πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε ἢ ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως*; iii. 8, *ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοὶ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ θεός*. Already the phrase seems to have a stereotyped form, and to imply a suppressed thought with which the readers were familiar. Paul, therefore, in his teaching to the Galatians, must already have insisted on the distinction *ἐκ πίστεως* and *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* (or *ἐκ περιτομῆς*); and hence he could use such concise and pregnant language to those who already had heard, when he desired to revivify in their mind the early lessons.¹

But in writing to the Roman Church, Paul was addressing a body of Christians who had never listened (except a few individuals) to his doctrine; and he therefore explained his meaning more fully to them. In that letter we read what was the kind of teaching which Paul in his preaching set before the Galatians, and which he assumes

¹ See above.

in his Epistle as familiar to them.¹ His Gospel was evidently exactly the same, and quite as fully thought out in Galatia in A.D. 47-48, as in Corinth in January or February A.D. 57. He saw the truth at his conversion at once and for ever. Thereafter there was no further progress or development in his Gospel, though there was undoubtedly a great development on the practical side, as regards the way and the accompaniments by which the Gospel was to be spread through the Gentile world, to which he was from the first commissioned to preach it.

In *Romans* i. 17, Paul declares that the revelation in man of "the righteousness of God begins from faith and leads on to fuller faith," ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, and he quotes *Habakkuk* ii. 4.

It is noteworthy that He gives the last words as a formal quotation, when writing to those who had not heard his teaching; but to the Galatians He uses them as a familiar axiom.

Faith, then, is the beginning and the end of man's part in the reception of the righteousness of God; and this is emphasized in iii. 21-22, "apart from the law righteousness hath been manifested," and iii. 28, "a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the Law."

Paul had always in mind the idea of his opponents that faith was only one element in the reception of righteousness, that "apart from the Law righteousness is not fully manifested," that "a man is justified fully by faith conjoined with the works of the Law." Against that view Paul always appealed to the authority "by works of Law shall no flesh be justified" (*Gal.* ii. 16, *Rom.* iii. 20.) The Law is a preliminary, aiding to produce that profound conviction of sin, which is a necessary step towards justification, because it exhibits so clearly to man his own sin.

¹ *Romans* is thus on a logical earlier stage than *Galatians*, but the circumstances show that logical priority does not (as some scholars assume) imply chronological priority.

Another pair of antithetical phrases is διὰ πίστεως and διὰ νόμου (*Gal.* ii. 16, 19, *Rom.* iii. 25, 30). This seems to indicate the indispensable condition or means for the continued operation of the cause or source.

The exact point in dispute between Paul and the Judaizing Christians must be kept in mind. Both sides were Christians. Both held that belief in Christ was indispensable to salvation, that righteousness in man could not exist without faith. But the Judaizers held that the Law and Circumcision were also indispensable to at least the fullest stage of righteousness. They were the party of believers who set the Law alongside of faith; and it would appear from *Galatians* ii. 16 that Paul represents His opponents' view as being that in the Jew righteousness came from works of Law through (*i.e.* on condition of) faith, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου διὰ πίστεως. Hence the Judaistic part of the Christians were οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς πιστοί, as they are called in *Acts* x. 45.¹

In regard to the Gentiles the view of Paul's opponents was expressed in the form that righteousness in them comes ἐκ πίστεως διὰ νόμου.

In both cases alike Paul maintained the origin ἐκ πίστεως καὶ διὰ πίστεως. His formula agrees always with half of theirs; and when he contradicts them, he only contradicts the discrepant half of their formula. Hence we find the contradictions thus :

	JUDAISTIC.	PAULINE.
Jews .	ἐκ νόμου διὰ πίστεως.	ἐκ πίστεως (καὶ διὰ πίστεως).
Gentiles	ἐκ πίστεως διὰ νόμου.	(ἐκ πίστεως καὶ) διὰ πίστεως.

¹ In *Acts* xi. 2, the title is used in a still further abbreviated form οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς: but the meaning is the same, and the idea πιστοὶ has to be supplied in thought.

Accordingly, in Rom. iii. 30, God δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως, *i.e.* the Gentiles (from faith and) through the continued operation of their faith.

Finally, the motive power in the process is expressed by the dative, χάριτι, *Romans* iii. 24; *Ephesians* ii. 8.

As the distinction between an indispensable condition and a source is very fine, the use of διὰ and ἐκ is hard to keep apart. But it is noteworthy that we never find the party names οἱ διὰ, but only οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, οἱ ἐκ νόμου, οἱ ἐκ πίστεως. In most places ἐκ expresses the fundamental thought; and διὰ is used much more rarely.

In the two passages quoted from *Acts* the Pauline expression has crystallized into a title and the badge of a party. But in that case it is clear that the author of *Acts* understood the two opposing parties to be already constituted when he applies to one of them the technical term. They who hold the view that the author was a remarkably accurate describer of events must conclude that he intentionally chose the technical term in order to show that the antithesis between the two views was already clear and definite.

XXVII. GALATIANS III. 15-18.

An illustration from the ordinary facts of society, as it existed in the Galatian cities, is here stated. The Will (διαθήκη) of a human being is irrevocable when once duly executed: hence the Will of God, formally pledged to Abraham, that all nations should be blessed in his seed, *i.e.* in Christ,¹ cannot be affected by the subsequent act of God executed 430 years later, *viz.*, the giving of the Law. The inheritance of blessing comes from the original Will, and not from the subsequent Law.

¹ EXPOSITOR, March, 1896, p. 178 f.

The sense of *διαθήκη* in this passage has been much debated; and many excellent scholars declare that it does not mean Will or Testament (as we have rendered it), but either denotes a Covenant, *Bund* in German (so Calvin, Beza, Flatt, Hilgenfeld, Meyer, Lightfoot), or has the general sense of Determination, *Willensverfügung* or *Bestimmung* (so Zöckler, Philippi, Lipsius, Hofmann, Schott, Winer).¹

But, in the first place, *διαθήκη* here is proved to indicate a Will by the fact that what the *διαθήκη* determines is an inheritance, *κληρονομία*, iii. 18.

Secondly, there are really only two senses in which the Greek word *διαθήκη* might be used by Paul; and the supposition that he understood it, and expected the Galatians to understand it, in some vague, general, half-poetic sense, is quite unjustifiable: the passage demands a sharp, clear, and technical sense for the prominent word. Paul might employ it in the ordinary meaning in which it was current in the cities of Asia and Galatia; and he could also use it with the peculiar force of Covenant, which is given to it in the Septuagint.² In the present case there is no opening for doubt: he says that he is speaking "after the manner of men," iii. 15. He therefore is employing the word in the sense in which it was commonly used as part of the ordinary life of the cities of Asia.

What this sense was there can be no doubt. The word is often found in the inscriptions, and always in the same sense which it bears in the classical Greek writers,³ Will, or Testament. But we must not take this to indicate a will as understood in modern law; and it is the unsuitability of

¹ I quote from Zöckler's statistics.

² See Section xxviii.

³ Lightfoot, who takes *διαθήκη* in the Septuagint sense, quotes in his favour Arist. Av. 439, and says there are a few other examples; they are not, however, given in the latest edition of *Stephani Thesaurus*, and we must require exact quotations to support such a rare sense in prose.

the modern idea of a Will in the passage that has led the Commentators to reject it almost unanimously. We must interpret *διαθήκη* according as the idea was understood in the Asiatic Provinces at the time when Paul was writing. It was a provision to maintain the family with its religious obligations ; and, though it sometimes included bequests of money to the State or to individuals, these bequests seem to be always regarded in the light of provisions for the honour and privileges of the testator and his family.

It is here plainly stated that when the Will has been properly executed with all legal formalities, no person can make it ineffective or add any further clause or conditions. It is not a complete explanation to say that "no person" means "no other," for the argument is that a subsequent document executed by the same person does not invalidate the former. We are confronted with a legal idea that the duly executed Will cannot be revoked by a subsequent act of the testator. The appointment of an heir was the adoption of a son, and was final and irrevocable in the Galatian territory. The testator, after adopting his heir, could not subsequently take away from him his share in the inheritance or impose new conditions on his succession.

That is a totally different conception of a Will from our modern ideas. We think of a Will as secret and inoperative during the life-time of the testator, as revocable by him at pleasure, and as executed by him only with a view to his own death. A Will of that kind could have no application to God, and no such analogy could have been used by Paul. But the Galatian Will is irrevocable and unalterable ; it comes into operation as soon as the conditions are performed by the heir ; it is public and open.

Such was the original Roman Will ;¹ but that kind of Will had become obsolete in Roman law. It could have been familiar to no one except a legal antiquary ; and

¹ Maine, *Ancient Law*, ch. vi.

neither Paul nor any other Provincial is likely to have known anything about that ancient Roman idea. The Prætorian Will had become usual, and it was secret and revocable, and took effect only after the testator's death. But Greek law retained that character much longer, and Galatian law, as we have seen, was under the influence of Greek law.

The Græco-Syrian Law-Book—which we have already quoted as an authority for the kind of legal ideas and customs that obtained in an Eastern Province, where a formerly prevalent Greek law had persisted under the Roman Empire — well illustrates this passage of the Epistle.¹ It actually lays down the principle that a man can never put away an adopted son, and that he cannot put away a real son without good ground. It is remarkable that the adopted son should have a stronger position than the son by birth; yet it was so. Mitteis illustrates this by a passage of Lucian,² where a son, who had been put away by his father, then restored to favour, and then put away a second time, complains that this second rejection is illegal, inasmuch as his restoration to favour put him on a level with an adopted son, who cannot be turned away in that fashion.

In the Gortynian procedure, this principle of the Greek law was relaxed, and the adoptive father could put away his adoptive son by a public act, declared from the stone in the market-place before the assembled citizens, but he must give him two staters as a guest-gift. Evidently the gift is a sort of substitute for the inheritance; the adopted son had an indefeasible claim to share the property, and, by a legal fiction, the testator gives him his inheritance, and sends him away.

¹ The following remarks are taken from Mitteis' *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 218 ff., who does not notice the confirmation by Paul's words of the view which he states.

² ἀποκηρυγμένος, 12.

The adopted son and heir was adopted by the will and authority of the whole community, to keep up the existence of one of the families constituting the community. The father, therefore, had less power over the adopted son than over the born son; the latter was subject to his solitary will, the former had the will of the whole community on his side.

When *διαθήκη* is understood thus, the paragraph becomes full of meaning; but this sense could hardly have existed in Gallic Galatia, but only in Southern Galatia.

To make this subject clear, we must look at the use of *διαθήκη* in an Epistle addressed to readers among whom Greek law had never exercised much, if any, influence, and to whom the Will of the Roman type, as current in the first century, alone was likely to be known. The use of the term *διαθήκη* was to them encumbered by the difficulty that a Will does not become valid until the death of the testator (*Heb.* ix. 16). This requires a special section.

The exact sense of v. 15 must be observed. Paul does not say that a supplementary Will, *ἐπιδιαθήκη*, cannot be made; but that the new Will cannot interfere with or invalidate the old Will. A man can adopt a second son and heir by a subsequent Will. Then the two adopted sons jointly carry on the family in its religious and social aspect. Inheritance was not simply a claim to property, as we now regard it. Inheritance was the right to take the father's place in all his relations to the gods and the State; and two or more sons can take the father's place jointly, each being the heir.¹

W. M. RAMSAY.

¹ Mr. Grenfell publishes an *ἐπιδιαθήκη* (*Alex. Erot. Pap.*, no. 21); it confirms and quotes the *διαθήκη*. See next section. Nature might necessitate changes in the details; new children and heirs may be born, and so on; but in essence the *ἐπιδιαθήκη* confirms the previous will.

NOTE ON MR. GRAY'S ARTICLE, "THE ALPHABETIC POEM IN NAHUM."

MR. GRAY'S carefully worked out article is not only an introduction to the newer mode of correcting the transcriptional errors of the Hebrew text, but a reply to the statement that the supposed traces of an acrostic in Nahum i. may be fortuitous, and an attempt to bring those English scholars who are as yet but moderately impressed by the critical discussions of Bickell and Gunkel into somewhat closer agreement with those scholars. Few tasks indeed are more urgent than to stir our scholars up to work in more union with their continental brethren in the correction of the Hebrew text. But it would be strange if only the three English scholars mentioned by Mr. Gray had referred to the subject. In 1891 (*Origin of the Psalter*, p. 228), I argued that the psalm which underlies Psalms ix. and x., being an acrostic, might be contemporary with the alphabetic poem which "perhaps" underlies Nahum i. 2-10; and in the *EXPOSITOR* (June, 1895, p. 437) I remarked that, "as the combined researches of Bickell and Gunkel have shown," Nahum i. 2-ii. 3 is "really an alphabetic psalm, describing Jehovah's speedy appearance for judgment on Israel's enemies, and is one of the numerous insertions of the post-exilic editors of the prophetic records" (see also the footnote). I think that Mr. Gray should have mentioned my adhesion first to Bickell, and then to Bickell and Gunkel, uncoupled as it was with any minimizing adjectives or adverbs (which are ungracious, take up space, and are not required by scholars), except that diplomatic "perhaps," which was necessary in self-defence, but exerted no influence on my argument. For if any one has suffered in this country for a frank adoption of German methods, both in higher and in lower criticism, it is surely the

present writer; and if Bickell has had any friend among English critics, he surely hails from an Oxford college.

I have also to make a suggestion, which seems to me all-important, to produce complete conviction of the correctness of Bickell's and Gunkel's theory. On that theory, line 11 of the poem or psalm in Nahum i. (*i.e.* Nah. i. 4*b*) ought to begin with ד. But the word found in our Hebrew text at the head of this line (אמלל) begins with א. Mr. Gray's argument in favour of דלל (in preference to the words favoured by Bickell and Gunkel) is thoroughly sound, but the statement דלל בשן וכרמל is lacking in definiteness; we expect דלל כבוד בשן, on the analogy of Isaiah xvii. 4, nor can Mr. Gray lay much stress on the specialized sense of דקל, "to thin grapes," in some Talmudic passages. This is one of the cases in which radical (not arbitrary) criticism is the best criticism. What the poet wrote was most probably this: דללו אלני בשן ואמללו פרד (or דלו דלל). The initial אמלל in M. T. conceals the word אלני; מ frequently takes the place of נ (or *vice versa*) in corrupt passages, while erroneous transposition of letters is so common that it hardly needs to be mentioned. The final ל in אמלל is a vestige of a nearly effaced דלו or דללו. When the first two words had coalesced to form אמלל, it became easy to mistake an indistinctly written ואמלל for וכרמל (cf. Isa. xxxiii. 9, "Bashan and Carmel.") The final ו in ואמללו then became attached to פרד, and to make sense אמללו was placed at the end of the hemistich. Later on, in some copies דללו and אמללו changed places, as Mr. Gray has virtually pointed out. The parallels for each critical step are numberless. All this I would rather have indicated in half the number of lines, but, like Mr. Gray, I am conscious of the novelty which such arguments must still present to some readers. Render, "The (strong) oaks of Bashan become weak, and the growths of Lebanon wither."

T. K. CHEYNE.

[NOTE ON REV. CANON DRIVER'S ARTICLE,
ENTITLED, "*MAGNA EST VERITAS ET
PRÆVALET.*"]

IN the EXPOSITOR for June, 1898, I observe, under the above title, a summary sketch of recent views as to the "reconciliation" of the first chapter of Genesis with the development of the earth in geological time, and in this courteous references are made to my published works on the subject, though Dr. Driver holds very different views as to the cosmic value and correctness of the venerable document in question.

In my present condition of infirm health I have neither power nor disposition to reopen these questions, but desire to state in a few words my continued adherence to the principles of interpretations and comparison which I maintained as long ago as 1860 in my book entitled *Archæia*, and which are more fully stated and supported in my subsequent work, *The Origin of the World*. I would also desire to define my actual position as distinguished from that of a mere "reconciler."

In regard, then, to the "proem" or introduction to Genesis, I believe it to be in the highest and most complete sense a divine revelation communicated to some ancient seer, and not intended to teach geology or any other science, but to give such a general outline of the actual plan and true order of creation as might form a basis for a pure monotheistic religion, and for the divine programme of the plan of redemption contained in the following books of the Old and New Testament. It was further intended to guard the people of God against the seductions of nature-worship and fanciful polytheistic myths, as well as to bring them near the Creator as the Father of His intelligent creatures. These great objects it has continued to

serve in all the intervening ages, and among peoples both rude and civilized. It is still carrying its great intellectual and spiritual light into the minds of the newest converts from heathenism. In regard to science, its influence has been wholly beneficial, by its teaching the unity of nature under the law of the great creative and sustaining Will, and thereby removing mere chance and superstitious fancies out of the way.

I have explained the absolute necessity of such a revelation of origins, and such a gathering of all the materials of ancient idolatry under one creative power, in the *Origin of the World*, 6th edition, 1893, chapters i., ii., iii., and appendices A to N. This recent edition it is possible Dr. Driver may not have seen.

In so far as the interpretation of the word is concerned, we have the text in very good condition, and there are few verbal difficulties except in the precise meaning of certain words which the writer has occasion to use in different senses, as, for instance, the words "earth" and "clay," but he has usually defined their meaning. There are also a few inaccurate translations which have come down to us by tradition, as, for instance, "firmament," "moving things," "whales," "sea monsters." It will also be observed that the theory of an inspired revelation frees us to some extent from the necessity of discussing questions of date and authorship, as a revelation might be communicated when it was most needed, or when a suitable medium was present. On this, however, I would make the following remarks:

1st. The appropriate chronological place of the creation record is at the beginning of the whole Bible. 2nd. Its entire want of local or national colouring, its simple majesty, and its freedom from superstitious accretions accredit it to us as an original document, and render it extremely improbable that it could have been condensed

from the florid and mythical creation stories of Babylonia and Assyria.

On the other hand, it is impossible to suppose that the introduction to Genesis could originate in any mere "Semitic cosmological speculations,"¹ since we know that nothing so terse, accurate, and intelligible could be produced in that way in our time. Even Darwin, in speculating on the first introduction of life, was obliged to quote the words of this old document, though less correctly than if he had been more familiar with its scope and contents.

Finally, I concur in the fine old aphorism with which Dr. Driver heads his article, but would prefer to be allowed to read the closing verb in the future tense, and to hold it to predict that the truth of the Old Testament in its cosmogony, history and prophecy, will prevail when the objections derived from modern science shall have vanished away. (See 1 Cor. iii. 19.)

J. WILLIAM DAWSON.

¹ See my articles on "Creative Development, etc.," *EXPOSITOR*, 1898.

SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

INTRODUCTION.—Among the most important books connected with New Testament literature which have made their appearance during the last few months may be mentioned Baljon's *Greek Testament*. The full title is *Novum Testamentum Graece, praesertim in usum Studiosorum recognovit et brevibus annotationibus instruxit*, J. M. S. Baljon (Groningen). The first volume contains the four Gospels. Satisfied neither with the text of Tischendorf, nor with that of Westcott and Hort—the one leaning too much on the Sinaitic, the other on the Vatican MS.—he has constructed a text for himself. But the chief attraction of the book is that he gives us the authorities with considerable fulness, and expresses a regret, which many share, that Westcott and Hort did not furnish a full critical apparatus. The authorities are not given as full as in Tischendorf's Eighth larger Edition, but they occupy almost the same space as in the "Editio viii. minor." Indeed, this edition of Baljon's is a revised Tischendorf, with a different text and some additional conjectures. The text is printed in a rather small, but sharp and distinct type, and the critical notes are precisely what the student needs. They are not discouragingly bulky, but are practically serviceable, and by their aid any one can make a text for himself. Baljon's edition may be recommended to all who wish to ascertain the authorities for the various readings of the New Testament text.

In connection with the text, it may be mentioned that the Rev. G. Margolionth has printed some portions of a Syriac MS. recently acquired by the British Museum, which he thinks to some extent throw light on the Palestinian Syriac version. The title is, *The Palestinian Syriac Version of the Holy Scriptures: Four recently-discovered Portions*, edited, in photographic facsimile, from a unique MS. in the British Museum; with a Transcription, Translation, Introduction, Vocabulary, and Notes (privately printed by the Society of Biblical Archaeology). Of the New Testament one lesson from the *Acts* is printed, showing, the editor believes, that the Malkites were content to prepare a mere adaptation from the Peshitta.

Messrs. Macmillan and Mr. Mackail are to be congratulated on the completion of their *Eversley Bible*, which will find its way to the shelves and hands of all lovers of a beautiful book. The same publishers are also making progress with their issue of Professor Moulton's *Modern Readers' Bible*, and have now issued St. Matthew and St. Mark and the General Epistles. Among these the Epistle to the Hebrews is included. The notes and introductions are decidedly helpful.

Messrs. Eyre & Spottiswoode, who more than twenty years ago struck out in their *Teachers' Bible* a new path (which has been abundantly followed by other publishers), wishing still to be in the van, issue a thoroughly revised, and in some respects wholly new, edition. It contains not only the usual Teachers' Aids, but, under the editorship of Mr. Ball and Mr. Kenyon, no fewer than 172 plates have been produced, many of them new, and representing monuments and documents hitherto known only to a few experts. Ten of these plates illustrate the origin and development of the written character by means of which the Scriptures have been transmitted, and they throw fresh light upon the pedigree of the alphabet. Fourteen more give us the great MSS. from the 4th to the 14th centuries A.D. The remainder illustrate the ethnographical, historical, social, and religious aspect of the Old and New Testaments. Undoubtedly it gives an impression of the trustworthiness of the Biblical history, when we see the likeness of Amraphel, King of Shinar, and other worthies.

Mr. Albert S. Cook, Professor of the English Language and Literature in Yale, has published with Messrs. Macmillan a volume which will have an interest for students of the Latin Versions of Scripture, as well as for those who read Old English prose. It is entitled *Biblical Quotations in Old English Prose Writers*. The volume now issued is the first of a possible series, and contains the quotations which occur in Alfred and Ælfric. These are given in full, with the Latin originals. The introduction contains a great deal of information on the translations of Scripture into Old English during the period from the 7th to the 10th century.

The place which the Archbishop of Armagh's scholarly and suggestive volume on *The Leading Ideas of the Gospels* has won for itself is sufficiently proved by the issue of a new edition

(Macmillan & Co.). The author tells us that "the present edition has been carefully revised and corrected. A few additions of some importance have been introduced." These additions seem mainly to consist of a note from Carlyle's *Schiller*, and a brief passage on the origin of the Gospels.

Mr. Arthur Wright, Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Cambridge, is known as the ablest living advocate of the "oral tradition" theory of the origin of the Gospels; and the research he has spent on this subject, and the ingenuity and originality he brings to bear upon it, prepare for his *New Testament Problems* (Methuen & Co.) a hearty welcome. With one exception, the problems here discussed arise out of the Gospels and the Acts. We may say of the whole volume what the author says (p. 193) of one chapter: "We have passed in review a great number of subjects of engrossing interest to all Biblical students. We have shown that many received opinions need revision. We have pointed out places where further investigation is desirable, and we have submitted some new proposals." His new proposals deserve consideration, but will certainly be disputed. To name only some of them: He finds three stages of formation in Mark's Gospel; in this Gospel two suppers are fused in the account of the last Passover; a one-year's ministry is considered attractive and not improbable; the Crucifixion is placed in the year 29 A.D., on Friday, the 14th Nisan, which probably fell on March 18th; the Gospel of Luke is dated about the year 80 A.D. But even when Mr. Wright's proposals fail to win assent, they are suggestive, and his arguments in their favour are always instructive. Many will be grateful to him for a delightful and helpful volume.

Under the slightly-misleading title, *Philology of the Gospels*, Prof. Blass, of Halle-Wittenberg, gives us a brilliant essay on the textual condition and criticism of the Gospels. Perhaps the first intention of the volume was to strengthen the author's theory—that Luke issued two editions both of his Gospel and of the Acts. But the establishment of this theory involves as its first requirement an examination of the text; and Professor Blass in his present essay presents us both with principles of textual criticism and applications of these principles, which are new, and may almost be called revolutionary, for he traces back the variants in the Gospels to sources and to a time which cannot

be reached by documentary evidence. Conjectural emendation must be much more largely used than hitherto. Some of the specimens of conjectural emendation given by Prof. Blass scarcely encourage inferior scholars to follow his example. But there is a great deal of truth as well as of novelty in his remarks on the origin of various readings, and the volume is both stimulating and important. The English deserves a word of acknowledgment; and Prof. Blass does not need to be told that in this country his work on the New Testament is followed with interest and respect.

Four Lectures on the Early History of the Gospels, by the Rev. J. H. Wilkinson, M.A., sometime Lecturer at Queen's College, Oxford, are published by Messrs. Macmillan & Co. They are intended to embody what is known of the Canonical and associated Gospels in the first two centuries, and thus to throw light on the origin and history of the evangelic tradition. Several of Mr. Wilkinson's opinions are too dogmatically stated, but as a whole his volume is a convenient and useful manual. Those who desire to arrive without much expenditure of time at some knowledge of Gospel literature in the first two centuries may consult it with advantage.

EXEGESIS.—There seems to have been less output than usual in the department of Exegesis. But we have some notable attempts to engage the attention of the laity in a more accurate study of the apostolic writings. Thus Canon Gore treats with accuracy, but popularly, *The Epistle to the Ephesians* (John Murray); while Principal Moule attempts a somewhat novel style of commentary in his *Colossian Studies* (Hodder & Stoughton). His aim has been to furnish the reader with an accurate translation, so eked out by paraphrase as to convey the meaning of the Apostle to an average English mind. Further than this, he emphasizes by brief, pregnant comment the more important teachings of the Epistle. Unquestionably, the student who wishes at once a scholarly and a devout guide to the true meaning of the writings of St. Paul could not have a better guide than Principal Moule.

SERMONS.—For the preacher's aid two volumes have been issued by Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton. The first is a handsome volume by the late Dr. Broadus, favourably known in this country as the author of one of the best commentaries on *Matthew*, and is called

A Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. Its popularity may be inferred from the fact that this is its 23rd edition. It is very full, and gathers up from other writers a great deal that is significant and well said. And without disparaging the numerous and excellent volumes which stimulate and instruct the preacher, Dr. Broadus' treatise may be accorded the first place for completeness as a manual on its subject.

The other volume, *The Clerical Life*, is of wider range, and is composed of twenty letters supposed to be written to ministers in various circumstances and of various character. Thus we have letters to "a minister whose sermons last an hour," "a minister who has studied in Germany," "a minister who has no theology in his sermons," "a minister who inclines to condescension," and so on. The writers are Dr. John Watson, Principal Edwards, Dr. Denney, Dr. Nicoll, and others. The volume contains much that is both racy and profitable.

Of recently published sermons the most notable are those selected from the papers of the late Prof. Henry Drummond, and now published by Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton under the title *The Ideal Life*. Brief sketches of the author are prefixed by Dr. Robertson Nicoll and Dr. John Watson. To some readers these sermons will seem the finest fruit of a singularly rich and prolific life. No man has ever put Christianity in a more reasonable and winning form; and these sermons, as original as they are simple and persuasive, are likely not only to enthrall the mind, but to win the heart and secure the conviction of all readers.

The same firm has also published specimens of the best style of Welsh preaching, although written in English. They are selected from the manuscripts of the late Dr. Herber Evans, and are models of popular preaching. They are thoroughly evangelical, full of happy illustration, intensely earnest and impassioned, and ringing with true eloquence.

Prof. Martin's volume, *Winning the Soul* (Hodder & Stoughton), gives evidence of the sacrifice made by the pulpit to fill the chair. It will appeal to all who mingle thought and reflection with their religion, and who can appreciate good literature. The sermons are of first-rate quality, and account for the large influence Prof. Martin had as a preacher.

To Dr. Robertson Nicoll's series of "Little Books on Religion"

(Hodder & Stoughton) two notable additions are made: *From Strength to Strength*, by J. H. Jowett, M.A.; and *The Holy Father and the Living Christ*, by Dr. Forsyth, of Cambridge. Mr. Jowett's volume exhibits that combination of profound and original thought with perfect lucidity of expression which characterized his predecessor in Carr's Lane. In a thoroughly popular manner he discusses the strengthening of the will, the conscience, the heart, the mind. If these sermons are read as widely as their vigour and utility merit, they will run into many thousands.

Dr. Forsyth's treatment of his subject is such as was to be expected from a preacher who has already won the ear of all in this country who are interested in religion. The theme of God's Fatherhood might be thought hackneyed, but it is here treated in a wholly fresh and most fruitful manner. The reader will inevitably wish that Dr. Forsyth would devote a volume to the Atonement, for remarks occur in these pages which reveal that he has much to say on that subject which the Church would benefit by hearing. The volume is important in the inverse ratio of its size. Those who read it once will certainly read it again.

Short Studies on Vital Subjects, by the Rev. P. W. de Quetteville, M.A. (Elliot Stock), if scarcely distinguished enough to catch the public ear, contain much that is wise and well said, much that is conciliatory and persuasive. They are the "studies" of a man who looks at life with his own eyes, with intelligence and sympathy.

The Nourished Life, by Rev. E. Aubrey, Glasgow (Stockwell and Co.), is a series of Homilies on Hosea xiv. 5, 6, 7. *The Children of Wisdom, and other Sermons preached in Canadian Pulpits*, by the Rev. John de Soyres, M.A., Rector of St. John's Church, St. John, New Brunswick, is published in this country by Messrs. Deighton Bell & Co.

MISCELLANEOUS.—Among publications less strictly bearing upon New Testament study may be mentioned Mr. J. R. Illingworth's *Divine Immanence: an Essay on the Spiritual Significance of Matter* (Macmillan & Co., Limited). There is no living writer who, with greater richness of exposition and penetration, treats those roots of theology which are embedded in a philosophical soil; and although there is perhaps in the present volume scarcely the same finish and felicity as in that on "Personality," yet it is a book to read twice and thrice, until its teaching becomes a solid part of our

mental equipment. The relation of matter and spirit is treated in a wholly original manner. It is shown that though spirit is of no use to matter, matter is of use to spirit, and especially by its religious influence. From this it is argued that matter is a manifestation of spirit. And if the problem of the connection of God with the world is to be solved at all, it must be so under the guidance of the analogy in our own experience. That our spirit transcends matter will scarcely be denied; but our spirit is also immanent in matter, not only working through the brain, but manifesting itself in the entire organism, and in a secondary degree extending even to the external world. "For a man imprints his spiritual character upon all the things with which he deals—his house, his clothes, his furniture, the various products of his hand or head." This relation of our own spirit to matter is that which guides us to the relation held by the supreme Spirit to the material world. "As self-conscious, self-identical, self-determined, we possess qualities which transcend or rise above the laws of matter; but we can only realize these qualities, and so become aware of them, by acting in the material world; while, conversely, material objects—our bodies and our works of art—could never possibly be regarded as expressions of spirit, if spirit were not at the same time recognised as distinct from its medium of manifestation." "Spirit which is merely immanent in matter, without also transcending it, cannot be spirit at all; it is only another aspect of matter, having neither self-identity nor freedom."

It will be understood that in the course of Mr. Illingworth's argument many interesting points are raised, such as Freewill, the relation of Heredity to the Virgin Birth, and others. Miracles are considered from a fresh point of view; and, in every part of the volume, matters which exercise the thought of the philosopher and the theologian are felicitously and suggestively handled.

To the International Theological Library issued by Messrs. T. and T. Clark two volumes have been added. One is by Dr. Washington Gladden on *The Christian Pastor and the Working Church*. It forms a complete guide to the whole of a minister's work, in the study, in the pulpit, among his congregation, with his lay assistants, in connection with the Sunday School, the poor, and other Churches. The choice of Dr. Gladden as the writer of this volume has been a most happy one. He is a man of ex-

perience and of sense, neither hampered by traditional methods nor carried away by an innovating spirit. The counsel he gives will approve itself to all who follow it as wise and trustworthy, and the young minister could not have a safer guide in the various departments and delicate emergencies of his work. To follow Dr. Gladden's instructions is to secure a successful ministry. It need scarcely be said that the point of view is strongly anti-sacerdotal and that the style is lively and attractive.

The other volume is Prof. A. V. G. Allen's *Christian Institutions*. Dr. Allen is an expert in Church History, and his familiarity with the development of the Church and of her creeds stands him in good stead here. No one who has read Prof. Allen's *Continuity of Christian Thought* need be told that he is a most skilful and learned writer, able to pick out the salient features of a perplexed period and to render the obscure intelligible. The volume now published is characterised by wide knowledge and great literary skill. It is divided into three large sections, of which one is devoted to Church organization, another to the creeds, and the third to the worship of the Church. A large amount of space under the first head is devoted to an account of the development of the ministry or official orders in the Church. Necessarily Dr. Allen touches here upon many warmly debated matters, and his conclusions will not satisfy every one. In the other parts of his book there will also be difference of opinion both as to the proportion of space given to the various subjects and as to the success with which they are treated; but all will agree that the volume is in a high degree instructive and valuable, written with unusual learning and in a temperate and candid spirit.

Mr. John A. F. Gregg, late Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge, has published (William Blackwood & Sons) his Hulsean Prize Essay on *The Decian Persecution*. The biographical list which Mr. Gregg prefixes to his essay (and in which some misprints occur) reminds the reader that this difficult period of history has been constantly investigated by scholars. Mr. Gregg does not profess to have made important discoveries, although he claims to be the first who has brought the Greek of the "Acta Pionii" to this country. But he has investigated the period in a scientific and scholarly manner, and has produced a monograph which may be read with pleasure as well as with profit. In connection with this period of history it may be mentioned that Sir William Muir,

K.C.S.I., Principal of Edinburgh University, has published through Messrs. T. & T. Clark a much needed protest against Cyprian's intolerance and sacerdotalism. The title of the pamphlet is *Cyprian: His Life and Teaching*.

A New Directory for the Public Worship of God has been prepared by the "Public Worship Association in connection with the Free Church of Scotland," and has been published by Messrs. Macniven & Wallace. On the whole this Directory seems more satisfactory than any aid to worship which has previously appeared. It is prepared on the principle of suggesting topics rather than of providing completely finished services, and in preparing for the conduct of public worship ministers will find in this volume judicious and welcome aid. The question to be put to a parent presenting his child for baptism is: "In presenting your child for baptism, do you profess your faith in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?" Ought it not rather to be, Do you now accept, for yourself and for your child, the Spirit of the Son here in this ordinance of Baptism offered you by the Father?

To the series of "Books for Bible Students" (Charles H. Kelly) Mr. Alfred S. Geden, of the Wesleyan College, Richmond, has contributed *Studies in Comparative Religion*. As he intends to publish a second volume on the same subject he confines his attention in the present book to Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia, Zoroastrianism, and Muhammadanism. The last-named religion is treated with considerable fulness, a history being given of its rise as well as of its more important developments. It will serve its purpose well and be found useful as a manual for classes.

From the same publisher comes a valuable book by Prof. W. T. Davison, of Handsworth College, *The Christian Interpretation of Life, and other Essays*. The papers in this volume, with the exception of the first, have appeared in the *London Quarterly Review*, and were apparently evoked from time to time by the appearance of certain noteworthy theological or philosophical volumes. We thus have in the present collection criticisms by an able and fair-minded writer of such books as Martineau's *Seat of Authority in Religion*, Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, and the various writings of John Morley and Cotter Morison, Mr. Lilly and Dr. Hatch. Those who desire to survey some of the most important departures in recent thought could not have a better informed or safer guide than Prof. Davison. His mode of dealing

with anti-Christian and semi-Christian writers is incisive and convincing.

Christ the Substitute, by E. Reeves Palmer, M.A. (John Snow & Co.), is a series of studies in Christian Doctrine based upon the conception of God's universal Fatherhood. Mr. Palmer advocates a new interpretation of Christ's substitution, and also endeavours to establish the "larger hope." His book is much weakened by a superficial exegesis, and much is asserted or taken for granted that ought to have been argued. There are, however, passages in the book which show thought and a capacity to appreciate spiritual religion.

The Rev. Alexander Robinson, B.D., has published a second edition of his *Study of the Saviour in the Newer Light*, (Williams and Norgate). The first edition of this work occasioned Mr. Robinson's deprivation of his office in the Church of Scotland. In the present edition certain expressions are modified, but substantially the teaching is unaltered.

The Hittites and their Language, by C. R. Conder, Lt.-Col. R.E., contains the results of many years' study (William Blackwood & Sons). The author believes the Hittites to be Mongols, and he has much that is interesting to tell us about their language and inscriptions, as well as about the origin of the alphabet and of writing. A book so full of material and of suggestive interpretation of it cannot fail to advance the study of a subject which is of recognised importance.

In this place we can scarcely do more than record the appearance of a work on *Christian Dogmatics* by the Rev. John Macpherson, M.A. (T. & T. Clark). That Mr. Macpherson is competent for the task he has undertaken no one who has read his previous publications will dispute. In reading the present volume what strikes one is that Mr. Macpherson is very well read in modern theology; that he has digested his reading and so mixed it with original thought that his "Dogmatics" is a very readable book, but that it seems scarcely written all on the same plane. In connection with some doctrines he utters himself from a somewhat advanced position; whereas in speaking of other doctrines he seems scarcely to have apprehended the difficulties felt by the modern mind. As an introduction to the study of systematic theology it is to be recommended for its lucid style, its interesting treatment, and its references to literature in which fuller discussion may be found.

Those who are in search of books likely to interest the young in religion would do well to turn their attention to the series published by A. & C. Black and R. & R. Clark for the *Guild Library* of the Established Church of Scotland. With the exception of Dr. Charteris' *A Faithful Churchman*, these volumes are catholic in subject and treatment, and may be profitably used by the members of any Church. On former occasions attention has been called in these pages to the supremely excellent volume on *Our Lord's Teaching*, by Dr. Robertson, of Whittingehame. Other volumes are now added to the series: Prof. Wenley's somewhat too philosophical but eminently instructive *Preparation for Christianity in the Ancient World*; *The Missionary Expansion of the Reformed Churches*, by the Rev. J. A. Graham; and *Hymns and Hymn Makers*, by the Rev. Duncan Campbell.

From Paris (Librairie Fischbacher) we have received *Les Origines de la Compagnie de Jésus, Ignace et Lainez*, by Hermann Müller—a critical history in which it is shown that Ignatius was indebted for the "Exercises" to Garcia de Cisneros, and for the constitution of the society to the Mussulman orders of Catalonia. There is much that is curious and new in the volume. Another contribution to history comes from the same firm: *Speculum Perfectionis seu S. Francisci Assisiensis Legenda Antiquissima auctore fratri Leone nunc primum edidit Paul Sabatier*. The editor believes that in Leo's *Speculum* we reach the primal source of Franciscan tradition. That Brother Leo lived with St. Francis and had ample opportunities of observing his actions, recording his sayings, and understanding his rule, cannot be doubted. The "Speculum" exists in several MSS., which are carefully described by Sabatier. He fixes the date of the work in 1227, and believes it to have been finished within a year after the death of St. Francis. Its relation to subsequent documents connected with Assisi is investigated, and a well-printed text with critical notes puts readers in a position to judge for themselves of the merits of the work. Two further volumes are promised, and these, with Sabatier's *Life*, will furnish those interested with an adequate Franciscan library.

From the same firm we have received *Un Essai de Religion Scientifique*, par Christian Cherfils. This volume is an introduction to the writings and ideas of Wronski, who was born at Posen in 1778 and died at Neuilly in 1853. It seems there are

Wronskists of various types—philosophical, political, religious—to whom this volume will be acceptable and whose numbers it may increase.

From Lausanne (Payot) comes *Le Danger Moral de l'Evolutionnisme Religieux*, par Gaston Frommel, prof. à l'Université de Genève. It has been evoked chiefly by M. Sabatier's *Esquisse* and Chapuis' *Du Surnaturel*, and is written with ability and deserves consideration.

The space at our disposal prevents us making fuller mention of some apologetic books. The most important is *Scientific Aspects of Christian Evidences* (New York: Appleton), by G. Frederick Wright, of Overton College, an excellent treatment of some scientific difficulties, written by a thorough scientist. The volume may be confidently recommended to all who are interested in the relation of Christianity to science. *Reason in Revelation* (James Nisbet & Co.) is written by a lady who has won the ear of the public in connection with similar publications, Emma Marie Caillard. The Rev. J. J. Lias, Chancellor of Llandaff Cathedral, has published, also with Messrs. Nisbet, *Science in Relation to Miracles, Special Providences, and Prayers*.

We have also received a vigorous appeal by Mr. Samuel Pearson, entitled, *Why Worship?* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.), and Wijnkoop's, *Hebrew Grammar*, a convenient manual, published by Luzac & Co.

We have received the following periodicals: Holtzmann's *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, containing a survey of the Exegetical Literature for 1897; the *Classical Review*, which continues its vigorous career; the *American Journal of Theology*; the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, which is not so exegetical as it used to be; the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*; the *Primitive Methodist Review*; the *Dublin Review*; the *New Orthodoxy*; the *Anglican Church Magazine*; the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, containing an article on Aquila by Mr. Burkitt, and another on an apocryphal work ascribed to Philo by Dr. Leopold Cohn; the *Critical Review*, which, so far as current literature goes, is the best of all.

MARCUS DODS.

A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

XXVIII. "COVENANT" IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

THE idea is exceptionally important in Biblical language. But the Greek term *διαθήκη*, which was taken to represent it, is so obscure, and it is so difficult to find any trustworthy information about the Greek usage, that the attempt must be made to treat the subject a little more accurately and less vaguely than the ordinary books. Most writers on "Covenant" discuss the theological and philosophical side very elaborately, and confine themselves to a few vague words about the Greek use of the term *διαθήκη*, though it occurs nearly three hundred times in the Greek Old Testament, and thirty-three times in the New (almost entirely in Paul and Hebrews, or with reference to the blood of Christ in the Last Supper).

I touch upon the subject with reluctance and diffidence. It lies beyond the sphere of my knowledge, among the obscure mysteries of Greek law, and I shall be very grateful for any corrections of, or apposite additions to, the statements made in the following paragraphs.

The Septuagint translators found themselves confronted with a difficult problem, when they had to select a Greek word to translate the Hebrew *berith*. The Hebrew word, denoting primarily an agreement, private or public, among

¹ The final corrections for my last article reached the printer too late to be used. The most important may be made by adding in p. 298, l. 4: "compare δὲ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη, Gal. v. 5"; in p. 299, l. 6, "πνεύματι, Gal. v. 5"; and in p. 296, note, "p. 118 f." Also in p. 299 the footnote refers to l. 22.

men, guaranted and confirmed by weighty and solemn oaths on both sides, had become almost a technical term to denote the promises made, and confirmed by repetition, by God to the ancestors of the Hebrew people, especially Abraham, and, in a much less degree, Isaac and Jacob. As Professor A. B. Davidson says,¹ it "had become a religious term in the sense of a one-sided engagement on the part of God." This sense was peculiar and unique. Nothing like it was known to the Greeks, and therefore there was no Greek word to correspond to it. Accordingly, the translators were compelled to take some Greek word, which hitherto had denoted something else, and apply it to their purpose. The word selected must necessarily be encumbered by associations connected with its recognised meaning, and, therefore, must be to a certain degree unsuitable. The problem was to find the least unsuitable word.

A word which in some respects corresponded well to the sense required was *συνθήκη*, which brought out the binding force and legal solemnity of the idea. But it was unsuitable because it implied so pointedly that two persons standing more or less on a footing of equality (though not necessarily on perfect equality) are concerned, each of whom joins in the act with a certain degree of power and voluntary action. But in the Biblical idea the power and the action lie entirely on one side. God gives the assurance, binds Himself by the promise, and initiates alone the whole agreement. The other side merely accepts the agreement, and has simply to fulfil the conditions, which are often unexpressed, for God foresees the course of events, and knows how far the future action of the chosen recipients will fulfil the conditions. But the history of the Greek rendering of the Old Testament shows that *συνθήκη*

¹ In Hastings' *Diet. of the Bible*, i. p. 514.

must have been felt to have some claim, for the later translators, Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, use the word *συνθήκη* in a number of cases, where the Septuagint version has *διαθήκη*.¹

The word *ἐπαγγελία*, promise, might also have been used. It has the advantage of expressing strongly that the action and the initiative proceed entirely from one side. But it lacked entirely the idea of bond, of solemn guarantee and the binding force of oaths and religious sanctity, which was absolutely indispensable. It was used, for example, to indicate the public promises, made by a candidate for public office, as to what he would do when elected; there was no binding force in these promises beyond the unpopularity likely to accrue, if they were not carried out at least to some extent; and it was recognised that they were the stock-in-trade of a candidate, which might be broken as far as was safe. Hence the word is very rarely used in the Old Testament, and never to represent *berith*.

In the New Testament, on the other hand, it is rather common. Paul seems to have liked it, as expressing the perfect voluntariness of the act of God. It made the "covenant" an act of God's grace, wholly undeserved by any previous desert on the part of the recipients. Hence he even speaks of "the covenants of the promise" (*Eph.* ii. 12), *i.e.* the solemn, binding, holy engagement of God's voluntary grace and kindness.

It is characteristic of the change of spirit that the Old Testament uses only the word indicating binding, inexorable legal force, the New Testament prefers² the word indicating free, undeserved, kindness and grace.

The word *Diatheke* was fixed upon by the Septuagint

¹ The Sept. version uses *συνθήκη* in a few cases to represent other Hebrew words, and, in one case, 4 Kings xvii. 15, one of the texts uses it to represent *berith*.

² Paul uses *διαθήκη* 9 times, *ἐπαγγελία* 25 times. In *Hebrews*, *διαθήκη* occurs 17 times, *ἐπαγγελία* 14 times.

translators to represent *berith*. This resolve must have been formed at the beginning of their work. They took the word in spite of its associations with human business, on the ground of its character as a whole. Now the word *Diatheke* went through a rapid course of development during the period 300 B.C. to about 100 A.D.; but the Septuagint translators, taking the word about 285 B.C., found it without any of the connotation derived from the changes that affected it after 300 B.C. It had such marked advantages for their purposes that their choice could not have been doubtful.

In the first place, the *Diatheke* was a solemn and binding covenant, guaranteed by the authority of the whole people and their gods. It was originally executed verbally before the assembled people as a solemn religious act, the people being parties to it; and even in the late third or second centuries B.C., when it had become a private document, the reigning sovereigns were made parties to it, and named executors of it: this was, of course, a mere form, a sort of legal fiction, substituted for the old fact that the public authority was actually a party to the *Diatheke*.

In the second place, the *Diatheke* was primarily an arrangement for the devolution of religious duties and rights, and not merely a bequeathing of money and property.¹ The heir was bound to carry on the religion of the family, and was placed there for that purpose.

In the third place, the maker of the *Diatheke* had the full power in his hands, and the party benefited by the *Diatheke* exercised no authority in the making of it. The latter had only to fulfil passively the conditions, and he succeeded to the advantages of the *Diatheke*.

In the fourth place, while the noun *διαθήκη* is confined almost exclusively to the disposition of one's property and

¹ See above, p. 303.

duties by Will,¹ the verb *διατίθεσθαι* is used also in the sense of "to dispose of one's property by sale," and in various other senses of the term "dispose"; but in every case one party disposes with authority. The Scotch legal term "disposition" best translates *Diatheke*.

Finally, the central idea expressed in *διαθήκη* represented fairly one important side of the Biblical conception. The *Diatheke* was the concrete expression of individual authority over property, and embodied the reaction against the former system of family authority. The tradition is that Solon passed the first law in Athens permitting the owner of property to bequeathe it by a *Diatheke*, whereas previously the family to which the owner belonged inherited in default of children. Solon, however, gave the right of bequeathing only in default of male children, only under the form of adoption, and with the obligation of marrying the daughter if there was one. Gradually the freedom of making *Diatheke* was widened, the individual became more and more master of his property, and its disposition and the claim even of his children became weaker. He was permitted to bequeathe legacies to strangers without adoption; but these legacies seem to have been classed as gifts (*δωρεαί*), not as inheritance, and were restricted in certain ways (Mitteis, p. 336); by common Greek custom and feeling the son must inherit, and an heir was called a son. In the cases which are most familiar to us in inscriptions legacies took, as a rule, the form of religious endowments intended to perpetuate the

¹ That such was the sense of *διαθήκη* in ordinary Greek is attested by the lexicons and by many inscriptions (see p. 300). The only exception quoted from Aristoph., *Av.* 439, is not very clear. It contains a joke founded on some unknown popular story of the ape and the woman (or his wife); the story is explained by the scholiasts in the usual Aristophanic style, but little value attaches to their evidence. Dr. Hatch, *Essays in Bibl. Greek*, p. 47 f., exaggerates the loose expression of Lightfoot (quoted on p. 300, n. 3), thinking that *διαθήκη* means "covenant" several times in Classical Greek, and regularly in Hellenistic. But neither quotes any example except under Biblical influence.

cult and the memory of the deceased; they are on the same footing as gifts made by a living person to keep up the religion and the worship of his deceased child or relative;¹ and are sometimes by consent of the heirs, *i.e.* the sons (above, p. 204).

Thus the Diatheke expressed strongly the absolute authority of the disposer, who in the Biblical "Covenant" was God himself.

The owner could even disinherit his son. But the act of disinheritance must be performed by the father publicly, during his lifetime, and for good reasons.² Even in the fifth century after Christ the principle remained in force in Syria, persisting from Seleucid custom and law, that the father could only put away his son on good grounds. On the other hand, in Greek law, a daughter was not strictly an heiress. She had an indefeasible right to a dowry; but she was styled an *ἐπικληρος*, not a *κληρονόμος* (as a son or adopted son was); and her dowry must not encroach seriously on the son's portion.

Further, the owner and disposer could affect by his Will the disposition of his property for generations. Thus, in an unpublished Greek Will found in Egypt,³ a man leaves his property to his wife for her lifetime, and thereafter to the children of his concubine, who on their part are not free to alienate it, but must leave it to their own family.

Thus, even after the Greek Will had lost its original character of being open and public, immediately effective, and irrevocable, the word Diatheke still retained many characteristics which fitted it to be used as the rendering for *berith*. But the change in the character of the Greek

¹ A good example of this is given in *Inscriptions d'Asie Mineure I Amorion* in *Rev. Ét. Gr.* 1889, p. 18.

² Mitteis, p. 336; so certainly in Seleucid (South-Galatian) law.

³ Communicated (like the other unpublished Wills quoted below) by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt (to whom I am much indebted): period of Trajan.

Will tended to make the word less suitable. The steps of the change, and their dates, are obscure; and in regard to the following notes, I should be especially grateful for correction. To describe the development of the Greek Will would require a treatise; but some points bearing on the New Testament usage of *Diatheke* may be put together here. The new evidence gained from the many Wills of Greek settlers found in Egypt, from inscriptions, and from the Græco-Syrian Law-Book¹ of the fifth century after Christ, has never been collected and arranged. The obscurity in which the subject is involved may be gathered from the words used by such a high authority as Dr. W. E. Ball: "It need hardly be said that St. Paul, in any metaphor based upon Will-making, could only refer to the Roman Will. The Romans were the inventors of the Will." He speaks on the assumption that there was no Greek system of Will-making. But, as soon as we realize that in Tarsus, in Syria, in South Galatia, and at Ephesus, Paul was in the region where Greek Wills had been a familiar fact of ordinary life before a single Roman had set foot in the Eastern land, and where Greek Wills were still customary when Paul was writing, the case assumes a different aspect.

The subject is complicated by difference of custom and law in different Greek countries, and by the way in which Roman law affected Greek law in the Eastern Provinces. For example, a Greek Will of A.D 189 in Egypt is expressed quite in the Roman style and after Roman custom,² and the Græco-Syrian Law-Book, while retaining many points of Greek law,³ uses many Roman ideas, and observes the rule of the *Lex Falcidia* B.C. 40, that three-

¹ Bruns and Sachau, *Ein Syrisch-römisches Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.

² Mommsen in *Berlin Sitzungsber.* 1894, p. 48 ff.

³ See above, p. 802.

fourths of the testator's property is at his own disposal, but one-fourth must go to his children.¹

In the history of the Biblical term, it is clear that it was affected by the development in the meaning of the legal term. In *Hebrews* ix. 15 the writer is troubled by the fact that a *Diatheke* has no validity except after the disposer's (*i.e.* the testator's) death. Such a difficulty evidently was not felt by the Septuagint; and Paul, writing to the Galatians, iii. 15 ff., does not feel it, and assumes that they will not feel it. To them, clearly, *Diatheke* (though it did not actually operate to cause division of the property until the disposer's death) was valid from the moment when it was executed (publicly, of course) and deposited in the Record Office, through which all Greek Wills, so far as our knowledge extends, had to pass.

The passing through the Record Office took the place of the ancient execution before the public assembly.² "In the Record Office were preserved public documents of all kinds, as well as copies of important private documents, title-deeds, wills, records of the sale of real property, mortgages, loans, etc. Before a copy of any such deed was accepted in the Office, its legality and validity were verified; and thus the official in charge of the office played an important part in the business of the city. The existence of a certified copy of a deed in the Record Office was accepted as proof of legal right; and this simple guarantee facilitated the borrowing of money on the security of property, besides making the transfer of property and the verification of titles very simple."³

The Greek Wills in Egypt went through a peculiarly

¹ The form was that the heir inherited the whole, but was obliged to pay out of the property such legacies as the testator ordered. The *Lex Falcidia* provided that these legacies could not exceed three-quarters.

² Compare also the statements in Wills found in Egypt (all by Greeks and in Greek) that the Will was executed *ἐν ἀγυῖαι* or *ἐν ἀγοραῶν*.

³ *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Part ii. p. 368 f.

rapid development. The soldiers who settled there were separated from their family, and sole masters of their fortune. The family influence on the Diatheke, and family rights over the property of the individual, therefore, had no existence. Everything concurred to give the individual owner absolute right to dispose of his property as he pleased. The development would go on continuously through the centuries, for Egypt was a battlefield for Greeks and Romans. Hence in a will dated in the year 123 B.C.¹ the testator leaves all his property away from his two sons, except two beds: all the rest he bequeaths to his second wife. In the wills in Egypt of the first two centuries after Christ there is often contained the provision that the testator is free to alter or invalidate.

But in Lycaonia and Southern Phrygia, as was pointed out,² the Greek influence was strongest under the early Seleucid kings, and then grew weaker (so far at least as the existing form of government was concerned). The Will in the Galatian Churches was likely to retain more of the early Seleucid type, and to be regarded (as Paul says) as an irrevocable document, which had to be taken up and observed in any subsequent Will (*ἐπιδιαθήκη*), as seems to be the case even in an Egyptian Will of the second century B.C., quoted in a note to p. 303.

The Greek Diatheke came to the East with Greek settlers and soldiers and colonies, in the third century B.C., or earlier, and therefore with the associations of its past history. The Roman Will came much later, as a fact in the law of the conquerors, and without any associations from its past history: it appeared in the East as a document which had no standing and no meaning until after the testator's death. Now the Epistle to the Hebrews moves entirely in the atmosphere of Roman law. "The

¹ Gizeh no. 10388, unpublished, communicated by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt.

² See above, p. 294.

Rabbinical Will was unknown before the Roman Conquest of Palestine, and was directly based upon the Roman model."¹ Even under the rule of Herod in Palestine, as of Amyntas in Galatia,² the new law introduced was almost certain to be Roman, not Greek. The pleadings in Rome about the comparative validity of Herod's last Will are of the Roman character: the last Will is tacitly acknowledged to be the only one valid, unless it could be shown to have been executed in a state of unsound mind.³

Even if the Epistle was addressed (as some think) to the Church in Rome, not to that in Jerusalem, that would only show more clearly how Roman is the atmosphere in which it moves. The writer of the Epistle was probably a Jew, resident in Cæsarea, for it was, as I believe, written by the Church of Cæsarea during Paul's imprisonment.

Throughout the difficult passage *Hebr.* ix. 11-22 *Diatheke* means Will or "Disposition"; but the writer finds the same difficulty that we should feel in speaking of God's last Will and Testament. He tries to solve it by saying that God's *Diatheke* needs always a death before it becomes valid, once the death of calf or goat, now the death of Christ. This is really a conceit, forced on the writer, because in the law familiar to him *Diatheke* had lost much of the sense which it had in the Septuagint, and still had to the South Galatians.

XXIX. THE ARGUMENT IN GALATIANS III. 16.

He saith not "And to seeds," as of many; but as of one, "And to thy seed," which is Christ.

It is necessary for Paul's argument to show that all nations, and not Jews alone, have the right to share in the

¹ Dr. Ball, *Contemp. Rev.*, Aug., 1891, p. 287. He is undoubtedly right in this statement.

² See above, p. 292.

³ Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* xvii. 9, 5.

blessings promised to Abraham. He finds the proof in the fact that the various promises made to Abraham were made equally to his seed.¹ Now, as Lightfoot says, "with a true spiritual instinct even the Rabbinical writers saw that 'the Christ' was the true seed of Abraham: in Him the race was summed up, as it were; without Him its separate existence as a peculiar people had no meaning." In "the seed of Abraham" all nations were to be blessed (*Gen.* xxvi. 8). It cannot be doubted by those who regard the evolution of Hebraic religion and the coming of Christ as a series of steps in the gradual working out of the will of God, that this interpretation of the "seed of Abraham" is justified.

But, instead of using this way of reasoning simply, Paul seems to have been tempted to aim at the same result by a verbal argument. The Greek philosophers were often led astray by an idea that mere grammatical facts and forms contained some deep philosophical or mystical truth. Plato's *Cratylus* is sufficient evidence of this. Paul, therefore, argues that as the singular, "seed," is used, not the plural, the single great descendant of Abraham is meant, and not the many less important descendants. This is, obviously, a mere verbal quibble, of no argumentative force. Paul sees clearly and correctly the result to be aimed at, but he reaches the result by a process of reasoning which has no more force in logic than the poorest word-splitting of any old Greek philosopher or Hebrew Rabbi.

The attempt which Lightfoot makes to defend the character of the reasoning from "seed" and "seeds" cannot be pronounced successful. It amounts practically to this, "the theological result aimed at is right" (as we fully admit), "therefore the reasoning can hardly be wrong."

¹ *Gen.* xiii. 15, xvii. 8.

If we set aside the verbal fallacy, the argument remains complete and correct.

The promises were made to Abraham and to his seed.

The true "seed of Abraham" is "the Christ."

"Christ" is the whole body of true Christians.

The promises were made to all Christians.

That is to say, the promises made to Abraham are the heritage of the whole Church of Christ, the whole multitude of those who are justified by faith in Christ.

The argument is one more of the many ways in which Paul reiterates the fundamental truth that he has to drive home into the minds of the Galatians, or rather to revivify in their memory.¹ It is specially obvious here that Paul is appealing to familiar doctrines, already set forth to the Galatians, and not arguing to a circle of readers on a topic new to them.

XXX. GALATIANS III. 19-22.

In this passage Paul guards against a possible misinterpretation of his words, which might be dangerous. It might be said that he was representing the Law as being in opposition to the Promises made to Abraham and his seed. He must therefore define clearly what he conceives to be the function of the Law. The same person, the one God, gave both the Promises and the Law. The Promises were to be fulfilled, not immediately, but after a long interval, not to each individual of the human "Seed of Abraham," but to and through "the Seed," *i.e.* the Christ. The Law is the preparation for the fulfilment of the Promises. There must be a clear and peremptory forbidding of sin, before the sin is made emphatic and beyond

¹ See § XIII.

palliation or excuse. "The times of ignorance God might overlook," as Paul said to the Athenians; but none who sinned against the clear Law could try to shelter themselves behind such a plea. Moreover, the Law was necessary (as has been said, p. 201 f.) in order that the overwhelming consciousness of sin, which is a necessary preliminary to true faith in Christ, might be produced in the minds of men.

The Law would have been contrary to the Promises, if it had been intended to produce the same result as they by a new way, and therefore had rendered them unnecessary. The Promises are promises of life and salvation; and if a Law such as could produce life and salvation had been given from Mount Sinai, then this Law would really have interfered with and nullified the Promises.

But, on the contrary, the Scripture¹ declares that the effect of the Law is to "shut up everything under the dominion of sin without means of escape" (Lightfoot), in order that men might be forced to look forward to "the Christ" as the only means of escape, the only hope of life.

The expression "by faith to them that believe," v. 22, *ἐκ πίστεως τοῖς πιστεύουσιν*, is rendered very strong by the repetition. As has been pointed out on page 298, *ἐκ πίστεως* must be understood as emphatically denying the opposite doctrine of the Judaizing Christians—the source is *ἐκ πίστεως*, not *ἐκ νόμου*.

XXXI. THE MEDIATOR.

"The Law was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator. Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one."

We have here, as is recognised in the translation, re-

¹ Notice the vagueness of the reference; Paul's words become clear only if taken as referring to a previous exposition, made orally in his former preaching to the Galatians, of the combined effect of several biblical passages.

peated by Zöckler and others, and not disputed by Lightfoot (but, seemingly, recognised by him as the obvious sense), a clear and apparently undisputed example of a participle used in the sense of *καί* with a finite verb: "The Law was added because of transgressions, till the Seed should come to whom the Promise had been made, and it was ordained through angels, etc.," where the Greek has merely the participle "being ordained." But, distinctly, the giving of the Law by God is the first step, and the carrying into effect by means of angels is the following step. This is one of the many examples justifying the construction *διήλθον . . . κωλυθέντες* in *Acts* xvi. 6 in the sense which I have pleaded for, "they traversed . . . and were prevented." That loose usage of the participle belongs to the later language, in Greek and in Latin, beginning in the early Empire.¹

The precise meaning of the argument that lies in the words of iii. 20 is very difficult to catch; and I shall not attempt to add one to the 250 or 300 interpretations that have (according to Lightfoot) been proposed for this passage. We have in section xxix. seen a case where Paul sees the right result, and yet attains it by an argument founded on the generally accepted (though mistaken) view of that period, that grammatical forms had a deep philosophical meaning (usually assigned on arbitrary and capricious grounds to suit some individual instance). Is that not the case here?

Paul is evidently emphasizing a certain contrast that

¹ See EXPOSITION, April, 1894, p. 298. At the same time, I think with Lightfoot that this reading, found in the great MSS., is a later one, and that this is one of the cases in which B is wrong, as in *Acts* xi. 20; *Luke* iv. 17 (where *ἀναρῶντας*, "unfolding the roll," was clearly the original text, while *ἀνοίξας*, "opening the book," is an alteration belonging to the third or fourth century, when the book form had been generally adopted for Bibles, as more convenient for frequent use, instead of the roll form): *St. Paul the Trav.*, p. 195 f.

exists between the free grace of the Promises and the indirect character of the Law, as being merely a means to an end beyond itself, as not being the direct and ultimate gift of the grace of God. The distinction is undeniable and of immense importance. In this paragraph, therefore, he does not use the word *Diatheke* to indicate the "covenant" made with Abraham. In accordance with the distinction drawn in section xxviii., it is necessary for him to use *ἐπαγγελία*, in order to emphasize the character of freedom and grace in the covenant made by God with Abraham and his seed. Accordingly the word Promised or Promises occurs three times in the short paragraph (*vv.* 19, 21, 22); the Greek text has the verb instead of the noun in 19, where the English translation, if literal, would be "the Seed to whom it hath been promised."

The Law did not come immediately and directly from God to men. It was conveyed by angels from God; and a mediator, viz. Moses, carried it down from the Mount to the Hebrew people. This method is far less gracious and kind than the direct communication from God to Abraham; and brings out the consciousness of an impassable gulf separating God from even the chosen people. The allusion to the angels seems founded more on Rabbinical interpretation and later tradition than on the text of the Books of Moses; but the words of Stephen (*Acts* vii. 53) and of Herod in Josephus, *Ant.* xv. 5, 3, quoted by Lightfoot and others, seem to imply that the common belief of the time supposed the ministry of angels.

A mediator implies one who goes between two parties to an agreement, and therefore to a certain degree might seem to diminish the absolute authority and completeness of the one party in this case. Can this, then, be the sense of the last words of *v.* 20, "but God is one"? So Lightfoot thinks, and so it may be. But it seems an unsatisfactory form of expression; and I cannot avoid the suspicion that

Paul here is betrayed into a mistake, and is thinking of the other and infinitely more important sense of the words, "God is one"—as in *Rom. iii. 30*—"He is one and the same God in all His acts, one God makes both the Promises and the Law." The argument would then be a fallacy, "a mediator implies (two parties), but God is one." I may be wrong; but, if one speaks, one must say what one thinks. Here, while Paul aims at a great truth, he reaches it, I think, by a mistaken argument.

W. M. RAMSAY.

*THE REVELATION OF THE SON OF MAN
TO NATHANAEL.*

ONE clear glimpse, and one only, of the character and inner life of Nathanael is given us in the Gospel narrative. The occasion is that of his introduction to Jesus. The story, as told in the opening chapter of St. John's Gospel, overflows with interest. And yet we feel that something is lacking. Our wonder is aroused, and we are eager to know one thing that is not told us. What was it that had taken place underneath the fig tree before Philip found his friend?

Now such wonder may be something better than idle curiosity. For we inevitably feel that this is an essential part of the whole, and that if our wonder were gratified we should have a key that might unlock the inner meaning of the incident. If we knew what Nathanael must have known, then the revelation to him would be also a revelation to us. Without that knowledge we can have but a partial understanding of the occurrence.

Earnest endeavours to perceive what is not definitely expressed in terms of sense must be made if the gospel is to be to us an unveiling of the eternal. The incidents recorded by the Evangelists are successive revelations,

within the limits of space and time, of the one eternal life. They are given to us in order to enable us to behold that life. We must use the word spoken and the deed done as aids to penetrate into the unseen world, where the thoughts and feelings of the actors are at work, where the real life is lived, where God draws near to man. Until we perceive something of the inner spiritual movement in each incident it cannot be to us a manifestation of the eternal.

This is clearly true with regard to the story of Nathanael. We feel instinctively that the real movement takes place far below the surface. And we can scarcely doubt that the enlightening process through which Nathanael was led to recognise in Jesus the Son of God and King of Israel began when he was under the fig tree. What, then, was the nature of this beginning, this spring of spiritual action? We are not told. And it may naturally be urged that if a knowledge of his experience there were necessary for a true and complete interpretation of the narrative, it would have been clearly recorded. The argument, though plausible, has no real weight. It would apply with even greater force to our Lord's teaching by parables. The reason for that form of instruction applies here. There is always a danger of our seeing without perceiving, and being satisfied therewith; and that danger must be guarded against. We must by some means be raised from the low spiritual level where we think we see to a loftier standpoint, whence the truth can really be discerned. Nay, rather, we must be induced to raise ourselves by our own mental and spiritual efforts. Now a strong inducement of this kind is created by the very reticence shown in the story of Nathanael. It is suggested that something took place under the fig tree which had an important bearing on the relation between Jesus and His new disciple, but nothing definite concerning its nature is recorded. Such reticence cannot be observed for the mere purpose of tantalizing us. It is surely meant

to stimulate our faculties of spiritual inquiry, so that by using them we may rise step by step to that same point of view from which the guileless Israelite looked with opened eyes upon his King.

We must look, then, in the narrative for the stepping-stones by which we may attain to this true point of view. Now we may take it for granted that the Evangelist is economical of his materials. He gives just what is needed, nothing more. No suggestion must be neglected. Each word has its purpose; each has its vital relation to the whole. Bearing this in mind on our introduction to Nathanael, we pay special attention to the words with which Philip addresses him, "*We have found Him, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write.*" The form in which he announces his discovery throws a clear light on the customary lines of thought of the speaker and his friend. It may reasonably be inferred that Nathanael was in the habit of studying the Pentateuch and the prophetic writings of the Old Testament with special reference to one pre-eminent person there made known. That was a subject to which his thoughts would naturally turn in his hours of quiet meditation.

The story, as we follow it further, appears to suggest also that there were favourite passages in these sacred writings over which the student specially loved to linger. Throughout it there is repeated reference to the history of Jacob. We find this in our Lord's first words concerning Nathanael. We find it in the new disciple's confession of faith. We find it in the glorious promise which crowns the interview between the Israelite and his King. Jacob's history, then, has a prominent place in the composition of this picture of Nathanael. Now if, as we may well believe, St. John gives us in this picture not only a faithful likeness, but also an example of the truest art, then we are driven to the conclusion that the story of the patriarch had a

special meaning in the case of this man of Cana. This is most clearly shown in our Lord's introduction of the new comer to the other disciples, which moreover indicates that one critical incident in Jacob's career bore a peculiarly close relation to his descendant's spiritual history. This introduction is a brief description of the character of Philip's friend. "*Behold, an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile.*" A true descendant of Israel! Our thoughts are at once carried back to the time when one of whom Moses wrote appeared to Jacob in the night-watches, and bestowed upon him the new name of Israel. That this reference was deliberately intended is evident from the concluding words of Christ's description—"in whom is no guile." For in Jacob's case the change of name answered to a change of character. The supplanter, the deceiver, the guileful one, was transformed into the prince, or soldier, of God.

The man of Cana, it would seem, was his descendant spiritually as well as physically. He too had been freed from guile; but whether through so complete a change of character as in the case of Jacob we do not know. That his single-mindedness, however, was in some degree acquired is clearly indicated. The fact stands revealed in Nathanael's reply to the greeting of Jesus, "*Whence knowest Thou me?*" He evidently accepts as true our Lord's description of his character. His words express an amazed recognition of a knowledge which penetrated through outward appearances and discerned the thoughts and intents of the heart. Now such words as these are not the words of a man whose guilelessness has always been so natural to him that he is almost unconscious of it. They are the words of a man who has striven earnestly after that same purity of heart which, won through many tribulations, enabled his great ancestor to see God face to face.¹

¹ Gen. xxxii. 30; cf. St. Matt. v. 8

If, then, this struggle after guilelessness was a salient feature of Nathanael's spiritual history, we need not wonder if he took a peculiar interest in the story which told how Jacob wrestled with a heaven-descended man, and won for himself a new name. And we naturally ask, Had he been thinking of this before Philip found him? Had he then been praying for the blessing which he so earnestly coveted? Had he been striving in spirit with One who, though unseen, was near? Had he been yearning to see Him face to face?

If this were so, then the objection which Nathanael makes to his friend's announcement is most natural. We can readily understand his troubled perplexity when Philip identified the one of whom Moses wrote with a man of Nazareth. His own thoughts were full of one who came direct from God, from heaven. How incongruous this new idea! How poor in comparison! Could a small country town, contemptible because of his very familiarity with it, if for no worse reason, be the source of the blessings for which he looked? Could a man of Nazareth fulfil his glorious hopes?

The objection is so natural under these assumed conditions that it affords a slight justification of the truth of our conjecture as to the nature of Nathanael's thoughts. But we stand on surer ground when we find the question clearly decided by our Lord's answer to Nathanael's surprised inquiry as to the source of His knowledge. "*Before Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee.*" Thus Jesus definitely connects His discernment of the man's character and inner life with a particular time and place. Before Philip called him, when he was under the fig tree, Christ had looked into his heart. Then and there He had seen Jacob's struggle repeated. Then and there He had seen Nathanael's striving after guilelessness.

The evidence is overwhelming, and Nathanael cannot but

believe. Jesus must have been present with him in spirit underneath the fig tree, and have read his very thoughts. The invisible being with whom he had striven for a blessing must be identical with this man of Nazareth. Flesh and blood had not revealed this unto him. Philip's words had had no convincing effect. But his Father in heaven had borne witness in his heart with resistless power. He sees the truth by a flash of inspiration, and makes his enraptured confession, "*Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God, Thou art King of Israel.*"

Now in the form of this confession we find a striking justification of the preceding line of thought; for it is a brief description of the mysterious being who appeared to Jacob. This person is called a "man" in the account in Genesis, and is referred to by Hosea as an "angel";¹ but both by the historian and the prophet he is regarded as partaking so intimately of the Divine nature that his self-manifestation is equivalent to a revelation of God. Jacob *had power with God*, we are told; and when the event was over, declared in solemn awe that he had *seen God face to face*.² To such a person the title "Son of God," implying the divine origin of him who bore it, and marking him out as representing God, would naturally be given by the thoughtful Israelite who diligently studied Moses and the prophets. And how would this same person be described in his relation to the patriarch? He gave Jacob a new name. He enrolled him as his prince or soldier. To Israel, therefore, he was a King.

Thus the spiritual history of Jacob was repeated in all its essentials in the experience of his descendant. Nathanael had striven to gain from God a clean heart. He had seen God's representative, his own Lord, face to face. He had won a new name, as the true Israelite,

¹ Gen. xxxii. 24; Hos. xii. 4.

² Hos. xii. 8; Gen. xxxii. 30.

free from guile. But the revelation which had been given to Israel was not merely repeated ; it was extended, completed, crowned. And herein perhaps we find the surest confirmation of the view which has been set forth. The patriarch, we are told, asked that the name of the God-man might be made known to him. . *"Tell me, I pray thee, thy name."* But his prayer received no answer. The hour had not then come. The name would have been in no way understood. At last, however, in the fulness of time, the revelation is given. To Nathanael, though he asks it not, the true name is declared. But it is not told to him only ; for it is to be the exclusive possession of no one person, or no one race. The true Israelite, typical member of the chosen people to whom the oracles of God were intrusted, is addressed ; but all the disciples, the representatives of the world-wide Israel that is to be, are included in the promise. *"He saith unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye shall see the heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man."*

Thus the two visions which mark Jacob's departure from and return to the promised land are connected, completed, and made permanent. In the vision of the ladder he became conscious of a connecting link between heaven and earth. In the vision of the God-man he learned that this connecting-link is a living person. It is now made manifest that that person is one who is called the Son of Man.

The Son of Man ! For the first time Jesus describes Himself. He gives Himself that name which, save on one occasion only within the limits of the New Testament, is used by Himself alone. It is a title which asserts the reality of His manhood. But it implies also that He is something more than one man among many. He is *the* Man, the ideal Man, who fulfils in Himself God's idea of manhood. He is the representative Man, who sums up in Himself all that there is in humanity as God has created it.

Through this name, then, the truths that were revealed to Jacob, and the promises that were sealed, are extended to the human race. That which was true for Israel and his descendants is also true for man as man. In every hour of loneliness, in every struggle after a nobler and purer state, there stands beside us One who shares our nature, and knows what is in man. He feels our temptations, realizes our weaknesses, and discerns our thoughts and hopes. He has lived on earth, was born of a woman, has been called a man of Nazareth. Yet He is not of the earth. He is a visitant from heaven, whence all true manhood comes, and whither it returns when it has learned obedience through the things which it suffers. Through Him heaven and earth are united. All the human hopes and aspirations which are set on this ideal man are carried upwards to the presence of Him in whose image we are made. All the answering strength and love which are bestowed on Him in abundance by the Father are brought down to us, to enable us to rise to that heavenly state. To each of us He will give at last a new name, answering to a purified and ennobled character. And when the dawn appears, He will not vanish, but will reveal Himself and His Father more and more clearly to us in the fulness of the eternal day.

W. D. RIDLEY.

*THE USE OF ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΟΝ AND ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΙΖΕΙΝ
IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

THE word *σκάνδαλον* occurs fourteen times in the New Testament; namely, five times in St. Matthew (thrice in one passage), once in St. Luke, six times in St. Paul's Epistles, once in 1 John, and once in the Apocalypse.

The verbal form *σκανδαλίζειν*, which does not occur in the LXX., is found nineteen times in the New Testament; namely, ten times in St. Matthew, three times in St. Mark, twice in St. Luke, once in St. John, and thrice in St. Paul's Epistles.

The Revised Version has practically one and the same rendering for *σκάνδαλον* in all the passages in which it occurs, namely, "things that cause stumbling" (*πάντα τὰ σκάνδαλα*, St. Matt. xiii. 41); "stumbling block," "occasion of stumbling," "occasion of falling." In Romans ix. 33, and 1 Peter ii. 8—a citation from Isaiah viii. 14—*πέτρα σκανδάλου* is translated "rock of offence," "stone of stumbling" having been used to render the preceding *λίθος προσκόμματος*.

The rendering of the verb *σκανδαλίζειν* by the Revisers proceeds on the same lines. "To cause or make to stumble" is the active voice, and "to stumble" or "find occasions of stumbling" (Luke vii. 23) are the renderings in fifteen passages; in the remaining four the translation of the A.V. "to be offended" is retained.

The following investigation into the meaning of these words is an attempt to show that the Revisers have, to say the least, very unnecessarily narrowed the meaning of them, and have in consequence failed to express, as perfectly as might have been done, the true significance of several important passages of Holy Scripture. These remarks, therefore, are not intended merely to establish a

point of verbal accuracy, but to endeavour to elicit the full force of divine sayings.

Σκάνδαλον is not found in literary Greek before the Hellenistic period. It had, however, probably had a long previous existence in the vernacular, as it has already acquired a figurative sense when adopted in the language of literature. The root meaning is said to be that of swift, darting movement, as of falling or gliding away (Curtius, *Greek Etymology*, 166). This agrees with the meaning of the cognate form, σκανδάληθρον, which is defined as the crooked hook or stick to which the bait is suspended in a trap, and which, being pressed or disturbed, closes the trap on the imprisoned bird or animal. Hence in a figurative sense σκανδάληθρ' ἰστάς ἐπῶν, Aristoph., *Acharn*, 647, "setting word traps" in a disputation.

The scanty evidence from the classics in regard to σκάνδαλον points to the literal meaning of a baited trap or snare, and to the figurative meaning of enticement or allurement to ruin. This sense of the word is retained in later authors, as Alciphron, *Epistolæ*, iii. 22, κρεάδιον τῆς σκανδάλης ἀφάψας, "having attached a bait to the trap"; and Joann. Mosch. 3049 C (cited by E. A. Sophocles *sub voc.*) ἐσκανδαλίσθη εἰς ἐμέ, "was tempted to fall in love with me."

This primary thought of ensnaring through temptation, extended to a wide range of figurative meaning, seems to be applicable wherever the words σκάνδαλον and σκανδαλίζειν occur in the New Testament.

In the LXX. version of the Old Testament σκάνδαλον is employed to represent the Hebrew word שָׂקֶל in eight passages, and מִכְשָׁל in three passages. Two other passages, Ps. 1. 20, xlix. 13, where different Hebrew words are represented, need not be considered in our argument.

The precise meaning of שָׂקֶל, which is derived from שָׂקַץ, to ensnare, is seen in Amos iii. 5: "Can a bird fall in

a snare upon the earth where no *môkēsh* ('gin' R.V. 'bait,' Driver) is set for him? Shall a snare spring up from the ground and have taken nothing at all?" (R.V.). Professor Driver, in his explanation of the passage, refers to Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, 1878, ii. 103, where a bird-trap is described, "consisting of net-work strained over the semicircular flaps, moving on a common axis: this was laid upon the ground; and when the bait in the middle was touched by a bird, the two flaps, by a mechanical contrivance, flew up and closed, entrapping the bird."

It will be observed that this precisely corresponds with the description given independently above of the *σκάνδαλον*. It is true that *σκάνδαλον* is not here used to translate *שֶׁרֶץ*; but this is accounted for by the fact that for some reason unknown to us *σκάνδαλον* is not included in the vocabulary of the translators of the prophetic books in the LXX. In Psalm lxix. 23 *γενηθήτω ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν εἰς παγίδα*. . . . *καὶ εἰς σκάνδαλον* (Heb. *môkēsh*) the reference is probably to the oriental cloth or leather spread upon the ground like a net. Other passages where *σκάνδαλον*, representing *môkēsh*, signifies ensnaring or ruin through allurement are Joshua xxiii. 13: The nations allowed to remain shall be a "snare and a trap unto you"; Judges ii. 3: "Their gods shall be a snare unto you." So Gideon's ephod became unto him *εἰς σκάνδαλον*, Judges viii. 27. Michal was given to David by Saul to be "a snare (*σκάνδαλον*) unto him." In Psalm cxl. 10 *σκάνδαλον* (*שֶׁרֶץ*) is used in parallelism with, *παγίς* (Heb. *פֶּה*), a net or snare (trap). In passages where *שֶׁרֶץ* is not rendered by *σκάνδαλον* it is represented by *παγίς*, *σκῶλον*, a pointed stake; *πρόσκομμα*, an impediment; *σκληρότητες*, pains, agonies; *δυσκολία*, hardship or waywardness; *βρόχους*, snares; *κοίλασμα*, a pit.

לִשְׁכַּח, which is represented by *σκάνδαλον* in three

passages (Lev. xix. 14; 1 Sam. xxv. 31; Ps. cxix. 164), is derived from a root signifying weakness in the limbs, and is used to express any obstruction or impediment which causes a fall. Hence, with the addition of רֶשֶׁת, "a rock of offence" or "stumbling-block" (Isa. viii. 14). In a figurative sense the word implies temptation to sin (Ezek. vii. 19, xiv. 3); illecebræ ad peccatum, Gesen. *sub voc.* In passages where σκάνδαλον is not used the LXX. translators render רֶשֶׁת by πτώμα, Isa. vii. 14; σκῶλα, Isa. lvii. 14; τὴν βάσανον, Ezek. iii. 20, vii. 12 (*scandalum*, Vulg.); τὴν κόλασιν, Ezek. xiv. 3, 4, 7, xviii. 30, xlv. 12; οἱ ἀσθενοῦντες, Ezek. xxi. 20.

So far, then, as the evidence of the LXX. goes we find no justification for the uniform translation of σκάνδαλον by "stumbling-block" either in a literal or symbolical sense. Even in Leviticus xix. 14 the impediments would include pitfalls or obstruction by ropes or nets, etc. (comp. εἰς παγίδα ποσὶν ἀφρόνων, Wisdom xiv. 11), and in most of the passages cited the ideas of allurement and ensnaring are predominant.

In the Apocryphal books σκάνδαλον is used in a literal sense (Judith v. 1) of impediments laid in the plain. These may have been pitfalls, rope-entanglements, sharp stakes or "caltrops," *Lat.* tribuli or murices; comp. Curt. l. 4, c. 13. Murices ferreos in terram defodisse Darium qua hostem equites emissurum credebat. The Syriac, however, of this passage has "and laid ambushes in the field" (*Speaker's Com. ad loc.*); and a comparison with 1 Macc. v. 3 shows that this sense of entrapping by an ambush may be the meaning of σκάνδαλα here. In other places in the Apocrypha σκάνδαλον has the sense of temptation or sin through temptation; see especially Judith xii. 2: "I will not eat lest there be an offence," *i.e.* a temptation to ceremonial defilement.

It is in the Apocrypha also that for the first time we

meet with the verbal form *σκανδαλίζειν*. Its meaning is derived from the symbolical use of the noun. It occurs three times, and in the book of Ecclesiasticus only : in ix. 5, in the sense of being ensnared by allurements, *παρθένον μὴ καταμάνθανε, μήποτε σκανδαλισθῇς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις αὐτῆς* ; in xxiii. 6 it has the meaning of being entrapped by words ; in xxxii. 15 the extended force of finding difficulties in the law.

Returning to the new Testament, we find there the same group of meanings for *σκάνδαλον* and *σκανδαλίζειν* which we have endeavoured to trace in the classics and in the Septuagint. But in the New Testament both noun and verb have extended their signification, and especially the verb.

σκάνδαλον has carried with it to New Testament times the following meanings : snare, temptation or impediment, hindrance, difficulty, and (joined with *πέτρα*) stumbling-block.

Hence the verb *σκανδαλίζειν* signifies : (a) to entrap (figuratively), to tempt to sin ; and (b) from result of ensnaring, to check, discomfit, ruin ; and (c) from the feelings of one ensnared, to shock, terrify, disconcert, bewilder, cause anger, resentment, doubt, difficulty.

The different passages where the words occur may be classified under these meanings : in S. Matthew xiii. 41 *πάντα τὰ σκάνδαλα* are all persons and things which hinder the growth of the spiritual life. S. Matthew xvi. 23 *ὁ δὲ στραφεὶς, εἶπε τῷ Πέτρῳ, Ὑπαγε ὀπίσω μου, Σατανᾶ, σκάνδαλόν μου εἶ*. "Thou art a snare unto Me." Thou temptest Me by the inducement of a wordly ambition to depart from the Father's will. S. Matthew xviii. 7 *οὐαὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ἀπὸ τῶν σκανδάλων· ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα· πλὴν οὐαὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ τὸ σκάνδαλον ἔρχεται*. Here the thought is of temptation, and of the sin and ruin which follow temptation. Some such translation as "Woe to

that man by whom the temptation cometh" would teach Christ's lesson better than the rendering of the R.V., "Woe to that man through whom the occasion (of stumbling) cometh!"¹

The combined quotation from Isaiah viii. 14 and Isaiah xxviii. 16 in Romans ix. 33, and 1 Peter ii. 8 is not given in the words of the LXX., but is independently translated from the Hebrew. In place of *πέτρας πτώμα*, LXX., we have in the New Testament *πέτρα σκανδάλον*, representing the Hebrew צוּר מַכְשֹׁל. The rendering of this by "rock of offence or stumbling" is correct. But the addition of *πέτρα* tends to show that *σκανδάλον* by itself would not be understood to mean "a stumbling-block."

In Romans xiv. 12 *σκανδάλον* is the hindrance to the Christian life caused by needlessly raising questions of conscience; in Romans xvi. 17 *σκανδάλα* are such hindrances as would arise from contentions within the Church.

In 1 Corinthians i. 23 and Galatians v. 11 "Christ crucified," or "the cross," is spoken of as a *σκανδάλον*. It was a shock, a surprise, a difficulty to the Jew who expected something very different in the Messiah.

St. John also uses *σκανδάλον* in the sense of hindrance or impediment, 1 John ii. 10 *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ μένει, καὶ σκανδάλον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν*. That is, there is nothing in him to hinder his Christian progress; love and light have made all smooth, "qui amat iter expeditum habet" (Bengel); or else, he that loveth his brother presents no hindrance, no cause of resentment, no difficulty in the way of belief, or offence to others.

The primitive idea of the word, "temptation to sin and ruin," may be traced in Revelation ii. 14, where Balaam is described as one who, *ἐδίδασκεν τῷ βαλὰκ βαλεῖν σκάν-*

¹ Dr. S. C. Malan, in the *Revision of 1881 Revised*, p. 43, notes that the Æthiopic version of S. Matt. v. 29 renders, "If . . . cause thee to err, mislead thee"; and the Arabic, "If . . . offend, mislead or deceive thee."

δαλον ἐνώπιον τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθута καὶ πορνεῦσαι.

In most cases the use of the verb is sufficiently illustrated by what has been said of the noun. But the following examples are of exceptional interest: *Μακάριός ἐστιν ὃς ἐὰν μὴ σκανδαλισθῇ ἐν ἐμοί*, St. Matthew xi. 6. Blessed is he who feels no resentment from disappointed hopes, has no difficulty in recognising Me as the Messiah. John had been perplexed and disappointed.

Γενομένης δὲ θλίψεως ἡ διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν λόγον εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζεται, S. Matthew xiii. 21. "Straightway falls," being grievously disappointed and alarmed at the dangers of the position into which he had been tempted to enter. This is also the meaning of the word in S. Matthew xxiv. 10 and xxvi. 31. Even the disciples would be vexed and disappointed and find difficulties when things proved different from their hopes and expectations.

Οἶδας ὅτι οἱ Φαρισαῖοι ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον ἐσκανδαλίσθησαν, S. Matthew xv. 12. The Pharisees resented that which Jesus had said. Here "were offended at it" of the A.V. and R.V. is an adequate rendering if rightly understood.

In S. Matthew xiii. 27 our Lord gives as a reason to His disciples for paying the temple tax to those who demanded it, *ἵνα μὴ σκανδαλίσωμεν αὐτούς*. That is, either, lest we offend them, in the sense of exciting their anger. Even if we rightly enjoy an immunity, let us pay the tax for the sake of peace. "*Facillime ubi de pecunia agitur, scandalum capiunt a sanctis homines negotia mundana curantes*" (Bengel). Or, lest we place them in a false and difficult position, and even bring them unwittingly into an unconscious act of sin. Comp. for this use of the word Romans xiv. 21, 1 Corinthians viii. 13.

Twice in St. John's Gospel *σκανδαλίζειν* is used in the sense of causing perplexity or difficulty in belief; chapter

vi. 61. *Τοῦτο ὑμᾶς σκανδαλίζει*; and in chapter xvi. 1, *ἵνα μὴ σκανδαλισθῆτε*, that ye be not disquieted, and tempted. to lose faith through persecution.

To sum up our conclusion. We claim to have shown that in several passages of the new Testament where *σκάνδαλον* and *σκανδαλίζειν* occur the underlying original thought of enticement or temptation is included in the meaning of the word, and that in other passages where hindrance or difficulty is the predominant symbolical meaning the imagery is enriched and made more suggestive by the wider associations which we have described as properly belonging to the words.

ARTHUR CARR.

THE GENESIS OF DEUTERONOMY.

II.

B. Deuteronomy and its relation to History and Prophecy.—In our previous paper we discussed the relation of Deuteronomy to the middle book of the Pentateuch; we now propose to examine its relation to History and Prophecy. A recent writer¹ is quoted as having said, "In history not in literary criticism lie the problems of the future." In keeping with which Wellhausen² affirms that "the basis of Old Testament criticism is the historical and prophetic books; on this basis rests not only the position of Deuteronomy but also the other strata of the Pentateuch."

The problem in the following paragraph, accordingly, is this: Have we, or have we not, sufficient traces in the historico-prophetic books of the Old Testament to warrant the conclusion that the laws of Deuteronomy were not

¹ Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, 1897.

² Wellhausen, *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, 1899, p. 358.

necessarily codified at a time subsequent to Moses? It is not enough to show that they may in part have had an *oral* existence from the Mosaic age; were they written down? If the question (discussed in our first article) of alleged existing contradistinctions between Deuteronomy and the other portions of the Pentateuch was a test of critico-exegetical skill, the problem now before us is a measure of one's critico-historical sense.

1. *Deuteronomy and Joshua*.—The *literary* dependence of the *book* of Joshua, in its present form, upon the *book* of Deuteronomy is admitted on all sides.¹ The same is true of Judges, Samuel, and Kings. But of course there might be a literary dependence of these books, as books, on the book of Deuteronomy and still the latter be of seventh century origin. Hence the primary question is not one of literary dependence. The true thesis is rather this: All these books (Joshua, Judges, etc.) show an incidental acquaintance with Deuteronomic statutes and regulations which, unless Moses actually promulgated such statutes and left them in written form, renders it almost inexplicable how Israel should have acted as they did, either in warfare or in worship. To deny this proposition impugns the general truthfulness of the history; and to destroy the history for the sake of establishing the dicta of criticism is of no greater advantage than to change the figures in an arithmetical problem in order to obtain the answer.

For example, (a) when Jericho was about to be taken Joshua commanded that the city and all within it, except Rahab, should be *devoted* (Josh. 6. 17, 18); this was in keeping with the entire spirit of the Deuteronomic law but

¹ The following passages, especially, show a Deuteronomic colouring: Joshua 1. 1-18; 3. 2-8; 4. 21-24; 8. 30-35; 10. 23-43; 11. 10-23; 13. 1-14; 21. 43, 44; 23. 1-16.

especially with Deuteronomy 13. 15 ff. Achan, however, trespassed in the accursed thing (7. 1), for which he was stoned and burned with fire (7. 25), which was according to the teaching of Deuteronomy 13. 10; 17. 5; because he had "sinned against the Lord God of Israel" (7. 20). (b) Again when Ai was taken, "only the cattle and the spoil of the city" did Israel take for a prey unto themselves (Josh. 8. 27), according to the privileges expressed in Deuteronomy 20. 14. The King of Ai Joshua "hanged on a tree until the evening"; but as soon as the sun was down, Joshua commanded his body to be taken down from the tree (8. 29), in obvious obedience to a law *peculiar* to Deuteronomy, which forbade allowing the bodies of the dead to hang over night (Deut. 21. 23). Likewise did Joshua, with the five kings of the Amorites, whom he also hanged (Josh. 10. 26, 27). Elsewhere also Joshua is reported, when capturing the cities of the Canaanites, to have left nothing remaining but to have destroyed all that breathed as "the Lord commanded Moses" (cf. Josh. 10. 40; 11. 12, 15 with Deut. 7. 2; 20. 16, 17).

As in warfare, so in worship. For instance, (a) after crossing the Jordan Joshua waged war in the direction of Mount Ebal, where he built an altar unto the Lord God of Israel—an altar of whole stones over which no man lifted up any iron, and there offered thereon burnt offerings unto the Lord and sacrificed peace offerings (Josh. 8. 30, 31), "as Moses the servant of the Lord commanded the children of Israel" (cf. Deut. 27. 4-6). Moreover, Joshua wrote upon the stones a copy of the law of Moses (Josh. 8. 32), as Moses also had commanded (Deut. 27. 3, 8), and the elders and officers and judges who bore the ark of the covenant stood on either side of the ark (Josh. 8. 33, cf. 3. 3), the stranger being present (cf. Deut. 31. 11, 12), half of them over against Mount Gerizim and half over against Mount Ebal, as directed in Deuteronomy 11. 29; 27. 12,

13; then Joshua read to all the congregation of Israel all the words of the law, the blessings and the cursings (Josh. 8. 34, 35), according to all that was written in the book of the law, and in strict obedience to the command given in Deuteronomy 31. 11, 12. (b) Of far greater importance is Joshua 2. 2, in which there is an event recorded which could hardly have happened had Moses never taught the unity of the sanctuary (a teaching emphasized in, though not peculiar to, the book of Deuteronomy), and the account of which has every appearance of being trustworthy history, "The indignation of the people against their brethren (the two and a half tribes) who had erected an altar on the border of Jordan before they crossed it to return to their own possession on the eastern side of that river; the earnestness with which the latter hastened to assure the people that they had erected the altar, not to establish an independent worship, but rather that it might stand as a permanent witness that they still adhered to and claimed to have part in Jehovah as their God; and the solemnity with which they disclaimed any intention to rebel against the Lord by building an altar for burnt offerings, for meat offerings, or for sacrifices besides the altar of the Lord that was before the tabernacle—all incontestably show that this law was known and recognised as imperative at the time of the settling of the people in the promised land. It was this law which they who had built the altar so earnestly disclaimed having broken; it was zeal for this law which stirred the other tribes to such wrath against their brethren when they supposed it had been violated by them."¹

Also the fact that in Joshua 1. 8 and 8. 31, 34 the author speaks of a *book of law* which he affirms was bequeathed by Moses to Joshua strongly corroborates our explanation of such events as those which we have just

¹ So W. L. Alexander, *Deuteronomy*, The Pulpit Commentary, p. xxxi., 1897.

examined above (cf. the expression, "this book of the law" in Deut. 31. 24-26).

2. *Deuteronomy and Judges.*—The death of Joshua marked a turning-point in the history of Israel's religious life. The period which followed was an age of moral declension. "Every man did that which was right in his own eyes" (Judg. 17. 6; 21. 25). Israel served Jehovah all the days of Joshua and all the days of the elders, who outlived Joshua; but after them there arose another generation which knew not Jehovah, but served Baalim (Judg. 2. 7, 10, 11). Over and over again the children of Israel are reported to have done evil in the sight of Jehovah by *forsaking the Lord God* and by breaking the covenant which he had made with their fathers (cf. Judg. 2. 11, 13, 17, 19, 20; 3. 6, 7, 12; 4. 1; 6. 1; 10. 6; 13. 1). On what grounds, it may with justice be asked, must we conclude that these statements are not true to fact? Wherefore does the historian only occasionally relate any example of Israel's observance of Mosaic teaching if he was unscrupulous in the statement of truth? Few are the examples he gives of any marked conformity, on Israel's part, to the laws of Deuteronomy. Only three or four can be cited with any degree of certainty or confidence.

In Judges 1. 17 the utter destruction of Zephath (Hormah) is recorded, which conforms to the requirements of Deuteronomy 7. 2; 20. 16 f., according to which "the wars with the Canaanites were always to be holy wars of extermination." In Judges 7. 1-7 Gideon's army is selected in keeping with the spirit of that very extraordinary statute laid down in Deuteronomy 20. 1-9, according to which all fearful and faint-hearted (beside many others who are specified) might be excused from going out to war. In Judges 21. 13 the congregation of Israel proclaimed peace to the children of Benjamin in perfect harmony with

Deuteronomy 20. 10-18. The writer further shows marked familiarity with Israel's journeyings from Egypt to Moab (cf. Judg. 11. 13-28 with Deut. 2. 1 f. and Amos 20. and 21.); assumes that Levi is the priestly tribe (Judg. 17. 7-13; 20. 27, 28); and shows studied concern, in describing what might be interpreted as legitimate violations of the Deuteronomic law, by stating that in these instances they acted in obedience to a direct command from God (cf. Judg. 6. 25-27, Gideon's altar; 13. 16, Manoah's sacrifice), apparently conscious that the only legitimate place of regular worship in Gideon's and Manoah's day was at Shiloh (cf. also 18. 31; 21. 19).

These are old and oft-repeated observations, but apparently true nevertheless. There is no doubt, as remarked above, of the literary dependence of the *book of Judges* upon the *book of Deuteronomy*, for, as Moore¹ has shown, various parts of *Judges* bear an unmistakably Deuteronomic stamp.

3. *Deuteronomy and the books of Samuel and Kings.*—During the period of Samuel's judgeship there is little evidence of the existence of the Deuteronomic law; concerning the law of a central sanctuary there is no proof whatever. Nothing is gained by veiling this fact. At the same time there is a key which unlocks fairly well the enigma of Samuel's age, an event of such tremendous significance, that, when correctly interpreted, explains the religious acts of Samuel's life in an entirely new light. That event was the loss of the Ark of the Covenant to the Philistines. Strange indeed that the pious Elkanah should be described in 1 Samuel 1. 1-9, 21 as going up yearly to worship Jehovah at Shiloh, and after the birth of Samuel as sacrificing also in Shiloh (1. 24), whereas, when Samuel grew up and became a priest he sacrificed at Mizpah (1 Sam. 7. 7-9), Bethlehem (1. Sam. 16. 5), and built an

¹ Moore, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Judges*, 1895, p. xxxv.

altar at Ramah (1 Sam. 7. 17)! And yet when it is remembered that Samuel did so only after the captivity of the Ark, his disregard of the Deuteronomic law is not so inexplicable, for, from the time the ark of God was taken in the war with the Philistines, (cf. 1 Sam. 4. 1) the law of the central sanctuary was in abeyance; Israel *could no longer* worship at Shiloh any more than the captives of Judah in Babylon, five hundred years later, could worship in Jerusalem. In the former case the *sanctuary* was in captivity, in the latter both sanctuary and people. This is the only real difference. In our judgment the worship of Jehovah in Mizpah, or Bethlehem, or Ramah, was quite as permissible in Samuel's days as Synagogue worship in Babylon during or after the exile. For with the loss of the ark the glory had departed from Israel (cf. 1 Sam. 4. 21, 22).¹ During the whole period of Philistine supremacy (from 1 Sam. 4. to 2 Sam. 6.) Israel was practically deprived of a central sanctuary; and thus being left to worship where they would, Baal and Jahwe worship came to have more and more in common. Even for pious Israelites in these times it must have been difficult to know where to sacrifice and what form of worship under the circumstances would receive the Divine sanction; hence this period—the period of Samuel and Saul, whose rule and lives were almost coterminous—in our judgment, furnishes absolutely no norm by which to judge the date of Deuteronomy. To our mind it is a no better criterion as to the existence or non-existence of the Deuteronomic statutes than the history of the Judean exile from 586 till 536 B.C.

Before the recovery of the sacred Palladium, however, an attempt was made by David (1 Kings 5. 3) to bring the nation once more to a common centre of worship—now Jerusalem. But this was practically impossible. Israel was so deeply

¹ Cf. Sime's *Deuteronomy the People's Book*, 1877, p. 118 f.

engrossed in war that the construction of a house suitable to the worship of Jehovah was necessarily postponed. *When Solomon finished the temple, it was too late.* The nation had enjoyed the license of semi-idolatry, and in some cases open apostasy, too long. The costly and unnecessary splendour of the Jerusalem temple (as some may have regarded it) only aggravated more and more the spirit of divorce which was growing against the central government. Even Solomon himself was allured into compromise with Baal practices through marriage with foreign wives (1 Kings 11. 1, 7), for whom he was fickle enough to erect high places of worship. Political disruption followed. Judah, remaining in possession of the temple, did not however, entirely forsake the worship of Jehovah, though their service became nominal and formal. Jehoiada the priest gave Joash the crown and testimony, whatever that may have been (2 Kings 11. 12; cf. Deut. 17. 18). And, what for our purpose is still more important, Hezekiah reformed the cultus of his day by removing the high places, breaking down the pillars, cutting down the *Asherah*, and even breaking in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had made, and which Israel had from time immemorial been wont to worship (2 Kings 18. 4). The latter act shows how radical and thorough were Hezekiah's attempts at reformation, and, as is obvious, in most striking accord with the emphasized teachings of the book of Deuteronomy. Nevertheless, permanent reformation under Hezekiah was impossible. Religious defection had become chronic. The same was true also of Josiah's attempts to reform. But these instances of failure do not prove the non-existence of the Deuteronomic law any more than the steady degeneracy of the Oriental Church attests the non-existence of the Gospels. Doubt and faith have existed from the first side by side. There is indeed as great a lack of evidence for the Mosaic origin of the second commandment

(even in its shortest possible form) as for the Deuteronomic statute concerning the Unity of Sanctuary. And as Dillmann¹ argues concerning the great day of Atonement that the argument from silence would forbid our assigning the origin of the ordinance to the days of the return from Babylon or any of the free Christian centuries, for "one would then have to maintain that the festival first arose in the first Christian century, since only out of that age do we first have any explicit testimonies concerning it"; so in the case of Deuteronomy. The *literary* dependence again of Samuel, Kings, or Deuteronomy is too generally admitted to require comment.²

4. *Deuteronomy and Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, Micah.*—The problem here is not whether these prophets of the eighth century teach truth in keeping with the laws of Deuteronomy, but whether they are the precursors of the Deuteronomic code. The book of Deuteronomy is said to be the product of their prophetic teaching. It is possible, on the other hand, to think that these prophets knew Deuteronomy as a book. Hosea, for example, complains of Israel's sacrificing upon the tops of the mountains, and burning incense upon the hills (4. 13), and at the same time warns *Judah* not to follow Israel's example in coming up to Gilgal and Bethaven (4. 15). George Adam Smith and others deny the genuineness of 4. 15 and various other passages in these prophets which we feel entitled to use, but upon insufficient grounds. Hosea alludes to striving with priests (4. 4; cf. Deut. 17. 12); removing landmarks (5. 10; cf. Deut. 19. 14); returning to Egypt (8. 13; 9. 3; cf. Deut. 28. 68); bearing Ephraim in his arms (11. 3; cf. Deut. 1. 31; 32. 10), all of which have a decidedly Deuteronomic ring.

¹ Dillmann, *Die Bücher Exodus u. Leviticus*, 2. Aufl. 1880, p. 525; cf. Kellogg, *The Book of Leviticus* (Expositor's Bible), 1891, p. 258.

² Cf. Driver, *Comm. on Deuteronomy*, 1895, p. lxxi.; also Sime, *Deut. the People's Book*, pp. 219 ff.

Amos 3. 2 is a bold denunciation for a shepherd-prophet to make against Israel without having had any written basis with which to verify his declaration: "You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will visit upon you all your iniquities." (But cf. Deut. 7. 6; 4. 7, 8.) Amos further denounces *Judah*, "because they have rejected the law of the Lord and have not kept His statutes, and their lies have caused them to err, after the which their fathers did walk," etc. (2. 4); which "law and statutes" must refer to a written code of some kind which had long had an established authority.¹ Moreover, Amos also condemns *Israel* for inhumanity towards the poor (2. 6), for adultery (2. 7), for retaining pledges over night (2. 8), notwithstanding that God had destroyed the Amorite before them and brought them forth from the land of Egypt (2. 9, 10). (But compare Deut. 8. 2, 15; 24. 12, 13.)

Isaiah, in the prophecies confessedly his own, is likewise a possible witness to the written existence of well-established and universally recognised law. Thus in chapter 1. 14 the phrase "Your new moons and your appointed feasts," like the great variety of offerings alluded to in 1. 12, 13, presupposes, as Delitzsch correctly observes, a law correspondingly great.² Throughout his prophecies Zion is pictured as the centre of the Jewish religion and as Jehovah's dwelling-place (cf. 2. 2-4, and Mic. 4. 1-4; also Isa. 8. 18; 28. 16; 29. 1, 2; 31. 9; 30. 29). His inaugural vision is another witness to the same effect (chap. 6). Isaiah never recognised high places as legitimate places of worship. On this point Dillmann³ remarks in connection with Isaiah 36. 7, "That Deuteronomy should have intro-

¹ We are aware that this passage is suspected by Dort, Duhm, Wellhausen, Stade, G. A. Smith and others, but again with insufficient right.

² Delitzsch, *A Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah*, transl. 1892. Vol. i. p. 76.

³ Dillmann, *Der Prophet Jesaja erklärt*, 5 Aufl. 1890, p. 315.

duced a command against high places as something entirely new is in itself unthinkable." ¹

A certain passage in Micah's prophecies points in the same direction: "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Mic. 6. 8). This passage seems to be a prophetic exposition of one in Deuteronomy: "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart?" etc. (Deut. 10. 12). The reverse is, in our judgment, quite out of the question; for the reason that a late prophet, writing in the name of Moses, would hardly put into Moses' mouth so ethical and so profound a prophetic teaching. And as in the case of Micah, so in that of all the eighth century prophets.

Hence we conclude that History and Prophecy are not entirely barren of evidence to the early existence of Deuteronomy. On the other hand, if there were no evidence whatever in these books of its early origin, it would not be surprisingly remarkable, because there was no official, political, or ecclesiastical sanction given to the law until the history of Israel was drawing to a close. Had the law to which Hosea and Amos apparently allude been written as late even as the ninth century B.C., it is difficult to see why they should have appealed to it at all. "The mere writing of a law did not give it any authority." ² On the contrary, as we have seen, the law seems to have had authority all through Israel's history—an authority which, in the minds of the *Biblical* historians at least, was

¹ For other passages in Hosea, Amos, and Isaiah, which more or less clearly indicate their dependence upon Deuteronomy, compare W. L. Alexander, *The Pulpit Comm.*, "Deuteronomy," 1897 (pp. vii.-ix.).

² So A. B. Davidson, *Expository Times*, Jan. 1898, p. 187.

Mosaic. And the Prophets likewise refer to the law "in such a way as to imply that in their belief the people at some time *long ago* had been made acquainted with it."¹

C. Deuteronomy's witness to itself.—The aim of a critical investigation along this line is to discover, if possible, any genuine historical allusions which clearly require our assigning the composition of the *body* of the book to a post-Mosaic age. Obvious *editorial* additions of course are in themselves insufficient to bring the composition of the main portion of the book down to the seventh century B.C. (*e.g.* Deut. 1. 1-5; 4. 44-49; 29. 1; 31. 1, 7, 9, 22; 33. 1; 34. 1-5); for it is natural to suppose that whoever added the account of Moses' death (34. 5-12)² might also have attempted to adjust the different portions of the work and bring them into their present form. There may likewise be, here and there, certain archæological notes (*e.g.* 2. 10-12, 20-23; 3. 9, 11, 14; 10. 6, 7), of a parenthetical character, which may very possibly have crept into the text later than the time of its composition. These are usually of an antiquarian character and interrupt the text,³ giving information concerning the aborigines of Edom and Moab, etc. Thus in Deuteronomy 2. 10-12 we are told that the Emims dwelt aforetime in Moab, but that the Moabites drove them out, and that the Horims once dwelt in Seir, but the descendants of Esau drove them out, "*as Israel did unto the land* (allowably, but not necessarily, restricted to Canaan) *of his possession*" (cf. the expression, "to possess" in Deuteronomy 3. 18, spoken to the two and a half tribes). Now this is an explanatory "footnote" (to use occidental language) of antiquarian character, which,

¹ Cf. Davidson, *idem*.

² Deuteronomy 34. 5-12 is denied to Moses even in the Talmud (Baba Bathra, 14b, 15a).

³ Cf. Dillmann, *Numeri, Deuteronomium u. Josua*, 2 Aufl. 1886, p. 243. Also Moulton, *The Modern Reader's Bible*, Deuteronomy, 1896, p. xii.

if treated as an original part of the text, would have possessed not only a didactic but a practical value in the mouth of Moses; or, if treated as a later interpolation, must have been inserted some time after the original text had itself been composed.¹

These are admissions which need not invalidate in the least the probable early origin of the main portion or body of Deuteronomy. We turn now to an examination of certain expressions and clauses which make one doubt the Mosaic, or even the early origin of the book.

1. The expression "at that time," which occurs fifteen times in the Book of Deuteronomy (1. 9, 16, 18; 2. 34; 3. 4, 8, 12, 18, 21, 23; 4. 14; 5. 5; 9. 20; 10. 1, 8), and which seems utterly inappropriate in the mouth of Moses speaking so soon after the events took place. But of these fifteen allusions to the past *eight* refer to events which happened before Israel departed from Horeb, which was *thirty-nine* years prior to the time of speaking, and the other *seven* refer to what took place when Israel defeated Sihon king of Heshbon, and Og king of Bashan, six months before (2. 34; 3. 4, 8, 12, 18, 21, 23). And it can hardly with justice be said that six months are too brief a period to warrant the use of such an expression, especially as on any theory of the origin of Deuteronomy, early or late, the context clearly shows that these words are not those of the *author* necessarily, but of the *speaker*. It is the speaker quoted by the author, who says, "at that time we did this and that."²

¹ Deuteronomy 3. 14 was explained as a later insertion by Hermann Witsius (d. 1708) in his Dissertation on *The Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch* (p. 31). Translated by Rev. John Donaldson, 1877. Cf. also the *Speaker's Commentary on Deuteronomy*, p. 799.

² Of all possible colloquial formulæ that of "at that time," and the following one to be discussed, "unto this day," are just such as a literary artist of the seventh century, in attempting to reproduce Moses' speeches in Moab, would have studiously avoided, had they seemed to him inappropriate in Moses' mouth. Cf. the remarkable use of these expressions in Joshua 6. 25, 26.

2. The expression, "unto this day," which occurs in Deuteronomy altogether six times (2. 22; 3. 14; 10. 8; 11. 4; 29. 3 (4); 34. 6). Of these, however, two occur within the archæological notes alluded to (2. 22; 3. 14), which are very possibly later than the body of the book. One of the remaining four is found in the account of Moses' death (34. 6), which is confessedly post-Mosaic. Accordingly only three remain. One of these (10. 8) describes how the tribe of Levi had exercised the office of priesthood from the time the Levites were set apart at Horeb—thirty-nine years before—and remain set apart "unto this day," *i.e.* until Moses' address was given in Moab. Another (11. 4) recounts how the Lord destroyed the Egyptians in the Red Sea—forty years before—adding that, "the Lord hath destroyed them unto this day." This was essentially true of the Egyptians during the forty years which followed Israel's exodus; but later on Egypt's power revived, *e.g.*, in the days of Rehoboam, Shishak, a king of the XXII. dynasty, actually plundered Jerusalem (1 Kings 14. 25–26). The only remaining passage to be explained (Deut. 29. 3) accuses Israel of blindness of eyes and dulness of hear. during all their desert wanderings "unto this day"—an expression quite as appropriate in Moses' mouth as the accusation was practical and just (*cf.* 1 Macc. 13. 30).

3. The formula, "over Jordan" בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן, which occasionally seems to place the writer on the *west* side of the river. This phrase is employed in the book of Deuteronomy ten times; seven times it is used of the territory east of the Jordan (1. 1, 5; 3. 8, 41, 46, 47, 49) and three times of the territory west of the Jordan (3. 20, 25; 11. 30). These facts are confusing; for, if the author were on the *east* side of Jordan at the time of writing, we should naturally expect him to designate by the phrase "over Jordan" the *west* side. But he does not do so. Seven times he uses it, and means the side he himself is on, *i.e.*

the *east*. On the other hand, if the author wrote on the *west* side of the river, we should naturally expect him to designate by the phrase "over Jordan" the *east* side. But, on the contrary, three times he uses it of the same side he is supposed to be on, *i.e.* the *west*. This is exceedingly troublesome, as it quite forbids our placing the author on the one side of Jordan or on the other without considerable uncertainty.¹ *Prima facie* we are almost forced to conclude that the term was an elastic one, and when standing alone is ambiguous. This conclusion is further evident from the fact that in every instance where the phrase occurs in the book of Deuteronomy it is accompanied by some modifying phrase such as "eastward," or "westward," or "toward the sun rising," or "by the way where the sun goeth down," which define it and relieve it of its own native ambiguity (the context determines 3. 20). In Numbers 32. 19, in one brief sentence, the formula is used first of the west and then of the east country, but in both cases the ambiguity is relieved by being accompanied by the word "forward" and "eastward." It cannot be claimed that "wherever the author of Deuteronomy speaks in his own person (as Deut. 1. 1, 5; 4. 41, 46, 47, 49) it refers to the country *east* of Jordan; wherever Moses is introduced as the speaker (as Deut. 3. 20, 25; 11. 30) it refers to the *west*"; for Deuteronomy 3. 8 stands in a passage attributed to Moses, and yet the phrase there, בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן, means (confessedly) the land of Moab.² Besides, this hypothesis would fail to explain its use in the other books of the Pentateuch. There may have been a time when, as some

¹ Holzinger (*Einleit. in den Hex.*, 1893, p. 296) attempts to solve the difficulty by supposing that in Deuteronomy 1. 1-5; 4. 45-49 the standpoint is that of the *west* side of Jordan, whereas in chapters 5.-11, that of the *east*; but this is arbitrary.

² *A Dictionary of the Bible*, art. "Beyond," by Dr. Hastings, 1898.

claim,¹ the phrase was equivalent to a "proper name" with a fixed geographical sense of the *east* alone; or there may have been a time when, as Driver² affirms, the habit had arisen of viewing the regions on the two sides of Jordan as contrasted with each other; but nothing is gained by such a supposition. The most probable hypothesis is that the expression *בְּעֶבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן*, when standing alone, is ambiguous and quite capable of being used of either side of the Jordan. As A. Moody Stuart³ inquires with some force: "If we could imagine Moses, for a moment, on the east of Jordan and wishing to express himself concerning Palestine, what other general expression could he have used except *בְּעֶבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן*?"

4. The clause, "when ye came forth out of Egypt," which occurs five times with the plural suffix (4. 45*b*, 46*b*; 23. 3 (4); 24. 9; 25. 17), and twice with the singular (16. 3, 6), and at first sight has the appearance of late authorship. But in one instance (24. 9) Moses bids Israel remember how Miriam was stricken with leprosy "when ye were come forth out of Egypt" (some thirty-eight years before the time of speaking); in another (25. 17) to remember how Amalek smote them "when ye were come forth out of Egypt" (more than thirty-nine years previous); in another (23. 4 [5]) he cautions them not to permit an Ammonite or Moabite to enter into the congregation of the Lord, "because they met you not with bread and with water in the way when ye came forth out of Egypt" (some thirty-eight years prior to the time of speaking); and in 16. 3, 6 he commands them to keep the passover and to

¹ So Wellhausen, quoted by A. Moody Stuart, *The Bible True to Itself*, 1884, pp. 84, 85; and W. L. Alexander, *Pulpit Comm.*, "Deuteronomy," 1897, p. xxvi. f., who makes it analogous to Negeb, Norfolk (= North-folk), etc.

² Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xliii.

³ A. Moody Stuart, *The Bible True to Itself*, 1884, pp. 84, 85. Cf. Hommel, *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, 1897, p. 261. Douglas, *Lex Mosaica*, 1894, p. 95. Green, *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, 1895, p. 50 f. Witsius, *ut supra*, p. 80.

kill the sacrifice at even, "that thou mayest remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt" (also some forty years before); in any case referring to events which happened years before the time of speaking and in the language of personal, direct address, most suitable in Moab when Moses was exhorting Israel to keep the Torah. The other two remaining references (4. 45, 46) are found in an editorial comment and need no further explanation.

5. Star-worship (4. 19; 17. 3), which, so far as we know, became popular in Palestine first in the seventh century—in the reign of Manasseh (cf. 2 Kings 21. 3 f.; 2 Chron. 33. 3 f.). At the same time the names of certain places in Canaan testify that the worship of the sun and moon was ancient;¹ and Deuteronomy lays no particular stress upon star-worship apart from that of the sun and moon. The following facts point to an earlier date than the age of Manasseh for the beginning of star-worship in Palestine: (a) 2 Kings 17. 16 states that the ten tribes worshipped "all the host of heaven" (with no mention of either sun or moon).² (b) 2 Kings 23. 11 f. speaks of sun horses and sun chariots which the "kings" (plural) of Judah had given to the sun, implying that the worship of the sun at least was a custom of considerably long standing in Israel. (c) Isaiah 17. 8 (a passage confessedly Isaianic) makes mention of "sun images" worshipped in the prophet's time. (d) Amos 5. 25, 26 denounces Israel for doing sacrifices to "the star of your god"; from which it may justly be inferred that star-worship was not foreign to their idolatries. (e) The monuments of Ramak, dating from the reign of Seti I. in the 14th century B.C., show pictures of a steer of Moloch and a cow's head with a

¹ Cf. Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xlv.

² Kuenen (*Hexateuch*, p. 218) to be sure discredits 2 Kings 17. 16, on the ground that "it is a general survey of a long-vanquished past which is characterized by anything but precision"; but cf. Kleinert, *Das Deuteronomium*, etc., 1872, pp. 105–112 for the opposite view.

crescent between the horns.¹ (f) Jeremiah's vivid descriptions of star-worship (7. 18; 19. 13; 44. 17, 18, 19, 25) differ too widely from the Deuteronomist's comparatively casual allusions to allow of the conclusion that they breathed the religious atmosphere of the same century.²

6. The *Mazzebah* or Pillar (מִצְבֵּה, Deut. 16. 22). The command reads: "Thou shalt not set thee up a *mazzebah*, which Jehovah thy God hateth," which to some seems to be in conflict with the prophecy of Isaiah 19. 19, viz., "In that day shall there be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt and a *mazzebah* at the border thereof to the Lord." And the question often raised is, "Would Isaiah have used the *mazzebah* as a symbol of the future conversion of Egypt to the true faith had he known of such a law?"³ The difficulty is one of interpretation. In the Pentateuch the word מִצְבֵּה has a double signification; first as a "memorial," or stone of witness, as when Jacob set up a *mazzebah* at Bethel (Gen. 28. 18, 22; cf. also 31. 13, 45, 51, 52; 35. 14, 20; Exod. 24. 4); and also as an image, or pillar, erected for idolatrous purposes, which Israel are commanded to destroy (Exod. 23. 24; cf. 34. 13; Lev. 26. 1; Deut. 7. 5; 12. 3). In this latter sense of an image of idolatry, the word מִצְבֵּה is obviously employed in the passage in Deuteronomy 16. 22. But in Isaiah 19. 19 it is otherwise. The prophet there predicts that in that day, viz., the day of the catholicity of Divine grace, when the nations shall be converted to the worship of Jehovah, there shall be an altar to Jehovah in the midst of the land of Egypt and "at its border" a *mazzebah*, or memorial "unto the Lord." This is no *Mazzebah* of idolatry, but

¹ Cf. Kleinert, *ut supra*, p. 109 n., who cites Osburn, Duncker, and Eusebius as authorities; cf. also Ebers, article "Ägypten," in Riehm's *Handwörterbuch*, etc., 1894.

² Cf. Kleinert's exposition of Ewald's reasoning on this point (pp. 106, 107).

³ So, e.g., Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xlvi.

a stone of witness "unto the Lord." Indeed, in the very next verse (Isa. 19. 20) the prophet explains that the *Mazzebah* "shall be for a sign and for a witness unto the Lord of hosts in the land of Egypt."

If, however, this interpretation be rejected, then it remains to be shown how Exodus 24. 24 and 34. 13, which also forbid the worship of images and pillars, could have been composed *before* the time of Isaiah; for these passages belong to JE, which *ex hypothesi* antedates the time of Isaiah. And, further, it is becoming more and more evident that Deuteronomy 16. 22 precedes Isaiah 19. 19 after all. The genuineness of the section (Isa. 19. 16-25) is doubted by Hitzig, Gesenius, Vatke, Geiger, Merx, Renan, Grätz, Duhm, and others, who place it late. Cheyne, for example, in his recent *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah*¹ assigns it to the second half of the third century (between 250 and 220 B.C.). And he substantiates this claim by saying that "it may well be post-Deuteronomic. For though the letter of the law in Deuteronomy is violated, the spirit is not. The reference to the altar and to the *Mazzebah* may be purely symbolical. Had the writer said, 'There shall be altars and a *mazzebah* by each altar,' he would have transgressed the spirit of the law; but he says 'an altar' and a *mazzebah* at the border."² Thus Cheyne re-asserts the priority of Deuteronomy to Isaiah, and on purely critical grounds.³

These are the principle marks which lie on the surface of the book of Deuteronomy, and which might indicate its probable late origin.

G. L. ROBINSON.

¹ p. xxix.

² Cheyne, *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah*, 1895, p. 101.

³ Cf. Douglas, *Lex Mosaica*, 1894, p. 88. Driver frankly allows (*Deuteronomy*, p. xlvi. n.) that "the argument does not possess the cogency of those of a broader and more general character."

DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN ROMANS.

VII. THE NEW LIFE IN CHRIST.

As we pass from the fifth to the sixth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, we become conscious of a total change of matter and phrase and tone. It is not like the change from darkness to light in chapter iii. 21, or the converse change in chapter i. 18. For already in chapter v. 1, 2 the readers stand in the favour of God and exult in God: and in the chapter before us they are not under law but under grace, looking forward to the end, eternal life. But in chapter vi. we read no more for the present about justification through faith and reconciliation to God. Other thoughts and phrases, also peculiar to St. Paul, take their place. And there opens before us a new aspect, from another point of view, of the life entered at justification.

A way of transition to this new point of view is found in chapter v. 20, 21. In the contrast between Adam and Christ, the Law seems to have been forgotten. We now read that it *came in alongside* (παρεισῆλθεν) as though hiding between greater events. St. Paul refers evidently to the Law of Moses; but, by omitting the article, he looks at it in its abstract quality as a prescribed rule of conduct. It came in *in order that the trespass might be multiplied: i.e.* in order that the one disobedience of Adam might be followed by the many transgressions of those to whom the Law was given. This was an inevitable result of the gift of a divine law to men who had inherited Adam's moral fall; and therefore, like all inevitable and foreseen results, may be spoken of as the aim of the Law. But this was not its ultimate aim. As matter of fact, the multiplication of the trespass was followed by superabundant results produced by the undeserved favour of God: *where sin multiplied, grace abounded beyond measure.* The aim of this

superabundance of grace, and therefore the ultimate aim of the coming in of law, was that the undeserved favour of God might exercise beneficent rule and dispense royal and life-giving bounty: *in order that grace may reign, for life eternal*. In other words, the multiplication of sin by means of the Law was a means to a further and blessed end.

This teaching suggests an objection which St. Paul uses as a stepping-stone to another view of the way of life. For the first time, in the exposition of the Gospel begun in chapter iii. 21, we have now a serious moral question: *are we to continue in sin?* If multiplied trespass be a means of blessing, are we to go on sinning in order that still more abundant blessing may follow?

This question St. Paul meets by stating another doctrine, also peculiar to him, quite different from the two great doctrines stated in chapter iii. 21-26. Plainly stated, it is that in the death of Christ we died to sin, and therefore can no longer live in it, and that from His grave, with our risen Lord, we have gone forth into a new life like His own life of devotion to God. In other words, the cross of Christ now stands between us and sin; and the life we are now living is a partnership in His resurrection life.

Notice here the first reference to Baptism, the rite of introduction into the corporate life of the Church of Christ. Reconciliation to God is a personal matter. But the reconciled need for preservation and growth, the help provided by Christ in the community instituted by Him. *Baptized for Christ, . . . for His death: i.e.* the new relation to Christ which Baptism has in view has special reference to His death. This implies, as does the whole argument following, that even as compared with His holy life the death of Christ holds a unique place in man's salvation. This place has been already marked out in chapter iii. 25, 26: and these verses are the only sufficient explanation of the importance here given to the death of

Christ. Since Baptism has special reference to His death, and symbolises our death to sin resulting from His death on the cross, it is the funeral rite of our old life of sin, which is now buried in His grave. In this sense, St. Paul and the Roman Christians *were buried with Him by Baptism for death.*

To Christ, death and burial were not the end of life; but only a transition to a higher life. And St. Paul argues that, if believers are buried with Christ, it is in order that they may share His resurrection life: *in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead . . . so also we may walk in newness of life.* Notice here the word *walk* in a moral sense, as in Genesis v. 22, "Enoch walked with God." It is a conspicuous feature of the Epistles of Paul and John; and in John viii. 12, xii. 35, is attributed to Christ. The future tense in verse 5, *we shall be* united in growth with Him by the likeness of *His resurrection*, is best understood, like a similar form in chapter iv. 24, as a sort of logical future. Christ is already dead; and we have been united with Him in His death in the sense that thereby we have escaped from sin: and from this we infer that henceforth we shall be sharers of the life, and ultimately of the glory, of our risen Lord.

Verse 6 explains in what sense we are "dead to sin" by union with the Crucified. The word *συνεσταυρώθη*, *crucified-along-with*, is used in Matthew xxvii. 44, Mark xv. 32, John xix. 32 to describe the fate of the robbers executed beside Christ. Here and in Galatians ii. 20 it evidently describes an inward experience, making men in some sense sharers of Christ's crucifixion; in what sense, is explained in the rest of the verse. The references to death immediately following in verses 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and in verses 2, 3, 4, show that this is the writer's chief thought when using the word *crucified*. On the other hand we have no reference here to the pain of crucifixion. Believers are dead

and buried with Christ, and therefore dead to sin: for the death of Christ was, as we read in verse 10, a death to sin. In other words, St. Paul looks upon himself and his readers as, not merely nailed to the cross and dying, but as already, in some real sense, actually dead.

The word *καταργηθῆναι*, a favourite with St. Paul, denotes to reduce to ineffectiveness, to deprive of results, to make useless. It may be rendered, here and in chapters iii. 3, 31, iv. 14, *made of no effect*. *The body of sin* can be no other than the human body looked upon as an organ of sin. This exposition is required by the conspicuous prominence given in verses 12, 13, 19 to the body and its various "members" as "weapons" or "slaves" of sin or of righteousness. To surrender ourselves to sin, is to surrender our bodies to be a throne from which sin will rule us. The believer has been united to Christ in order to reduce to powerlessness the hostile power exerted over us by sin through the medium of our own bodies.

The ultimate aim of this destruction of the power of the body is *in order that we may be no longer slaves to sin*. This explains in what sense believers are to be "dead to sin": they are no longer to be in bondage to it. And we notice that death sets every bondman free from the bondage under which he lay while living. We are dead to sin in the sense of being set completely free from bondage to it. That this death to sin is described here as a partnership with Christ in His death, implies that our deliverance from the bondage of sin is a result of His death on the cross.

The words *no longer slaves to sin* (*μηκέτι δουλεύειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*) imply, as does the whole contrast in verses 17-22, that all men are or have been slaves of sin. And this is in harmony with the picture of the heathen given in chapter i., where we read that because they turned away from God, He gave them up to shameful sins.

The word *justified* in verse 7 is used, not in St. Paul's

technical sense, as in chapters iii. 24, 26, 28, 30, iv. 2, 5, 25, nor as in chapter ii. 13, nor as in chapter iii. 4, but in a more general sense. *He who has died* has paid the due penalty, and is therefore legally free, and in this sense *justified*, from any further punishment of his *sin*. So is every criminal who has borne the full punishment of his crime. This form of speech is another indication of St. Paul's legal mode of thought. He looks at everything from the point of view of law.

Then follows a further exposition of this deliverance from sin and of the new life which is its positive counterpart, and especially of the relation to Christ of this deliverance and this new life. St. Paul argues that if we have shared His death we shall also share His life. The future tense as in verse 5. Notice the word *believe* to denote a logical inference. But this inference is full conviction, which is the root idea of the word. Moreover this conviction rests on the promise of God in Christ, and is therefore an element of saving faith. The special ground of this assurance that we shall share the life of Christ is that by death He once and for ever escaped from the dominion of death: *of Him, death is no longer lord*. Moreover, *He who died to sin once for all now liveth for God*. From this, St. Paul infers that if we share the death of Christ, we shall also share His life of devotion to God. He bids his readers to contemplate Christ, dead to sin and living for God, and then to *reckon* themselves also to be like Him, *dead to sin* and *living for God in Christ*. This important verse demands our best attention.

The first word of verse 11, *οὕτως*, which we may render literally *in this way*, or (R.V.) *even so*, makes Christ, dead to sin and living for God, a pattern of the experience which St. Paul bids us to reckon to be our own. This parallel will shed important light on the phrase *dead to sin*, both as used of Christ and of us. That Christ *died to sin*, implies

that in some sense by death He escaped from it: and this implies that before He died He stood in some hurtful relation to it. And this we can understand. "On our behalf" God "made Him to be sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). When hanging on the cross, He "became on our behalf a curse" (Gal. iii. 13). This relation to sin did not in the least degree defile Him who to save us from sin placed Himself under the curse of our sin: but it brought to Him anguish and shame. All this ceased in the moment He died. In this sense *He died to sin*.

Very different was our relation to sin. We were held fast by it in degrading bondage. But death sets every captive free from the bondage in which he lived. And St. Paul bids his readers reckon that they also are *dead to sin*. This can only mean that they are set free from all bondage to sin, as the Christian slave is liberated by the hand of death. And the phrase is so explained in verses 18 and 22: "having been made free from sin."

This freedom from sin is only the negative side of the experience St. Paul is here describing. He bids his readers reckon themselves to be on the one hand dead to sin, on the other hand *living for God*: *μὲν . . . δέ*: the two sides of the new life thus placed in conspicuous juxtaposition. Of each side, Christ is the pattern. For He who (verse 10) once died to sin now *liveth for God*. And the word *οὖτως* in verse 11 covers both elements, as does the phrase "in Christ Jesus." In each verse, in reference to Christ and to us, the Greek dative, *ζῆ τῷ Θεῷ*, is the dative of advantage. The whole phrase denotes a life of which God is the one aim, and in which all the powers of life are put forth to work out the purposes of God. The present tense in verse 10, *He liveth for God*, describes the glorified life, divine and human, which the ascended Son now lives at the right hand of God. In verse 11, this life of Christ in heaven is made the pattern of our life on earth. In other

words, God claims, not only that we refrain from sin and obey His commands, but that He shall be to us the one aim of life, that all our purposes and activity be subordinate to the one purpose of serving Him and building up His Kingdom.

Notice that this positive side of the Christian life involves the foregoing negative side. For all sin is antagonistic to God. Consequently unreserved devotion to God implies a turning from all sin. But sin occupies so large a place in human life, and raises so tremendous a barrier between man and God, a barrier broken down only by the death of Christ, that St. Paul makes deliverance from sin a definite element in his description of the new life in Christ.

That the two datives, *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* and *τῷ Θεῷ*, in verse 10 and again in verse 11, convey different ideas and require in English different renderings, is no difficulty. The Greek dative denotes in itself merely a close relation, in this case a relation to sin and to God. What the precise relation is, must be determined by the context. The words *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν* denote *died in relation to sin*: and, since death is separation, we infer that these words assert a separation from sin. This sense is conveniently reproduced by the English rendering *died to sin* and *dead to sin*. But the word *live* suggests activity. The dative case asserts that this activity has relation to God; and suggests, according to a common use of this case in Greek, that of this activity God is the aim. This meaning is admirably reproduced by the rendering *for God*. But no one English rendering will reproduce the sense of the Greek in each clause. The Revisers' rendering *unto God*, here and in 2 Corinthians v. 13 (cp. 15), Galatians ii. 19 is clumsy and meaningless. Uniformity is dearly purchased at such a price.

The concluding phrase *in Christ Jesus*, like the word *οὕτως* at the beginning of verse 11, dominates both sides of the ideal life here set before us. We are *dead to sin*, not in

ourselves, but *in Christ*, i.e. by inward spiritual contact with the Crucified, and only so far and so long as this contact continues. And *in Christ* we are *living for God*: i.e. our devotion to God is an outflow, by inward spiritual contact, of the devotion to God of the glorified Son. We live for God on earth because for us He thus lives in heaven. Away from Him we at once fall into selfish and worldly aims.

The phrase *in Christ* is all-important in the writings of St. Paul and St. John. We have already met it in chapter iii. 24, "redemption in Christ Jesus." It occurs at the end of this chapter, in chapter viii. 1, 39, and elsewhere frequently. The phrase "abide in Him" is found in 1 John ii. 6, 24, 28, etc. In John vi. 56, xv. 4, 5, 7, the same phrase is attributed to Christ. Notice also 1 John iv. 16: "he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God in him." This conspicuous mode of speech represents Christ and God as the home and refuge and the living and life-giving environment of the servants of Christ.

St. Paul bids his readers *reckon* themselves to be, like Christ and in Christ, dead to sin and living for God. This reckoning is faith. For, like the faith of Abraham expounded in chapter iv. 18-21, it is a firm conviction resting on the word and power of God. The word *reckon* is a favourite with St. Paul; and reveals a mind accustomed to mental calculation. It denotes the mental process of faith. This exhortation implies that God will make good in us this reckoning of faith. Otherwise our reckoning will be false. For it contradicts our past experience. Hitherto we have submitted to the yoke of bondage, or vainly striven against it. St. Paul bids us to believe that the yoke is broken. His words would be awful deception unless he knew that in the moment of our faith and in proportion to our faith God breaks in us the bondage of sin. And thousands have proved, by happy experience, the reality of this experience.

The present imperative λογίζεσθε denotes a continuous reckoning always going on. It thus differs from the aorist imperative in verses 13 and 19, "present yourselves to God," which represents the consecration as made once for all. The difference is merely in the mode of viewing similar mental acts. But it is worthy of attention.

We have now before us two more fundamental doctrines, distinct from, and supplementing, those of *justification through faith* and *through the death of Christ* in chapter iii. 21-26. These are (1) that God claims from the justified abandonment of all sin and unreserved devotion to Himself like the devotion of Christ; and (2) that what God claims from us He is prepared to work us on the condition of faith and in proportion to our faith. The former of these, we may speak of as St. Paul's doctrine of *sanctification*, using this word as in verses 19 and 22. The latter we may describe as *sanctification through faith*. These great doctrines need to be carefully correlated with other moral teaching of the New Testament and to be guarded from misuse. But thus correlated and guarded, they are an all-important element of the Gospel of Christ.

Verses 12, 13 are a practical application of the reckoning bidden in verse 11. The word βασιλεύω keeps up a form of speech already used in chapter v. 14, 17 twice, 21 to describe the dominion of death and sin. The locality or throne of this reign of sin is *in your mortal body*: its tendency or aim is *in order to obey the desires of the body*. It involves that we *present the members* of our bodies (τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν), as *instruments* (or *weapons*) of *unrighteousness, to sin*. In contrast to this earlier consecration to sin, St. Paul bids us now *present ourselves to God*, and our *members, as instruments of righteousness, to God*. Similar language is found again in verse 19.

This phraseology does not imply that the body is essentially bad: and, that God claims that it be presented to

Him, implies that it is good. It implies only that sin, always an element of disintegration and revolt, uses the lower element of man's nature, the part condemned to the grave, as a platform from which to dominate the whole man. The prominence given to the body as a factor in the spiritual life is a conspicuous feature of the teaching of St. Paul as compared with modern religious thought.

The exhortation in verse 11 to present ourselves and the members of our bodies to God is strengthened by the encouraging assurance *sin shall not be your lord*. And this assurance is supported by the statement *ye are not under law but under grace*. But this statement is not further expounded. It is simply used as a starting point for an objection similar to that in verse 1 introducing the new aspect of the Christian life now before us. It is a momentary and preliminary reference to a topic which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Verses 1-14 have given an answer to an immoral perversion of the Gospel. The answer is, We must not continue in sin, because God designs us to be dead to sin through the death of Christ and living for God by inward contact with our risen Lord. Verses 15-23 give another answer to a similar perversion supplementing the answer just given. This second answer is a comparison of the only two courses open to us, a comparison based on the readers' own experience. St. Paul assumes that all men are and must be *slaves, δοῦλοι*, that the only alternative open to them is a choice of masters. His readers know by experience the service of sin. The apostle reminds them, in verse 21, that its service was shameful, and asks what *fruit*, i.e. good result, they had from it; and asserts in verse 23 that *the wages of sin is death*. On the other hand, they who have been *made free from sin and have been made slaves to God have fruit of their service in the direction of sanctification; and the end, eternal life*. This eternal life, like the life of

devotion to God which St. Paul in verse 11 bids his readers appropriate by faith, is *in Christ Jesus*, whom he now speaks of as *our Lord*.

That the servants of God are in verses 18 and 22, and the members of their bodies in verse 19, spoken of as *slaves*, is in harmony with the title "slave of Jesus Christ" claimed by the apostle at the beginning of this epistle, and expounded and justified in my first paper.

St. Paul has now described negatively and positively the new life which God designs for the justified, has taught how it may be obtained, viz. by the reckoning of faith, and has given a strong reason for claiming it, viz. the comparative profit of the old life and the new. In so doing, he has referred once to the Law and has said that we are "not under law but under grace." This passing remark and the whole subject of the believer's relation to the Law need further exposition. This is given in the next chapter of the epistle. The apostle will there show in what sense we are no longer under law but dead to it; that, although deliverance from the Law is good yet the Law is not bad, but reveals to us the infinite evil of sin and the awful condition of those who have not experienced the salvation offered by Christ. This important teaching will be the matter of my next paper.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

HOW JESUS MET RECRIMINATION.

(JOHN VIII. 48-51.)

THE course of our Lord's discussion with the Temple doctors down to this point had been so irritating, that no one can be surprised they should have resented it. He has denied that they belonged to the household of God in any real sense. He has told them that they were not children of the Most High. He has striven to prove, on the contrary, that they bore the marks of an opposite lineage, and were spiritually sons of Satan. Very calmly, but not the less terribly on that account, He has shown that He was aware of their secret plots against Himself, and saw to the bottom of their evil hearts. All this was not easy to be borne—all the less easy since their consciences probably told them it was true. When men detest the truth, it is usual for them to turn upon him who speaks it. Unable to deny, unwilling to admit, the resource of a hard-pressed sinner is to lose temper and begin to scold. Occasionally, to be sure, it is a sign that the word of God has begun to tell on people when they grow cross under it, since there are those who conceal the first stages of conviction of sin beneath a cloak of ill-nature. More often it is nothing better than a refuge of convicted or exposed wrongdoers to rail against the preacher whom they cannot answer. It was so with these Jews. Quite unconsciously they proceeded to give evidence how true had been the Lord's verdict upon them, the verdict which in terms they resented; for, shut up by the unanswerable logic of One who could not reason falsely, they did the double deed which showed them to be of the seed of the devil—they rejected God's truth and they hated His Son.

To begin to throw hard names was in their case the next step to throwing stones. Orientals have always been less dignified in the use of abusive epithets than we are, giving

free vent to their ill will in forms of which a European of similar social position would be utterly ashamed. By way of retort, they first styled Jesus a Samaritan. It was a term of abuse. The Samaritans, although a mixed people, descended in part from remnants of the ten tribes left in Palestine at the first captivity, and in part from a colony of idolatrous Assyrians, yet claimed to share in the worship of Jehovah as a genuine section of the chosen people. When pure-blood Jews of the restoration disowned this claim, the outcast Samaritan dissenters set up a rival temple of their own, and, greatly to the chagrin of the Jew, persisted in calling themselves the people of Jehovah. Nay, by degrees they came to say that they were not simply a portion of Israel, but the true people; that they only were Israelites, the others only Jews. To render this pretension plausible, they were led to discard nearly all the sacred books of the old covenant, and to read backwards, as it were, the best sections of Hebrew history. In this way it is intelligible how "Samaritan" became on Hebrew lips a term of the most bitter opprobrium. To call a Jew by that name was as much as to say that he was an apostate and schismatic, a false pretender to the privileges of God's ancient race and of His holy Temple. This is very like retaliating upon Jesus the precise charges which He has just been making against them. He has been denying to them any title to true spiritual descent from Abraham, calling them nominal sons of his after the flesh only, not his spiritual descendants. They retort that He for His part is no better than He calls them, worse indeed—as much a false pretender to be a true son of the covenant as any half heathen, excommunicated "Samaritan."

Pursuing the same style of retort, they add that He is possessed by a demon. He has just been alleging of them that they bore the moral likeness of their spiritual parent,

the devil. And although they do not like exactly to say as much of Him—since, indeed, they could not meet His challenge to convict Him of any sin—yet they venture on something akin to it. Recollecting how usual it was to refer insanity to demoniacal influence, I understand them to be explaining His language on the theory that spiritual self-conceit had driven Him crazy. So read, the charge cannot be set down for a mere outburst of senseless malice. There was at all events some semblance of reason in it. To hear any man fancy himself to be the only Son of God on earth, and call all others children of Satan, might well enough suggest to a bystander that the demon of religious pride had turned his brain. The conclusion could only be maintained, however, in this case, if this Man had not sustained His claim by works unmistakably Divine, enforced His charge against His enemies with unanswerable argument, and beaten back their countercharges by the majesty of a holy wisdom and stainless purity which are not of this world. It is really the only alternative to our acceptance of our Lord as that which He claimed to be : an alternative quite inadmissible now, no longer advanced even by the most ingenious or implacable of His modern adversaries. At the time, and on these men's lips, it was the most plausible and even kindly outlet which their baffled enmity could find.

Yet, after all, an outlet for baffled enmity. No fairly dispassionate observer of our Lord's career could say that He exhibited the signs of a maniac. But it is far from rare for the wisdom of God to be called folly by the tongues of men. How often, when His servants have spoken out " words of truth and soberness " about human sin and the certainty of God's awful judgment seat, have the men whose sin they rebuked turned aside the edge of the truth by calling them words of extravagance or of fanaticism ! I am persuaded that the bulk of unregenerate men do in their

hearts believe, although they may not all like to say so, that to call them children of the devil is to use wild language. "Say we not well that Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a demon?"

What St. Paul has celebrated as the "meekness and gentleness" of Christ comes out in His reply. "Being reviled, He reviled not again." It really is not an easy thing to take such words with calmness. I do not mean merely, what every schoolboy knows, that nicknames are ill to bear. Grown men find that a worse poison is left behind by stinging terms like these. When people, whose good esteem is of value, insist on thinking only evil of a man, and travesty his character before the public by the circulation of false charges; when a public teacher is supposed to be capable of conduct which he abhors, and under that imputation is set in a light so odious that his whole power for good is neutralized;—then deeper pain is caused than personal vexation. The nobler any man is, or the more devoted to the cause he represents, so much the less likely is he to preserve an unruffled temper when his work suffers through such false attacks upon himself. Calumny need not always be condensed into one pungent epithet of scorn. The polish of modern manners may substitute smoother insinuations for such outspoken abuse as we find here. It is neither polite nor safe now-a-days to be too plain of speech. I am not sure that the modern equivalent gives less suffering to the patient. To have base motives suggested, or one's character defamed, will wound every sensitive and honourable man, no matter how delicately the thing be done. To know that ill-natured people are whispering statements to one's discredit, which for no consideration would they say plainly to one's face, is not a great improvement on the old way. Those who have had the most of this to bear will best appreciate the dignity and composure of our Lord's rejoinder.

To their rudeness He returned, in fact, the calmest of all calm answers : " I have not a demon "—I am not mad, that is to say—" but I honour My Father, and ye dishonour Me." How admirably quiet, and at the same time how dignified is His bearing ! For while these words betray no trace of irritation, they are equally remote from meanness of spirit. There is a gentle emphasis laid on the personal pronoun, as though to say, " It is not *I* who am possessed," which prepares us to find in the words which follow a contrast betwixt His own behaviour and theirs : " God, My Father, I live to magnify, which is far enough from the way of demons ; but you, what are you doing when you thus pour scurrilous abuse on Me?—dishonouring Me, and through Me Him whose Son I am ! Surely the Father's credit is identified with His Son's. The reproaches that fall on Me are reproaches upon God."

Less than this by way of rejoinder would have been too little for self-defence and for the protection of honour ; since it is the part of every upright man to meet calumny with denial, in order to guard, as far as he may, that good name which is one's best possession, which he who filches from me had better far have robbed me of my purse. But Jesus had no mind to let this talk degenerate into a personal squabble, or an idle bandying of names. Neither is it His chief concern to care for His own honour, or what men choose to say or think of Him. For His Father's honour has He said so much ; *that* it is His business to care for, and while He cares for that, He is content to leave His own good name to the Father's care. " I seek not Mine own glory ; there is One that seeketh and judgeth." With these words He stops the personal controversy, to lift it into a serener atmosphere.

Let it be noticed how the perfection of Divine love betwixt the unseen Father and His Son in flesh brings about in Each of them the most unselfish concern only for the

Other. As on a humble scale, we sometimes see two human lovers so wrapt up in one another, that the parent (say) thinks only of the child's welfare, the child not of itself at all, but entirely of its parent's comfort—beautiful interaction and rivalry of love, intent not on itself but wholly on its object—so, to liken small things with great, do this celestial Father and Son, continuing an interchange of affection which had endured within the Godhead from eternity. It is the Father's design that the Son of His love should be honoured by all men upon earth, even as they honour the Father; nor can we please Him better than when we exalt Him who for love "made Himself of no reputation," as St. Paul wrote to the Philippian disciples. Everywhere in Scripture is the elevation of Christ to honour, His ascension, enthronement, adoration by the angels, exaltation as King over men, and final manifestation in glory, spoken of as the Father's doing—the compensation and reward with which paternal love rejoices to wipe out that sore dishonour which the blessed Son endured on earth, and to this hour, alas! endures. Yes, "the Father seeketh and judgeth." On the Son's part however, it is equally fitting that He should forget Himself in seeking to restore the glory of His Father's name among a fallen race. To magnify the Father's law, to make reparation to the Father's honour, to display the Father's holiness and love, to win men back to the Father's service—for these ends He came, and in the pursuit of these high, unselfish ends was He not content to live and die dishonoured? It was part of our Lord's trial of faith that He should accept, without a murmur, the utmost indignity and personal outrage at men's hands, attempting no vindication of Himself, not avenging His own cause, not grasping prematurely at the honour which was due to Him, but, serenely patient, leaving His cause contentedly to the care of One who was sure to see justice done by bringing forth

His Son's "righteousness as the light, and His judgment as the noonday." What shall we say of such utter self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice on either side, such mutual confidence in one another's love, such devotion to one another's honour? That it opens to our reverent insight a glimpse into the moral life of the Divine nature! That it helps us a little to comprehend how He for whose glory all things are and were created, can yet be the most unselfish and perfect of lovers, setting our grasping, narrow hearts the hardest and noblest of all examples, a lesson to be for ever learnt!

It seems to me most natural to assume a pause at this point. The long discussion has reached a stage at which (one thinks) it might even take end. The impression which His words in the earlier portion of it had produced on some of His audience had been wholly favourable. Of this favourable impression He had tried to take advantage, from the thirty-first verse onward. But His words found no entrance or understanding; and the discussion since then about the spiritual position of the nominal Israelite has terminated in the use of hard words on both sides—a breach between the disputants which might be thought past healing. From the risk of an unseemly altercation Jesus has only saved Himself by drawing Himself up once more in an attitude of lofty, but to these men nearly unintelligible, self-assertion. Weary of strife, He seems for the moment to have closed it by a solemn reference of the case between Him and His adversaries to the supreme arbitrament of the Father, the Judge of all.

Why does not the conversation terminate here? Simply, I think, because these men have not yet absolutely refused to hear Him any longer; and therefore the inexhaustible kindness and hopefulness of Jesus prompt Him to try once more if He can win an entrance for His message. As I

read the connexion, He reopens His discourse after a pause, and the conversation therefore takes a fresh departure, as it were. Jesus ceases to dispute with men, that He may afresh preach the gospel to them. Of that He is never weary. Even to these men, after all that has come and gone—sons of Satan as He knows them to be, “demoniac” as they term Him—He has a wonderful offer to make, the offer of the life eternal. For thus does He reopen His lips of grace, after a few moments of silent thought, in a tone far more gentle and winning than before: “Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a man keep My word, He shall never see death”—literally, death he shall not see at all for ever.

Into the meaning of these words, and the subsequent issue of the conversation to which they gave rise, I cannot enter now, but must reserve them for another paper. But let it be observed that He has here solemnly reverted to the point at which He was setting out in ver. 31, when He was interrupted, and the painful discussion began. Is there not, when one thinks of it, a suggestion of kindness in this recurrence to the ideas of ver. 31? Consider what had led Him at that point to address them in such words as these: “If ye abide in My word, then are ye truly My disciples; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” Was it not the hopeful beginning of belief in the breasts of some? Well, His attempt to follow up that hopeful beginning has failed. It has issued in a bitter exchange of reproaches. Nevertheless the charity of this Preacher will hope all things. He is unwilling to let so promising a state of mind slip away unimproved, or to give up all hope of leading some of them to the light. In spite of all that has transpired, therefore, He cannot forget how softened they had been a few moments back, and returns to catch up afresh that dropped thread. Therefore are His words an echo of the former ones: *If any man*

(not "ye" this time) *keep My word*—abide in it, as I said before—he *shall*, not merely be free from sin, but live for ever, and *never more taste death*. Therefore, too, these words, for all their intense solemnity, are unspeakably gracious, holding out a promise richer and stronger even than the last. Therefore they are made so startlingly absolute and unlikely. For they are intended to arouse curiosity afresh, to stimulate inquiry, to set the hearers off on a new and more profitable track, in the hope that some among them at least may by searching deeper reach the truth, and with the truth the life that is everlasting.

Yet are the words also full of warning. The condition of receiving life eternal is declared to be a state of mind the precise opposite of these men's present state. Captious, disputing, prejudiced, supercilious, self-righteous men cannot taste the life eternal. Such men, instead of keeping the words of Christ, quarrel with them. It is only the candid, receptive soul, needy and trustful, eager to hear words of life, because conscious of eternal death in itself—it is such a soul that welcomes the message from the Father, and lets the words of the Son enter and find lodgment in its affections, grasps and feeds on saving truth. To such a soul the entrance of that word does bring, not light only, but life; not freedom only, but life eternal. For to keep Christ's saying in this way leads a man into vital fellowship with Jesus Himself. His words are not dead things, but the living thoughts of God, instinct with Divine life, pulsing with Divine love; and through them we touch the very heart of Jesus, the Son of the Father. "They are spirit, and they are life." How many hear the word of God, year in, year out, yet never keep it close in to their own warm souls, that it may quicken in them a heavenly life! Oh, if once one's poor, dead soul hungered for God! how should it then catch at these sayings of

Jesus our Saviour, and clutch them and hang on them, and suck hope from them as draughts from above! How should one set oneself steadily to put them into practice, to keep and to do the word and will of God—that one's soul might live!

J. OSWALD DYKES.

JACOB'S WRESTLE: A MAN AND HIS FATE.

A NARRATIVE such as that of the wrestle of Jacob by the brook Jabbok requires to be not expounded but translated. Its meaning is clear whenever it is written in language intelligible to the modern mind. The incident is told in the Book of Genesis in, as it were, a dead language—one foreign to our modes of thought and expression—and so we find it hard to understand. And most people treat it as a man unfamiliar with the classics would treat a passage in Greek or Latin which he finds in a book he is reading. They glance at it, fail to make much of it, and pass on. But this unfamiliarity and obscurity are only in the manner of the telling of the story. The language is foreign; the story itself is no far old-world prodigy or strange Semitic legend, but a real "human document," a page from the catholic experience of man. The wrestle of Jacob—what was it really but simply the struggle of a man with his fate, with the "Divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will"? For that Power men have various names—fate, chance, providence, the force of circumstances, but, under whatever name, every one who knows life knows its reality. We are not alone and supreme in the guidance of our life. A *force majeure* meets us here and there. It met Jacob at the summit of his fortunes. He struggled against it and struggled in vain. But he learned much. That is the meaning of the story. And to-day the experience of man has the same story to tell, though we should not tell it in the same language as did the picturesque old Hebrew chronicler.

The way most clearly to see that this is the meaning of the story is to glance back over the earlier period of Jacob's life.

Jacob was a clever man and an ambitious man; moreover he had a mother who was also clever and ambitious

on his behalf. Her suggestions, no less than his own inclinations, made him resolve to make the most of his life. He formed his definite conception of what he would be and set about to realize it, aided constantly and stimulated by Rebekah. A man's cleverness and ambition are often lazy, a woman's are restless and practical; the two together produce intense keenness about life. So Jacob's plans grew and grew to practical ends. There was always in them a certain religious element. He was not a "profane person" like his brother. There was in his natural temperament a strain of piety, or at least of religious appreciativeness, to which Esau was an entire stranger, and so his plans of life included and indeed centered round what was characteristic of the faith of his fathers. None the less, however, were they *his* plans of life, his personal ambitions.

All this comes out plainly in the two chief recorded incidents of Jacob's earlier days—the buying of Esau's birthright and the gaining of Isaac's blessing. In both of these transactions were ambition—an ambition with a religious colour—and cleverness. In strong contrast to the thoughtless, impulsive, blundering natural-animalism of the one brother is the reflective, deliberate, adroit intellectualism of the other. Esau had no plan of life beyond what is contained in saying: "A fine day—let us hunt something." To Jacob life was a study, a fine art, a game of skill. The securing of the eldest son's birthright and of the father's blessing were two important points or positions which he had gained.

But the game of life is not finally won by two even supremely successful strokes. Soon after this Jacob was forced to flee from home, and he found himself a lonely wanderer at Bethel. His prayer there has been made into a Christian hymn, but it is really the prayer of the same Jacob of pious temperament and personal ambition. "If," premises the latter, "God will prosper me, then," adds the

former, "shall the Lord be my God." This is a different school of prayer from that of Gethsemane—"not my will but Thine be done." However, when the traveller reached the house of Laban, it seemed as if his prayer were being answered. All went well with him. Jacob began to get the lead in the game of life again. The two great factors in the making of a man—love and work—came to his hand, and he made the most of them. He laboured hard, and his labour was done to music for her sake for whom it was done. Year by year his purse grew heavier and his heart lighter. Jacob felt he was winning in life. The risks and obstacles of his earlier days were past. He had neither feared his fortunes nor proved unequal to them—a situation that suggests pleasantly interesting and complacent reflections. Now there seemed before him only ease and happiness. He "increased exceedingly, and had much cattle and maidservants and menservants and camels and asses." He married and became the head of a house. Jacob's life was a success. True, he had in part succeeded by means that could not always bear the strictest moral investigation; but we very easily let success, even more than charity, cover a multitude of sins. The one thing still left for him to accomplish was to make his way again homewards and settle in the old country. That had always been the crowning feature of his plans, as his prayer at Bethel shows; and, moreover, Laban's sons were getting jealous of his prosperity and becoming unfriendly. So again Jacob set out to retrace the old road.

It was the same road, but a very different man. How often on that return journey did Jacob turn back over the pages of the earlier volumes of his life and read their story as a novel! How interesting had his life been! It had had the glamour of adventure and the spice of danger; it had not missed the thrill of love nor even the charm of romance; nor had it lacked the solid elements of work and

of duty ; and, moreover, there were the "much cattle and maidservants and menservants and camels and asses." It was altogether a pleasant situation. The atmosphere of the East lends itself to comfortable reflections. On many an evening as Jacob went out, as his father had been fond of doing, to meditate in the fields, and the Syrian sun lowered and the shadows lengthened, and the peaceful bleat of the sheep and lowing of the kine fell on his ears, and his eyes rested gratefully after the glare of the day on the quiet tones of the landscape, he felt his life a sweet, a satisfying and a safe thing. This was the Jacob who was returning to the home from which years before—it seemed ages before, so much had happened since—his brother's angry threats had driven him. No wonder it seemed to him that the very "angels of God met him."

Meanwhile what of that brother? The question could not but suggest itself to Jacob's mind as he approached again the hills and plains over which he had fled from Esau for his life. It was an old story now, and the Jacob of to-day was in a very different position from the fugitive of that day. Still, as a measure of precaution—for we often accept prudential suggestions from the region of the conscience, while dead to its moral strictures—or possibly as a mere civil intimation of his coming home, he sent forward messengers to Esau to bespeak his friendliness. The message said nothing of the past, and practically assumed that bygones were bygones. The answer was sent back : "Esau cometh to meet thee with four hundred men." We know from the subsequent narrative that these four hundred were coming only in friendship, but to Jacob—his long half-forgotten treacheries to his brother recalled to his mind by the sight again of the scene of them—the news seemed black with another meaning. If it was from his conscience that the suggestion of his own message came, from his conscience came now the interpretation of his

brother's response. The four hundred meant revenge. And what did that mean? It meant the cup dashed from Jacob's very lips. It meant shipwreck at the very harbour bar. It meant that all for which he had waited so long and so laboriously worked was to be wrested from him, and his whole life spoiled and shattered just at its climax. In the hour of confident success here was ruin; here was disaster at the moment of entering on the joys of victory. Jacob was face to face with despair. It was only with the energy of despair that he divided his camp into two companies—obviously a last resort. He sent out in advance a long procession of cattle and camels, laden with gifts that might appease his brother. He prayed, and his prayer had no "ifs" in it now. He did what he could to avert his fate. But after all, what did anything he could do amount to in the face of this horde of wild warriors, headed by his rough and revengeful brother, that every hour brought nearer? He sent his wives and household over the brook, and "Jacob was left alone, and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day."

I said at the outset that this story needs only to be translated. Do we not now understand what this wrestle was? Jacob was realizing that a man—even a clever man—cannot play providence to his own life. He had now met that in life which was other and stronger than himself. He was in the hands of an unseen Power. He had played the game of life skilfully, patiently, successfully; but here was something he had not calculated upon, and which he could neither circumvent nor overcome. It was not just Esau's four hundred. That was only its instrument. It was a great *force majeure* declaring itself in his life. That it was connected with his own deeds only moralized it and made it more impressive, but did not reduce it to a mere human consequent. Jacob had all but completely achieved his life, when here was a hand laid on

it, and a voice said : "*This is not yours, but mine.*" And Jacob wrestled with the claim. It was not the mere loss of goods he fought against : it was this authority. His pride wrestled ; his will wrestled ; his ambition wrestled. All through the night, the calm, shining, Syrian stars looked down on that proud, wilful, ambitious man as he fought against his fate, rebelled against its lordship in his life, and—even if he was helpless before it—refused to accept it or bow his spirit before it.

Thus translated, this story is, in the profoundest sense, true to life. It is no old-world legend or marvel. For indeed, as sooner or later we all learn, there is about us a power not ourselves. The man of faith and piety finds he is led by it through life ; the man of daring and independent nature, who would ignore it or deny it, finds himself at times lying in its hand. Even a Napoleon has his St. Helena. This element in life—call it with the thoughtless chance, or with the faithless fate, or with the devout providence, or what you will—is one of the great phenomena of history, of literature, and of experience. It is the key-note at once of ancient Greek tragedy and of modern fiction. It is one great aspect of your life and mine. We plan and we often achieve, we dare and do, we labour and wait ; but we are not sole masters of our destiny. There is an Another in the plot. An eminent writer—I think it was the late Mr. Huxley—likened life to a game of chess in which we play against Nature, an opponent perfectly fair, but that never overlooks our mistakes. If life is to be compared to any game, it is most aptly described as like some game that combines known and unknown elements—such, for example, as whist, in which a great deal depends on our own skill in using what we have, but in which we simply cannot win if our opponent plays certain cards from his unknown hand. And how often the unseen player in life does this ! How often—if

one may continue a metaphor which to some may appear inappropriate, but is really most apposite—does fate trump a man's best cards in life! Sometimes it is by such obvious means as the loss of health or fortune, or some outward calamity. And of course its final stroke is death. At other times we are checked by means that are less apparent and nameable, but are none the less on that account real. The destiny of a man's life may be diverted from chosen ends, and its dearest hopes destroyed, by inward and subtle forces.

“A God, a God their severance ruled!”

Few men surely can look back over life, even a life lived boldly and strongly, without feeling that there has been another Power besides their own in the determination of their destinies. To quote Arnold again:—

“Even so we leave behind
As, chartered by some Unknown Power,
We stem across the sea of life by night,
The joys that were not for our use designed;—
The friends to whom we had no natural right,
The homes that were not destined to be ours.”

And when this Power asserts itself, as it did to Jacob, in the day of success and of triumph, how our wills wrestle with it! Then a man knows—especially if he has been keen about life, and has really lived it—what that scene by the tumbling Jabbok meant. Could we indeed describe it better than by saying, “He was left alone, and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day”? The solitariness, the struggle, the darkness: how they are all true! Over how many early graves, over how many baffled ambitions and blighted hopes, has the human spirit in all ages wrestled with this “man”!

The object of this paper is not homiletical, but it is impossible to leave the scriptural narrative of Jacob's wrestle without at least indicating the lessons as well as the pic-

ture of life it contains. Here one must not try to force moral significance into details. The narrative is literature, not dogma. I shall mention briefly three things.

One is that this "man," while he overcame Jacob and even wounded him, blessed him. After all Jacob's fate proved to be his friend. And one of the things we too may find in life is this—that there is nothing which can happen to us from which we may not gain. Circumstances often come upon a man like a crowd of robbers and take from him his dearest treasures; and yet he can always extort something from them. They can take from him his health, his wealth, his friends, his pleasures, his ambitions, his prospects; but he can gain from the very loss of these a humbler spirit, a tenderer heart, a gentler mind, more insight, more sympathy, more helpfulness. Whether or not this be so, depends upon himself—upon his own will. If a man say to his hardest fate: "I will not let thee go except thou bless me," he will turn that fate into, not perhaps happiness but, blessedness. How many a man, looking back on his life, dates his real inward good from some outward evil. The human spirit, taught of the Spirit of God, can make its foes its footstool. Our flesh wins merely its victories; our spirit is victorious even in defeats.

This inward good is in character. A second noteworthy point in the narrative is that Jacob received a new name, and that means a new character. That struggle was the laming of him, but it was also the moral making of him. Hitherto, as we have seen, Jacob had been a somewhat mixed character; hereafter, he was a strong and a noble man. And so that night, in which his character was made and his fortune apparently all about to be lost, taught Jacob the great lesson that life is made for character. Hitherto he had pictured and planned his life as made for money or love or ambition; after that night he had a truer conception of it and the meaning of it. For the only

meaning you can justly find in this strange, mortal career of ours is that of character. For all other purposes—the making of money, the enjoyment of pleasure, the securing of worldly good—this life is most obviously not primarily adapted. The flux of things, the uncertainties of fate, the varied, unforeseen combinations of circumstances adverse to fortune and happiness and satisfaction—all these prevent us from expressing the meaning of life in things the attempt to gain which is so easily and often thwarted, and which, even if gained, are held on so uncertain a tenure. But, observe, that these very conditions—this flux, this risk, this uncertainty—are just the conditions that make character. It is precisely in the elements by which life declares itself to be unfitted primarily for other ends that it declares itself fitted for this end. Jacob learned this all-important lesson about life that night he spent by the Jabbok. It is one of the greatest lessons a man can learn.

A third and last point in this suggestive narrative I mention in a word or two in closing. This “man,” who blessed Jacob and gave him a new name, did not reveal his own name nor even let himself be clearly discerned, for with the breaking dawn he departed; however, Jacob called the place Peniel, that is, “the face of God.” How true this is: how soberly and sanely true! Some persons are glib in consolation for themselves and others, and have the most pious and beautiful names for the heaviest disciplines of life. But most men are rather silent about these things; they are not unbelieving, but they do not say much. They do not attempt to name or describe the “man” that has taken from their hearts their dearest. And yet one thing can be said about it all. That “man” has brought us face to face with God. He takes us past the false and foolish and fleeting to that which is eternal. We see there the things that are, the real things, the best things, the

only things. That is to see the face of God. We cannot perhaps with appropriate piety name nor with theological assurance describe death or disaster or disappointment—at least, we cannot always or immediately do so ; but we can, with Jacob, say we were really face to face with God there. And what would God with us ? Shall we not let Christ assure us about that ? If, after such times, we believe in God, let us believe also in Him whom God hath sent to teach us what His thoughts and purposes about us really are. The Christian name for fate is God's love.

P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON.

EPAPHRODITUS, SCRIBE AND COURIER.

IN a previous study of the manner of composition of an ancient letter,¹ and in particular of the letters which form so large a part of the New Testament, we endeavoured to eliminate from the general structure of such compositions the conventional phrases and turns of speech which characterized a correspondence carried on in Greek, and to classify them roughly under various heads, such as—

- (a) Thanksgiving for good news received, together with other forms of congratulation, and pious wishes.
- (b) Prayers for the general welfare of the correspondent, especially such as turn on health of body or soul, or the maintenance and increase of worldly prosperity.
- (c) General expressions of joy over a beloved object, whether lover or friend, etc., etc.

Now, in making an examination into these conventional expressions in early Greek correspondence, we found that the Epistles in the New Testament furnished a multitude of phrases closely and almost identically parallel to those which we were able to isolate from early Greek papyri; and by taking an epistle in which they were especially conspicuous, such as the first Epistle to the Thessalonians, we were able to show that the conventional expressions contained in that epistle betrayed the existence of similar elements from a previous correspondence between Paul and Thessalonica, so that it stood third in a series of letters

¹ *EXPOSITOR*, Sept. 1898.

which had passed, of which the first two had altogether perished.

The importance of this conclusion was not slight; for, first, it established the general genuineness of a very peculiar composition as against the theory of forgery, and perhaps also against the hypothesis of very extensive interpolation; for the application of critical methods is not sufficient to bring up from the pages of a *forged* or widely interpolated document the features of an underlying previous correspondence. It is, in fact, useless to apply re-agents in search of palimpsest writing where the vellum has only been used once. So that, unless the forger produces a whole series of letters which are mutually connected, we shall not find in his composition those delicate allusions to previous history and the previous interchange of thought which the critical processes bring to light.

But, second, the examination which we made showed the method which St. Paul adopted in writing a reply to a letter, and the method in which he composed a letter; nor need the remark be limited to St. Paul, for the method is largely Oriental and conventional.

When he composed a letter, we know from his own language that he usually employed a secretary or scribe. To this scribe he dictated the terms of the letter, perhaps giving him the very words, especially where the language becomes impetuous and the syntax anacoluthic; but also at times indicating the trend of the communication and leaving the scribe to put it in words, with the natural result that the scribe may sometimes give us the wrong word or the incorrect meaning. The usage is precisely the same as that which still prevails in Eastern life, where the great man (patriarch, primate, or what you will) calls over to his secretary the terms of his proposed communication, perhaps revises it rapidly, adds a few words of his own, and seals the document with his private seal. The Pauline

Epistles are full of allusions to this method, so that we can not only classify (a point to which we referred in a previous article) his postmen (both going and coming), but we can isolate a little group of favourite scribes, of whom it is not unreasonable to hope that we may some day recognise individual peculiarities. But, further than this—a point which is almost involved in what has gone before—we may say that when Paul replied to a letter, he held the letter that he was replying to in his hand and followed closely the points in it that needed attention. He did this so closely that he not only answered the inquiries of the writer, but he even answered and echoed his opening salutations, and duplicated his method of farewell. And it is this close treatment of the unimportant matter before him that is our best warrant for believing that he treated with similar detail the actual and important business that the correspondence turned on. For he would not have been at such pains to take up the very words of his correspondent's greetings unless he had also been in the habit of handling in a like manner the more important sentences of their communication. In this way we establish the general correctness of Prof. Lock's acute analysis of certain passages in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where he isolates expressions in the text as quotations from a letter to which Paul was replying, and pleads for the insertion of them between marks of quotation, *e.g.*, 1 Corinthians 8. 1:—

“Now concerning idol-offerings, we know that we all have knowledge.” Knowledge puffeth up, but love buildeth up. If a man thinks he knows aught, he knows naught, etc.

The quotation marks show that he is not scolding himself and his companions, but his correspondents. So we find ourselves introduced into a new factor in the interpretation of Paul's Epistles, which consists in the isolation,

either by marks or by special type, of such parts as really belong to his correspondents. Whether, then, we take Prof. Lock's canon of concealed quotations or our own method of scrutiny of the conventional epistolary forms, we come to much the same result. We see the way in which the Apostle worked, and we learn that he is not responsible for all that is printed under his name, for there may be whole sentences that belong to the earlier and antecedent factors of the correspondence, and there may be cases where the language is not his own, but is either that of his secretary or that which is common to all secretaries. And it is clear that these considerations to which we have drawn attention will require a good deal of reform to be made in the linguistic and the homiletic treatment which have been bestowed upon the Pauline Epistles. We must not, for instance, say of a peculiar expression that this is characteristically Pauline, when it may be that it is due to a Corinthian scribe, or when it may be merely a conventional turn of the Greek ready letter-writer. We will take an instance or two in support of these positions.

It will be remembered that in discussing the passage 1 Thessalonians 2. 13 (*καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐχαριστοῦμεν, κτλ.*) we pointed out that the use of *καὶ ἡμεῖς* implied that he was reading an expression of thanksgiving on the part of the Thessalonians, and that he was re-echoing it. Now it is clear that we are not entitled to isolate such an expression and reconstruct the parallel and previous member of the Thessalonian communication, unless we are prepared to deal in a similar manner with similar expressions in the other Pauline Epistles.

For example, in Colossians 1. 9 we have the similar turn—

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀφ' ἧς ἡμέρας ἠκούσαμεν, οὐ παύομεθα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν προσευχόμενοι.

Here it is implied that he is replying to a letter in which the writer or writers had said that they prayed for him

constantly, which indeed we have shown to be one of the conventional ways (however sincere) of beginning a letter. It follows from this that the Epistle to the Colossians should be headed something as follows :—

To Colossians :

a reply to kind inquiries in a letter brought by Epaphras.

This conclusion is abundantly confirmed by the context, where we find also a stray expression lying, which the Apostle has picked up along with the opening prayer from the very beginning of the Colossian epistle ; for after saying that he gives thanks at having heard (sc. by letter) of their faith, he goes on to remark that the Gospel is καρποφορούμενον καὶ αὐξανόμενον in all the world, *as it is amongst yourselves*, and then a little lower down returns to the same expression, which had evidently caught his fancy, and prays that they may advance spiritually and be καρποφοροῦντες καὶ αὐξανόμενοι in the knowledge of God.

No doubt, then, the opening verses of Colossians are a part of a real letter. And this suggests some further inquiries ; for we may ask whether modern commentators upon Colossians have seen this feature of the epistle ; and, if they have seen it, have they used it either to illustrate the epistle, or to solve the riddle of its perplexing relations with its companion epistle, viz., the Epistle to the Ephesians.

Let us try Lightfoot¹ *in loc.* ; we shall find as follows :—

“ For διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς in an *exactly similar connexion* see 1 Thessalonians 2. 13. . . . In all these cases the καὶ denotes the *response* of the Apostle’s personal feeling to the favourable character of the news.”

The italics are our own. It will be seen that Lightfoot comes very close indeed to the point of our argument ; he sees that the two cases cited are similar, and he sees that

¹ Lightfoot in *Col.* i. 9, p. 208.

the Apostle is, in each case, replying to something. But he just misses the point that Paul is replying to written, and not merely oral, communications: he loses his letter in the postman: and this defect is characteristic of Western as distinct from Oriental life; the Eastern entrusts his message, not to a messenger, but to a paper *plus* a messenger. Epaphras no doubt brought a string of communications from the Churches through which he passed; but they were probably packed away, not in his head, but in his head-gear. As he passed from city to city they multiplied; for almost all Churches would wish to express similar inquiries as to the Apostle's condition and needs, and to make reports as to their own state. These things could not easily be done orally, and would not be so done except in a very limited degree.

It will be seen, then, that Lightfoot comes very near to the explanation of Paul's language in the passages referred to.

Dr. Moule, also, in his "Notes on Colossians" in the *Cambridge Bible for Schools*, comes near to the same conclusion, e.g. Colossians 1. 9:—

For this cause] in view of the whole happy report from Colossæ.

We also]. The "*also*" means that the news of the loving life at Colossæ was *met* by the loving prayer of Paul and his friends.

But curiously, while he has (no doubt under the influence of Lightfoot) recognised the echo in Paul's sentiments to the Colossians, in his remarks on a similar passage in Ephesians 1. 15 ("For this cause I also . . . do not cease giving thanks," etc.) he misses the point almost entirely by saying,—

I also] as well as others who have you in their hearts: a touch of gracious modesty.

where there would seem to be a well-intentioned effort to

put the highest construction possible on the fact that St. Paul was—answering a letter!

Dr. Moule, by his comment upon the parallel passage in Ephesians, takes us into the heart of a famous critical problem; though I doubt whether he would allow that any such problem existed. We will come presently to this question. Meanwhile let us approach it slowly by trying what Dr. S. Davidson thought of the Pauline epistolary “we also.” He tells us as follows¹:—

“In Colossians 1. 9 ‘we *also*,’ referring to Epaphras as well as the writer, is appropriate; but the ‘also’ is retained in the corresponding passage Ephesians 1. 15, though Epaphras is not mentioned there.”

We are advised, that is, by Dr. Davidson that the Epistle to the Ephesians has been imitating Colossians, and imitating it so badly as to misunderstand it! In other words, the Epistle to the Ephesians is a clumsy forgery. It is sufficient to remark that the words in which the imitation lies (or is supposed to lie) are conventional, and that they relate not to Epaphras but to certain Greek correspondents who use fixed literary models.

Dr. Davidson has, by his parallel quotations and absurd comments on them, taken us into the heart, as we said above, of a critical problem, viz., that of the parallelism and supposed interdependence of Colossians and Ephesians, with which must be connected the general question of the character of Ephesians; and concerning this we may venture a few remarks.

When in Ephesians 1. 15 we find the sentences—

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ γὰρ, ἀκούσας τὴν καθ’ ὑμᾶς πίστιν ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ
Ἰησοῦ καὶ τὴν εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους [ἀγάπην], οὐ
παύομαι εὐχαριστῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν μνηλὸν ποιούμενος ἐπὶ
τῶν προσευχῶν μου,

¹ *Introd. to N.T.*, ii. 275.

we must say, in explanation of the words "I also," linked to a conventional epistolary expression—

(i.) That he has had a letter, which indeed is the meaning of "since I heard";

(ii.) That this letter expressed the prayers of certain people on his behalf.

The Epistle to the Ephesians is, then, a reply to an actual letter received, and cannot be a circular letter at all, as has often been maintained. Consequently, if the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ are lacking in the opening of the epistle in some leading codices, the explanation is more probable that some other name has been removed than that a blank was left to be filled up variously. And this immediately suggests that we write with Marcion the words ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ.

Nor are there wanting other suggestions in the Epistle to the Ephesians that the Apostle is replying to a written communication. Both here and in Colossians there are traces of anxious inquiries made after his welfare under the untoward circumstances of prison life. These inquiries are the cause of the replies in—

Ephesians 3. 13: I beg you not to lose heart over my tribulations on your account, for they are your glory.

Ephesians 6. 21: In order that you may know my state, and how I do, . . . I have sent Tychicus to you [with this letter], that he may comfort your hearts.

The same sentiment almost *verbatim* in Colossians 4. 12.

Obviously there would have been no need of a comforting Tychicus unless there had been a disconsolate series of Churches, who had made open expression of their disconsolation. These Churches were neighbouring Churches, especially if we are right in substituting Laodicea for Ephesus. The coincidence in their communication and in Paul's replies to them is perfectly natural; each had written saying, "We always pray for you. We hear you are in prison, and want to know how things are going with you."

There is no need to press either the underlying coincidence of the questions nor the parallelism of the replies into an argument against the genuineness of either Colossians or Ephesians, when we reflect that the same man (Epaphras) was scribe for the two Churches, or at least postman; and that the return-post was brought by the same man (Tychicus), as Epaphroditus did not return immediately. I do not mean to say there are no further difficulties in connection with the Ephesian-Colossian problem.

Now let us turn to the Epistle to the Philippians. This also is a reply to a letter already received; for (i.) it is clear that Epaphroditus brought a sum of money from Philippi, which means that he came to Rome overland from Colosse [Laodicea?] and Ephesus[?] With this gift there was a [written] message that "we should have sent you help sooner, but we had no one to send by." This is involved in Philippians 4. 10, "Ye were anxious to send, but lacked opportunity." So far, it may be said, there is nothing that might not have been conveyed in an oral message. But on turning to the opening verses of the epistle, we find the same conventional epistolary turns and the same inquiry as to how things were going with him. With regard to the latter he says plainly (Phil. 1. 12), "I should like you to know that my affairs have turned out to the furtherance of the gospel," which implies inquiry as to his affairs. And with regard to the former, the conventional thanksgivings, remembering and longings to see one another, we have only to slightly modify the translation of Philippians 1. 7, *διὰ τὸ ἔχειν με ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν*, so as to read, "because you have me in your hearts," in order to see the traces of the very language employed in the Philippian letter to St. Paul.

Not to prolong the investigation further, we may say that there is reason to believe that when Epaphras came to Rome, he brought papers and parcels for Paul from Colosse,

Laodicea, and Philippi, travelling, as we have said, overland. The replies to the first of these were carried by Tychicus, who seems to have set out almost immediately. He did *not* travel overland; and at some later date Paul despatched Epaphras to go overland and carry return messages to Philippi.

It appears, then, that the consideration of the epistolary formulæ involved in the Pauline letters leads to important conclusions with regard to the circumstances of the despatch of those letters. So far as we have followed the matter, the inquiry is not unfavourable to a belief in the genuineness of some of the most important parts of the correspondence.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

“DAN TO BEERSHEBA”:

THE LITERARY HISTORY OF THE PHRASE, AND THE
HISTORICAL PROBLEMS IT RAISES.

THE investigation is suggested by the story of the removal of the ark to Jerusalem. According to one text David gave festive portions not only to the crowd that happened to be gathered to behold the festivities or to take part in them, but also to every man and woman from Dan to Beersheba. This is the account of the LXX. The MT and the Peshitta omit the phrase “from Dan to Beersheba.” Which is correct? Of course it is perfectly clear that the LXX. account is unhistorical; but that does not prove it to be interpolated. When we examine the Greek text more closely, however, we cannot have much doubt that the phrase “Dan to Beersheba” is merely a marginal gloss; for it has made its way in at different places in the texts represented by the editions of Swete and Lagarde respectively.

Thus supplied with positive evidence of a tendency to interpolate the phrase, we proceed to inquire whether we may assume it to be original in the other places where it occurs.

1. *Examination of passages.*—We read in Judges 20. 1 that “the congregation was assembled as one man, from Dan even to Beersheba, with the land of Gilead, unto Yahwè at Mizpah,” in order to examine into the outrage on the Levite’s concubine. That this statement, as we now read it, reflects post-exilic ideas is admitted. The utmost that might be questioned is whether the particular phrase under consideration may not belong to an older narrative worked up by the post-exilic editor. Budde, in his new commentary, maintains that it does. For our present purpose, however, his verdict is of no use. It is founded on the assertion that elsewhere the phrase we are discussing is found in

early writers, whereas the date of the phrase is the very thing we wish to determine. Moore, on the other hand, appears to see no reason to sever the phrase from its post-exilic context. This seems much more plausible. The earlier sources do not countenance any such fantastic conception as that of a gathering of all Israel from Dan to Beersheba in the pre-monarchic age even for purposes of war, far less for the purpose of conducting a judicial investigation.

We come next to the one passage containing the expression in the Book of Kings. The question is complicated by the well-known intricate relations of the texts represented by the Hebrew and by the Greek respectively. The phrase occurs in a passage that is found at this point (1 Kings 4. 24 f. [5. 4 f.]) only in A of the Greek MSS. cited in Swete, and it is certainly the easiest view that the Greek of B and of Lagarde's edition represents an earlier state of the text. The text of B and of Lagarde, indeed, inserts the passage in chapter 2;¹ but their presence seems not more natural there than it does in chapter 5. The Hebrew runs thus: "And Judah and Israel dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree, from Dan even to Beersheba, all the days of Solomon."² Kamphausen, in Kautzsch's *Die Heilige Schrift*, assigns the verses in Kings to the second half of the Exile. Meyer, in his most recent work,³ assigns them to Persian times, on account of their use of עֵבֶר הַנָּהָר for the Persian trans-Euphratic province.

Nor can we assign a much earlier date to the third passage, the only passage in 1 Samuel: "And all Israel from Dan even to Beersheba knew that Samuel was estab-

¹ The text of Lagarde at verses 31 and 32, that of B at verses 46 f. and 46 g. in Swete.

² The recurrence of the metaphor of the vine and the fig tree verbatim in Mic. 4. 4, and of a very similar expression in 2 Kings 18. 31=Isa. 86. 16, gives no light as to the date. The phrase is probably proverbial, and the date of the passages cited is itself uncertain.

³ *Die Entstehung des Judenthums*, p. 20, note 2.

lished to be a prophet of Yahwè" (1 Sam. 3. 20). Budde strangely states in *The Sacred Books of the Old Testament* (*ad loc.*) that this verse is omitted by the LXX. The fact is that it occurs twice over with interesting variations. The most noteworthy point for our present purpose is that in the second form of the statement the phrase we are considering does not occur, the place it occupies in our present Hebrew text being taken by the expression "from one end of the land to the other end of the land," which is almost identical with a phrase occurring repeatedly in Deuteronomy. Budde assigns the verse in 1 Samuel to E₂ —*i.e.*, probably the first part of the 7th century B.C. We may be pretty sure it is not earlier. If the alternative Deuteronomistic expression found in the LXX. is the older, we can hardly regard our present Hebrew phrase as earlier than exilic.

Four cases remain, all in 2 Samuel. The first is in a somewhat impossible speech put into the mouth of Abner (3. 10). He threatens Ishbosheth that he will translate the kingdom from the house of Saul, and set up the throne of David over Israel and over Judah from Dan even to Beersheba. The impossibility of such a speech from Abner, since we have no reason to suppose that Saul ever ruled over anything like so extensive a territory, is no reason for refusing to accept Budde's assignment of it to the source he calls J. On the other hand, we cannot be sure that the verse really belongs to the passage. If we grant the originality of the addition to v. 9 (*ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ταύτῃ* at the end) in Lucian's recension, supported by B, then v. 10 may well be a later accretion. The phraseology would very well suit a late date. The phrase "throne of David" makes one think of some student of Jeremiah. It occurs in Isaiah 9. 7; but it is not now possible in argument to assume that that passage is pre-exilic.

The second occurrence in 2 Samuel also is in a speech

(17. 11). Here, again, the question is not whether Hushai could have used the words in counselling Absalom to gather all Israel together before venturing to pursue David, but whether they belong to the original narrative; and if so, when it was written.

In the precise form used here, the simile of the sand of the sea occurs elsewhere only once—viz., in 1 Kings 4. 20,¹ in a verse belonging to a context which we have already found reason to suspect of being late. In slightly different forms, however, the simile occurs very frequently, and is found as early as J (Judg. 7. 12).

We have now examined five of the seven cases, and while some have been found to be certainly later than the Exile, only one has betrayed no obvious note of affinity with late writings as distinguished from early. Even in that case, however, there is nothing positive against a late date.

The remaining two instances (2 Sam. 24. 2, 15) occur in the story of the census and the pestilence, a story the early date of which there is no obvious reason to call in question. Kittel hesitates to what source to assign it; Budde attributes it to the source that he equates with J. The question that concerns us, however, is the date not of the story, but of the clauses containing the expression, "Dan to Beersheba." Now it is precisely the geographical details in this story that arouse one's suspicion. The text is so corrupt that it is difficult to form a critical estimate as to date. The geographical passage does not look old. "Hivites"² is a term that occurs nowhere else in the Old Testament except with reference to the settlement in Palestine. An early writer would scarcely have thought of

¹ An editor describes the vast multitudes of Israel, or, as the MT reads, of Israel and Judah, eating and drinking and making merry.

² It may be a corrupt reading; but cf. "Canaanites," and, in the Peshitta, "Jebusites."

making the census extend to Tyre or Sidon. We can hardly resist the suspicion that vv. 5-7 are a later addition; and the conjecture is perhaps confirmed by a comparison with the version of the story preserved in 1 Chronicles 21. It would seem that the text as it lay before the Chronicler passed directly from v. 4 to v. 8. No doubt he is abbreviating the story at this point; but could the Chronicler, whose fondness for statistical details we know so well, have resisted the temptation to incorporate the geographical details that now stand in 2 Samuel had they been present in his authority? Dropping vv. 5-7 does not remove the phrase "Dan to Beersheba" in vv. 2 and 15; but it adds weight to any other reason for suspecting interpolation. There is such a reason. In verse 15, the account of the pestilence, the Chronicler gives no sign of having found the words, "from Dan to Beersheba," in his authority. It would certainly be natural for the editor who added the other geographical details to add this detail also.

The case of verse 2 is different. We have proof of a very interesting kind (to this we shall return) that the phrase already stood in the text of Samuel used by the Chronicler. The question whether it was original or interpolated, however, is not thus decided.

We have now examined all the passages where the phrase occurs. There are seven in the Hebrew, eight in the Greek. In only two cases were we not confronted with some (at least plausible) positive ground for suspecting interpolation.

2. *When did the phrase originate?*—The general result of the preceding investigation is to establish the phrase as a favourite with late writers. There is one consideration, however, that rather suggests that it was not coined in post-exilic times. The Chronicler seems to have liked the phrase—this strengthens the conviction that he would not have omitted it had it been present in 2 Samuel 24. 15—

for he introduced it into his embellished account of the reign of Hezekiah (2 Chron. 30. 5); but he wrote "Beersheba to Dan," not "Dan to Beersheba"; and when he incorporated an earlier passage (the story of David's census) in which the words occur with the name of Dan placed first, he changed the order to that which seemed to him the more appropriate. Whether the preference was peculiar to him or was shared by all the men of his time, we need not consider here (the question belongs to a wider investigation which must be reserved for another place). In any case the preference seems to betray the fact that the original phrase represented the circumstances of an age that was past. When Lucian's recension of the LXX. restores the phrase (in the two passages in Chronicles) to the common form, this is a mere harmonistic correction. The Massoretic reading, with Beersheba first, was difficult for the post-canonical reader who knew the passages in Samuel. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the Chronicler it would be natural to put Beersheba first. A theoretical writer who regarded a proclamation by Hezekiah to all Israel as a natural thing, would think of it as proceeding from Beersheba to Dan.¹ The phrase "Dan to Beersheba" originated, therefore, at a time when there prevailed a set of conditions different from those known to the Chronicler. In other words, its origin is much earlier.

If, then, it was an inheritance from pre-exilic times, when and how did it originate? and why is it specially favoured by late writers?

Can the form of the phrase give us any further hint? Perhaps it can. Surely the peculiarity which showed that the phrase is not post-exilic also makes it probable that the

¹ Cf. his phrase "From Beersheba to Mount Ephraim" (2 Chron. 19. 4), and in Neh. 11. (vv. 27 and 30), "Beersheba to the Valley of Hinnom." The same principle is exemplified, though in the opposite way, in Josiah's going "from Geba to Beersheba" (2 Kings 23. 8).

words embody an idea prevalent at some time or other in northern, rather than in southern, Israel.

It is difficult, however, to believe that the phrase can have been applicable during the time of the divided monarchy.

Unfortunately our knowledge of the conditions that then prevailed north of Jezreel is very imperfect. The population in the neighbourhood of Dan appears to have been, even in very early times, largely Aramæan. W. Max Müller has argued from the forms of the names in the Šešonk list that Aramaic influence was prominent in Palestine in the 10th century B.C. However that may be—and there is room for doubt—Maacah and Beth-Rehob were apparently Aramæan. Where the latter was we perhaps do not know exactly, but Dan would seem to have been, strictly speaking, within it. The Book of Kings represents Benhadad—*i.e.*, Bir-idri of Damascus—as having to take Dan from Baasha (15. 20). However matters may have stood before that, as Tell el Kādi, the modern representative of Dan, is only some fifteen hours distant from Damascus, so vigorous a state as Damascus was would be loath to let slip out of its hands a centre of such importance. The fact that Dan does not occur in the list of northern districts seized by Tiglath-pileser in the following century, makes it questionable whether Israel was ever after able to assert political supremacy there. Dan, therefore, hardly contributed anything to the political life of the nation—Bilhah was but a concubine. The important fact that there are indications that it was long felt to be in *some* sense an integral part of Israel—in fact an ancient centre of Israelitish life and thought (so an early source in 2 Samuel) with a Mosaic priesthood—will claim our attention later.

To question Dan's having been a real frontier town of northern Israel may be an excess of caution. In the case of Beersheba, however, the caution seems to be fully warranted. It could hardly have been natural for northern

Israel to speak of Beersheba as a territorial boundary on the south. There is, indeed, some reason to believe that, during part of the reign of the house of Omri, Judah stood to Israel, to all intents and purposes, in the position of a vassal state. It is perhaps conceivable that at such a time people, at least at the court of Samaria, might have spoken of Beersheba as the southern limit of Israel's power. We may suspect, however, that for long periods this could hardly have been much more than a courtly fiction—of the same kind, though not of the same degree, as the English claim to France, which survived on English coins till the end of last century. There was, indeed, as we know, a very close bond of *some* kind between north Israel and Beersheba in particular (to this we shall return); but it is doubtful whether the territorial stretch down to that town was so dominated by northern Israel as to make natural the use of the proverbial phrase. The political conditions of the 9th and the 8th centuries, therefore, will hardly account for the phrase we are discussing, which moreover is not used in any narrative relating to a period later than the time of Solomon.

Can we, then, suppose it to have originated in the time of David? Surely his sway extended to Dan and to Beersheba. Some may regard even this as uncertain. There is great difficulty in distinguishing between what is legendary and what is, in kernel at least, historical in the story of the hero king. It is unsafe to dogmatize. Such positive evidence as there is of David's power having extended so far in any effective degree is not contemporary. The real original basis of his power was in the Judahite and other southern clans, and yet here, at a somewhat advanced period of his reign (as the story reads in the present Book of Samuel), was the very seat of a most formidable rebellion. Abel-beth-maacah, a few miles from Dan, was the remote district to which Sheba, another rebel leader, fled for refuge.

No doubt the editor of the Book of Samuel as we have it obviously intends to represent David's dominion as of far-reaching extent and imposing strength. His materials, however, if they are at all correctly arranged, perhaps hardly fit his scheme. We know how strong for later writers was the temptation to glorify the past, and how far they yielded to it.

Nor is there in the list of Solomon's prefects in 1 Kings 4. much to suggest that he had any effective authority as far north as Dan. Just as little is there any allusion to control as far south as Beersheba.

All this makes one feel that it is not safe to assume that if David's sway extended to both these places it was stable and effective. It would be difficult for him to resist the aspirations of the Aramæans. The circumstances would hardly favour the creation of a phrase such as we are considering—a phrase, that is, current among the people and probably originated by them. All peoples are slow to accommodate their phraseology to new conditions. In modern Egypt, *e.g.*, a new decimal coinage has been in existence for a dozen years, and yet people still calculate (or did so quite recently) in the old terms—just as we pay in guineas, though none has been coined since 1817. So old Egyptian names of towns have survived till the present day, whilst the Greek names bestowed upon them in Ptolemaic times failed to establish themselves. That "Dan to Beersheba" was not really a popular expression but a mere official formula seems unlikely. If the court at Jerusalem had coined a phrase of this kind, is it not probable that the names would have stood, as they stand centuries later in the work of the Chronicler, in inverted order?

The main difficulty, however, is this. If the phrase was in use then in a territorial sense, is it likely that it could survive centuries during which, as we have seen, it could

not be used in a political sense, and then in some way become common in later Judæan writers?

We have thus found it difficult to assign the rise of the phrase to any period between David and the fall of the northern kingdom. May we then turn to the 7th century? The Chronicler seems to have thought that Hezekiah extended his claims as far as Dan. The idealizing of the claims of Israel may not have been confined to literature. Indeed it is probable that, as a vassal state, Judah extended its authority some distance northwards. We cannot suppose, however, that "Dan to Beersheba" could have represented in the 7th century or later anything but an ideal claim. Can we then regard it as possible that it never was a description of actual political conditions; that it was simply used retrospectively or otherwise by writers who delighted to idealize the dignity of their people? This is a possible hypothesis, though hazardous. To discuss it here would require an examination of certain other analogous formulæ, and this we must reserve for another place. Even if we adopted the hypothesis, however, we should still have to inquire on what principle the terms of the phrase were selected, and so we shall proceed to consider whether there is any principle other than political on which we can suppose the selection to have been based.

3. *A possible non-political meaning of the phrase.*—The first thing to strike one is that the terms are not lines (boundaries) but points. The real boundaries mentioned in the Old Testament are generally such natural features as rivers¹ or wildernesses—features which furnish more or less definite lines,—and the confusion characteristic of much of the geographical description in the Old Testament is usually to be ascribed to curtailment of sources or to other conditions of late editorial workmanship: the Israelites knew

¹ *E.g.* the river (Euphrates), the *Nahal Miṣraim* or (so called) river of Egypt (the Wady el-'Arish), the Jordan, and so on.

how to define a boundary. Almost in every place where the phrase occurs what is treated of is not a delimitation of contiguous territories but a supposed gathering of the people or a visitation of them in the centres of population.

Elsewhere¹ the present writer has suggested that the origin of the phrase is perhaps to be found not in the political but in the religious life of Palestine. Dan and Beersheba were very famous sanctuaries and were visited as such by Israelites of the northern kingdom. If they were the most distant sanctuaries commonly so visited, a phrase "Dan to Beersheba" might readily come into use. It need not surprise us to find such a phrase surviving the downfall of Samaria. There is reason to suppose that, alongside of their jealousy of the northern kingdom, people in the south were conscious of a certain pride and national proprietorship in the superior glory of Israel. They would not preserve a north Israelite territorial phrase, perhaps; but they might share a phrase of a somewhat different meaning.

As the sanctuaries were very ancient the phrase also may be ancient, even premonarchic. As conditions changed and the popular religion was gradually modified by the influences represented by Deuteronomy and the Priestly Law Book, the phrase would change its meaning. In time it would be assumed to have had a political significance. Its popularity, therefore, with later writers would be due to its apparent confirmation of the erroneous conception they had formed of the early history of their people.

HOPE W. HOGG.

¹ In a paper read at a meeting of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology (for an abstract see the *Proceedings* for 1898, p. 35 f.). The paper included also an outline of the argument of this article.

*MISREADINGS AND MISRENDERINGS IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT.*

I.

It is a popular belief, shared even by Biblical critics, that the New Testament, as it appears in our current and especially critical editions, is the best edited book among all ancient texts. This view is founded on the consideration that, whereas the ancient classical texts are based upon MSS. which are separated from their archetypes or authors by no less than twelve to fifteen centuries on an average, the oldest Greek Testament MSS. (N B A) go back to the fourth and fifth centuries, and so come within three or four centuries of their authors. Another advantage claimed on the side of the New Testament text is that, while the ancient classics are known only in Greek and Latin respectively, the Bible appears very early in translations as well, that is, in Syriac and Latin versions following close upon Apostolic times. Lastly, it is argued that numerous passages of the New Testament are corroborated by their appearance as quotations in early Christian or Patristic literature. This last argument, however, applies, in a large measure at least, to classical texts as well, seeing that most of the ancient classics are also largely quoted by their immediate and later successors, not to mention their imitators and excerptors.

A long and laborious study of the history of the Greek language¹—which now forms the subject of my annual lectures in the University of St. Andrews—and a pro-

¹ The results of these labours, which have occupied my whole time and energy during the last fifteen years, are given in various publications, especially in my recent *Historical Greek Grammar*, chiefly of the Attic dialect, as written and spoken from classical antiquity down to the present time, founded upon the ancient texts, inscriptions, papyri, and present popular Greek. London (Macmillan & Co.), 1897.

longed research into the Greek text of the New Testament have convinced me that the above three classes of evidence underlying our New Testament text—namely, the extant MSS. versions, and patristic quotations—even granting that each and all of them constituted, in every detail, unimpeachable evidence, are not sufficient data for the complete recovery of the genuine word of the Holy Writ. Other sources and fields of information have to be laid under large contribution. Indeed an earnest textual critic must start with a good knowledge of Hebrew and late Latin; but before and above all, he must make himself *thoroughly familiar*—

(1) With the whole range and extent of the *Greek language*; that is, not only with the language of classical literature and the New Testament compositions, but also with all post-classical (alike literary and popular) phases of the Greek language, including even present Greek.

(2) With the post-classical and subsequent history of the *Greek writing and spelling*. This should include a thorough familiarity with the traditional or—as it is commonly mis-called—modern Greek pronunciation, such knowledge being indispensable for detecting itacisms and other various kinds of palæographic error.

(3) With the history of the *ancient Church* in all its details (institutions, doctrines, heresies, persecutions, etc.).

How far the above conditions have hitherto been fulfilled, is not for me to say. I merely wish to point out here that, despite the prodigious industry and learning already spent upon the text of the New Testament, all our printed editions and versions of the sacred text are still disfigured by very many and often strange misreadings and misrenderings. I propose in the present paper to give some specimens of such corruptions and blunders by selecting a few of such cases as will be obvious to general readers and students of the Bible. And I shall consider here chiefly

St. John's text, because of the independence, purity, and simplicity or naivety of the language of that Gospel.

I. *Errors of punctuation.* It is well known to general, but especially to classical, students that the ancients wrote all words in a connected line, called *scriptura continua*; that is, they wrote without stops, without accents, without breathings; in short, without any notation whatever (including marks of interrogation, exclamation, etc.). This practice, which of course applies to the Greek original and to the early versions as well, may be witnessed by an inspection of the early, especially uncial, MSS. of the Bible, where each line has the appearance of one continuous long word extending from the internal to the external margin of each column or "page." Accordingly the systematic punctuation and notation shown in our printed editions is a modern expedient resorted to since the middle ages for purposes of convenience, and as such is of no binding character for us, nor has it any absolute value; it merely reflects the personal view or subjective interpretation of each individual editor.

I begin by a lengthy passage in the first chapter of St. John, which, in its current punctuation and interpretation, suffers grievously in more than one point. The words underlined are those especially affected.

John i. 19: καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία Ἰωάννου, ὅτε ἀπέ-
στειλαν (πρὸς αὐτὸν) οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεῖς καὶ
Λευῖταις ἵνα ἐρωτήσωσιν αὐτόν, Σὺ τίς εἶ; καὶ ὁμολόγησε
καὶ οὐκ ἠρνήσατο· καὶ ὁμολόγησεν ὅτι Ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμι ὁ
Χριστός.

The rendering of the passage in the Authorised and Revised Versions is this:—

"And this *is* the record (R.V. the witness) of John *when* the Jews *sent* (unto him) Priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, Who art thou? *And* he confessed and denied not: but (R.V. and he) confessed, I am not the Christ."

Now leaving aside the vagueness of the introductory pronoun *αὕτη*, "this," which may refer either to the preceding or to the following statement, no one will deny that in the grammatical construction "this *is* the record when the Jews *sent*"—the co-ordination of the present with the aorist tense is unnatural and illogical. And the difficulty is increased by the succession of *καί* in "*and* he confessed," seeing that "and" here, viewed logically and syntactically, cannot introduce the reply to a question; here it should rather refer to *ὅτε ἀπέστειλαν*: "when the Jews sent *and* (when) he confessed." A further difficulty—a difficulty which is, of course, tacitly passed over in the versions—lies in the presence of the emphatic pronoun *σύ* (*σὺ τίς εἶ;*), seeing that the use of the nominative of personal pronouns in Greek implies, as we know, emphasis or contradiction.

I believe that all the above difficulties are removed if we read: *Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία Ἰωάννου. "Ὅτε ἀπέστειλαν (πρὸς αὐτὸν) οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεῖς καὶ Λευῖτας ἵνα ἐρωτήσωσιν αὐτὸν Σὺ, τίς εἶ; καὶ ὡμολόγησε καὶ οὐκ ἤρνήσατο. Καὶ ὡμολόγησεν ὅτι Ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ὁ Χριστός.*

That is in English:—

"And John's witness is this: When the Jews sent (unto him) from Jerusalem priests and Levites to question him, Ho thou (or Hark! I say)! Who art thou?—he both acknowledged and denied not. And he acknowledged: I am not (the) Christ."

Here then we see that the *καί* before *ὡμολόγησε* is not connective but additive or emphatic: *καί—καί, et—et*, "both—and." Hence Schoettgen's remark on the passage, as quoted by Prof. M. Dods in Dr. W. R. Nicoll's *Expositor's New Testament*, that the sentence is "judaico modo" like "Jethro confessus et non mentitus est," is out of place. Equally misplaced is Westcott's comment on the passage to the effect that "the first term (*confessed*) marks the

readiness of the testimony ; the second (*denied not*) the completeness of it. Both terms are used 'absolutely.' Nor is less artificial the opinion of H. Holtzmann, when he says that "the *ὁμολόγησε* stands absolutely, while the *οὐκ ἡρνήσατο* refers to the succeeding speech." As a matter of fact the combination *καὶ ὁμολόγησε καὶ οὐκ ἡρνήσατο* is not individual of our writer, nor does it convey two distinct notions ; it forms a colloquial phrase, a sort of Græcism, and simply means : "he readily admitted." This may be seen from parallel passages in other ancient compositions, as Soph. *Ant.* 443, *καὶ φημι δρᾶσαι κοῦκ ἀπόφημι* ; *id.* O.C. 317, *καὶ φημι κάπόφημι* ; so too *Ant.* 1,192 ; Jos. *Ant.* 6, 7, 4 (= 6, 151, ed. Niese), *Σαοῦλος δὲ ἀδικεῖν ὁμολόγει καὶ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἡρνεῖτο*.

Regarding my changing, without hesitation, the current reading *Σὺ τίς εἶ* to *Σύ, τίς εἶ*, it is obvious that *σὺ* here is not a nominative (despite the succeeding '*Ἠλίας εἶ σύ* ; *ὁ προφήτης εἶ σύ* ; which will be discussed elsewhere) ; it is a *vocative* synonymous with (*ὦ*) *οὗτος*, *heus tu ! ho there ! hark ! holloa ! I say !*

Of other passages so misread, I may note here : John ix. 35 *σὺ πιστεύεις εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* ; which should be read : *σύ, πιστεύεις, κτλ.*, "I say, dost thou believe in the Son of man ?"—xxi. 12 "Now none of the disciples durst inquire of Him : Holloa ! who art thou ?" (*Σύ, τίς εἶ* ; not *Σὺ τίς εἶ* ;)—Acts xxii. 27 "I say, tell me, art thou a Roman ?" (*Λέγε μοι, Σύ, Ῥωμαῖος εἶ* ; not *Λέγε μοι, σὺ Ῥωμαῖος εἶ* ;)—Romans xiv. 3 "Ho there ! who art Thou ?" (*σύ, τίς εἶ* ; not *σὺ τίς εἶ* ;).—So further : John xix. 9 *πόθεν εἶ σύ* ; should be read : *πόθεν εἶ* ; *σύ !* "where dost thou come from ? I say !" (Here evidently Jesus was not listening to Pilate ; hence the writer proceeds : "But Jesus gave him no answer.")

But while in the above principal passage (John i. 19) the punctuation before or after *τίς* does not materially affect the

nature of the sense but the degree of emphasis, in other passages the laying or not laying of the stress upon the personal pronoun makes a very great difference. Thus in John xviii. 37, where Jesus says "My kingdom is not from hence," the reading of our printed text proceeds thus: *εἶπεν οὖν αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλάτος, Οὐκοῦν βασιλεὺς εἶ σὺ; ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Σὺ λέγεις ὅτι βασιλεὺς εἰμι ἐγώ.¹ Ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο γεγέννημαι, κτλ.*

Examining the various interpretations given to this passage, Prof. Dodds says:

"Pilate understands only so far as to interrupt with *οὐκοῦν . . . σὺ*, 'so then you are a King?'—to which Jesus replies with the explicit statement: *Σὺ λέγεις . . . ἐγώ*, 'thou sayest.' This, says Schoettgen (Matt. xxvi. 25), is 'solennis adfirmantium apud Judaeos formula'; so that *ὅτι* must be rendered, with Revised Version margin, 'because' I am a King. Erasmus, Westcott, Plummer, and others render 'Thou sayest that I am a king,' neither definitely accepting nor rejecting the title. But this interpretation seems impossible in the face of the simple *σὺ λέγεις* of the synoptists (Matt. xxvii. 11, Mark xv. 2, Luke xxiii. 3)."

And so it is. As a matter of fact all these interpretations are forced and too improbable to be accepted. For my part I believe that the passage is restored if we read:

Εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Πιλάτος, Οὐκοῦν βασιλεὺς εἶ; Σὺ; Ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Σὺ λέγεις ὅτι βασιλεὺς εἰμι.—Ἐγὼ;² ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο γεγέννημαι, κτλ. That is in English:

"Pilate therefore said unto him, So then thou art a king? Thou? Jesus answered, It is thou who sayest that I am a king. I? I was born to this end," etc.

¹ The codices \aleph B D show only one *ἐγώ*, but $\text{A}\chi\Gamma\Delta\Lambda\text{H}$ have *ἐγὼ ἐγώ*.

² Implying slight annoyance, *ἐγὼ*; "I? (why) I was born," etc.—The alternative reading *ἐγὼ, ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο, κτλ.*, in the sense of "I for one was born," "as for me, I was born," would be improbable, seeing that a simple *ἐγὼ* (as given by \aleph B D) would be sufficient or that purpose.

In a similar way the passage in Matthew xxvi. 25 is misread. To Jesus' pointed exclamation that "Woe unto that man through whom the Son of Man is being betrayed," Judas, conscious of his guilt, nervously asks, "*Μή τι ἐγὼ εἰμι, ῥαββί*;" to this anxious question Jesus is represented as replying: *Σὺ εἶπας*, "thou hast said."—Well, what? Surely this is an incomplete answer. Moreover the emphatic *σὺ* is altogether left out. It seems to me that Jesus' words will recover their true meaning and dignified tone if we read: *Μή τι ἐγὼ εἰμι, ῥαββί; λέγει αὐτῷ, Σὺ εἶπας*,—that is, in plain English, "Is it I, Rabbi? He says unto him, It is thou; thou hast hit it."

Among the numerous other passages where the current punctuation misrepresents the text, I may adduce Mark xiv. 41, with its parallel in Matthew xxvi. 45: "Sleep on now and take your rest." Here Jesus' pathetic words are grievously misread and misunderstood. To realize the proper meaning of the sentence we must remember that, before retiring to pray, Jesus expressly enjoined Peter and James and John to "*keep awake*" (or "*watch*," *γρηγορεῖτε*). However, to His surprise, when He comes back for the first time, He finds them asleep; He reprimands them, and again bids them to "*keep awake*." He returns for the second time, and again finds them asleep and too drowsy to give Him a reply. Now, when He returns for the third time and again finds them asleep, instead of rebuking them severely, as the nature of the case required, He is represented as at first remarking to them, "*go on sleeping now*," then immediately hereafter as again changing His mind and bidding them "*stop sleeping (ἀπέχει)!* arise! let us go!" *Καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε· ἀπέχει· ἦλθεν ἡ ὥρα· ἰδοὺ, παραδίδοται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν. Ἐγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν. Ἰδοὺ, ὁ παραδιδούς με ἤγγικεν.*—"Sleep on now and take your rest: it is enough; the hour is come; behold, the Son of Man is betrayed into

the hands of sinners. Arise, let us go. Lo (R.V. Behold), he that betrayeth Me is at hand."

This glaring inconsistency, this threefold change of mind—Keep awake! Sleep on! Arise!—is highly improbable in itself. One might, of course, argue that some long pause (. . .) may have intervened between "sleep on now" and "it is enough, arise," a pause which would justify the change. But such an assumption is precluded by the rapid succession of tragical events: Jesus had hardly finished the sentence *καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε*, when the soldiers at the head of the traitor made their appearance (*εὐθὺς ἔτι αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος*, which cannot apply to *ἀπέχει! ἦλθεν ἡ ὥρα, ἰδοὺ!*).

It was apparently these, or some of these, considerations and objections that led David Schulz,¹ when he was editing Griesbach's *Novum Testamentum* in 1827,² to insert the interrogation marks between *ἀναπαύεσθε* and *ἀπέχει*. But the suggestion failed to attract attention evidently on account of the presence in the sentence of the troublesome term *τὸ λοιπὸν*; for it, like *τοῦ λοιποῦ*, is taken to refer to the future, and thus mean: *for the rest, henceforth, further*, so that *καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν* is rendered by "sleep further," "sleep on." But *τὸ λοιπὸν*, or simply *λοιπὸν*, is a colloquial term peculiar to post-classical and subsequent Greek—including modern Greek—as an adverb equivalent to, and substitute for, the classical *οὖν*, with which it is even found associated. Thus Polyb. 1, 15, 11 *λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς*. So 1, 30, 8; 3, 96, 14 *καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὗτος μὲν αὐτοῦ συννομήσας τὸν στόλον ἀνεκομίσθη*, and often. Diosc. 2, 105 (p. 232) *λοιπὸν λίνφ διάρας τὰ κυκλίσκια διεστῶτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κρέμασον*. Epict.

¹ According to Tischendorff, *Nov. Test.* (8th ed.) *ad loc.* p. 879 (et 184): *ἀναπαύεσθε (-σθαι)*; Schu. et in *Mo.* et in *Mt.* interrogationis signum poni vult ut h. l. *F* al. *pauc.*

² This refers to the 3rd edition of the first volume.

Diss. 1, 22, 15 ἄρχομαι λοιπὸν μισεῖν αὐτόν. 1. 18, 20 τοῦτοις τὸ λοιπὸν πεποισθῶς τοῖς δόγμασιν ὀρθὸς περιπάτει, ἐλεύθερος. 1. 24, 1. 1, 25, 15. 1, 27, 2. 1, 28, 10. 1, 29, 5. 1, 29, 8 τίνα λοιπὸν δέδοικα; 1, 29, 26. 1, 30, 5. 2, 1, 8. 2, 5, 16 2, 5, 22. 2, 6, 23 τί λοιπὸν ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλη ἀνέρχῃ; 2, 8, 8 καὶ λοιπόν. 2, 8, 15. 2, 19, 34 λοιπὸν οὖν, *et passim*. Just. Tryph. 56 καὶ παυσάμενος λοιπὸν τοῦ λόγου ἐπυθόμεν αὐτῶν εἰ ἐνενοήκεσαν. Clement. 345c τότε λοιπὸν ὁ Πέτρος, κτλ. Athan. i. 865b καὶ οὕτω λοιπὸν γέγονε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι μοναστήρια. Didym. Al. 489a ποῦ οὖν λοιπὸν ἢ μετὰ ποίων κτισμάτων τάσσεσθαι δοκιμάζουσιν αὐτό; Acta Nerei, 2, 22; 7, 28; 9, 4; 10, 4 ἐπίσχετε οὖν λοιπόν.¹

It is chiefly in this sense of οὖν—*therefore, then, well, well then*—that (τὸ) λοιπὸν occurs also in the New Testament compositions, the adopted translations (*finally, moreover, etc.*) being untenable. Thus 1 Corinthians iv. 2, ὥδε λοιπὸν ζητεῖται, means “here then it is required.” vii. 29, ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος ἐστὶ. Τὸ λοιπὸν (so for ἐστὶ τὸ λοιπόν) ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες γυναῖκας ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ὦσι, “the time is short. Therefore let² them that have wives be as though they had none.” 2 Corinthians xiii. 11, λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί, χαίρετε, “Well (or So then), brethren, farewell.” So too Ephesians vi. 10 (Rev. text v. l. τοῦ λοιποῦ); Philippians iii. 1; and iv. 8; 1 Thessalonians iv. 1 (where mark the collocation [τὸ] λοιπὸν οὖν); 2 Thessalonians iii. 1; 2 Timothy iv. 8 (“Therefore,” not “Henceforth”!).

It now becomes clear that the passage under consideration in Mark xiv. 41 (also Matt. xxvi. 26) must be read thus: καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε; Ἀπέχει! I told you once, twice to keep awake: “well, are ye sleeping

¹ For other examples see E. A. Sophocles' Lexicon, s. v. λοιρός. I have quoted here Epictetus largely, because he was a contemporary, and then, so to say, fellow-countryman of the Apostles.

² For the use of ἵνα as a hortative particle (= ἄγε, φέρε, “let”) see my *Historical Greek Grammar*, § 1914 f. However, this question will be fully discussed in my next paper.

and resting? It is (or Ye have) enough! Behold . . . arise! let us go." This reading is moreover confirmed by the parallel passage in St. Luke xxii. 46 *τί καθεύδετε*.

One more specimen out of this numerous class of mis-readings will, I hope, remove all doubt as to the faulty state of our printed editions of the Greek text and the versions founded upon it. In John i. 40 f. we read: *καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ ἔμειναν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην ὥρα ἣν ὡς δεκάτη· Ἦν Ἀνδρέας ὁ ἀδελφὸς Σίμωνος Πέτρου εἰς ἐκ τῶν δύο τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Ἰωάννου καὶ ἀκολουθησάντων αὐτῷ. Εὕρισκει οὗτος, κτλ.*

"They abode with him that day; it was about the tenth hour. One of the two which heard John speak and followed him was Andrew, Simon Peter's brother. He findeth first his own brother Simon and saith unto him," etc.

Now any reader who can for a moment emancipate himself from an inherited and lifelong habit of thought will at once see the incoherency and oddness of the passage. In the first place, the asyndetic succession of three sentences (*ὥρα ἣν—ἦν Ἀνδρέας—εὕρισκει οὗτος*) is unnatural in Greek,¹ since there is no question here of pathos or rhetoric; we have before us a simple, calm *narrative*. Then what has the "tenth hour" to do with the sudden account about Andrew? It was the tenth hour; Andrew was one of the two who heard John speak!

Well, then, I may be asked, where lies the crux? It lies simply in the corrupt reading of the second *ἦν* (*ὥρα ἣν ὡς δεκάτη. ἦν Ἀνδρέας*); it should be *ἦν*, an accusative of time. The obviousness of this reading will be seen as soon as we remember that the autograph, as well as its subsequent copies—including our old uncial MSS.—showed HN, that is *ἦν* (suppl. *ὥραν*),² an accusative of time, very

¹ This is the chief passage generally adduced as an illustration of St. John's alleged fondness for the asyndetic construction.

² On this accusative of time see my *Hist. Gr. Gram.* § 1,274 f., and compare John iv. 52; Revelation iii. 3; Acts xx. 16.

common, especially in post-classical and subsequent Greek, including modern. Accordingly the author's genuine meaning is recovered if we read: *ώρα ἦν ὡς δεκάτη, ἦν Ἀνδρέας ὁ ἀδελφὸς Σίμωνος—εἰς ἐκ τῶν δύο τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Ἰωάννου καὶ ἀκολουθησάντων αὐτῷ—εὕρισκει οὗτος¹ πρῶτον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν ἴδιον, Σίμωνα, καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ, κτλ.*

"It was about the tenth hour when Andrew, the brother of Simon Peter—one of the two that had listened to John and had followed him—(he) meets first his own brother, Simon, and says unto him," etc.

One more word, and I have closed. If the above proposed new readings prove correct, which I hope, the inference to be drawn therefrom is important in another sense as well. As the misreadings under discussion occur also in the old Syriac and Latin versions, the conclusion is warranted that, whatever their origin and primitive type or character may have been, the said versions, in their extant form, are obviously more or less close adaptations to the canonical or traditional Greek text.

A. N. JANNARIS.

¹ Here *οὗτος* is resumptive, in which function it, like *ἐκεῖνος*, is very common in the New Testament, as; John i. 18; vi. 46; vii. 18; xv. 1; 2 John ix.; Revelation iii. 5; Matthew x. 22; xiii. 10; xxii. 23, etc., etc. (compare also John ii. 9).

*A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE GALATIANS.*

XXXII. GALATIANS III. 23-25.

BEFORE the age of Faith began, we of the Jewish race were shut up and kept under the guard of the Law, in preparation for (with a view to) the approaching revelation of Faith. Thus the Law has played the part of "a servant, responsible for our safety, and charged to keep us out of bad company,"¹ until the age of Christ arrived, so that we might be made righteous by Faith. For that result could not have been attained unless special care had been taken of us during the interval. We could not safely be permitted to be free at that time, for we could not then acquire Faith, that vitalizing and strengthening power, seated in our mind and working itself out in our conduct, which enables those who have seen and known Christ to be free and yet safe.

But now the age of Faith has begun, and we are set free from the guard and the directing care of the Law.

When Paul compared the Law to a *paidagogos*, he intended undoubtedly to describe it as having a good moral character, and exercising a salutary, though a strict and severe, effect on those who were placed under it. He speaks no evil of the Law; he represents it as subsidiary and inferior to Faith, but still as a wholesome provision given in God's kindness to the Jews.

Further, he chose an illustration which would make this clear to his Galatian readers; and they must, therefore, have been familiar with that characteristic Greek institution, the *paidagogos*, and considered it salutary and good. This throws some light on the social organization in the

¹ The best way of explaining Paul's meaning is to imitate closely the description of a *Paidagogos* given in the *Dictionary of Antiquities* (Smith), II. p. 307.

Galatian cities, for it places us in the midst of Greek city life, as it was in the better period of Greek history. "In the free Greek cities the system of education was organized as a primary care of the State. The educational system was the best side of the Greek city constitution. Literature, music, and athletics are all regulated in an interesting inscription of Teos, the salaries of the teachers are fixed, and special magistrates survey and direct the conduct of teachers and pupils."¹

In that period it would appear that the *paidagogoi* were trusted servants and faithful attendants, standing in a very close relation to the family (in which they were slaves). Their duty was not to teach any child under their charge, but simply to guard him. Among the Romans, who adopted this institution from the Greeks, the *paidagogos* gave some home instruction to the child: he was a Greek-speaking slave, who looked after the child, and taught him to use the Greek language. Though he also accompanied the child to school, yet there was not the same kindly feeling in the relationship of guardian and ward in Rome as in Greek cities during the better period. Roman *paidagogoi* were often chosen without the slightest regard to the moral side of their teaching, and brought the child in contact with the lower side of life among vicious slaves; and in the later Greek period, amid the steady degeneration of pagan manners in the whole Roman empire, Plutarch complains that a slave, worthless for any other purpose, was used as a *paidagogos*; and a little earlier Juvenal gives a terrible picture of the upbringing of young children, which, though exaggerated in his usual style, is still an indication of what was becoming characteristic of ordinary pagan homes (though certainly with some, probably many, brilliant exceptions).

¹ Quoted (and shortened) from *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Pt. II. p. 440.

In contrast with the Greek care for education, the Roman imperial government lavishly provided shows and exhibitions of a more or less degrading character for the population of Rome and the provinces, while the degeneration of the provision for watching over and educating the young in the cities was the worst feature of the Roman period. This had much to do with the steady deterioration in the moral fibre of the population, and the resulting destruction of the empire.

This passage of the Epistle, therefore, places us in the midst of Greek city life as it was in the better period of Greek history. When read in relation to the provision for education in the Greek cities, the illustration which Paul selects becomes much more luminous.

But there is nothing here characteristic of North Galatia. We are placed amid the Greek-speaking population of Antioch and Iconium, where Greek ways and customs had been neutralized since Alexander had conquered the country and left behind him a long succession of Greek kings. Even in Lystra, recently founded as a military station in a more barbarous district, and off the main line of trade, the probability is that only a minority of the population were so used to education that this illustration would have appealed to them; but I have often argued that it was among that minority that Christianity first spread.¹

Moreover, it is an early state of Greek manners which is here presented to us. We turn to Plato for the best illustration of Paul's meaning, and not to late writers. Similarly, in the case of the Diatheke, Paul's words in iii. 15 implied an early stage in the development of that idea.

That is all characteristic of South Galatia, where Greek government existed for nearly two centuries after 334 B.C.,²

¹ *Church in Rom. Emp.*, pp. 57, 146; *St. Paul the Trav.*, ch. vi.

² The chief Græcizing influence, however, was the Seleucid rule, lasting only about a century, and ending in 190 B.C.

and then gave place to Gallic and Pontic supremacy. Thus it was a rather early form of Greek society which maintained itself in a city like Pisidian Antioch; and that society was likely to be kept vigorous by the constant struggle which it had to maintain against Oriental influence.

No other reference to *paidagogoi* occurs in Paul's writings, except 1 *Corinthians* iv. 15. It may perhaps be fanciful, but it seems to me as I read that passage that it is distinctly more contemptuous in tone than the allusion in *Galatians* iii. 24, 25. Moreover, it implies, apparently, that the *paidagogoi* are teachers, elementary teachers, of those whom they look after. There we have the later, the Romanized conception of the *paidagogos*, which naturally ruled in a town like Corinth that was at once a Greek city and a Roman colony.

XXXIII. GALATIANS III. 26-30.

In v. 25 Paul changes almost unconsciously from the use of "we," as "we Jews," to the wider sense, in which it embraces also the Galatians (and all Gentiles who come to the Faith). Then he explains in vv. 26-30 why he ranks Galatians and Jews together. The working of the Faith which you feel in Christ Jesus makes you sons of God, for all who are baptized to Christ have clothed themselves with Christ, and put His nature and person round them in becoming His people. Christ is the sum of all who believe in Him; He takes them all into Himself; He admits no distinction of nationality, or of rank, or of sex; all are placed on an equality and made one in Him. And if you are part of Christ and partake His nature, then you are the seed of Abraham (for Christ is the true seed of Abraham, v. 16), and therefore you are heirs according to God's promise.

We note that the distinction of the "true seed," and superior right of the "true seed" to inherit, is characteristic both of Greek law in general, and in particular of the

late-Syrian law (which we take to be a survival of Seleucid law analogous to that which prevailed in South Galatia).¹

Comparing this passage with Paul's writings as a whole, we see that this obliteration of distinctions in Christ is the end, but not the beginning, of the life in Christ. Beyond all doubt Paul considered that, practically, to become a part of Christ implied membership of the Church of Christ: that was the actual fact, as the world was constituted. But the Church was not to begin by abolishing all distinctions in social life: that abolition would be the result of the gradual working of Faith in the individual, and of the gradual lessening of the distance that separated the actual state of these struggling and imperfect congregations from the perfect realization of their true nature in Christ.²

Paul rather accepted the existing state of society, with its distinctions and usages, except in so far as they were positively idolatrous. He bade the slave continue as a slave, the woman stand in the same relation to the man as was the rule of society. The realization by each individual of his or her true life in Christ was to be sought in accepting, not in rebelling against, the present facts of life in the world: their present situation was of indefinitely small consequence in comparison with the goal towards which Faith would bring them.

But the words which Paul here uses imply, necessarily and inevitably, that the Church, as it disengages itself from and rises above the existing state of society, and as it remakes the facts of the world in the course of its growth, must rise above those distinctions which have no reality in Christ. How far the Apostle was conscious, at the moment,

¹ See Mitteis, p. 326, and Bruns-Sachau, *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch*, p. 4.

² The difference in tone and spirit of the Pastoral from the rest of the Pauline Epistles is greatly due to the fact that the former are mainly concerned with the practical steps in an early congregation, while the latter rather exhibit the ideal to be striven after (though this is not fully true of either group).

of the meaning that lay in his words, is doubtful. He uttered the truth as he saw it clearly revealed to him : he was not interested in speculation as to its future effect on society : he lived in the present crisis. An observant and thoughtful citizen of Rome might perhaps have been able to see—as the modern scholar can now look back and see—how the diffusion of Roman civilization and government was tending to obliterate the distinctions of nation and race, and to unite alien peoples in a wider patriotism. The philosophic mind might perhaps see—as some philosophers then actually saw, at least dimly and faintly—that the subjection of one man as a slave to another was unnatural, and must pass away. We can now see that, though not very clearly : nominally we hold slavery as abolished ; but really slavery is far from abolished in any country.

But what is implied as to the relation of man and woman by these words of Paul's, we still cannot discern.¹ We can indeed see with certainty, in comparing nation with nation and religion with religion, that one of the most important forces in the progress of society lies in the education which the mother conveys to her children, and that where a religion (as, for example, Mohammedanism) does not tend to raise the standard of thought and feeling, knowledge and character, among its women, no amount of excellence in abstract principles and truths will make that religion a practical power for steadily elevating the race which clings to it. From the contemplation of such facts we may guess as to the future, but we can only guess.

The remarkable expression used here is one of the many little touches throughout this Epistle which place the reader in the Græco-Phrygian cities of Asia Minor. Among them the position of women was unusually free and important, and they were often entrusted with offices and duties which

¹ The change of form, "bond nor free, male and female," springs from the feeling that the two cases are not precisely analogous.

elsewhere were denied them. Hence, the allusion to the perfect equality of the sexes in the perfect form which the Church would ultimately attain, would seem far more natural to the people of these Græco-Phrygian cities than to pure Greeks or Romans.

XXXIV. THE INFANT SON AND HEIR (GAL. IV. 1-7).

So long as the son who has succeeded to an inheritance is a child, he is treated in practice like a slave subject to orders, though in theory he is the owner and master. But the property and its child-master are directed by guardians and stewards, until the child has reached the age named in the *Diatheke* of his father.

Here we observe the distinctively Greek touch that the term "heir," used by Paul, is almost convertible with "son."¹ The same term is often used in the inscriptions of Asia Minor and elsewhere in precisely the same way as here to indicate "a son after he has succeeded to the inheritance" as the representative of his father, undertaking all the duties and obligations of his father.

A state of society is contemplated as familiar to the Galatian Christians, in which the father by his Will ordinarily nominated a term when his infant heir was to come of age. This does not imply that there was no age fixed by law in cases where a Will had not been made; but it does seem to imply that in the circle of Paul's readers the maker of a Will was free to fix such age as he pleased. It is known that Seleucid law differed from Roman law in regard to the legal period of full age. Mitteis (p. 107) points out that in Tyana the legal term for coming of age was different from the Roman: he ascribes this to Greek influence, but probably it is Anatolian (and South-Galatian) custom.

Further, Paul clearly describes a state of society and law

¹ See above, § xxiii. p. 204, and § xxviii. p. 325.

in which the father by his Will appoints two distinct kinds of administrators for his child, so that the infant owner is said to grow up under the rule of guardians and stewards (*ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι*). The former is the regular term in Greek law for the guardian of an infant, appointed by the father, or by the law in default of the father's nomination. It was also the regular translation of the Latin *tutor*.

The *οἰκονόμος* or steward is less easily understood. A state of the law is implied in which the father by Will named both a guardian and an *οἰκονόμος* for his infant child. Presumably the guardian (*ἐπίτροπος*) exercised a more complete authority over the infant than the *οἰκονόμος*, who (as the name implies) merely regulates household and business matters for the infant. Now in Roman law that distinction was well known: an infant was under a *tutor* until he reached the age of 14, and thereafter under a *curator* until 25. But in Roman law the *curator* could not be appointed by the Will of the father.¹

In pure Greek law, as for example at Athens, this distinction seems to have been unknown; and Paul's words have less meaning when we think of pure Greek manners. But the law and manners of the Græco-Phrygian cities (and of the Seleucid cities generally) were not pure Greek. They were Hellenistic, having the form which Greek ideas assumed, when they went forth to conquer the East and were inevitably modified in the process.

Accordingly, everything becomes clear when we look at the Syrian law-book. The same distinction is there drawn as in Rome: a child is subject to an *Epitropos* up to 14, thereafter he is able to make a Will and dispose of his own property, but the practical management of the property remains in the hands of a *curator* till the ward reaches the

¹ An elementary fact, stated in any manual of Roman Antiquities or Law: see e.g. Ramsay's *Roman Antiquities*, p. 255; Mitteis, p. 218.

age of 25.¹ But the Syrian law differs from the Roman in permitting the father to appoint both *epitropos* and *curator* by Will. This is exactly the state of things which Paul speaks of; and the probability is that the distinction of *epitropos* and *oikonomos* dates back to the old Seleucid law, and thus persisted both in Syria and in South Galatia. In Syria, however, as time went on, Roman law affected native custom; and so the name *curator* was substituted for *oikonomos*.

Thus once more we find that we are placed amid Seleucid, and therefore South-Galatian, not among North-Galatian,² manners and law.

XXXV. THE RUDIMENTS OF THE WORLD (GAL. IV. 3 AND 9).

As in the world of business, so it was in religion: while we Jews, the heirs and sons, were children, we were like slaves, subjected to rudimentary principles and rules of a more material and formal character. But when the proper time, contemplated by the Father in his Diatheke, had arrived with Christ, then we all, Jews and Gentiles, receive in actual fact the inheritance and the position of sons (which previously was only theoretically ours, as we could not as yet fulfil the conditions necessary for accepting the inheritance).

There seems to be here the same transition as in iii. 52 f. from "we" in the sense of Jews to "we" embracing all true Christians, Gentile alike and Jew; and Paul goes on to explain his reasons and to justify the transition.

¹ The Syriac seems to borrow the Greek term in one case, the Roman in the other (to judge from the German translation in Bruns and Sachau, *Syrisch-Römisches Rechtsbuch*, p. 5).

² The Roman lawyer Gaius, I. 55, points out that the North Galatian law retained the old Gaulish (Cæsar, *B.G.*, iv. 19) and non-Greek principle (also Roman) that the father had absolute authority, even to death, over his children. Mitteis, p. 23 f., infers from this and other facts that the North-Galatian law and customs were quite distinct from those of the Hellenized or half-Hellenized races of Asia Minor.

Previously, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to false gods. But now, when you have come to know God, or rather when God has taken cognizance of you (for the change in your position is due entirely to His gracious action and initiative), how is it that you are turning back again to the weak and beggarly elementary rules, to which you wish to make yourselves slaves again completely, while you pay respect to sabbaths, and new moons, and annual celebrations, and sacred years, as if there were any virtue and any grace in such accidental recurrences in the order of the world. I am afraid that I have spent trouble and labour upon you in vain.

It is clearly implied that there was a marked analogy between the bondage of the Jews under the "rudiments of the world" and the bondage of the Gentiles under the load of ceremonial connected with their former idolatry. The Jewish rudiments are contemptuously summed up as "days and months and seasons and years"; and each of these terms was applicable in startlingly similar fashion to the pagan ceremonial practised in Asia Minor.¹ A few sentences, written in another connexion and still unpublished, may be here quoted: "A highly elaborate religious system reigned over the country. Superstitious devotion to an artificial system of rules, and implicit obedience to the directions of the priests (cf. *Gal.* iv. 3-11), were universal among the uneducated native population. The priestly hierarchy at the great religious centres, *hiera*, expounded the will of the god to his worshippers.² Thus the government was a theocracy, and the whole system, with its prophets, priests, religious law, punishments inflicted by the god for infractions of the ceremonial law, warnings and

¹ Examples of the similarity are given in a series of articles in the *Expository Times*, 1898, October, etc., on "The Greek of the Early Christian Church and the Pagan Ritual."

² *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, i. 131 ff., 147 ff., 94 ff., etc.

threats, and the set of superstitious minutiae, presented a remarkable and real resemblance in external type to the old Jewish ceremonial and religious rule. It is not until this is properly apprehended that Galatians iv. 3-11 becomes clear and natural. Paul in that passage implies that the Judaizing movement of the Christian Galatians is a recurrence to their old heathen type. After being set free from the bonds of a hard ceremonial law, they were putting themselves once more into the bonds of another ceremonial law, equally hard. In their action they were showing themselves senseless (*ἀνόητοι*, *Gal.* iii. 1), devoid of the educated mind that could perceive the real nature of things. There is an intentional emphasis in the juxtaposition of *ἀνόητοι* with *Γαλάται*, for it was the more educated party, opposed to the native superstition, that would most warmly welcome the provincial title. Hence the address 'senseless Galatians,' already anticipates the longer expostulation (iv. 3-11), 'Galatians who are sinking from the educated standard to the ignorance and superstition of the native religion.'

Obviously the enumeration, "days and months and seasons and years," is merely a contemptuous summary of the formalistic side of Jewish ritual; and there is no implication that the Galatians were actually observing at the time a sacred or Sabbatic year. The meaning is merely "are you about to enslave yourselves to the whole series of their feeble and poor ceremonies?"

XXXVI. HE SENT FORTH HIS SON (GAL. IV. 4).

When the preparatory stage had come to an end and the world was ripe for the new development, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.

It seems almost incredible to the outsider, who judges

evidence after the ordinary methods of historical students, that this verse should be regarded as proof that Paul understood and believed Jesus to be plainly and literally "the son of Joseph." Yet the opinion has been strenuously and confidently maintained that Paul was ignorant of any idea that Jesus, so far as concerned His birth, was anything else except, in the strictest sense, Joseph's son. But the words which Paul here uses plainly imply the following points in his belief and in his teaching to the Galatians:—

1. Jesus existed in the fullest sense as the Son of God before He was sent forth into the world.

2. He was sent forth with a definite duty to perform, retaining the same nature and personal character in the performance of this duty that he had previously possessed. That is proved by the common use in Luke of the verb "sent forth" (*ἐξαποστέλλω*), and its natural sense as the despatching of a suitable messenger, qualified by his personal character and nature, for the duty to which He is sent.

3. For this duty Jesus took human form and nature: the words *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός* express simply that He became a man among men.

4. To discharge this duty, it was indispensable that Jesus should be subject to the Law, in order to show in His own case how by dying to the Law a man rises superior to it: thus His death was the purchase of men, paid in order that they might be placed in a position to avail themselves of the adoption as sons, open to them by the Diatheke of the Father.

It is clear that the teaching, so briefly summed up in this verse, is to be understood as already familiar to the Galatians: Paul is merely revivifying it in their memory. And, in the discourse which Luke gives as typical of Paul's teaching in Pisidian Antioch and elsewhere (Acts xiii.

16-41), exactly the same teaching is set forth in very simple language, language so simple that its full meaning hardly impresses itself on the reader until he compares it with the Epistle. Paul there quotes "Thou art My Son"; and he says "the Word of this salvation is sent forth to us," using the same verb as in *Galatians* iv. 4. The context shows that "the Word" here is not to be taken in the mere sense of news or spoken words, *ῥήματα* (as Meyer-Wendt explain): it is used in a mystical sense, and it forms the transition from the simpler expression of the Synoptics to the language used about "the Word" in the Fourth Gospel. That Luke employs this term in his brief abstract of Paul's Galatian teaching, must be taken as a proof that Paul intentionally expressed himself in mystic language as to the relation between the Father and the Son. This was not a subject about which he spoke openly.

It has often seemed to me that this was the subject about which he "heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for man to utter" in the vision described in 2 *Corinthians* xii. 4. Though it is vain to seek to know the contents of a vision, which the seer pointedly refuses to speak about, yet the mystic language which Paul uses on this subject may justify, perhaps, a conjecture as to the vision.

The peroration of the address at Syrian Antioch insisted on the marvellous and mysterious nature of God's action in the sending forth of His Son: "I work a wonder in your days, a work which you would not believe, if one should recount it to you."

XXXVII. THE ADDRESS AT PISIDIAN ANTIOCH.¹

It is evident from the Epistle, that Paul must have insisted orally to the Galatians on the preparatory character of the Jewish Law. He must have shown them in his first preaching how the history of the Jews becomes in-

¹ This section was suggested to me by a remark of Mr. A. Souter.

telligible only as leading onward to a further development and to a fuller stage. That is the whole burden of the address reported in brief by Luke.¹ The typical words, "the fulness of time" (*τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*, *Gal. iv. 4*), are echoed in the words of that address: John was fulfilling his course (*ἐπλήρου τὸν δρόμον*); the Jews fulfilled the words of the prophets by condemning Jesus (*ἐπλήρωσαν κρίναντες*), God hath fulfilled His Promise (*ἐπαγγελίαν . . . ἐκπεπλήρωκεν*).

Further, Paul must have previously laid special stress in addressing the Galatian Churches on the fact that the Promise made to the ancestors of the Jews cannot be performed except through the coming of Christ; that Christ's coming is the fulfilment of the Promise; that Christ is the true seed of Abraham; that men cannot be placed in a position to receive the ratification of the Promise except by being identified with Christ and becoming a part of Christ; and that in this way only do they become fully the sons and heirs who actually succeed to the inheritance.

This, which is the burden of the Epistle, is also the burden of the address: "ye could not be justified by the Law," "through (the action of) Jesus every one that hath faith is justified."² That idea is urged and reiterated, time after time, in the Epistle; it is specially emphasized in the address; the word in which it is expressed, *δικαίωω*, is never used in Acts except in the address; it occurs with extraordinary frequency in the Epistle and in the kindred letter to the Romans, but is very rarely used elsewhere by Paul.

The address twice declares that Jesus came as the fulfilment of the Promise, *vv. 23 and 32 f.* It lays stress on His being of the seed of David (therefore ultimately of Abraham). It is plain what a decisive part in the con-

¹ Acts xiii. 16-41.

² διὰ τούτου, i. e. Christ. This phrase is characteristically Pauline.

version of Paul, and in the message to the Galatians presupposed in the Epistle (see § xxii.), was played by his coming to realize for himself, and his declaring to others, that Jesus was not dead. In the address the same truth is insisted on at length as fundamental in the message which God has sent.

The word "inheritance" is not used in the address with the same prominence as in the Epistle; the more explanatory and the more Petrine¹ "remission of sins" appears instead of it. "Inheritance" is used only of the Promised Land (*κατεκληρονόμησεν*).

The Epistle points out how the hanging upon a tree was necessary as a step in the working out of the duty for which Christ was sent; and the address describes how, when the Jewish leaders "had fulfilled all things that were written of Him, they took Him down from the tree." Paul never uses this expression "the tree," *ξύλον*, in this sense in any other Epistle. Peter uses it twice in *Acts* v. 30 and x. 39, as well as in his first Epistle ii. 24.

We notice, in this connection, that Peter also uses the word "fulfil" (*Acts* iii. 18) in a way remarkably similar to that which Paul emphasized to the Galatians, and that his addresses there and in v. 30 ff. are remarkably similar to Paul's Galatian address. Is not the similarity in their view the reason why Paul specially turned to Peter, and why he went to Jerusalem at first with the single intention of interviewing Peter (*ἰστορήσαι Κηφᾶν*, *Gal.* i. 18)? Finally the resemblance between their addresses at the beginning of their career finds its confirmation at the end, when Peter's Epistle is so instinct with Pauline feeling that Lightfoot believes he had read *Rom.* and *Eph.* Hence he inherited the care of Paul's churches and the services of Paul's coadjutors (1 *Pet.* i. 1; v. 12, 13).

The coincidences between the Epistle and the address at

¹ *Acts* ii. 38, v. 31, x. 43 (Petrin); Pauline *Acts* xxvi. 18; *Col.* i. 14; *Eph.* i. 7.

Pisidian Antioch are so striking as to make each the best commentary on the other. It may be said in explanation that the topics common to them are those which are fundamental in Paul's Gospel and must appear in every address. But there is no such close resemblance between the Epistle and any other of Paul's addresses reported in Acts, and the Antiochian address stands in much closer relation to this than to any other of Paul's Epistles, even the kindred letter to the Romans.

W. M. RAMSAY.

DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN ROMANS.

VIII. THE REIGN OF LAW.

IN chapter vi. St. Paul set before us, as a reply to the objection that God's purpose of mercy is a reason why men should continue in sin, a description of the new life He would have us live, in its relation to God, to the death and the resurrection life of Christ, and as contrasted with our past life of sin. While thus delineating the new life, he made the astonishing assertion, "ye are no longer under law." This passing assertion he explains in chapter vii. 1-6, by saying that his readers "have been put to death to the Law through the (crucified) body of Christ," that they have been put beyond reach of the efficacy of the Law (*κατηργήθημεν*), and have died to that in which they were held fast. A reason for this deliverance from the Law is said to be that the emotions of sins aroused by means of the Law were at work in the members of their body bringing forth fruit for death.

The above explanation lies open to serious objection. Possibly it was designed to raise the objection. If by means of the Law sinful passions were aroused, if in order that we may be united to Christ we must needs die to the

Law, may we not infer that the Law itself is evil? This plausible inference the apostle states in plain words: *Is the Law sin? Is the written letter an embodiment of opposition to God?* This suggestion St. Paul rejects as inconceivable; and goes on to expound the actual relation of sin to the Law, thus vindicating his rejection. He says, The Law is not sin, *but I had not known sin except by means of law.* The conjunction *ἀλλά* might be rendered with equal correctness *nevertheless*. It introduces a statement quite different from the suggestion rejected.

That the Law is not sin, St. Paul proves by a case in point, a case typical of all sin, viz. the sin of covetousness or illicit desire. The verb *ἐπιθυμῆσαι* is neutral; and is in Luke xxii. 16 attributed to Christ: "with desire I have desired to eat this passover." But, as here used, it is a quotation from Exodus xx. 17 (LXX.) "*Thou shalt not desire thy neighbour's wife,*" etc. The writer says that but for the tenth commandment, here quoted, the sin of covetousness would have been impossible. And it is evident that apart from prohibition there would be no sin, for nothing would be sinful. In other words, by giving man a law God created the possibility of sin.

To this argument we cannot object that there was evil desire long before the Law was given on Sinai. For, a the apostle taught in Romans ii. 14, 15, there is a still older law written in the hearts of all men, and speaking with the authority of God. He prefers however to refer here to the law written in the Sacred Books from which the Jews of his day learnt the principles of morality.

Verse 8 describes the working of the Law in St. Paul's own case. The word *ἀφορμή* denotes a starting-point for activity. It is used in the same sense in 2 Corinthians v. 12, xi. 12, Galatians v. 13, 1 Timothy v. 14. He says that by means of the tenth commandment *the abstract principle of sin obtained a starting-point for activity, and wrought out*

in him all evil desire. This assertion, he supports by a general principle: *for apart from law sin is dead*: and this principle he illustrates from his own experience. He writes: *I was alive apart from law once; but when the commandment came, sin woke up into life, and I died.* On this sad event he lingers: *and the commandment which was for life (i.e. designed to maintain life), this was found in my case to be for death.* Notice here the preposition *εἰς* used in the same sentence once for design and once for actual result. Each of these uses falls under its radical meaning, viz. to denote tendency. In verse 11 the apostle describes more fully the sad event stated in verses 8 and 9. The abstract principle of sin, here almost personified, took hold of the commandment, made it a starting-point for activity, and by means of it deceived and slew him.

We now ask, when was St. Paul alive apart from law, when and in what sense did the Law come, and in what sense did he die? Certainly he was not spiritually alive when he was persecuting the Church. He was then, as he teaches in Ephesians ii. 1, "dead through trespasses and sins." Nor was he without law: for he was earnestly seeking righteousness by means of law. Still less could it be said that at that time, so far as he was concerned, sin was dead. For he was its obedient servant. To what time then does the apostle refer? The only possible reference, and a reference quite satisfactory, is to the innocence of infancy. When Saul lay in his cradle at Tarsus, before the moral law had entered his consciousness, the sinful nature in which he was born was inoperative and in this sense *dead*; and the infant, as not yet guilty of actual sin, and therefore not yet under the anger of God, was in a very real sense *alive*. He had not yet forfeited the life which he received from his Creator. But, with opening consciousness, the authority of the moral sense made its voice heard, and along with this dawning sense of right and wrong the

child became conscious of sin within him. He committed actual sin, and thus fell under condemnation and the gloom of spiritual death. In this very real sense he died, slain by sin through the instrumentality of the moral law which took historic form and literary embodiment in the Decalogue.

This personal experience reveals the relation of the Law to sin. It was the weapon with which a foreign foe slew Paul.

We notice now that the foregoing statement of the facts of the case has vindicated the Law from the charge which in verse 7 was brought against it. That a weapon torn by an enemy from a soldier's hand has slain him, is no proof or presumption that it is bad or was made by an enemy. That which was designed to be his protection has become his destruction. This is very sad. But no one blames the weapon. So with the Law. This logical result is stated in verse 12. The same use of the word *ὥστε* is found in verse 4 and in chapter xiii. 2. The particle *μέν*, without *δέ* following, suggests that the sentence is incomplete. And its logic is incomplete: for we have as yet had no valid proof that the Law is good. The real logical result of verses 7-11 is stated in verse 13. The excellence of the Law, now vindicated from the charge brought against it in verse 7, has revealed the awful evil of sin which by means of a law designed to maintain life has wrought death: and this revelation is so wonderful and complete that St. Paul rightly infers that it was designed by God.

In verse 14 we find a conspicuous and important transition. The writer still uses the first person singular, and still narrates his own experience. His tone of sadness continues and deepens. But, instead of past tenses, as throughout verses 7-13, we have to the end of the chapter the present tense. In chapter viii. 2, but in an altogether different tone, we have again the past tense. This change

of tense without change of tone, and the change of tone in chapter viii. demand explanation.

The writer describes himself as *σαρκινός* or fleshen, a man of flesh. He further describes himself as *sold under sin*. In these last words, the perfect participle depicts the abiding state of one *sold* as a slave, thus put *under* the power of another, and that other *sin*. This recalls chapter vi. 17: "ye were slaves of sin." The proof that Paul is a slave is at once given: he does not know what he is doing; *i.e.* like a man under the control of another, he is working out purposes he does not understand. This statement, the writer further supports by saying that he does, not what he wishes, but what he detests. This detestation of his own action is an agreement with the judgment of the Law which condemns him: *I agree with the Law that it is good*. From this agreement with the Law the writer infers in verse 17 that the results of his action are wrought not by himself but by another. And, inasmuch as there is no one external to himself who controls his actions, he is compelled to infer that his master is within him. This *indwelling* lord, he calls *sin*.

The title thus given, the apostle goes on, in verses 18-20, to justify. The indwelling ruling principle cannot be *good*: *ἀγαθόν*, *i.e.* beneficent. That it is not *good*, is proved by his sad experience that he is unable to do that which is noble: *τὸ καλόν*. In other words, that which he desires and cannot do is good: and this proves that the inward power which prevents him from carrying out his desire is not good. This argument is plainly stated in verse 19, which differs from verse 15*b*, by characterizing as respectively *good* and *evil* that which the writer desires and that which he actually does. The inference from the opposition between Paul's desire and action, already stated in verse 17, is emphatically restated, after the introduction in verse 19 of the words *good* and *evil*, in verse 20.

The foregoing argument is summed up, and developed, in verses 21-23. The grammatical construction of verse 21 is very difficult. The chief difficulty is the construction of τὸν νόμον. If we were to leave out these words, we could take τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν in apposition to the second ἐμοί, thrust forward out of its place in order to emphasize the desire to do good even while evil is present. We could then render, "I find therefore, to me who desire to do the excellent, that to me the evil is present." But what are we to do with τὸν νόμον thrust in between εὐρίσκω and τῷ θέλοντι? In this chapter we have the Law of God, of which the decalogue is a partial expression. This is undoubtedly the meaning of *the Law* in verses 14 and 16. And in verse 22 which explains and supports the verse now before us, and again in verse 25, we read of *the Law of God*: it is also the ordinary meaning of these words throughout the epistles of Paul. This is the meaning at once suggested by the words before us. On the other hand we read in verse 23 of *another law* and of *the law of sin*. But these are carefully distinguished from the ordinary use of the word *law*.

It seems to me extremely difficult or impossible to give to the phrase *the law* in verse 21, used as it is without any further specification, any meaning other than its common one. Dr. Sanday and Mr. Headlam render "I find therefore this law—if it may be so called—this stern necessity laid upon me from without, that much as I wish to do what is good, the evil lies at my door." But no example is adduced of the use of the common term *the law* in any such way. An easier exposition is to retain the common use of the term, and to take the accusative τὸν νόμον as governed, not by εὐρίσκω foregoing, but by τῷ θέλοντι following, taking ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν as epexegetic, giving the purpose for which the writer desires the Law. In this case, the accusative would be put before the governing

verb for emphasis, just as for emphasis τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί is pushed forward. We might then render "I find therefore, to me who desire the Law in order to do the good, that to me the evil is present." This exposition is practically the same as those of Fritzsche and Meyer.

The above interpretation has the advantage of giving to the common term *the law* its ordinary meaning. It explains the conspicuous introduction of the word *law*, which in the other interpretation, as adding nothing to the sense of the verse, is unexplained. It is, as I understand it, introduced in order to reassert the writer's agreement with the Law even while breaking it; and is thus parallel to "I agree with the Law" in verse 16, and with "I am pleased with the Law of God" in verse 22. It thus renders real service to the argument.

Elsewhere in the New Testament the word θέλω is almost always followed by an infinitive. But an accusative follows it in verses 15, 16, 19, and 20: and this conspicuous construction in four foregoing verses prepares a way for the same construction in verse 21. The same construction is found in 2 Corinthians xi. 12: τῶν θελούντων ἀφορμήν. On the whole, the exposition given above, of one of the most difficult verses in the New Testament, seems to me open to fewest objections.

The practical significance of the statement in verse 21 is expounded in verses 22, 23. The writer says συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ: *I am pleased along with the Law*, i.e. I share its pleasure. This is a stronger restatement of verse 16, "I agree with the Law." The writer not only approves what the Law approves, but does so with pleasure. But this pleasure pertains only to one side of his nature, to *the inner man*. This suggests that to him evil is still alien and in some sense external. But verse 23 tells us, in graphic and terrible words, that even this inner man and indeed the whole man is in bondage. He sees *another law*, another

prescription of conduct speaking with an authority he cannot resist, *carrying on war against the law of his mind*, i.e. against the prescription of conduct which his intelligence approves, and taking him captive, as a conquered foe, to the law of sin, to the prescription of conduct which is characterized by sin.

Notice the emphatic repetition of the words ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου, *in the members of my body*. These words describe the locality of this hostile law. They thus recall chapter vi. 12: "Let not sin reign as king in your mortal body." The importance given in these passages to the complex human body as the locality in which sin dominates the man is a conspicuous feature of the teaching of St. Paul in contrast to modern theology. Equally conspicuous and important is his teaching, in chapter vi. 13, 19, xii. 1, and elsewhere, that our bodies are to be laid on the altar of God and are thus to become the dwelling-place of the Spirit of God.

The above description of the writer's terrible position evokes, in verse 24, a wail of anguish, which is at once relieved by a shout of joy in verse 25*a*. The result of the whole discussion is given in verse 25*b*. In the writer there is an unreconciled dualism. With his intelligence he recognises the binding authority of the *Law of God*. With his body, the organ through which thought passes into action, in virtue of its constitution as a thing of *flesh*, he acknowledges the compelling authority of a *law of sin*. From this painful inward antagonism, the next chapter will announce full deliverance.

The charge brought against the Law in verse 7 is now completely removed, by a statement of the whole case. The Law has been an instrument of spiritual death. But this was contrary to its purpose. And, even in his deepest bondage, the captive recognises, by the reluctance with which he breaks its commands, the excellence of the Law

and the total dissimilarity of the evil prescription of conduct which he finds himself compelled to obey. The case is profoundly sad : but even before the sadness is removed the excellence of the Law is completely vindicated.

We now ask, to whom and to what time does the writer refer in his conspicuous use of the first person singular throughout verses 7-25 and in his use of the present tense throughout verses 14-25? The utter contrast between the captivity and bondage and sin described in these last verses, and the liberation from sin described in chapter vi. 18, 22, and again in chapter viii. 2, forbids the suggestion that these passages refer to the same man at the same time. No one man can be dead to sin and made free from it and at the same time a captive and slave to it. Evidently the writer is either personating some one else or is reproducing an experience of the past.

In verses 7-13, where we have the first person singular and past tenses, there is no reason to doubt that the writer refers to his own past experience. Moreover, throughout chapter viii., he is undoubtedly describing an experience shared by himself and his readers. Unless we have strong reason to the contrary, we must accept the intervening verses, chapter vii. 14-25, as describing himself. And, if so, the contrast between these verses and the rest of the epistle and of all his epistles compel us to believe that the experience here described was not his experience while writing.

Other reasons support this inference. In chapter vi. 17 we read of a state of bondage to sin, followed in verses 18 and 22 by liberation from sin : and in chapter vii. 4 we read that this liberation has been brought about by death to the Law. But in verse 9 the writer took us back to a still earlier time, when he was " alive apart from law," followed in verses 9-11 by the coming of the law and his own melancholy death. Then follows, in verses 14-25, a

description of a state of bondage to sin, followed in chapter viii. 2 by liberation from sin by the spirit of life. In other words, between the sad transition from life to death in chapter vii. 9-11 and the experience described throughout chapter viii., another and a happy transition has taken place. Where in the intervening verses are we to place it?

Not at the beginning of verse 14, where for the first time we have the present tense: for one who is "sold under sin" cannot be already "made free" from it. Nor can we put the deliverance in the following verses, where we have no indication of a great and happy change till we come to the joyful shout in verse 25*a*. This is followed by the present indicative, which reproduces in verse 25*b* the dark picture given in verses 14-24. In the verses following, the deep shadow passes finally away and we have a plain statement of the great deliverance. Evidently, the transition for which we are seeking must be placed in chapter vii. 25*a* and viii. 1, after the dark picture we are now endeavouring to interpret. And, if so, this picture must delineate the writer's spiritual condition before he experienced the deliverance described in chapter v. 1-11, vi. 17-22.

Some may object, If St. Paul is here describing a past experience, why does he use the present tense? This question may be answered by attempting to rewrite this paragraph in the past tense. "I was a man of flesh, sold under sin. I did not know what I was doing. I hated my own actions. I saw another law in the members of my body carrying on war against the law of my mind. I cried, Who shall deliver me?" The life and strength of the paragraph are gone. In order that his readers may realize what Christ has done for him and for them, St. Paul delineates as present a condition which has passed away. Similarly in chapter iii. 7 he places himself among liars, and in chapter iv. 24 he looks forward to their faith reckoned for righteousness as then future.

This mode of speech, common in all languages, is a conspicuous feature of the language in which this epistle was written. So Kuehner, *Greek Grammar*, § 382. 2 : "In the narration of past events the present is frequently used, especially in principal sentences, but not unfrequently in subordinate sentences, while in the vividness of the representation the past is looked upon as present. This use of the present is also common to all languages. But in the Greek language it is specially frequent; and in the language of poetry appears not merely in narration, but also in vivid questions and otherwise, frequently in a startling manner.

The only serious objection to the above exposition is that the paragraph before us contains statements at first sight inapplicable to persons not yet justified. The writer *hates* the evil which he does, agrees with the Law that it is good, and is pleased with that which is pleasing to the Law. This last statement, however, is limited to the inmost element of his nature. There is nothing here inconsistent with the inner life of a conscientious Pharisee striving to do right yet borne down by inward forces he cannot resist. Certainly this difficulty is much less than that involved in attributing to a man set free from sin the bondage to sin here described.

It has been suggested that we have here a description of one who has only partially appropriated by faith the salvation offered by Christ. Every defective experience (and whose experience is not defective?) has elements in common with that of those without Christ. Consequently the language of this paragraph is appropriate to many who have a measure of saving faith. But in this paragraph we have no hint whatever of any salvation received by faith in Christ. It is therefore better to understand it as referring to a man not yet justified.

If the above exposition be correct, we have here the full-

est description in the Bible of the natural state of man. Even in the immoral there is an inner man which in some measure approves the good and hates the bad. But this inner man is powerless against the enemy who is master of his body, and who thus dictates his conduct. In spite of his better self, the man is carried along the path of sin. This is not contradicted, nor is its force lessened, by St. Paul's admission, in chapter ii. 26, 27, that even pagans do sometimes what the law commands. For their obedience is only occasional and imperfect ; whereas the Law requires constant and complete obedience. A man who breaks the laws of his country is not saved from punishment by occasional performance of noble actions. Although men unfor- given sometimes do that which deserves approbation, they are utterly powerless to rescue themselves from the power of sin and to obtain by good works the favour of God.

Man's relation to the Law is now sufficiently expounded and the Law sufficiently vindicated. It remains only to describe the new life with which in Christ Jesus the Spirit of life makes free the adopted children of God.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

SECOND PETER AND THE APOCALYPSE OF PETER.

THE discovery of the "Apocalypse" has introduced a new element into the 2 Peter controversy. Similarities of language suggest that either the two works proceed from the same hand, or the writer of the Epistle borrowed from the Apocalypse, or the author of the Apocalypse is indebted to the Epistle. The last supposition is alone consonant with the genuineness of 2 Peter.

The external evidence for the Apocalypse is as follows. Clemens Alexandrinus commented on it and made quotations of which four are preserved. Methodius of Olympus in Lycia (c. 300 A.D.) quotes it as a divinely inspired writing. Eusebius (iii. 3) mentions it in a list of works attributed to Peter but not received by Catholics or used by ecclesiastical writers, and subsequently places it formally among the "spurious." Macarius Magnes, at the beginning of the 5th century, has two fragments in his Apocritica, and refers to its repudiation without undertaking a defence. Sozomen in the same century mentions its public reading in certain churches in Palestine as a curiosity, and writes "the so-called Apocalypse of Peter, which was *stamped as entirely spurious by the ancients.*" It is among the disputed books in the list of Nicephorus and in the Codex Claromontanus, but ἀντιλεγόμενα had gradually become equivalent to "rejected."¹ If mentioned in the Muratorian Fragment, it is as a disputed book not accepted at Rome, and there is no express reference to the book by a Western author. In Egypt, the silence of Origen, who mentions the "Preaching" and knew the claims of the Epistle, the absence of a translation into a Coptic dialect, the omission in the time of Athanasius from even the ἀναγινωσκόμενα, seem

¹ Zahn *Hist. of New Testament*, ii. pp. 812, 813.

corroborative of the decision of Sozomen. The 8th century copyist could only find a fragment.

Zahn has given excellent reasons for regarding the work as confined to the East; critics condemned and the Church dropped it. Against 2 Peter the worst evidence is doubt, but doubt is itself evidence, and merely means that there were too many reasons in favour of the Epistle to affirm its spuriousness. None such intervened to save the Apocalypse.

In the absence of express testimony to the widespread use of the Apocalypse, Mr. Montagu Rhodes James has endeavoured to show the literary obligation to the work of such books as Hippolytus' *Concerning the Universe*, Acts of Thomas, Apocalypse of Paul, Vision of Saturus, Vision of Josaphat in the History of Barlaam and Josaphat, Second Book of the Sibylline Oracles, etc. Certainly if this Apocalypse was the *fons et origo* of so much widely spread literature, it must have been an extremely well-known book all over the Christian world at a very early date. Yet the *direct* evidence of its use is unaccountably inadequate to explain such popularity as a *vade mecum* for "Infernal geographers."

Josaphat, "arriving at a plain of vast extent," (*μεγίστην πεδιάδα*) is said to be due to *μέγιστον χάρον* of Apoc. 5, where the similarity consists in the use of an adjective whose omission would be as remarkable as its insertion. The idea of a great plain is as old as Homer (Od. iv. 563), and is familiar from Vergil's "*ær̄is in campis latis*" (vi. 887). "Sweet-smelling flowers" is referred to a corresponding mention of flowers in Apoc. 5, where the verbal correspondence is the not very hopeful use of *ἄνθος* by each writer. But infernal horticulture had already occupied the attention of Vergil; cf. "*amoena virecta*," borrowed by Prudentius and used by him of Paradise; also "*in graminis palæstris*," "*inter odoratum lauri nemus*," "*manibus*

date lilia plenis, purpureos spargam flores." Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs*, 154 f., ὄψει τε φῶς κάλλιστον ὥσπερ ἔνθαδε καὶ αὐρῶνῶνας. Also of plants and fruits the common use of φυτά is not startling. As to the breeze blowing through the trees, we are more reminded of Vergil's "virgulta sonantia silvis," and a breeze is always expected since Homer *Od.* iv. 567. As regards the city the idea was old enough. Vergil had used a city as a place of punishment. St. John had used it as the abode of the blessed, and this latter is certainly the origin of the passage in Josaphat's vision with the gold, precious stones, bright light, songs, etc., where the "righteous are to shine forth as the sun."

Since the earliest times the invisible world has had a marvellous attraction for all classes. Every literature has its Inferno. Homer, Vergil, Dante, and Milton have each supplied his country with something ἐκτὸς τούτου τοῦ κοσμοῦ. Particularly is this true of ancient literature. By the time Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Aristophanes, Plato, Vergil, and hosts of others had contributed their descriptions of the other world, there existed among the Greeks and Romans a well-defined stereotyped picture of Elysium and Tartarus. A common stock of materials was to hand whereon all artists might draw. In Elysium there would be brilliant light, flowers, foliage, fragrance and inhabitants to match; in Tartarus, darkness, fire, squalor and mud, stock crimes, stock punishments. These would appear in some shape or other in every such piece of literature, so that in process of time a writer would not be directly indebted to another for his description.

The advent of Christianity, so far from allaying, served to stimulate this curiosity about the unknown, and was the cause of the appearance of much literature on a subject which otherwise might have become exhausted. But not merely was this curiosity quickened; into the old stock were new ideas introduced and a new literature collected.

The chance observations of our Lord, the imagery of St. John's Apocalypse, the Jewish conceptions of those who first promulgated the new doctrines, had to find a place in and produce a modification of the classical stock. But the storehouse of materials, both new and old, was common property, and from the use made thereof, however similar, no literary obligation could be inferred. Thus in the vision "fruits most pleasant to the eye and desirable to touch," the "leaves of the tree," and "fruit," mark the importation of the scenery of Genesis ii. and Revelation xii. 2. The music of Elysium becomes the music of Revelation—a song "never heard by mortal ears" (cf. Rev. xiv. 3). The voice and the failure to describe are commonplaces traceable perhaps to "Eye hath not seen, etc.," or the classic requisition of a hundred tongues.

This classical stock, supplemented by New Testament and Jewish literature, prevents surprise at the appearance of flowers and perfume in several descriptions of Paradise, and at the common use of *ἄνθος* for flowers, *δίκαιοι* for just or even, *ὑπέρλαμπρός* for exceeding brightness (Aristoph. *Nub.* 571). We expect the usual conductor in these regions, and, after St. John, we expect him to be an angel. As to the various places of torment, darkness was part of the old stock, and the "outer darkness" of the New Testament would ensure its continuance. "Phlegethon rapidus flammis torrentibus" deprived of its name will survive through the "lake of fire" (Apoc. 8, Sibyl., "fiery stream"). The quagmire is a regular property in the Phædo (*πελὸς βορβορώδης*), the Frogs, *Æneid*, etc. (cf. squalor, loca senta situ, the stock *αἰχμήρος*, Hell is murky). The tormentors Tisiphone and her sister Furies are now replaced by angels (*κολάζοντες ἄγγελοι*), and the explanatory voice is retained as in "Discite justitiam moniti, etc.," itself borrowed from Pindar (Pyth. 2, 39 f.). Very often, as in the Acts of Thomas, we recognise Charon. Ixion's wheel

became a fixture, while the punishment became extended and varied, "radiisque rotarum districti pendent," reappearing in the Acts of Thomas. No Christian description of hell would fail to use any hint dropped by our Lord, as in "where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched," suggested, no doubt, by Isaiah lxvi. 24, and which was a stock Jewish description as is seen by Sir. vii. 17, ἐκδίκησις ἀσεβοῦς πῦρ καὶ σκώληξ: and Judith xxi. 17, Κύριος Παντοκράτωρ ἐκδικήσει αὐτοὺς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως δοῦναι πῦρ καὶ σκώληκας εἰς σάρκας αὐτῶν καὶ καύσσονται ἐν αἰσθήσει ἕως αἰῶνος.

As regards the crimes punished, each age has its stock faults against which satirists and moralists inveigh. There was every conceivable form of immorality; that selfish rapacity which worshipped "pecunia regina" and disregarded the widow and the orphan, exaction of high interest, infanticide, the false witness of "delatores" from which the Christians must have suffered much.¹

After abstracting from this literature similarities due to the similarity of subject and to the floating ideas about Hades which had by this time crystallized, the remainder may well be ascribed to indirect rather than direct acquaintance with any one archetype. The idea of the sin determining the nature of the punishment is more likely due directly to Clemens Alexandrinus, whose works were certainly known. But the punishment of Tantalus, according to one legend, shows a still greater antiquity for the idea. Clearer still is Wisdom xi. 15, 16, which our author seems to have read—"Wherewithal a man sinneth, by the same also shall he be punished." δι' ὧν τις ἀμαρτάνει, διὰ τούτων κολάζεται. Even τημελούχος in Acts of Paul may be due to Clement, who uses it twice in his double quotation and may have used it oftener, for he has the noun τημελούχημα.

¹ Cf. Ep. Barn. 19, 20; Did. 2, 5; Hermas, Ἐντολή, Ep. Diog. 5. Cf. addition of idolatry in 1 Peter iv. 8 with Apoc. 18.

Indeed Clement the commentator of the Apocalypse is a more probable "common source" than the Apocalypse itself, and this is more in keeping with the external express evidence.

1 Peter has 543 words, 2 Peter 399, and the Fragment 303. 1 and 2 Peter have 153 in common; 1 Peter and the Fragment have 100. Again 1 Timothy has 537 words, and Titus 399; they have 161 in common. This shows a somewhat greater relative closeness, *on the score of words*, between 1 Peter and 2 Peter than between 1 Peter and the Fragment; also it shows almost as great a resemblance between the two Petrine Epistles as between the two Pastorals.

Consider next the ἀπαξ εἰρήμενα, or words found in no New Testament author in the case of the Fragment, and in no other New Testament author in the case of the Epistles. Of 543 words in 1 Peter 63 are such, of 399 in 2 Peter there are 57, and of 303 in the Fragment there are 45. True the proportion between the two last is closer than between the two first, but this is neutralized by the still greater variability in the Pastoral Epistles, where in 1 Timothy of 537 words there are 74, ἀπ. εἰρ., in 2 Timothy of 449 there are 49, in Titus of 399 only 29, roughly 13, 10, and 7 per cent. respectively.

An examination of these hapax eiremena transports us from neutral territory. Peculiar, striking words is characteristic of both Epistles. Of such as occur in no other writers (except ecclesiastical) there are nine in 1 Peter, five in 2 Peter, one in this Apocalypse—ἀναπαφλάζω perhaps common in the vernacular as the simple verb is in Aristoph. *Frogs*, 423. Including the fragments one more is gained, τημελοῦχος. The character of these non-New Testament words attracts more attention. 27 in 1 Peter are not found in a classical author, 24 in 2 Peter, 2 in the Fragment. In 1 Peter 33 are in the LXX., in 2 Peter 24,

in the Fragment 25, but as these last are also classical words it cannot be shown that the LXX. version had any influence on the language of the Apocalypse. Of all non-New Testament words in *every known portion* of the Apocalypse there are but three (*τημελοῦχος*, *ἀναπαφλάζω*, v. *supra*, *ναρδόσταχυν* found in Galen) which are not to be found in every age and class of Greek literature, while of those in 2 Peter, 24 are not found in the classical period and many of those called classical are very rare. From the bold rough language of the Apostle we pass in this Apocalypse to the vernacular of the city, of which *τηγανίζω* of Posidippus of the New Comedy and *τόκοι τόκων* of the money lenders are types.

Such is the difference of atmosphere, spiritual and verbal, such the inferiority of tone and character, such the lack of usefulness and "necessary doctrine," such the compliance with the spirit of the age, with its love for infernos of the crudest type and its morbid curiosity to pry into what the Apostle was content to describe as a "new heaven and a new earth," that no more than in the ancient Church is surprise to be caused by the discovery of certain phrases resembling others in 2 Peter. On the contrary, they may be regarded as mere decoys for those with whom the author intended his work to pass as St. Peter's.

Mr. M. R. James has made a collection of these resemblances. A microscopic study of any piece of literature will cause us to fancy resemblances where they do not always exist. We shall consider them in order.

Πολλοὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔσονται ψευδοπροφῆται—no doubt from Mark xiii. 22, where they are used by the same speaker and preface an apocalypse, and, together with "behold, I have told you all things beforehand," would justify ascribing the discourse following to Christ. At the same time they recalled 2 Peter ii. 1, and did double duty. *Ψευδιδάσκαλος*, peculiar to 2 Peter, is not used.

Καὶ δόγματα τῆς ἀπωλείας διδάξουσιν. The last words, derived from St. Mark, recalled 2 Peter ii. 1, and with it also *οἵτινες παρεισάξουσιν αἵρεσεις ἀπωλείας*, which fell in exactly with the requirements of the passage. If intentionally copied, both would lend verisimilitude to the claim of genuineness.

Δοκιμάζοντας τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς—a fortuitous connection with *ψυχὴν δικαίαν ἐβάσανιζεν*, where the idea is that of vexing, annoying, while here it is of trying, testing, proving, recalling (1 Pet. i. 7) *λυπηθέντες ἐν π. π. ἵνα τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμ. τ. πίστεως . . . διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου κ.τ.λ.* The trial in 1 Peter is also with a view to the revelation of Jesus Christ, as also in 2 Thessalonians i. 7-9, which two passages may have suggested the proving of the souls and the concomitant punishment of the wicked (2 Thess. i. 8), whence *ὁ θεὸς κρινεῖ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῆς ἀνομίας* may have no designed connection with *οἷς τὸ κρίμα ἔκπαλαι οὐκ ἄργει*, in which bold expression there is nothing to suggest identity of authorship with the first.

Τὸ ὄρος—this is compared with 2 Peter i. 18, *σύν αὐτῷ ὄντες ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ ὄρει*; but Christ's being on a mountain was a common event. Perhaps, however, the key to the matter lies here. Mr. James ascribes the Apocalyptic discourse to the post-resurrection period. Was not the scene described in sec. 3 suggested by the Transfiguration with its apparition of two men? It was on a mountain when, as here, Jesus had gone to pray (Luke ix. 28). The author of the Apocalypse, seeing the reference to the Transfiguration in 2 Peter, and seeing it used evidentially, pieced his Revelation into that time on the Mount when events might have occurred of which St. Peter would be the most fitting narrator. "Twelve" disciples is equally inaccurate after the Resurrection; twelve had become in the second century a stereotyped number for the original band, whence the same error in the "Gospel." Indeed, "twelve" is more

likely when the number existed, though only three were present. Mr. James' reasons are: (1) the Apostle's request implies they had received a commission to preach, and (2) "Let us go to the mountain to pray" coming after the discourse implies a date other than that of St. Matthew xxiv. But the disciples had received a commission before the Transfiguration, and the author is probably "reading in" the Peter as subsequently known. It was natural to make the Transfiguration an answer to Peter's request and take advantage of the authentic narrative. So it was not Matthew xxiv., nor an invented occasion, but St. Luke ix. Sec. 1 shows such a patchwork of Scripture, and the whole such a scrap-album of popular infernos, that the writer may be acquitted of originality even in the time of the supposed event. It is an apocryphal insertion, like the Song of the Three Children suggested by a passage in the Petrine work.

Τῶν ἐξελθόντων ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου is compared with *μετὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἔξοδον*, and may be explained by the previous reference to the Transfiguration immediately following in 2 Peter. But if we can build nothing on Irenæus' use of *ἔξοδος* when actually referring to the same event—Peter's death—there is less reason for detecting a reference to *ἔξοδος* in *ἐξέρχομαι*. Had it never occurred in 2 Peter, *ἐξέρχομαι* would still have been used, and might as well be traced to St. Paul's *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελθεῖν*.

Ποταποὶ εἰσι τὴν μορφὴν is compared with *ποταποὺς δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ὑμᾶς*, but, as in the cases of *ψευδοπροφήται*, *ἀπωλεία* and *ὄρος*, it is a mere verbal resemblance which might as well be used to establish a connection with St. Mark xiii. 1, where *ποταπός* is twice used, as in the Apocalypse, of an external condition, and not, as in 2 Peter, of an internal moral state.

Τόπον αὐχμηρόν is set beside 2 Peter i. 19, *ἐν αὐχμηρῷ τόπῳ*. Perhaps this is from the Epistle as exactly suiting the case, or perhaps it was as necessary a term as "squali-

dus" in describing the place of torment. The single use of *αὐχμηρός* in the New Testament is no more index to its rarity than is the case with *νή*, *μήτιγε*, *μηδέποτε*, *τοιόσδε*, *ὅς*, each only found in one epistle. *Αὐχμηρός* is found in Sophocles, Euripides, Plato, Xenophon, etc., with whose vocabulary the writer of this Apocalypse seems better acquainted than does the writer of 2 Peter.

Οἱ βλασφημοῦντες τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης is most probably taken from *δι' οὗς ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας βλασφημηθήσεται* (2 Pet. ii. 2), because it was necessary in the enumeration of classes of persons undergoing punishment for those to appear to whose condemnation 2 Peter ii. is devoted. Without this the work might not have passed as Petrine.

Κολαζόμενοι is used by both writers, but is scarcely a "coincidence," for the word is inevitable in such a work, especially coming after *ἦν τόπος κολάσεως*.

Βόρβρος and *ἐκυλίωντο*, occurring at some distance from each other (secs. 8 and 13), appear to Mr. James connected with *εἰς κυλισμὸν βορβόρου* (2 Pet. ii. 22). Of course the quotation in 2 Peter was equally open to every one; but the detached position of the words, and their perfectly literal application do not seem to point to the writer having had the proverb in his mind. *Βόρβρος*, like *αὐχμηρός* was a necessity in an Inferno. Rolling in filthy rags was a sign of utter abandonment, since Priam; *κυλίω* occurs in Mark ix. 20, the Transfiguration chapter. The proverb is used by Epictetus (Dissert. iv. 11, 29).

With the exception of adultery the references to impurity in 2 Peter are very vague and general, whereas the Apocalypse goes into very unsavoury details with no resemblance to St. Peter in tone or language beyond *μοιχεία* and *μιάσμα*, which latter word, though occurring in no other New Testament book, was very common and inevitable in an Inferno. There must be a resemblance in all references to the crimes of the age.

Ἀμελήσαντες τῆς ἐντολῆς τοῦ θεοῦ. This class of offenders, like *οἱ βλασφημοῦντες*, may have been inserted because mentioned in 2 Peter, and *ὁδὸς τῆς δικαιοσύνης* may have suggested them (*vide* 2 Pet. ii. 21). Yet *ἐντολή* or *ἐντολὴ Θεοῦ* was the regular word for God's commands or the moral precepts enjoined by Christianity, and is frequent in the Johannine writings (cf. 1 Cor. vii. 19; 1 Tim. vi. 14; Polycarp, Phil. 5, etc.). It has as much connection with Mark vii. 8, *ἀφέντες τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, where alone the combination occurs in the New Testament (cf. *ἀφέντες τὴν ὁδόν*, Apoc. 20).

In fragment 2 there is an undoubted reference to Isaiah xxxiv. 4, either directly or through 2 Peter, and belongs to the cases of employment of the Epistle mentioned above.

The connection between Clement of Alexandria's remark on the nature of the punishments, *ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν γεννᾶσθαι τὰς κολάσεις*) *φησιν* and the apparently proverbial *ὅ γάρ τις ἥττηται, τούτῳ δεδούλωται* is scarcely established. Clement says the Apocalypse represents the nature of the punishment as determined by the nature of the sin. 2 Peter ii. 19 says that a man is in real moral bondage to the sin which he fosters, the idea of punishment not being present to the writer's mind, however much it may be inherent, since bondage to a sin is a punishment, but not the external punishment meant in the Apocalypse.

The result of this investigation appears to be that while certain resemblances exist, they are less than have been represented. Between the two works there is a radical difference in style, tone, language and morale, showing a completely different source; while upon the spurious work have been stitched pieces of another garment easily betraying their adventitious source. The difference in testimony, internal as to character and external as to history, forces upon us the conviction that the author of the Apocalypse sought Petrine authority for his production by a

parade of "coincidences" with the second Epistle, testifying thereby to the earlier existence and at least partial acceptance of the latter.

As St. Peter's reference to the Transfiguration as an evidence supplied the idea and perhaps the time for the revelation, so did the mention of the spirits in prison and the destruction of the world by fire, showing St. Peter to be in possession of peculiar information, lend further reason for attributing the Apocalypse to that Apostle. Also we see a realization of the promised punishments in 2 Peter ii. 1, 9, 10, 12.

A forger composing the Epistle after the Apocalypse would not have omitted all reference to such a revelation vouchsafed to him alone. It may be said that neither does St. John, but St. John's Revelation was genuine, and was separated by a long interval from the Gospel. A forger must show some connection on the surface. Besides, St. John's vision occurred in a period lying outside that covered by the Gospel. St. Paul mentions his vision to inspire confidence; it is unlikely the writer of 2 Peter would have omitted *his* when to inspire confidence he mentions the Transfiguration. 2 Peter claims identity of authorship with 1 Peter; it is strange that it should be so ignorant of a far more wonderful production claiming to come from the same pen. The explanation is, that the author of the Epistle wrote when this Apocalypse was not yet in existence; he had written no such work nor had had any such vision.

Thus the early date of the Apocalypse provides an earlier date for Second Peter.

A. ERNEST SIMMS.

“TASTE OF DEATH.”

IN a paper under this head contained in the EXPOSITOR number of November, 1897, Canon Bindley appears to take an erroneous view of the meaning of our Lord's words in the passage cited by the three Synoptists. It is not merely that he fails to notice that in St. Matthew our Lord's prediction that some of those present would not taste of death till they saw the kingdom of God is preceded by the words μέλλε ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεσθαι, which give an idea of imminent accomplishment in a way that a mere future tense would not do, and can therefore scarcely be applied to an event so distant as the day of final judgment, but that he ignores the distinction between γεύεσθαι followed by the accusative, which means to partake freely, and followed by the genitive, which means to partake sparingly. Thus the ἀρχιτρίκλινος did not merely taste the wine out of curiosity, but took a full draught of it, as he did in the case of that which he had been previously drinking, and therefore the water made wine which he tasted is spoken of in the accusative. Again, in Hebrews vi. it is no mere superficial knowledge of the word of God and the powers of the world to come that is spoken of, in which case the persons referred to would have been guilty only of sin against the Son of man as distinct from sin against the Holy Ghost, but thorough experimental acquaintance therewith, and so the accusative is used. On the other hand, the forty men who lay in wait for St. Paul had bound themselves not merely to abstain from a full meal, μηδὲν γεύσασθαι, but not to taste a morsel, μηδένος γεύσασθαι, or, as verse 12 puts it, μήτε φαγεῖν μήτε πιεῖν, till they had killed him. How frequent such vows were among the Jews may be seen by reference to Lightfoot's notes on the passage in his *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ*. So when our Lord is spoken of in Hebrews ii. 9 as tasting death for every man, the death spoken of is plainly not spiritual death (for this He never underwent), but only physical death, from which He never promised His followers immunity, though the Jews falsely represented Him as doing so. Had the death spoken of in Hebrews ii. 9 been spiritual death, we should not have had γεύσασθαι θανάτου but γεύσασθαι θάνατον, or a repetition of our Lord's words in St. John viii., θεωρήσῃ θάνατον. On the full meaning of our Lord's words as found in the three Synoptists I would refer to an able paper by Dr. Matheson in the third volume of the *Monthly Interpreter*, entitled, “The Order of Christ's Revelation.”

J. W. BLACK.

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